seven-factor test in Indiana

2008Both parties base their arguments upon the seven-factor test used by the Indiana Supreme Court in GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 403-03 (Ind.2001) for purposes of determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship.

2003Our supreme court developed a seven-factor test in determining whether a person is the employee of two employers in GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ind.2001).

2015We must therefore consider whether the effects of the Act, as applied to Ammons, “are so punitive in nature as to constitute a criminal penalty.” See Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 317 (Ind.2013) (citing Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 ). [14] In evaluating a statute’s effects, our supreme court has adopted a seven-factor test — the Mendozcir-Martinez test— for determining whether a law is an unconstitutional ex post facto law: “(1) whether the sanction involyes an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play on

2015We must therefore consider whether the effects of the Act, as applied to Ammons, “are so punitive in nature as to constitute a criminal penalty.” See Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 317 (Ind.2013) (citing Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 ). [14] In evaluating a statute’s effects, our supreme court has adopted a seven-factor test — the Mendozcir-Martinez test— for determining whether a law is an unconstitutional ex post facto law: “(1) whether the sanction involyes an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play on

2014Id. (citing Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 379 (Ind.2009)).

2014Id. (citing Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 379 (Ind.2009)).

2012No one factor is determinative. “[0]ur task is not simply to count the factors on each side, but to weigh them.” Id. (quoting State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171 , 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (1992)).

2012No one factor is determinative. “[0]ur task is not simply to count the factors on each side, but to weigh them.” Id. (quoting State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171 , 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (1992)).

2026See also Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169 (declaring that, absent legislative intent to impose a criminal sanction, the seven-factor test “must be considered in relation to the statute on its face”) (emphasis added).

2015We must therefore consider whether the effects of the Act, as applied to Ammons, “are so punitive in nature as to constitute a criminal penalty.” See Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 317 (Ind.2013) (citing Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 ). [14] In evaluating a statute’s effects, our supreme court has adopted a seven-factor test — the Mendozcir-Martinez test— for determining whether a law is an unconstitutional ex post facto law: “(1) whether the sanction involyes an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play on

2015We must therefore consider whether the effects of the Act, as applied to Ammons, “are so punitive in nature as to constitute a criminal penalty.” See Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 317 (Ind. 2013) (citing Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 ). [14] In evaluating a statute’s effects, our supreme court has adopted a seven-factor test—the Mendoza-Martinez test—for determining whether a law is an unconstitutional ex post facto law: “(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only o

2015We must therefore consider whether the effects of the Act, as applied to Ammons, “are so punitive in nature as to constitute a criminal penalty.” See Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 317 (Ind.2013) (citing Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 ). [14] In evaluating a statute’s effects, our supreme court has adopted a seven-factor test — the Mendozcir-Martinez test— for determining whether a law is an unconstitutional ex post facto law: “(1) whether the sanction involyes an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play on

2005GKN, 744 N.E.2d at 402 .

2001GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 NE.2d 397, 402 (Ind.2001)(citing Hale v. Kemp, 579 N.E.2d at 67 ); see also Degussa Corp. v. Mullens, 744 N.E.2d 407 (Ind.2001).

2026Although our analysis under the intent-effects test is “independent from that of the federal standard,” Gonzalez, 980 N.E.2d at 316 n.3, the analytical framework itself is the “same,” Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. 2010).

2019See Jennings , 832 N.E.2d at 1050-51 (applying the Hale factors).

2009We instead will use a ten-factor test to assess McCants's employment status pursuant to our supreme court's direction in Moberly. 2 See Snell, 881 N.E.2d at 1091 (declining to use the seven-factor test even though the parties based their arguments on it).

2009See Patton v. State, 810 N.E.2d 690, 696 (Ind.2004) (Where defendant did not "sufficiently understand the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty" we reversed the denial of post-conviction relief and remanded "with instructions to grant [defendant] a new trial on the attempted murder charge."). [1] Under the seven-factor test the Court adopts today in Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind.2009), I think it is beyond question that the lesser new obligations imposed by the 2006 amendments are not themselves punishment.

1995See also Detrick, 598 N.E.2d at 1077 .