seven-factor test in California

2014As such, the Proposition 83 amendments at issue here cannot be regarded to have changed the essentially nonpunitive purpose of the Act.” (McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1194 .) After considering “the seven-factor test articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 372 U.S. 144 , 168-169” (McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1195 ), the Supreme Court held that “the Proposition 83 amendments do not make the Act punitive and accordingly do not violate the ex post facto clause.” (Ibid.) Again, we are bound by McKee I.

2014As such, the Proposition 83 amendments at issue here cannot be regarded to have changed the essentially nonpunitive purpose of the Act.” (McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1194 .) After considering “the seven-factor test articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 372 U.S. 144 , 168-169” (McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1195 ), the Supreme Court held that “the Proposition 83 amendments do not make the Act punitive and accordingly do not violate the ex post facto clause.” (Ibid.) Again, we are bound by McKee I.

2014(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455 .) The Supreme Court’s determination that the SVPA is not punitive is also dispositive of Rose’s double jeopardy claim.

2013(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455 .) Its determination is also dispositive of appellant Rotroff's double jeopardy claim.

2021Defense counsel urged the trial court to instead apply a seven-factor test used by federal courts in cases such as Benjamin v. B & H Educ., Inc. (9th Cir. 2017) 877 F.3d 1139 (Benjamin).

2020(Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 372 U.S. 144 , 168–169; Bishop of Oakland, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1162–1163.) Its contention that six of the seven factors “weigh in favor of a finding of unconstitutionality,” is directed at the treble damages provision.

2015(Jorge, at pp. 872-873.) In Jorge, the California Supreme Court applied a seven-factor test in deciding whether the Legislature had intended for the offense to be a “public welfare offense.” It considered: “(1) the legislative history and context; (2) any general provision on mens rea or strict liability crimes; (3) the severity of the punishment provided for the crime (‘Other things being equal, the greater the possible punishment, the more likely some fault is required’); (4) the seriousness of harm to the public that may be expected to follow from the forbidden conduct; (5) the defendant’s

2001Moreover, the machine gun cases rely on the fact that the statute required knowing transportation, but not knowing possession. ( People v. Corkrean, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 35, 39 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 375 ; People v. Daniels, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d 340, 344 , 257 P.2d 1038 .) While the Dangerous Weapons Control Law uses "knowingly" in some provisions (e.g., Pen.Code, §§ 12034, 12320, 12321, 12420), but not in others, such as section 12020, the Supreme Court found this no impediment to finding a mens rea requirement for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger in People v. Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th 322,

2001Moreover, the machine gun cases rely on the fact that the statute required knowing transportation, but not knowing possession. ( People v. Corkrean, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 35, 39 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 375 ; People v. Daniels, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d 340, 344 , 257 P.2d 1038 .) While the Dangerous Weapons Control Law uses "knowingly" in some provisions (e.g., Pen.Code, §§ 12034, 12320, 12321, 12420), but not in others, such as section 12020, the Supreme Court found this no impediment to finding a mens rea requirement for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger in People v. Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th 322,

2001Moreover, the machine gun cases rely on the fact that the statute required knowing transportation, but not knowing possession. ( People v. Corkrean, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 35, 39 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 375 ; People v. Daniels, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d 340, 344 , 257 P.2d 1038 .) While the Dangerous Weapons Control Law uses "knowingly" in some provisions (e.g., Pen.Code, §§ 12034, 12320, 12321, 12420), but not in others, such as section 12020, the Supreme Court found this no impediment to finding a mens rea requirement for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger in People v. Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th 322,

2001Moreover, the machine gun cases rely on the fact that the statute required knowing transportation, but not knowing possession. ( People v. Corkrean, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 35, 39 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 375 ; People v. Daniels, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d 340, 344 , 257 P.2d 1038 .) While the Dangerous Weapons Control Law uses "knowingly" in some provisions (e.g., Pen.Code, §§ 12034, 12320, 12321, 12420), but not in others, such as section 12020, the Supreme Court found this no impediment to finding a mens rea requirement for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger in People v. Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th 322,

2001They did not analyze the question in the context that "`[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Simon., supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 519 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 , 886 P.2d 1271 .) Nor did they apply the seven-factor analysis set forth in Jorge M. in concluding section 12020(a)(1) was a strict liability offense.

2001They did not analyze the question in the context that "`[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Simon., supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 519 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278 , 886 P.2d 1271 .) Nor did they apply the seven-factor analysis set forth in Jorge M. in concluding section 12020(a)(1) was a strict liability offense.

2001Moreover, the machine gun cases rely on the fact that the statute required knowing transportation, but not knowing possession. ( People v. Corkrean, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 35, 39 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 375 ; People v. Daniels, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d 340, 344 , 257 P.2d 1038 .) While the Dangerous Weapons Control Law uses "knowingly" in some provisions (e.g., Pen.Code, §§ 12034, 12320, 12321, 12420), but not in others, such as section 12020, the Supreme Court found this no impediment to finding a mens rea requirement for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger in People v. Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th 322,

2001Moreover, the machine gun cases rely on the fact that the statute required knowing transportation, but not knowing possession. ( People v. Corkrean, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 35, 39 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 375 ; People v. Daniels, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d 340, 344 , 257 P.2d 1038 .) While the Dangerous Weapons Control Law uses "knowingly" in some provisions (e.g., Pen.Code, §§ 12034, 12320, 12321, 12420), but not in others, such as section 12020, the Supreme Court found this no impediment to finding a mens rea requirement for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger in People v. Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th 322,