30 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Holloway v. Fifth Court of Appealsgreen2 sentences2013In Holloway, the supreme court held the court of appeals abused its discretion by granting relief by extraordinary writ to remedy a perceived error of the trial court when an appeal directly attacking the trial court's judgment also was pending. 767 S.W.2d at 684 . 2013In Holloway, the supreme court held the court of appeals abused its discretion by granting relief by extraordinary writ to remedy a perceived error of the trial court when an appeal directly attacking the trial court‟s judgment also was pending. 767 S.W.2d at 684 . | 2 | 4 |
Duvall v. Texas Department of Human Servicesgreen2 sentences2013In other words, the plaintiff must establish “he honestly believed he was reporting the perceived violation to an authority within an entity which could regulate under or enforce the law in issue or investigate or prosecute a criminal offense and, moreover, that this belief was objectively reasonable.” Duvall v. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs., 82 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex.App.--Austin, 2002, no pet.). 2013In other words, the plaintiff must establish "he honestly believed he was reporting the perceived violation to an authority within an entity which could regulate under or enforce the law in issue or investigate or prosecute a criminal offense and, moreover, that this belief was objectively reasonable." Duvall v. Tex. Dep't of Human Servs., 82 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex.App.--Austin, 2002, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Mosley v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Mosley , 983 S.W.2d at 259 . 2009See Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259 . | 2 | 2 |
Wilson v. Stategreen2 sentences2019“Thus, [error in admitting a testimonial statement] does not require reversal unless there is a reasonable possibility that, within the context of the entire trial, the perceived error ‘moved the jury from a state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion on a particular 15 issue.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. State, 296 S.W.3d 140, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d)). 2018Thus, Crawford error does not require reversal unless there is a reasonable possibility that, within the context of the entire trial, the perceived error "moved the jury from a state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion on a particular issue." Id. | 1 | 3 |
Garcia v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. 2012Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 102 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Kelly v. Cunninghamgreen1 sentence1995Kelly v. Cunningham, 848 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Kindergreen1 sentence1994See Jones v. Kinder , 807 S.W.2d 868, 871-72 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1991, no writ) ("Once the trial judge has disqualified a witness and precluded the witness from testifying due to a perceived violation of a procedural rule, as opposed to excluding testimony due to its substance, we find error is preserved without the need to reoffer the bill of exception testimony and without the need to obtain a subsequent ruling."). | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Campbellgreen1 sentence1989See id. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Weng Enterprises, Inc. v. Embassy World Travel, Inc.green1 sentence1994But see Weng Enters. v. Embassy World Travel , 837 S.W.2d 217, 221 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (stating that without a bill of exception the court had no basis for reviewing a contention that the trial court committed reversible error, and holding that the appellant had therefore failed to preserve error). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Scott v. State
green
2 sentences2016Thus, evidence admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause requires .reversal if there is a reasonable possibility that, within the context of the entire trial, the perceived error “moved the jury from a state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion on a particular, issue.” Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582 ; Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690 . 2016Thus, evidence admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause requires reversal if there is a reasonable possibility that, within the context of the entire trial, the perceived error "moved the jury from a state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion on a particular issue." Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582 ; Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690 . | 8 | 2012–2016 |
Langham v. State
green
2 sentences2016Thus, evidence admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause requires .reversal if there is a reasonable possibility that, within the context of the entire trial, the perceived error “moved the jury from a state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion on a particular, issue.” Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582 ; Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690 . 2016Thus, evidence admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause requires reversal if there is a reasonable possibility that, within the context of the entire trial, the perceived error "moved the jury from a state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion on a particular issue." Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582 ; Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690 . | 4 | 2015–2016 |
State v. Crook
green
2 sentences2022Id. 2022Id. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Brewer v. State
green
1 sentence2021Mother asserts, without any support, that reviewing the opposing side’s witness list is “a fundamental element of basic trial preparation,” that “[n]o attorney in their right mind would deliberately fail to review the opposing side’s witness list,”7 and that counsel’s conduct was “so outrageous that no reasonable attorney would have engaged in such conduct.” While being aware of the identity of witnesses the other side intends to call at trial is important to trial preparation, Mother makes no showing that her counsel’s alleged failure to review the list was conduct “so grossly deficient as to | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re MS
green
1 sentence2021Mother asserts, without any support, that reviewing the opposing side’s witness list is “a fundamental element of basic trial preparation,” that “[n]o attorney in their right mind would deliberately fail to review the opposing side’s witness list,”7 and that counsel’s conduct was “so outrageous that no reasonable attorney would have engaged in such conduct.” While being aware of the identity of witnesses the other side intends to call at trial is important to trial preparation, Mother makes no showing that her counsel’s alleged failure to review the list was conduct “so grossly deficient as to | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Proenza, Abraham Jacob
green
1 sentence2020Indeed, the Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that Rule 103(e) is simply a rule of evidence and that “[i]t is therefore inaccurate to cast Rule 103(e) as an exception to the rules of procedural default in situations where . . . the perceived error did nor arise from the trial judge ‘ruling to admit or exclude evidence.’” In the Matter of B.A.L., a Juvenile Page 5 Id. (quoting TEX. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Pena v. State
green
1 sentence2019“Thus, [error in admitting a testimonial statement] does not require reversal unless there is a reasonable possibility that, within the context of the entire trial, the perceived error ‘moved the jury from a state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion on a particular 15 issue.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. State, 296 S.W.3d 140, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d)). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Haley v. Lewis
green
1 sentence2015Haley, 604 S.W.2d at 196 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Trent Mason v. State
green
1 sentence2014Thus, Confrontation Clause error does not require reversal unless there is a reasonable possibility that, within the context of the entire trial, the perceived error “moved the jury from a state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion on a particular issue.” Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690 ; Mason, 416 S.W.3d at 731 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Santiago v. State
green
2 sentences1989Allaben v. State, supra; Santiago v. State, [ 444 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.Cr.App.(1969) ]. 1989Allaben v. State, supra; Santiago v. State, [ 444 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Cr.App. (1969)]. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Swain v. Board of Adjustment of City of Univ. Park
green
2 sentences1986Although I need not address Murmur's remaining points of error, I am compelled to touch upon an error I note in the trial court's treatment of "substantial evidence." In Swain, 433 S.W.2d at 730 , this court perceived the standard of review applicable to orders of a board of adjustment as follows: Briefly, these governing legal principles may be summarized: (1) The only question which may be properly raised in a review of the decision of the Board of Adjustment by writ of certiorari is that of the legality of the board's order; (2) a legal presumption exists in favor of the board's order and t 1986Although I need not address Murmur’s remaining points of error, I am compelled to touch upon an error I note in the trial court’s treatment of “substantial evidence.” In Swain, 433 S.W.2d at 730 , this court perceived the standard of review applicable to orders of a board of adjustment as follows: Briefly, these governing legal principles may be summarized: (1) The only question which may be properly raised in a review of the decision of the Board of Adjustment by writ of certiorari is that of the legality of the board’s order; (2) a legal presumption exists in favor of the board’s order and t | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.