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15 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State ex rel. Nicholls v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2001Comm. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 454 , 692 N.E.2d 188 , the commission’s explanation that the order “was issued in error” was not sufficient to justify continuing jurisdiction absent identification of the perceived error. 2001Comm. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 454 , 692 N.E.2d 188 , the commission’s explanation that the order “was issued in error” was not sufficient to justify continuing jurisdiction absent identification of the perceived error. | 1 | 5 |
State v. Barnesgreen2 sentences2023Since Farr failed to object in the trial court as to the perceived error, he has forfeited all but plain error on appeal. {¶19} For plain error to apply, the trial court must have deviated from a legal rule, the error must be plain, i.e., an obvious defect in the proceeding, and the error must have affected the defendant’s “substantial rights.” State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002). “[T]o demonstrate that the trial court’s error affected a substantial right, the defendant must establish that there is a reasonable probability -9- Case No. 1-23-10 that, but for the trial court’s error, th 2004In order to find plain error, Crim.R. 52(B) requires that there be a deviation from a legal rule, the error must be an "obvious" defect in the trial proceedings, and the error must have affected a defendant's "substantial rights." State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21 , 27 , 2002-Ohio-68 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Whitegreen1 sentence2021Montgomery No. 27749, 2018-Ohio-3076, ¶ 27 (holding it was not a clear and unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent where the suspect expressed that he “really do[es]n’t now even want to answer any questions”). 40 {¶176} “Invocation of the Miranda right to [remain silent] ‘requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire [to cease all questioning].’” Davis at 459 , quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 , (1991). {¶177} Since we do not find Mr. Davis invoked his right to remain silent by informing the detectives that he | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jackson, 06ap-1004 (5-22-2007)green1 sentence2008See, e.g., State v. Jackson , Franklin App. No. 06AP-1004, 2007-Ohio-2470 , at ¶ 10 . | 1 | 1 |
Lilly v. Virginiagreen2 sentences2004Moreover, those Justices — including Justice Scalia, the author of the Crawford opinion — who disagreed with the Court's pre- Crawford conclusion in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999), that the admission of an accomplice's confession did not violate the Confrontation Clause, nonetheless concurred in the judgment because they believed that harmless error review applied to the perceived violation. 2004Moreover, those Justices — including Justice Scalia, the author of the Crawford opinion — who disagreed with the Court's pre- Crawford conclusion in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999), that the admission of an accomplice's confession did not violate the Confrontation Clause, nonetheless concurred in the judgment because they believed that harmless error review applied to the perceived violation. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Barnes
green
2 sentences2004In order to find plain error, Crim.R. 52(B) requires that there be a deviation from a legal rule, the error must be an "obvious" defect in the trial proceedings, and the error must have affected a defendant's "substantial rights." State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21 , 27 , 2002-Ohio-68 . 2003In order to find plain error, Crim.R. 52(B) requires that there must be a deviation from a legal rule, the error must be an "obvious" defect in the trial proceedings, and the error must have affected a defendant's "substantial rights." State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21 , 27 , 2002-Ohio-68 . | 2 | 2003–2004 |
State v. Sutton
green
1 sentence2023Seneca No. 13-21-11, 2022-Ohio-2452, ¶ 50 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
McNeil v. Wisconsin
green
1 sentence2021Montgomery No. 27749, 2018-Ohio-3076, ¶ 27 (holding it was not a clear and unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent where the suspect expressed that he “really do[es]n’t now even want to answer any questions”). 40 {¶176} “Invocation of the Miranda right to [remain silent] ‘requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire [to cease all questioning].’” Davis at 459 , quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 , (1991). {¶177} Since we do not find Mr. Davis invoked his right to remain silent by informing the detectives that he | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Cabrales
green
1 sentence2008Instead, if, in comparing the elements of the offenses in the abstract, the offenses are so similar that the commission of one offense will necessarily result in commission of the other, then the offenses are allied offenses of similar import." State v. Cabrales , 118 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2008-Ohio-1625 , syllabus. {¶ 97} Ohio's burglary statute, R.C. 2911.12 , provides, in pertinent part: {¶ 98} "(A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall do any of the following: {¶ 99} "* * * {¶ 100} "(2) Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately occupied portion of an | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State ex rel. Royal v. Industrial Commission
green
1 sentence2007Id. {¶ 59} Citing Nicholls, Foster, and Gobich, relator claims that the commission lacked authority to exercise its continuing jurisdiction at the March 10, 1998 hearing before the SHO. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Blakemore v. Blakemore
green
2 sentences1997Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217 , 5 OBR 481, 450 N.E.2d 1140 . 1997Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217 , 5 OBR 481, 450 N.E.2d 1140 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Walker
green
2 sentences1989State v. Walker (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 483, 484 , 2 OBR 610, 611, 442 N.E.2d 1319, 1320-1321 , citing State v. Craft (1977), 52 Ohio App.2d 1 , 6 O.O.3d 1 , 367 N.E.2d 1221 . 1989State v. Walker (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 483, 484 , 2 OBR 610, 611, 442 N.E.2d 1319, 1320-1321 , citing State v. Craft (1977), 52 Ohio App.2d 1 , 6 O.O.3d 1 , 367 N.E.2d 1221 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Craft
green
2 sentences1989State v. Walker (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 483, 484 , 2 OBR 610, 611, 442 N.E.2d 1319, 1320-1321 , citing State v. Craft (1977), 52 Ohio App.2d 1 , 6 O.O.3d 1 , 367 N.E.2d 1221 . 1989State v. Walker (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 483, 484 , 2 OBR 610, 611, 442 N.E.2d 1319, 1320-1321 , citing State v. Craft (1977), 52 Ohio App.2d 1 , 6 O.O.3d 1 , 367 N.E.2d 1221 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.