special credibility instruction in Connecticut

2022In State v. Arroyo, supra, 292 Conn. 558 , we extended Patterson to require a special credibility instruction for all jailhouse informants, regardless of whether they had received a promise of a benefit in exchange for their testimony.

2012The defendant further concedes that a special credibility instruction and a pretrial reliability hearing are not constitutionally required, 2 but he asserts that “a rule should be enunciated as a matter of policy in fight of the potential for miscarriages of justice to occur on account of the testimony of cooperating witnesses such as Carlos Colon.” The defendant argues that Colon’s testimony posed the same dangers as that of a jailhouse informant for whom special credibility instructions are required under State v. Arroyo, 292 Conn. 558 , 973 A.2d 1254 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 911 , 130

2011You may consider a witness' prior conviction in weighing the credibility of that witness and give such weight to those facts as you decide is fair and reasonable under all the circumstances." [3] The defendant concedes that the trial court's failure to give a special credibility instruction was not of constitutional magnitude and, therefore, his claim does not qualify for review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). [4] As we discuss later in this opinion, a classic jailhouse informant is a witness who has testified that the defendant has confessed to him or had

2011You may consider a witness' prior conviction in weighing the credibility of that witness and give such weight to those facts as you decide is fair and reasonable under all the circumstances." [3] The defendant concedes that the trial court's failure to give a special credibility instruction was not of constitutional magnitude and, therefore, his claim does not qualify for review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). [4] As we discuss later in this opinion, a classic jailhouse informant is a witness who has testified that the defendant has confessed to him or had

2021Connecticut courts have routinely limited the definition of a jailhouse informant to only those individuals testi- fying to statements made by the defendant while the witness and the defendant were incarcerated together.2 See State v. Salmond, 179 Conn. App. 605, 630 , 180 A.3d 979 (concluding that Patterson held that ‘‘a special credibility instruction is required in situations [in which] a prison inmate has been promised a benefit by the state in return for his or her testimony regarding incriminating statements made by a fellow inmate’’ while both were incarcerated (internal quotation marks

2021Connecticut courts have routinely limited the definition of a jailhouse informant to only those individuals testi- fying to statements made by the defendant while the witness and the defendant were incarcerated together.2 See State v. Salmond, 179 Conn. App. 605, 630 , 180 A.3d 979 (concluding that Patterson held that ‘‘a special credibility instruction is required in situations [in which] a prison inmate has been promised a benefit by the state in return for his or her testimony regarding incriminating statements made by a fellow inmate’’ while both were incarcerated (internal quotation marks

2021Connecticut courts have routinely limited the definition of a jailhouse informant to only those individuals testi- fying to statements made by the defendant while the witness and the defendant were incarcerated together.2 See State v. Salmond, 179 Conn. App. 605, 630 , 180 A.3d 979 (concluding that Patterson held that ‘‘a special credibility instruction is required in situations [in which] a prison inmate has been promised a benefit by the state in return for his or her testimony regarding incriminating statements made by a fellow inmate’’ while both were incarcerated (internal quotation marks

2021Connecticut courts have routinely limited the definition of a jailhouse informant to only those individuals testi- fying to statements made by the defendant while the witness and the defendant were incarcerated together.2 See State v. Salmond, 179 Conn. App. 605, 630 , 180 A.3d 979 (concluding that Patterson held that ‘‘a special credibility instruction is required in situations [in which] a prison inmate has been promised a benefit by the state in return for his or her testimony regarding incriminating statements made by a fellow inmate’’ while both were incarcerated (internal quotation marks

2025Moreover, this court declined the defendant’s request to exercise its supervi- sory authority over the administration of justice and to modify its approach to special child credibility instructions as set forth in State v. James (211 Conn. 555).

2025Moreover, this court declined the defendant’s request to exercise its supervi- sory authority over the administration of justice and to modify its approach to special child credibility instructions as set forth in State v. James ( 211 Conn. 555 ).

2022The procedural point is significant because reversal for plain error ‘‘is reserved for truly extraordinary situa- tions [in which] the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 87 , 905 A.2d 1101 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269 , 127 S. Ct. 1491 , 167 L.

2022The procedural point is significant because reversal for plain error ‘‘is reserved for truly extraordinary situa- tions [in which] the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 87 , 905 A.2d 1101 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269 , 127 S. Ct. 1491 , 167 L.

2022Nothing in Jones, Arroyo, or Patterson implies that a special credibility instruction is unnecessary, inappropriate, or inadvisable in the present context. 3 The second ground on which the majority relies is ‘‘the wisdom of harmonizing our definition of jailhouse informants with the legislature’s recent definition of a ‘jailhouse witness’ as ‘a person who offers or provides testimony concerning statements made to such person by another person with whom he or she was incarcerated, or an incarcerated person who offers or provides testimony concerning statements made to such person by another per

2022Nothing in Jones, Arroyo, or Patterson implies that a special credibility instruction is unnecessary, inappropriate, or inadvisable in the present context. 3 The second ground on which the majority relies is ‘‘the wisdom of harmonizing our definition of jailhouse informants with the legislature’s recent definition of a ‘jailhouse witness’ as ‘a person who offers or provides testimony concerning statements made to such person by another person with whom he or she was incarcerated, or an incarcerated person who offers or provides testimony concerning statements made to such person by another per

2022The procedural point is significant because reversal for plain error ‘‘is reserved for truly extraordinary situa- tions [in which] the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 87 , 905 A.2d 1101 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269 , 127 S. Ct. 1491 , 167 L.

2022The procedural point is significant because reversal for plain error ‘‘is reserved for truly extraordinary situa- tions [in which] the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 87 , 905 A.2d 1101 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269 , 127 S. Ct. 1491 , 167 L.

2021Connecticut courts have routinely limited the definition of a jailhouse informant to only those individuals testi- fying to statements made by the defendant while the witness and the defendant were incarcerated together.2 See State v. Salmond, 179 Conn. App. 605, 630 , 180 A.3d 979 (concluding that Patterson held that ‘‘a special credibility instruction is required in situations [in which] a prison inmate has been promised a benefit by the state in return for his or her testimony regarding incriminating statements made by a fellow inmate’’ while both were incarcerated (internal quotation marks

2021Connecticut courts have routinely limited the definition of a jailhouse informant to only those individuals testi- fying to statements made by the defendant while the witness and the defendant were incarcerated together.2 See State v. Salmond, 179 Conn. App. 605, 630 , 180 A.3d 979 (concluding that Patterson held that ‘‘a special credibility instruction is required in situations [in which] a prison inmate has been promised a benefit by the state in return for his or her testimony regarding incriminating statements made by a fellow inmate’’ while both were incarcerated (internal quotation marks

2021See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452, 471 , 886 A.2d 777 (2005) (holding that, for purposes of harmfulness analysis, trial court’s improper failure to provide jury with special credibility instruc- tion for witness who was jailhouse informant was not constitutional in nature); State v. Brown, 187 Conn. 602, 613 , 447 A.2d 734 (1982) (holding that trial court’s failure to give accomplice credibility instruction to jury does not involve violation of constitutional right); State v. Cooper, 182 Conn. 207, 212 , 438 A.2d 418 (1980) (same for complaining witness credibility instruction); see

2021See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452, 471 , 886 A.2d 777 (2005) (holding that, for purposes of harmfulness analysis, trial court’s improper failure to provide jury with special credibility instruc- tion for witness who was jailhouse informant was not constitutional in nature); State v. Brown, 187 Conn. 602, 613 , 447 A.2d 734 (1982) (holding that trial court’s failure to give accomplice credibility instruction to jury does not involve violation of constitutional right); State v. Cooper, 182 Conn. 207, 212 , 438 A.2d 418 (1980) (same for complaining witness credibility instruction); see

2021Connecticut courts have routinely limited the definition of a jailhouse informant to only those individuals testi- fying to statements made by the defendant while the witness and the defendant were incarcerated together.2 See State v. Salmond, 179 Conn. App. 605, 630 , 180 A.3d 979 (concluding that Patterson held that ‘‘a special credibility instruction is required in situations [in which] a prison inmate has been promised a benefit by the state in return for his or her testimony regarding incriminating statements made by a fellow inmate’’ while both were incarcerated (internal quotation marks

2021Connecticut courts have routinely limited the definition of a jailhouse informant to only those individuals testi- fying to statements made by the defendant while the witness and the defendant were incarcerated together.2 See State v. Salmond, 179 Conn. App. 605, 630 , 180 A.3d 979 (concluding that Patterson held that ‘‘a special credibility instruction is required in situations [in which] a prison inmate has been promised a benefit by the state in return for his or her testimony regarding incriminating statements made by a fellow inmate’’ while both were incarcerated (internal quotation marks

2021Connecticut courts have routinely limited the definition of a jailhouse informant to only those individuals testi- fying to statements made by the defendant while the witness and the defendant were incarcerated together.2 See State v. Salmond, 179 Conn. App. 605, 630 , 180 A.3d 979 (concluding that Patterson held that ‘‘a special credibility instruction is required in situations [in which] a prison inmate has been promised a benefit by the state in return for his or her testimony regarding incriminating statements made by a fellow inmate’’ while both were incarcerated (internal quotation marks

2021Connecticut courts have routinely limited the definition of a jailhouse informant to only those individuals testi- fying to statements made by the defendant while the witness and the defendant were incarcerated together.2 See State v. Salmond, 179 Conn. App. 605, 630 , 180 A.3d 979 (concluding that Patterson held that ‘‘a special credibility instruction is required in situations [in which] a prison inmate has been promised a benefit by the state in return for his or her testimony regarding incriminating statements made by a fellow inmate’’ while both were incarcerated (internal quotation marks

2021See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452, 471 , 886 A.2d 777 (2005) (holding that, for purposes of harmfulness analysis, trial court’s improper failure to provide jury with special credibility instruc- tion for witness who was jailhouse informant was not constitutional in nature); State v. Brown, 187 Conn. 602, 613 , 447 A.2d 734 (1982) (holding that trial court’s failure to give accomplice credibility instruction to jury does not involve violation of constitutional right); State v. Cooper, 182 Conn. 207, 212 , 438 A.2d 418 (1980) (same for complaining witness credibility instruction); see

2021See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452, 471 , 886 A.2d 777 (2005) (holding that, for purposes of harmfulness analysis, trial court’s improper failure to provide jury with special credibility instruc- tion for witness who was jailhouse informant was not constitutional in nature); State v. Brown, 187 Conn. 602, 613 , 447 A.2d 734 (1982) (holding that trial court’s failure to give accomplice credibility instruction to jury does not involve violation of constitutional right); State v. Cooper, 182 Conn. 207, 212 , 438 A.2d 418 (1980) (same for complaining witness credibility instruction); see

2020The question presented in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court correctly held ‘‘that the special credibility instruction required in State v. Pat- terson, [supra, 452 ], was not applicable to an incarcer- ated informant who offered his testimony that the defendant confessed to him when they socialized out- side of prison in exchange for favorable treatment of the informant by the state . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Jones, 331 Conn. 909 , 202 A.3d 1023 (2019).

2020The question presented in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court correctly held ‘‘that the special credibility instruction required in State v. Pat- terson, [supra, 452 ], was not applicable to an incarcer- ated informant who offered his testimony that the defendant confessed to him when they socialized out- side of prison in exchange for favorable treatment of the informant by the state . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Jones, 331 Conn. 909 , 202 A.3d 1023 (2019).

2020Conse- quently, the testimony of such an informant . . . is inevitably suspect.’’ State v. Patterson, supra, 276 Conn. 469 . ‘‘As the United States Supreme Court observed [almost seventy] years ago, ‘[t]he use of informers, accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any of the other betrayals which are ‘‘dirty business’’ may raise serious questions of credibility.’ ’’ Id., quoting On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 , 72 S. Ct. 967 , 96 L.

2020Conse- quently, the testimony of such an informant . . . is inevitably suspect.’’ State v. Patterson, supra, 276 Conn. 469 . ‘‘As the United States Supreme Court observed [almost seventy] years ago, ‘[t]he use of informers, accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any of the other betrayals which are ‘‘dirty business’’ may raise serious questions of credibility.’ ’’ Id., quoting On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 , 72 S. Ct. 967 , 96 L.

2020The inherent unreliability of jailhouse informant testi- mony, combined with the endemic problems of proof, has prompted ‘‘at least eighteen states’’ to require ‘‘some corroboration of jailhouse informant testimony to sup- port a conviction . . . .’’ State v. Marshall, 882 N.W.2d 68, 83 (Iowa 2016), cert. denied, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 829 , 197 L.

2020The inherent unreliability of jailhouse informant testi- mony, combined with the endemic problems of proof, has prompted ‘‘at least eighteen states’’ to require ‘‘some corroboration of jailhouse informant testimony to sup- port a conviction . . . .’’ State v. Marshall, 882 N.W.2d 68, 83 (Iowa 2016), cert. denied, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 829 , 197 L.

2019The defendant's petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 187 Conn.App. 752 , ___ A.3d ___, is granted, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that the special credibility instruction required in State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452 , 886 A.2d 777 (2005), was not applicable to an incarcerated informant who offered his testimony that the defendant confessed to him when they socialized outside of prison in exchange for favorable treatment of the informant by the state?"

2017First, he asked this court to exercise its supervisory powers "to require trial courts to give a special credibility instruction when an incarcerated witness receives a benefit from the state in exchange for testimony regarding a crime that he claims he personally observed prior to his incarceration." Id., at 673 , 123 A.3d 1244 .

2017By order dated April 26, 2017, the court denied the defendant's request, but granted his petition and remanded his appeal "to the Appellate Court with direction to consider [his] claim of plain error in light of State v. McClain , [supra, 324 Conn. at 802 , 155 A.3d 209 ]." The parties thereafter filed supplemental briefs with this court on the issue of whether the defendant's conviction should be reversed pursuant to the plain error doctrine because the trial court "did not sua sponte give a special credibility instruction" to the jury.

2017By order dated April 26, 2017, the court denied the defendant's request, but granted his petition and remanded his appeal "to the Appellate Court with direction to consider [his] claim of plain error in light of State v. McClain , [supra, 324 Conn. at 802 , 155 A.3d 209 ]." The parties thereafter filed supplemental briefs with this court on the issue of whether the defendant's conviction should be reversed pursuant to the plain error doctrine because the trial court "did not sua sponte give a special credibility instruction" to the jury.