two-thirds requirement in California

2023(Richmond, at pp. 204-205.) The same year, the Supreme Court reiterated in City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47 (Farrell) that “the language of section 4 must be strictly construed and ambiguities therein resolved so as to limit the measures to which the two- thirds requirement applies” when it interpreted the term “ ‘special district.’ ” (Id. at p. 52.) The Supreme Court took this approach in Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245 (Kennedy Wholesale).

2020(Kennedy Wholesale, at p. 252.) 16 Finally, Kennedy Wholesale briefly mentions another principle that reverberates from two earlier cases construing ambiguous language in Article XIII A, section 4: this provision “must be strictly construed . . . so as to limit the measures to which the two-thirds requirement applies.” (Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 252 , fn.; see City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47 (Farrell) & Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d 197 .) Farrell construed the term “special tax,” and Richmond construed the term “special district,” in each case as t

2020(Kennedy Wholesale, at p. 252.) 16 Finally, Kennedy Wholesale briefly mentions another principle that reverberates from two earlier cases construing ambiguous language in Article XIII A, section 4: this provision “must be strictly construed . . . so as to limit the measures to which the two-thirds requirement applies.” (Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 252 , fn.; see City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47 (Farrell) & Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d 197 .) Farrell construed the term “special tax,” and Richmond construed the term “special district,” in each case as t

2020(Kennedy Wholesale, at p. 252.) 16 Finally, Kennedy Wholesale briefly mentions another principle that reverberates from two earlier cases construing ambiguous language in Article XIII A, section 4: this provision “must be strictly construed . . . so as to limit the measures to which the two-thirds requirement applies.” (Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 252 , fn.; see City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47 (Farrell) & Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d 197 .) Farrell construed the term “special tax,” and Richmond construed the term “special district,” in each case as t

1982In Westbrook , we noted that "the inevitable result of any extraordinary majority requirement is to give to one group of voters a greater influence on the outcome of an election than to another group of comparable size but opposite conviction." It is the functional equivalent of allowing "those citizens who opposed a measure ... to vote twice while those who favored it were limited to only one ballot." ( 2 Cal.3d at p. 783 .) The United States Supreme Court conceded the point in Gordon , when it stated that "any departure from strict majority rule gives disproportionate power to the minority."

1982In Westbrook , we noted that "the inevitable result of any extraordinary majority requirement is to give to one group of voters a greater influence on the outcome of an election than to another group of comparable size but opposite conviction." It is the functional equivalent of allowing "those citizens who opposed a measure ... to vote twice while those who favored it were limited to only one ballot." ( 2 Cal.3d at p. 783 .) The United States Supreme Court conceded the point in Gordon , when it stated that "any departure from strict majority rule gives disproportionate power to the minority."

2021Instead, the impact was on “a local agency’s governing functions” and was “a relatively ‘minimal’ burden.” (Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 915 ; see ibid. [although the meet-and-confer provision “ ‘encourages binding agreements resulting from the parties’ bargaining, the governing body of the agency . . . retains the ultimate power to refuse an agreement and to make its own decision’ ”].) In contrast, we are obliged to “narrowly construe provisions that would burden or limit the exercise of” the initiative power (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 936 ), and the two-thirds requirement

2021Instead, the impact was on “a local agency’s governing functions” and was “a relatively ‘minimal’ burden.” (Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 915 ; see ibid. [although the meet-and-confer provision “ ‘encourages binding agreements resulting from the parties’ bargaining, the governing body of the agency . . . retains the ultimate power to refuse an agreement and to make its own decision’ ”].) In contrast, we are obliged to “narrowly construe provisions that would burden or limit the exercise of” the initiative power (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 936 ), and the two-thirds requirement

2021Instead, the impact was on “a local agency’s governing functions” and was “a relatively ‘minimal’ burden.” (Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 915 ; see ibid. [although the meet-and-confer provision “ ‘encourages binding agreements resulting from the parties’ bargaining, the governing body of the agency . . . retains the ultimate power to refuse an agreement and to make its own decision’ ”].) In contrast, we are obliged to “narrowly construe provisions that would burden or limit the exercise of” the initiative power (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 936 ), and the two-thirds requirement

2021Instead, the impact was on “a local agency’s governing functions” and was “a relatively ‘minimal’ burden.” (Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 915 ; see ibid. [although the meet-and-confer provision “ ‘encourages binding agreements resulting from the parties’ bargaining, the governing body of the agency . . . retains the ultimate power to refuse an agreement and to make its own decision’ ”].) In contrast, we are obliged to “narrowly construe provisions that would burden or limit the exercise of” the initiative power (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 936 ), and the two-thirds requirement

1992(Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 52 .) As stated in Russ, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at page 1505 : “One characteristic of a special tax is that it levies a fee to replace revenue for services which were affected by the reduction caused by article XIII A. [Citations.] In contrast, the transit fee imposed by the Ordinance [in that case] is not intended to replace revenues lost as a result of article XIII A. It is triggered by the voluntary decision of the developer to construct office buildings and is directly tied to the increase in ridership that this construction will possibly generate.” Another

1992(Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 52 .) As stated in Russ, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at page 1505 : “One characteristic of a special tax is that it levies a fee to replace revenue for services which were affected by the reduction caused by article XIII A. [Citations.] In contrast, the transit fee imposed by the Ordinance [in that case] is not intended to replace revenues lost as a result of article XIII A. It is triggered by the voluntary decision of the developer to construct office buildings and is directly tied to the increase in ridership that this construction will possibly generate.” Another

1987Our Supreme Court has defined "special taxes" in section 4 "to mean taxes levied for a specific purpose rather than ... a levy placed in the general fund to be utilized for general governmental purposes." ( City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 57 [ 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 , 648 P.2d 935 ].) ( Heckendorn v. City of San Marino, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 489 .) In reaching this conclusion, the court held that the term must be strictly construed and ambiguities *1505 resolved so as to limit the situations to which the two-thirds requirement applies. ( City and County of San Fra

1987Our Supreme Court has defined “special taxes” in section 4 “to mean taxes levied for a specific purpose rather than ... a levy placed in the general fund to be utilized for general governmental purposes.” (City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47,57 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 713 , 648 P.2d 935 ].) (Heckendorn v. City of San Marino, supra, 42 Cal. 3d at p. 489 .) In reaching this conclusion, the court held that the term must be strictly construed and ambiguities resolved so as to limit the situations to which the two-thirds requirement applies.

2009Water Dist. v. QLC Corp. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 479, 486 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 318 ].) Unlike taxes, fees are not subject to the voter approval limitation of article 13 A, section 4.

2009Water Dist. v. QLC Corp. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 479, 486 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 318 ].) Unlike taxes, fees are not subject to the voter approval limitation of article 13 A, section 4.

2009(Sinclair Paint, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 873 ; Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 57 .) 11 In Farrell , the Supreme Court explained that the language of article 13 A, section 4 “must be strictly construed and ambiguities therein resolved so as to limit the measures to which the two-thirds requirement applies” because “the two-thirds vote requirement in section 4 is inherently undemocratic ...” (Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 52 ; see also Collier, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1338 ; see Carlsbad Mun.

2007(San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego County Air Pollution Control Dist. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1132, 1148-1149 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 420 ].) After voters passed article XIII A, the California Legislature enacted enabling legislation found at Government Code section 50075 et seq.

2007(San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego County Air Pollution Control Dist. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1132, 1148-1149 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 420 ].) After voters passed article XIII A, the California Legislature enacted enabling legislation found at Government Code section 50075 et seq.

2007(See id. at pp. 1183-1184, 1186.) In Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 232 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 , 902 P.2d 225 ], the court held, unremárkably, that a salés tax earmarked for transportation projects was a “ ‘special tax’ ” subject to the two-thirds requirement.

2007(See id. at pp. 1183-1184, 1186.) In Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 232 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 , 902 P.2d 225 ], the court held, unremárkably, that a salés tax earmarked for transportation projects was a “ ‘special tax’ ” subject to the two-thirds requirement.

1992(Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 52 .) As stated in Russ, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at page 1505 : “One characteristic of a special tax is that it levies a fee to replace revenue for services which were affected by the reduction caused by article XIII A. [Citations.] In contrast, the transit fee imposed by the Ordinance [in that case] is not intended to replace revenues lost as a result of article XIII A. It is triggered by the voluntary decision of the developer to construct office buildings and is directly tied to the increase in ridership that this construction will possibly generate.” Another

1990Industry Assn. v. Governing Bd. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 212, 236 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 497 ].) The Board, as operator and proprietor of the Airport, was to operate the facility without cost to the local taxpayers by imposing “fair and reasonable rentals, fees and charges . . . .” Nevertheless, in its designated role the Board, like the transportation commission in Los Angeles County Transportation Com. v. Richmond (1982) 31 Cal.3d 197 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 643 P.2d 941 ], was not “authorized to levy a property tax.” (Id., at p. 199.) 5 In Richmond , a sales tax was imposed, upon a majority voter appro

1990Industry Assn. v. Governing Bd. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 212, 236 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 497 ].) The Board, as operator and proprietor of the Airport, was to operate the facility without cost to the local taxpayers by imposing “fair and reasonable rentals, fees and charges . . . .” Nevertheless, in its designated role the Board, like the transportation commission in Los Angeles County Transportation Com. v. Richmond (1982) 31 Cal.3d 197 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 643 P.2d 941 ], was not “authorized to levy a property tax.” (Id., at p. 199.) 5 In Richmond , a sales tax was imposed, upon a majority voter appro

1990(Id. at p. 52.) City of Atascadero v. Daly (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 466, 470 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 228 ], held that “the words ‘special tax’ as they are used in article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution . . . have been authoritatively defined by our Supreme Court in City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47 .” In Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 486, 489 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 723 P.2d 64 ], the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Farrell and interpreted the portion of section 4 which is in issue herein as follows: “Section 4 also prohibits

1990(Id. at p. 52.) City of Atascadero v. Daly (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 466, 470 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 228 ], held that “the words ‘special tax’ as they are used in article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution . . . have been authoritatively defined by our Supreme Court in City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47 .” In Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 486, 489 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 723 P.2d 64 ], the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Farrell and interpreted the portion of section 4 which is in issue herein as follows: “Section 4 also prohibits

1990(Id. at p. 52.) City of Atascadero v. Daly (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 466, 470 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 228 ], held that “the words ‘special tax’ as they are used in article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution . . . have been authoritatively defined by our Supreme Court in City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47 .” In Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 486, 489 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 723 P.2d 64 ], the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Farrell and interpreted the portion of section 4 which is in issue herein as follows: “Section 4 also prohibits

1990(Id. at p. 52.) City of Atascadero v. Daly (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 466, 470 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 228 ], held that “the words ‘special tax’ as they are used in article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution . . . have been authoritatively defined by our Supreme Court in City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47 .” In Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 486, 489 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 723 P.2d 64 ], the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Farrell and interpreted the portion of section 4 which is in issue herein as follows: “Section 4 also prohibits

1986Jones Companies v. City of San Diego (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 745, 754 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 580 ].) Our high court has also noted that “the language of section 4 must be strictly construed and ambiguities therein resolved so as to limit the measures to which the two-thirds requirement applies.” (City and County of San Francisco, supra, at p. 52.) Seen in the context of these rules, fees not exceeding the reasonable cost of providing the service or regulatory activity for which the fee is charged and which are not levied for general revenue purposes, have been considered outside the realm of “special t

1986Jones Companies v. City of San Diego (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 745, 754 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 580 ].) Our high court has also noted that “the language of section 4 must be strictly construed and ambiguities therein resolved so as to limit the measures to which the two-thirds requirement applies.” (City and County of San Francisco, supra, at p. 52.) Seen in the context of these rules, fees not exceeding the reasonable cost of providing the service or regulatory activity for which the fee is charged and which are not levied for general revenue purposes, have been considered outside the realm of “special t

1986Code, §§ 50075, 50076; Beaumont Investors v. Beaumont-Cherry Valley Water Dist. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 227, 234 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 567 ]; Mills v. County of Trinity (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 656, 663 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 674 ].) In Mills, supra, at page 663, the court determined that a resolution providing for both increased and new fees for county services associated with processing land-use applications was not a special tax within the meaning of section 4.

1986Code, §§ 50075, 50076; Beaumont Investors v. Beaumont-Cherry Valley Water Dist. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 227, 234 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 567 ]; Mills v. County of Trinity (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 656, 663 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 674 ].) In Mills, supra, at page 663, the court determined that a resolution providing for both increased and new fees for county services associated with processing land-use applications was not a special tax within the meaning of section 4.