special needs doctrine in Texas

2015Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178 , at *14–15; see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).

2015Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178 , at *14–15; see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).

2016Furthermore, in Villarreal, the court of criminal appeals determined that the special-needs exception was inapplicable “when the search of a DWI suspect’s blood is undertaken by law-enforcement officers for the primary purpose of generating evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution,” 475 S.W.3d at 807 , and that the search-incident-to-arrest exception was inapplicable “because that exception to the warrant requirement applies only if such a search is ‘substantially contemporaneous’ with the arrest and is confined to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee” and because “there

2016Furthermore, in Villarreal, the court of criminal appeals determined that the special-needs exception was inapplicable “when the search of a DWI suspect’s blood is undertaken by law-enforcement officers for the primary purpose of generating evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution,” 475 S.W.3d at 807 , and that the search-incident-to-arrest exception was inapplicable “because that exception to the warrant requirement applies only if such a search is ‘substantially contemporaneous’ with the arrest and is confined to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee” and because “there

2021State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. Crim.

2019These exceptions include “the consent exception, the exigency exception, the automobile exception, the search-incident- to-arrest exception, and the special-needs exception.” State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. Crim.

2017The “Special Needs” Exception The State is correct that some school searches fall under the special needs exception. 5 Under the special needs exception, a warrantless search is reasonable when “ ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).

2017The “Special Needs” Exception The State is correct that some school searches fall under the special needs exception. 5 Under the special needs exception, a warrantless search is reasonable when “ ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).

2017Established exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the exigency exception, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), the automobile exception, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), the search-incident-to-arrest exception, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), and the special-needs exception, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987).

2017Established exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the exigency exception, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), the automobile exception, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), the search-incident-to-arrest exception, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), and the special-needs exception, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987).

2015The records do not reflect any other exception to justify the search. 13 We further point out that this court has already rejected the State’s argument that the evidence should not be excluded under article 38.23. 14 We therefore hold that the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the blood test results in each case. 15 12 See id. 13 See Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178 at *10 (rejecting implied consent, exceptions to the warrant requirement—the automobile exception, the special- needs exception, and the search-incident-to-arrest-exception, as well as the treatment of the bloo

2014As described above, the special-needs doctrine is limited to situations involving “special needs beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.” Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 ; see also King, 133 S.Ct. at 1978 (describing special-needs doctrine as encompassing “programmatic searches of either the public at large or a particular class of regulated but otherwise law-abiding citizens”).

2015See Villarreal, — S.W.3d at—, 2014 WL 6734178, at *8 (discussing consent, automobile, search-incident-to-arrest, and special-needs exceptions); Gore v. State, 451 S.W.3d 182,193-97 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. filed) (discussing exigency exception) Here, it is undisputed that appellant’s blood sample was taken without a warrant.

2015See Villarreal, — S.W.3d at —, —, 2014 WL 6734178, at *8 (discussing consent, automobile, search-incident-to-arrest, and special-needs exceptions); Gore v. State, 451 S.W.3d 182, 193-97 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. filed) (discussing exigency exception).

2014The recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement that the State suggests are implicated in the present case are the consent exception, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); the automobile exception, see California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); the search-incident-to-arrest exception, see Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 ; and the special-needs doctrine, see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). 2.

2014The recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement that the State suggests are implicated in the present case are the consent exception, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); the automobile exception, see California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); the search-incident-to-arrest exception, see Gant, 556 U.S. at 339 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 ; and the special-needs doctrine, see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). 2.

2014See id. at 81 , 121 S.Ct. 1281 (rejecting applicability of special needs when purpose “actually served” by search “ ‘is ultimately indistinguishable from t the general - interest in crime control’”) (citing Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 , 121 S.Ct. 447 , 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000)).

2014See id. at 81 , 121 S.Ct. 1281 (rejecting applicability of special needs when purpose “actually served” by search “ ‘is ultimately indistinguishable from t the general - interest in crime control’”) (citing Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 , 121 S.Ct. 447 , 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000)).

2014See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 , 121 S.Ct. 1281 , 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001) (invalidating public hospital’s policy of conducting nonconsensual testing of pregnant women for illicit drug use because “the immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes”; given that fact, the case “simply does not fit within, the closely guarded category of ‘special needs’”); see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 (upholding warrantless drug testing of railroad employees in part because testing was “not to assist in the prosecution of empl

2014See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 , 121 S.Ct. 1281 , 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001) (invalidating public hospital’s policy of conducting nonconsensual testing of pregnant women for illicit drug use because “the immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes”; given that fact, the case “simply does not fit within, the closely guarded category of ‘special needs’”); see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 (upholding warrantless drug testing of railroad employees in part because testing was “not to assist in the prosecution of empl

2014Reásonableness is Judged Under the Totality of Circumstances “Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, we generally determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ” Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2484 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 , 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999)).

2014Reásonableness is Judged Under the Totality of Circumstances “Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, we generally determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ” Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2484 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 , 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999)).

2014See id.

2014See id.

2017T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 , 105 S.Ct. 733 ; Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-57 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 , 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) (“T.L.O. did not deny, but indeed emphasized, that the nature of [the State’s power over schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults”).

2017T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 , 105 S.Ct. 733 ; Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-57 , 115 S.Ct. 2386 , 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) (“T.L.O. did not deny, but indeed emphasized, that the nature of [the State’s power over schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults”).

2016In light of the analyses from Villarreal and from subsequent opinions by this Court applying Villarreal, we must conclude that the warrantless blood draw at issue was not authorized under the mandatory-blood-draw and implied-consent provisions of the Transportation Code. 475 S.W.3d at 793 ; see State v. Molden, No. 03-14-00166-CR, 2016 WL 690795, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 17, 2016, pet. filed) (applying Villarreal and overruling State’s arguments).

2015See Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (holding that facial challenge to constitutionality of statute is forfeitable right that is waived if defendant fails to raise it in trial court); Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (holding that, to preserve error, defendant must make specific, timely challenge to constitutionality of statute as applied to him). 4 The State in Villarreal also argued that its search was permissible pursuant to the automobile exception, the special- needs exception, and the search-incident-to-arrest exception.

2015See id. art. that (1) a warrantless, nonconsensual blood test un- 38.23(b) (providing the only exception for officers der the transportation code should be upheld as cat- acting in good-faith reliance upon a warrant); State egorically reasonable under the consent excep- v. Anderson, 445 S.W.3d 895 , 912 tion—applicable in the form of a prior waiver (Tex.App.–Beaumont 2014, no. pet. h.) (explaining through implied consent, the automobile exception, that the federal exclusionary rule, unlike Texas's, the special-needs exception, or the search-incid- has at least three good faith exceptions) (cit

2015See Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (holding that facial challenge to constitutionality of statute is forfeitable right that is waived if defendant fails to raise it in trial court); Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (holding that, to preserve error, defendant must make specific, timely challenge to constitutionality of statute as applied to him). 4 The State in Villarreal also argued that its search was permissible pursuant to the automobile exception, the special- needs exception, and the search-incident-to-arrest exception.

2015See Burks v. State, 454 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2015, no pet. h.) (noting that “there is no exception to our statutory exclusionary rule for an officer’s good faith reliance on a statute”). .