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29 California opinions name it 3 courts 1931–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Jenningsgreen2 sentences2025I, § 15.) The Confrontation Clause “ ‘guarantees an opportunity for effective cross- examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ (Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 20 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 15 , 106 S.Ct. 292 ] (per curiam).)” (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 794 .) “Although we recognize that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor [citations], ‘[t]his does not mean that an unlimited inquiry may be made into collateral matters; t 2022A criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor,” but not to “ ‘an unlimited inquiry . . . into collateral matters.’ ” (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 372 .) To be admissible, “ ‘the proffered evidence must have more than “slight-relevancy” to the issues presented.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1042 .) As discussed above, the relevancy of the evidence under section 1103 could not be established without first determining the falsity of Tina’s prior allegations of domestic | 4 | 8 |
People v. Marshallgreen2 sentences2016I, § 15 [a criminal defendant has the right ‘to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant’s behalf’].)” (Bryant, 60 Cal.4th at 367–368.) Nevertheless, “ ‘[a]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present a defense,’ ” and courts retain “ ‘a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of prejudice.’ ” (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 305 .) Furthermore, “[a]lthough a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitle 2014(See People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 836 [“Although a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor, this does not mean the court must allow an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters; the proffered evidence must have more than slight relevancy”].) Moreover, the Prowler graffiti evidence would not have logically impeached Browne. | 3 | 5 |
People v. Babbittgreen2 sentences2016I, § 15 [a criminal defendant has the right ‘to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant’s behalf’].)” (Bryant, 60 Cal.4th at 367–368.) Nevertheless, “ ‘[a]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present a defense,’ ” and courts retain “ ‘a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of prejudice.’ ” (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 305 .) Furthermore, “[a]lthough a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitle 2016(People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 684 .) As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the confrontation clause "guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." (Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 20 , italics omitted.) Unlimited inquiry into collateral matters is not permitted. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Reedergreen2 sentences2014(People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 282 [while a defendant has the right to present evidence relevant to theory of defense, this right “does not require ‘the court [to] allow an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters’”]; People v. Reeder (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 543, 553 .) Defendant further argues error occurred because the trial court did not cite to nor engage in an analysis pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. 1991I, § 15.) (19) Although we recognize that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor ( People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal. App.3d 1027 , 1042 [ 182 Cal. Rptr. 197 ], disapproved on another ground in People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 808 [ 201 Cal. Rptr. 311 , 678 P.2d 886 ]; People v. Reeder (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 543, 553 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 275 ]), "[t]his does not mean that an unlimited inquiry may be made into collateral matters; the proffered evidence must have more than `slight-relevancy' to the issues prese | 2 | 3 |
People v. Northropgreen2 sentences2022A criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor,” but not to “ ‘an unlimited inquiry . . . into collateral matters.’ ” (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 372 .) To be admissible, “ ‘the proffered evidence must have more than “slight-relevancy” to the issues presented.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1042 .) As discussed above, the relevancy of the evidence under section 1103 could not be established without first determining the falsity of Tina’s prior allegations of domestic 2015A criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor,” but not to “ ‘an unlimited inquiry . . . into collateral matters.’ ” (People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 372 , original italics.) To be admissible, “ ‘the proffered evidence must have more than “slight-relevancy” to the issues presented.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1027,1042 ; see also People v. Williams (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1779 [court precluded examination of witness on whether he had given false testimony on another ma | 1 | 5 |
Delaware v. Fensterergreen2 sentences2025I, § 15.) The Confrontation Clause “ ‘guarantees an opportunity for effective cross- examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ (Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 20 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 15 , 106 S.Ct. 292 ] (per curiam).)” (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 794 .) “Although we recognize that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor [citations], ‘[t]his does not mean that an unlimited inquiry may be made into collateral matters; t 2025I, § 15.) The Confrontation Clause “ ‘guarantees an opportunity for effective cross- examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ (Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 20 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 15 , 106 S.Ct. 292 ] (per curiam).)” (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 794 .) “Although we recognize that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor [citations], ‘[t]his does not mean that an unlimited inquiry may be made into collateral matters; t | 1 | 3 |
People v. Burrell-Hartgreen2 sentences2014(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 414 .) Although Evidence Code section 352 must bow to a defendant’s right to present evidence (People v. Burrell–Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 ), that principle only applies where the evidence has “significant probative value” and “does not mean the court must allow an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters ….” (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 836 .) An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion in admitting or excluding evidence “except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrar 2013(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 414 .) Although section 352 must bow to a defendant’s right to present evidence (People v. Burrell-Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 ), that principle only applies where the evidence has “significant probative value” and “does not mean the court must allow an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters . . . .” (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 836 .) We will not disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion under section 352 unless the court “exercised its discretion ‘“in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner.”’” (People v. Fry | 1 | 3 |
Delaware v. Van Arsdallgreen2 sentences2021As for abandonment, as the trial court noted, that could be related to the state of Beavers’s relationship with the women: “you’re happy one day and not happy the next day, that’s life.” 10 758, 794.) “Although we recognize that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor [Citations], ‘[t]his does not mean that an unlimited inquiry may be made into collateral matters; the proffered evidence must have more than “slight- relevancy” to the issues presented.’ [Citation.] ‘ “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar 1991I, § 15.) (19) Although we recognize that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor ( People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal. App.3d 1027 , 1042 [ 182 Cal. Rptr. 197 ], disapproved on another ground in People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 808 [ 201 Cal. Rptr. 311 , 678 P.2d 886 ]; People v. Reeder (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 543, 553 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 275 ]), "[t]his does not mean that an unlimited inquiry may be made into collateral matters; the proffered evidence must have more than `slight-relevancy' to the issues prese | 1 | 2 |
People v. Tidwellgreen2 sentences2016(People v. Tidwell (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1457 (Tidwell) [§ 352 does not allow " 'an unlimited inquiry . . . into collateral matters' "; " 'proffered evidence must be of some competent, substantial and significant value' "];8 Woodward, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 832 [child molestation victim's prior sexual contacts were "dissimilar to the charged crimes" and properly excluded under Evid. 2016Code, § 352]; Mestas, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1518 ["Even if the trial court found the allegation (that child molestation victim had masturbated when she was five years old) true after a hearing, the evidence would have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because it had very little probative value with respect to [victim's] credibility."]; People v. Franklin (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [child sex abuse victim's prior sexual conduct, in seeing brothers naked, had 8 Benitez cites Tidwell for the proposition that a defendant does not need to comply with the procedures set forth | 1 | 2 |
People v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2015“Defendant contends his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was violated by the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] Although we recognize that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor [citations.], ‘[t]his does not mean that an unlimited inquiry may be made into collateral matters; the proffered evidence must have more than “slight- relevancy” to the issues presented.’ [Citation.] ‘ “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable li 2014(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 414 .) Although Evidence Code section 352 must bow to a defendant’s right to present evidence (People v. Burrell–Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 ), that principle only applies where the evidence has “significant probative value” and “does not mean the court must allow an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters ….” (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 836 .) An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion in admitting or excluding evidence “except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrar | 1 | 2 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2014While the due process right of a defendant to a fair trial and the right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to the defense trumps Evidence Code section 352, “[t]his does not mean that an unlimited inquiry may be made into collateral matters; the proffered evidence must have more than ‘slight-relevancy’ to the issues presented” and “must be of some competent, substantial and significant value.” (People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1042 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 807-808 .) The exclusion of tangential evidence d 1991I, § 15.) (19) Although we recognize that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor ( People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal. App.3d 1027 , 1042 [ 182 Cal. Rptr. 197 ], disapproved on another ground in People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 808 [ 201 Cal. Rptr. 311 , 678 P.2d 886 ]; People v. Reeder (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 543, 553 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 275 ]), "[t]his does not mean that an unlimited inquiry may be made into collateral matters; the proffered evidence must have more than `slight-relevancy' to the issues prese | 1 | 2 |
People v. Fryegreen2 sentences2013(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 414 .) Although section 352 must bow to a defendant’s right to present evidence (People v. Burrell-Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 ), that principle only applies where the evidence has “significant probative value” and “does not mean the court must allow an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters . . . .” (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 836 .) We will not disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion under section 352 unless the court “exercised its discretion ‘“in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner.”’” (People v. Fry 2012Evidence Code section 352 “is not limited by its terms to disputes by opposing parties; it may become applicable to parties on the same side of an action when their interests are adverse to each other.” (People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1007, fn. 10 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 568 , 755 P.2d 1017 ].) “Although we recognize that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor [citations], ‘[t]his does not mean that an unlimited inquiry may be made into collateral matters; the proffered evidence must have more than “slight | 1 | 2 |
People v. Lavergnegreen1 sentence2024(See People v. Lavergne (1971) 4 Cal.3d 735, 742 (Lavergne) [evidence that contradicts a witness’s testimony is relevant for impeachment purposes].) But a defendant is not entitled to engage in an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 865 ) or to attack a witness’s credibility with “time-consuming and remote evidence that was not obviously probative on the question” at issue (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 52 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Woodwardgreen1 sentence2016(People v. Tidwell (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1457 (Tidwell) [§ 352 does not allow " 'an unlimited inquiry . . . into collateral matters' "; " 'proffered evidence must be of some competent, substantial and significant value' "];8 Woodward, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 832 [child molestation victim's prior sexual contacts were "dissimilar to the charged crimes" and properly excluded under Evid. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Franklingreen1 sentence2016Code, § 352]; Mestas, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1518 ["Even if the trial court found the allegation (that child molestation victim had masturbated when she was five years old) true after a hearing, the evidence would have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because it had very little probative value with respect to [victim's] credibility."]; People v. Franklin (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [child sex abuse victim's prior sexual conduct, in seeing brothers naked, had 8 Benitez cites Tidwell for the proposition that a defendant does not need to comply with the procedures set forth | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2016I, § 15 [a criminal defendant has the right ‘to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant’s behalf’].)” (Bryant, 60 Cal.4th at 367–368.) Nevertheless, “ ‘[a]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present a defense,’ ” and courts retain “ ‘a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of prejudice.’ ” (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 305 .) Furthermore, “[a]lthough a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitle 2016I, § 15 [a criminal defendant has the right ‘to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant’s behalf’].)” (Bryant, 60 Cal.4th at 367–368.) Nevertheless, “ ‘[a]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present a defense,’ ” and courts retain “ ‘a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of prejudice.’ ” (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 305 .) Furthermore, “[a]lthough a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitle | 1 | 1 |
The People v. Mestasgreen2 sentences2016Code, § 352]; Mestas, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1518 ["Even if the trial court found the allegation (that child molestation victim had masturbated when she was five years old) true after a hearing, the evidence would have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because it had very little probative value with respect to [victim's] credibility."]; People v. Franklin (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [child sex abuse victim's prior sexual conduct, in seeing brothers naked, had 8 Benitez cites Tidwell for the proposition that a defendant does not need to comply with the procedures set forth 2016Code, § 352]; Mestas, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1518 ["Even if the trial court found the allegation (that child molestation victim had masturbated when she was five years old) true after a hearing, the evidence would have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because it had very little probative value with respect to [victim's] credibility."]; People v. Franklin (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [child sex abuse victim's prior sexual conduct, in seeing brothers naked, had 8 Benitez cites Tidwell for the proposition that a defendant does not need to comply with the procedures set forth | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheelergreen2 sentences2016I, § 15 [a criminal defendant has the right ‘to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant’s behalf’].)” (Bryant, 60 Cal.4th at 367–368.) Nevertheless, “ ‘[a]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present a defense,’ ” and courts retain “ ‘a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of prejudice.’ ” (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 305 .) Furthermore, “[a]lthough a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitle 2016I, § 15 [a criminal defendant has the right ‘to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant’s behalf’].)” (Bryant, 60 Cal.4th at 367–368.) Nevertheless, “ ‘[a]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present a defense,’ ” and courts retain “ ‘a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of prejudice.’ ” (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 305 .) Furthermore, “[a]lthough a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitle | 1 | 1 |
People v. Morsegreen2 sentences2015A criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor,” but not to “ ‘an unlimited inquiry . . . into collateral matters.’ ” (People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 372 , original italics.) To be admissible, “ ‘the proffered evidence must have more than “slight-relevancy” to the issues presented.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1027,1042 ; see also People v. Williams (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1779 [court precluded examination of witness on whether he had given false testimony on another ma 2015A criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor,” but not to “ ‘an unlimited inquiry . . . into collateral matters.’ ” (People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 372 , original italics.) To be admissible, “ ‘the proffered evidence must have more than “slight-relevancy” to the issues presented.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1027,1042 ; see also People v. Williams (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1779 [court precluded examination of witness on whether he had given false testimony on another ma | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2015A criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor,” but not to “ ‘an unlimited inquiry . . . into collateral matters.’ ” (People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 372 , original italics.) To be admissible, “ ‘the proffered evidence must have more than “slight-relevancy” to the issues presented.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1027,1042 ; see also People v. Williams (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1779 [court precluded examination of witness on whether he had given false testimony on another ma 2015A criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor,” but not to “ ‘an unlimited inquiry . . . into collateral matters.’ ” (People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 372 , original italics.) To be admissible, “ ‘the proffered evidence must have more than “slight-relevancy” to the issues presented.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1027,1042 ; see also People v. Williams (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1779 [court precluded examination of witness on whether he had given false testimony on another ma | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bittakergreen1 sentence2015(People v. Tidwell (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1457-1458 ; see also People v. Miranda (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1424 .) The trial court has discretion under section 352 to exclude evidence of prior reports of assault “if proof of the falsity of the prior complaint ‘would consume considerable time, and divert the attention of the jury from the case at hand.’ ([People v.] Bittaker [(1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046 ], 1097.)” ( Miranda, supra, at p. 1424 .) The probative value of such evidence for purposes of impeachment depends upon proof the prior accusation was false and the trial court retains discr | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mirandagreen2 sentences2015(People v. Tidwell (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1457-1458 ; see also People v. Miranda (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1424 .) The trial court has discretion under section 352 to exclude evidence of prior reports of assault “if proof of the falsity of the prior complaint ‘would consume considerable time, and divert the attention of the jury from the case at hand.’ ([People v.] Bittaker [(1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046 ], 1097.)” ( Miranda, supra, at p. 1424 .) The probative value of such evidence for purposes of impeachment depends upon proof the prior accusation was false and the trial court retains discr 2015(People v. Tidwell (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1457-1458 ; see also People v. Miranda (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1424 .) The trial court has discretion under section 352 to exclude evidence of prior reports of assault “if proof of the falsity of the prior complaint ‘would consume considerable time, and divert the attention of the jury from the case at hand.’ ([People v.] Bittaker [(1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046 ], 1097.)” ( Miranda, supra, at p. 1424 .) The probative value of such evidence for purposes of impeachment depends upon proof the prior accusation was false and the trial court retains discr | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ayalagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ainsworthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sullygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rodriguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Washington v. Texasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holtz v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Barrowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jimenezred | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Weingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Homick
green
2 sentences2024(See People v. Lavergne (1971) 4 Cal.3d 735, 742 (Lavergne) [evidence that contradicts a witness’s testimony is relevant for impeachment purposes].) But a defendant is not entitled to engage in an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 865 ) or to attack a witness’s credibility with “time-consuming and remote evidence that was not obviously probative on the question” at issue (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 52 ). 2016The statute empowers courts to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “‘Although . . . a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor [citations], “[t]his does not mean that an unlimited inquiry may be made into collateral matters; the proffered evidence must have more than ‘slight-relevancy’ to the issues presented.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 865 .) Here, the trial court excluded th | 5 | 2013–2024 |
People v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2025I, § 15.) The Confrontation Clause “ ‘guarantees an opportunity for effective cross- examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ (Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 20 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 15 , 106 S.Ct. 292 ] (per curiam).)” (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 794 .) “Although we recognize that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor [citations], ‘[t]his does not mean that an unlimited inquiry may be made into collateral matters; t 2014(People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 794 ; Alvarado, at p. 1137.) "Generally speaking, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." (Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 20 .) Although an accused has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor, he may not make an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters of slight relevance. | 2 | 2014–2025 |
People v. Pearson
green
2 sentences2021(People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 455 ; see Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 372 .) Unless the defendant can show that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced a “ ‘significantly different impression’ ” of the witness’s credibility, the trial court’s exercise of its discretion does not violate the Sixth Amendment. 2013(People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 455 .) Although a defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of 4 significant probative value in his favor, there is no right to pursue an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters. | 2 | 2013–2021 |
DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara
green
2 sentences2017Rather, the intent of the act is to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances.' [Citation.]" ( DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983 , 991, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 111 , 289 P.3d 884 .) An unlimited claim presentation period expanding the rights of plaintiffs against government entities would frustrate the intent and purposes of the Government Claims Act. 2017Rather, the intent of the act is to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances.' [Citation.]" ( DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983 , 991, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 111 , 289 P.3d 884 .) An unlimited claim presentation period expanding the rights of plaintiffs against government entities would frustrate the intent and purposes of the Government Claims Act. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Boyette
green
2 sentences2014(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 414 .) Although Evidence Code section 352 must bow to a defendant’s right to present evidence (People v. Burrell–Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 ), that principle only applies where the evidence has “significant probative value” and “does not mean the court must allow an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters ….” (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 836 .) An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion in admitting or excluding evidence “except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrar 2013(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 414 .) Although section 352 must bow to a defendant’s right to present evidence (People v. Burrell-Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 ), that principle only applies where the evidence has “significant probative value” and “does not mean the court must allow an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters . . . .” (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 836 .) We will not disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion under section 352 unless the court “exercised its discretion ‘“in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner.”’” (People v. Fry | 2 | 2013–2014 |
People v. Cudjo
green
2 sentences2014(People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611 .) C. 2013(People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611 .) Relevant here are the principles underlying the theory of provocation sufficient to reduce a charge of murder to voluntary manslaughter. “‘A defendant who commits an intentional and unlawful killing but who lacks malice is guilty of . . . voluntary manslaughter.’” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153 .) Malice is negated when the defendant acts in a “‘“sudden quarrel or heat of passion.”’” (Id. at pp. 153– 154.) To show heat of passion for voluntary manslaughter, the defendant’s reason must be “actually obscured as the result of a strong | 2 | 2013–2014 |
People v. Dement
green
1 sentence2024(See People v. Lavergne (1971) 4 Cal.3d 735, 742 (Lavergne) [evidence that contradicts a witness’s testimony is relevant for impeachment purposes].) But a defendant is not entitled to engage in an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 865 ) or to attack a witness’s credibility with “time-consuming and remote evidence that was not obviously probative on the question” at issue (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 52 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Loker green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Smith green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Alvarez green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In Re Kapperman green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Holder v. Superior Court of San Diego Cty. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Minnesota v. Murphy
green
1 sentence2014This probation condition does not purport to prohibit a probationer from exercising his or her privilege against self-incrimination outside of the sex offender management program. “[I]f reasonably possible the courts must construe a statute to avoid doubts as to its constitutionality.” (People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 259 .) As there could be doubts about the constitutionality of imposing a probation condition requiring an unlimited waiver of a probationer’s privilege against self-incrimination, we construe the statute’s waiver provision, consistent with the language of the entire statut | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Breverman green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Frye green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Kennedy v. Industrial Accident Commission neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| McGee v. Jones neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Hammell v. Atkinson neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.