special needs test in Illinois

2005A minority of courts have determined that genetic marker testing falls within the special needs doctrine.” Garvin, 349 Ill.

2005A minority of courts have determined that genetic marker testing falls within the special needs doctrine." Garvin , 349 Ill.

2015However, in limited circumstances, “ ‘where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be -5- placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.’ ” Id. at 458 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989)). ¶ 20 This court rejected the Secretary’s argument that section 11-501.6 fell within the special needs exception to the fourth amendment.

2015However, in limited circumstances, “ ‘where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.’ ” Id. at 458 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989)). ¶ 20 This court rejected the Secretary’s argument that section 11-501.6 fell within the special needs exception to the fourth amendment.

2015The court 1 Under the “special needs” exception to the fourth amendment, neither a warrant nor probable cause are required when “ ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)). -3- found the special needs exception underlies both section 11-401(b-1) and section 11-501.6, and that it would be illogical to hold that a person who flees the scene is subject to chemical testi

2015However, in limited circumstances, “ ‘where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.’ ” Id. at 458 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989)). ¶ 20 This court rejected the Secretary’s argument that section 11-501.6 fell within the special needs exception to the fourth amendment.

2015The court 1 Under the “special needs” exception to the fourth amendment, neither a warrant nor probable cause are required when “ ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)). -3- found the special needs exception underlies both section 11-401(b-1) and section 11-501.6, and that it would be illogical to hold that a person who flees the scene is subject to chemical testi

2015See Griffin, 483 U.S. 868 ; New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 .

2004Here, again, the State’s interests prevailed over the defendant’s privacy rights. 2 The Seventh Circuit, upholding a Wisconsin DNA testing statute similar to ours, relied on the special needs test: “ ‘The DNA Act, while implicating the Fourth Amendment, is a reasonable search and seizure under the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because the desire to build a DNA database goes beyond the ordinary law enforcement need.’ ” Green, 354 F.3d at 677 , quoting United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003).

2004Here, again, the State’s interests prevailed over the defendant’s privacy rights. 2 The Seventh Circuit, upholding a Wisconsin DNA testing statute similar to ours, relied on the special needs test: “ ‘The DNA Act, while implicating the Fourth Amendment, is a reasonable search and seizure under the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because the desire to build a DNA database goes beyond the ordinary law enforcement need.’ ” Green, 354 F.3d at 677 , quoting United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003).

2006Ed. 2d at 216 , 121 S. Ct. at 1288 ; see also People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231, 243-53 (2003) (applying the special needs test where, during a warrantless search of the probationer’s motel room, police found items the probationer was barred from possessing under the terms of her probation order).

2006Ed. 2d at 216 , 121 S. Ct. at 1288 ; see also People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231, 243-53 (2003) (applying the special needs test where, during a warrantless search of the probationer=s motel room, police found items the probationer was barred from possessing under the terms of her probation order). -10- Defendant advocates the use of this approach here, asserting that the United States Supreme Court has applied it in the context of other warrantless searches.

2004Here, again, the State’s interests prevailed over the defendant’s privacy rights. 2 The Seventh Circuit, upholding a Wisconsin DNA testing statute similar to ours, relied on the special needs test: “ ‘The DNA Act, while implicating the Fourth Amendment, is a reasonable search and seizure under the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because the desire to build a DNA database goes beyond the ordinary law enforcement need.’ ” Green, 354 F.3d at 677 , quoting United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003).

2004Here, again, the State’s interests prevailed over the defendant’s privacy rights. 2 The Seventh Circuit, upholding a Wisconsin DNA testing statute similar to ours, relied on the special needs test: “ ‘The DNA Act, while implicating the Fourth Amendment, is a reasonable search and seizure under the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because the desire to build a DNA database goes beyond the ordinary law enforcement need.’ ” Green, 354 F.3d at 677 , quoting United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003).

2004Under the special needs analysis, the Supreme Court has stated that a search can still be reasonable in the absence of probable cause “ ‘when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 , 132 L.

2004Under the special needs analysis, the Supreme Court has stated that a search can still be reasonable in the absence of probable cause “ ‘when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 , 132 L.

2004Those courts employing the special needs test have concluded that while there certainly is a relationship between genetic marker collection statutes and the solving of crimes, the immediate and primary purpose of these statutes is to fill and maintain a DNA database, a purpose "distinct from the regular needs of law enforcement." Steele , 155 Ohio App. 3d at 671 , 802 N.E.2d at 1136 ; see also D.L.C. , 124 S.W.2d at 372-73; Martinez , 276 Kan. at 533 , 78 P.3d at 773 ; see, e.g. , Nicholas , No. 01 Civ. 7891 (providing a thorough and well-reasoned discussion of this issue); United States v. Ki

2004Those courts employing the special needs test have concluded that while there certainly is a relationship between genetic marker collection statutes and the solving of crimes, the immediate and primary purpose of these statutes is to fill and maintain a DNA database, a purpose “distinct from the regular needs of law enforcement.” Steele, 155 Ohio App. 3d at 671 , 802 N.E.2d at 1136 ; see also D.L.C., 124 S.W.2d at 372-73; Martinez, 276 Kan. at 533 , 78 P.3d at 773 ; see, e.g., Nicholas, No. 01 Civ. 7891 (providing a thorough and well-reasoned discussion of this issue); United States v. Kincade

2004App. 3d 6 , 636 N.E.2d 1129 (1994), as “definitively rejecting the special needs test and adopting the balance test.” Hall, 352 Ill.

2004Hall cited People v. Wealer, 264 Ill.App.3d 6 , 201 Ill.Dec. 697 , 636 N.E.2d 1129 (1994), as "definitively rejecting the special needs test and adopting the balance test." Hall, 352 Ill.2d at 546-47, 287 Ill.Dec. 703 , 816 N.E.2d 703 , citing Wealer, 264 Ill.App.3d at 14-15 , 201 Ill.Dec. 697 , 636 N.E.2d 1129 .

2006Ed. 2d at 216 , 121 S. Ct. at 1288 ; see also People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231, 243-53 (2003) (applying the special needs test where, during a warrantless search of the probationer’s motel room, police found items the probationer was barred from possessing under the terms of her probation order).

2006Ed. 2d at 216 , 121 S. Ct. at 1288 ; see also People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231, 243-53 (2003) (applying the special needs test where, during a warrantless search of the probationer=s motel room, police found items the probationer was barred from possessing under the terms of her probation order). -10- Defendant advocates the use of this approach here, asserting that the United States Supreme Court has applied it in the context of other warrantless searches.

2005App. 3d at 148 , 817 N.E.2d at 1124 , neither Edmond nor Ferguson holds that the special-needs test should be used “to the express exclusion of the balancing test.” See also United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (analyzing supreme court precedent and concluding that use of the traditional balancing test to uphold genetic-marker testing was proper); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 , 120 n.6, 151 L.

2005As noted in Ramos, 353 Ill.App.3d at 148 , 288 Ill.Dec. 460 , 817 N.E.2d at 1124 , neither Edmond nor Ferguson holds that the special-needs test should be used "to the express exclusion of the balancing test." See also United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (analyzing supreme court precedent and concluding that use of the traditional balancing test to uphold genetic-marker testing proper); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 , 120 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 587 , 592 n. 6, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 , 505 n. 6 (2001) (failing to decide whether a suspicionless search of a probationer's residence w

2004Those courts employing the special needs test have concluded that while there certainly is a relationship between genetic marker collection statutes and the solving of crimes, the immediate and primary purpose of these statutes is to fill and maintain a DNA database, a purpose “distinct from the regular needs of law enforcement.” Steele, 155 Ohio App. 3d at 671 , 802 N.E.2d at 1136 ; see also D.L.C., 124 S.W.2d at 372-73; Martinez, 276 Kan. at 533 , 78 P.3d at 773 ; see, e.g., Nicholas, No. 01 Civ. 7891 (providing a thorough and well-reasoned discussion of this issue); United States v. Kincade

2004Those courts employing the special needs test have concluded that while there certainly is a relationship between genetic marker collection statutes and the solving of crimes, the immediate and primary purpose of these statutes is to fill and maintain a DNA database, a purpose “distinct from the regular needs of law enforcement.” Steele, 155 Ohio App. 3d at 671 , 802 N.E.2d at 1136 ; see also D.L.C., 124 S.W.2d at 372-73; Martinez, 276 Kan. at 533 , 78 P.3d at 773 ; see, e.g., Nicholas, No. 01 Civ. 7891 (providing a thorough and well-reasoned discussion of this issue); United States v. Kincade

2005People v. Edwards, 353 Ill.

2005People v. Edwards, 353 Ill.App.3d 475, 485 , 288 Ill.Dec. 879 , 818 N.E.2d 814, 822 (2004), pet. for leave to appeal pending, No. 99515.

2004See, e.g., Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992); Garvin, 349 Ill.

1994Declining to apply the special needs exception, as the court below had done to uphold the validity of the statute (see Jones, 763 F. Supp. 842 ), the fourth circuit rejected a challenge to a Virginia statute which required all convicted felons, including sex offenders, to provide the State with a blood sample for DNA analysis and storage. (962 F.2d at 304.) Viewing the cases which involve the fourth amendment rights of prison inmates as a class of cases separate from those requiring a special need, the court reasoned that the diminished privacy rights of prisoners and probationers combined wit

2004Courts outside our state which employ this test follow a doctrine that allows for searches and seizures without a warrant and without individualized suspicion as long as a governmental interest exists "beyond the normal need for law enforcement." Steele, 155 Ohio App.3d at 668 , 802 N.E.2d at 1134 ; Martinez, 276 Kan. at 530 , 78 P.3d at 772 ; D.L.C., 124 S.W.3d at 371 .

2004Those courts employing the special needs test have concluded that while there *714 certainly is a relationship between genetic marker collection statutes and the solving of crimes, the immediate and primary purpose of these statutes is to fill and maintain a DNA database, a purpose "distinct from the regular needs of law enforcement." Steele, 155 Ohio App.3d at 671 , 802 N.E.2d at 1136 ; see also D.L.C., 124 S.W.3d at 372-73 ; Martinez, 276 Kan. at 533 , 78 P.3d at 773 ; see, e.g., Nicholas, No. 01 Civ. 7891 (providing a thorough and well-reasoned discussion of this issue); United States v. Ki