seven-factor test in Pennsylvania

2021See Pro Se PCRA Petition, 10/2/18, at 2-3 (unnumbered); see also Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1223 (holding that the registration requirements of Subchapter H of SORNA I, as applied retroactively, were punitive under the seven-factor test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), and, thus, SORNA I was unconstitutional under the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions).

2021Appellant then filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, seeking to preclude application of the prior version of SORNA (“SORNA I”) on the grounds that it was invalidated by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1223 (Pa. 2017) (holding that the registration requirements of Subchapter H of SORNA I, as applied retroactively, were punitive under the seven-factor test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), and thus, SORNA I was unconstitutional under the ex post facto clau

2024See also id. at 397-98, 232 A.3d at 591 (recognizing that similar to factor 1, the trial court’s analysis of factor 2 did not specifically draw upon the scientific evidence presented by appellee; nevertheless, “we conclude that consideration of the scientific evidence presented on remand may alter the trial court’s weighing of this factor”); id. at 399, 232 A.3d at 592 (regarding factor 4, concluding “that the court’s analysis of this factor also favors remanding for further consideration in light of any additional scientific evidence”); id. at 401, 232 A.3d at 593 ____________________________

2024Specifically, the seven- factor test is as follows: whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment— retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inq

2021Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition on Appellant’s behalf, raising the following issue: a. [Appellant’s] designation as [an SVP] was ruled unconstitutional and illegal in Commonwealth v. … Butler, [ 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“Butler I”)] [(]citing Alleyne v. ____________________________________________ 1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.51-9799.75. -2- J-S56015-20 [U.S., 570 U.S. 99 (2013)].[2] Since the SVP designation has been rule[d] illegal and unconstitutional[,] this Court should vacate its finding of SVP (Tier Three Megan’s [L]aw [r]equirements) in the case of [Appellant].

2021Applying Muniz, in conjunction with Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 , 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), this Court deemed unconstitutional the SVP assessment provision of SORNA I, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24, because “it increases the criminal penalty to which a defendant is exposed without the chosen fact-finder making the necessary factual findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212, 1218 (Pa. Super. 2017), [order reversed, 226 A.3d 971 (Pa. 2020)].

2021Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition on Appellant’s behalf, raising the following issue: a. [Appellant’s] designation as [an SVP] was ruled unconstitutional and illegal in Commonwealth v. … Butler, [ 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“Butler I”)] [(]citing Alleyne v. ____________________________________________ 1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.51-9799.75. -2- J-S56015-20 [U.S., 570 U.S. 99 (2013)].[2] Since the SVP designation has been rule[d] illegal and unconstitutional[,] this Court should vacate its finding of SVP (Tier Three Megan’s [L]aw [r]equirements) in the case of [Appellant].

2021Applying Muniz, in conjunction with Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 , 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), this Court deemed unconstitutional the SVP assessment provision of SORNA I, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24, because “it increases the criminal penalty to which a defendant is exposed without the chosen fact-finder making the necessary factual findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212, 1218 (Pa. Super. 2017), [order reversed, 226 A.3d 971 (Pa. 2020)].

2023Id. at *4 (citing Kiriakos v. Phillips, 139 A.3d 1006, 1033-34 (Md. 2016)).

2021See Commonwealth v. Webster, 1003 EDA ____________________________________________ 2 In response to Muniz and Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding that the statutory mechanism for designating a defendant a sexually violent predator under SORNA I violated the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Alleyne v. U.S., 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)), the Pennsylvania General Assembly amended SORNA I by enacting Act 10 on February 21, 2018, and Act 29 on June 12, 2018, which are collectively known as SORNA II.

2014Commonwealth v. Lee, 935 A.2d 865, 873-74 (Pa. 2007) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)). -4- J-A15033-14 In Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. 2014), this Court addressed a similar challenge to the constitutionality of Megan’s Law IV.