special needs analysis in California

2021Labor Executives’ Ass’n (1989) 489 U.S. 602 , 619–624.) A roadblock where “police stopped all vehicles systematically” seeking voluntary assistance to identify the vehicle and driver involved in a hit and run accident has also come within the special needs exception to the warrant requirement.

2006(King, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1371 .) King relied on language in Skinner , in which the Supreme Court recognized the special needs exception, stating: “In most criminal cases, we strike this balance in favor of the procedures described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. [Citations.] Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. [Citations.] We have recognized exceptions to this rule, however, ‘when “special needs, beyond the normal need for

2006However, the searches they discussed were performed on free persons, not incarcerated felons.” (Padgett v. Donald, supra, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279 .) The special needs doctrine is an exception “to the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements . .. where ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” (Nicholas v. Goord, supra, 430 F.3d 652 , 660.) “Such searches, which have historically been treated as a ‘closely guarded category,’ Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 , 117 S.Ct. 1295 , 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997), have b

2006However, the searches they discussed were performed on free persons, not incarcerated felons.” (Padgett v. Donald, supra, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279 .) The special needs doctrine is an exception “to the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements . .. where ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” (Nicholas v. Goord, supra, 430 F.3d 652 , 660.) “Such searches, which have historically been treated as a ‘closely guarded category,’ Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 , 117 S.Ct. 1295 , 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997), have b

2006However, the searches they discussed were performed on free persons, not incarcerated felons.” (Padgett v. Donald, supra, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279 .) The special needs doctrine is an exception “to the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements . .. where ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” (Nicholas v. Goord, supra, 430 F.3d 652 , 660.) “Such searches, which have historically been treated as a ‘closely guarded category,’ Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 , 117 S.Ct. 1295 , 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997), have b

2006However, the searches they discussed were performed on free persons, not incarcerated felons.” (Padgett v. Donald, supra, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279 .) The special needs doctrine is an exception “to the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements . .. where ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” (Nicholas v. Goord, supra, 430 F.3d 652 , 660.) “Such searches, which have historically been treated as a ‘closely guarded category,’ Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 , 117 S.Ct. 1295 , 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997), have b

2006However, the searches they discussed were performed on free persons, not incarcerated felons.” (Padgett v. Donald, supra, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279 .) The special needs doctrine is an exception “to the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements . .. where ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” (Nicholas v. Goord, supra, 430 F.3d 652 , 660.) “Such searches, which have historically been treated as a ‘closely guarded category,’ Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 , 117 S.Ct. 1295 , 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997), have b

2006However, the searches they discussed were performed on free persons, not incarcerated felons.” (Padgett v. Donald, supra, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279 .) The special needs doctrine is an exception “to the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements . .. where ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” (Nicholas v. Goord, supra, 430 F.3d 652 , 660.) “Such searches, which have historically been treated as a ‘closely guarded category,’ Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 , 117 S.Ct. 1295 , 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997), have b

2021(Illinois v. Lidster (2004) 540 U.S. 419 , 427–428.) The special needs doctrine does not apply in the context of an 6 investigatory seizure, such as here, where there are no “programmatic safeguards designed to protect against a law enforcement officer’s arbitrary use of unfettered discretion.” (Curry, at p. 320, fn. 4 [“In the context of an investigatory seizure … , such an inquiry is untenable”].) On the facts elicited at the suppression hearing, defendant’s detention was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

2021(Illinois v. Lidster (2004) 540 U.S. 419 , 427–428.) The special needs doctrine does not apply in the context of an 6 investigatory seizure, such as here, where there are no “programmatic safeguards designed to protect against a law enforcement officer’s arbitrary use of unfettered discretion.” (Curry, at p. 320, fn. 4 [“In the context of an investigatory seizure … , such an inquiry is untenable”].) On the facts elicited at the suppression hearing, defendant’s detention was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

2021THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY HERE The United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the warrant requirement where “ ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” (Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 873 .) The special needs doctrine applies in contexts entirely different from those supporting the exigent circumstances doctrine.

2006(See, e.g., Alfaro v. Terhune, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 505 & cases cited; United States v. Kincade (9th Cir. 2004) 379 F.3d 813, 830-831 (plur. opn. by O'Scannlain, J.) & cases cited.) 22 *1159 People v. King (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1363 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 220 ] (King) rejected a challenge to former section 290.2.

2006(King, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1371 .) King relied on language in Skinner , in which the Supreme Court recognized the special needs exception, stating: “In most criminal cases, we strike this balance in favor of the procedures described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. [Citations.] Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. [Citations.] We have recognized exceptions to this rule, however, ‘when “special needs, beyond the normal need for

2006(See, e.g., Alfaro v. Terhune, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 505 & cases cited; United States v. Kincade (9th Cir. 2004) 379 F.3d 813, 830-831 (plur. opn. by O'Scannlain, J.) & cases cited.) 22 *1159 People v. King (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1363 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 220 ] (King) rejected a challenge to former section 290.2.

2006(Adams, supra, at pp. 255-256 .) The appellate court reviewed the requirements of section 295 et seq., and examined Ferguson, Edmond, King, and Alfaro v. Terhune, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 492 .

2002Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703 [ 96 L.Ed.2d 601, 612-615 , 107 S.Ct. 2636 ] (1987) (search of premises of certain highly regulated businesses); O’Connor v. Ortega [(1987) 480 U.S. 709 ] at 721-725 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 714, 725-728 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 ] (work-related searches of employees’ desks and offices); New Jersey v. T.L.O. [(1985) 469 U.S. 325 ] at 337-342 [ 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 731-735 , 105 S.Ct. 733 ] (search of student’s property by school officials); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-560 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 447, 480-482 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 ] (1979) (body cavity searches of prison inmates).’ [Citations.]” (In

2002Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703 [ 96 L.Ed.2d 601, 612-615 , 107 S.Ct. 2636 ] (1987) (search of premises of certain highly regulated businesses); O’Connor v. Ortega [(1987) 480 U.S. 709 ] at 721-725 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 714, 725-728 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 ] (work-related searches of employees’ desks and offices); New Jersey v. T.L.O. [(1985) 469 U.S. 325 ] at 337-342 [ 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 731-735 , 105 S.Ct. 733 ] (search of student’s property by school officials); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-560 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 447, 480-482 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 ] (1979) (body cavity searches of prison inmates).’ [Citations.]” (In

2002(Id. at p. 323 [91 S.Ct. at pp. 388-389].) The Wyman court cited the California case, Parrish v. Civil Service Commission, supra 66 Cal.2d 260 , which involved early morning mass raid upon homes of welfare recipients, in observing: “Our holding today does not mean, of course, that a termination of benefits upon refusal of a home visit is to be upheld against constitutional challenge under all conceivable circumstances.” (Wyman v. James, supra, 400 U.S. at p. 326 [ 91 S.Ct. at p. 390 ].) While the jurisprudence of the special needs doctrine has expanded a great deal since Parrish was decided in

2002Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703 [ 96 L.Ed.2d 601, 612-615 , 107 S.Ct. 2636 ] (1987) (search of premises of certain highly regulated businesses); O’Connor v. Ortega [(1987) 480 U.S. 709 ] at 721-725 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 714, 725-728 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 ] (work-related searches of employees’ desks and offices); New Jersey v. T.L.O. [(1985) 469 U.S. 325 ] at 337-342 [ 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 731-735 , 105 S.Ct. 733 ] (search of student’s property by school officials); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-560 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 447, 480-482 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 ] (1979) (body cavity searches of prison inmates).’ [Citations.]” (In

2002Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703 [ 96 L.Ed.2d 601, 612-615 , 107 S.Ct. 2636 ] (1987) (search of premises of certain highly regulated businesses); O’Connor v. Ortega [(1987) 480 U.S. 709 ] at 721-725 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 714, 725-728 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 ] (work-related searches of employees’ desks and offices); New Jersey v. T.L.O. [(1985) 469 U.S. 325 ] at 337-342 [ 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 731-735 , 105 S.Ct. 733 ] (search of student’s property by school officials); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-560 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 447, 480-482 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 ] (1979) (body cavity searches of prison inmates).’ [Citations.]” (In