7 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burris v. Cross Mountain Coal Co.green2 sentences1992See Burris v. Cross Mountain Coal Co., 798 S.W.2d 746 (Tenn.1990). 1991See Burris v. Cross Mountain Coal, 798 S.W.2d 746 (Tenn.1990) (commutation approved to purchase house); Clark v. National Union Fire Ins., 774 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn.1989) (partial commutation approved for downpayment on house); Flowers v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 672 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tenn.1984) (commutation approved for purchase of condominium, so disabled employee would not be burdened with yard work and maintenance); Kelley v. 3-M Co., 639 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn.1982) (commutation approved for purchase of mobile home and rehabilitation program to develop new skills); Smith v. Gallatin Nursing | 2 | 2 |
New Jersey v. T. L. O.green1 sentence2020The United States Supreme Court, in discussing the special needs exception to the warrant requirement, has recognized that programmatic searches performed in the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion may be permissible “in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)). | 1 | 1 |
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raabgreen1 sentence2020Because it does not appear that the Defendant’s probationary status, including any possible probation search condition, was a “salient” circumstance taken into consideration by the trial court, we are precluded from addressing whether the search could be supported upon such a basis pursuant to Knights and must address the constitutional issue presented by the special needs exception. -11- “When such ‘special needs’—concerns other than crime detection—are alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing p | 1 | 1 |
Vernonia School District 47J v. Actongreen1 sentence2020For example, the Court, in Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, held that a public-school district’s student athlete drug policy, which included a random urinalysis requirement for participation in interscholastic athletics, did not violate the student’s federal constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches. 515 U.S. 646, 652-665 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Odomgreen1 sentence2020On appellate review of suppression issues, the prevailing party “is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.” State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Talleygreen1 sentence2020On appellate review of suppression issues, the prevailing party “is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.” State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). | 1 | 1 |
O'CONNOR v. Ortegagreen1 sentence2020The United States Supreme Court, in discussing the special needs exception to the warrant requirement, has recognized that programmatic searches performed in the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion may be permissible “in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)). | 1 | 1 |
State of Tennessee v. Christine Caudlegreen1 sentence2018The State responds, and we agree, that the trial court properly denied probation or alternative sentence. “[T]he abuse of discretion standard, accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness, applies to within-range sentences that reflect a decision based upon the purposes and principles of sentencing, including questions related to probation or any other alternative sentence.” State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bostongreen1 sentence2013Grigsby, 957 S.W.2d at 546 ; State v. Boston, 938 S.W.2d 435, 438 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Vore v. United States Department of Justicegreen1 sentence2005“If the court determines that the primary purpose of the law or policy is beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it must perform ‘a careful balancing of governmental and private interests.’” Vore v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1133 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Flowers v. South Central Bell Telephone Co.green1 sentence1991See Burris v. Cross Mountain Coal, 798 S.W.2d 746 (Tenn.1990) (commutation approved to purchase house); Clark v. National Union Fire Ins., 774 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn.1989) (partial commutation approved for downpayment on house); Flowers v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 672 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tenn.1984) (commutation approved for purchase of condominium, so disabled employee would not be burdened with yard work and maintenance); Kelley v. 3-M Co., 639 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn.1982) (commutation approved for purchase of mobile home and rehabilitation program to develop new skills); Smith v. Gallatin Nursing | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Doe
green
1 sentence2020The Supreme Court of Idaho took guidance from Ferguson in Doe, 233 P.3d 1275 , in deciding that the magistrate court’s order for random drug screens of the parents -12- constituted an illegal search and seizure. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Chandler v. Miller
green
1 sentence2020Because it does not appear that the Defendant’s probationary status, including any possible probation search condition, was a “salient” circumstance taken into consideration by the trial court, we are precluded from addressing whether the search could be supported upon such a basis pursuant to Knights and must address the constitutional issue presented by the special needs exception. -11- “When such ‘special needs’—concerns other than crime detection—are alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing p | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ferguson v. City of Charleston
green
1 sentence2020The Supreme Court found the distinction critical, explaining as follows: “Because law enforcement involvement always serves some broader social purpose or objective, under respondents’ view, virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose.” Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Griffin v. Wisconsin
green
1 sentence2019Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Knights
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 117-18 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Grigsby
green
2 sentences2013Id. 2013Grigsby, 957 S.W.2d at 546 ; State v. Boston, 938 S.W.2d 435, 438 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Balding v. State
green
1 sentence2005Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 , 77 (2nd Cir. 1999); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1983); Balding v. State, 812 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re D.L.C., 124 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993); Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Kimler
green
1 sentence2005Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 , 77 (2nd Cir. 1999); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1983); Balding v. State, 812 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re D.L.C., 124 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993); Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Olivas
green
1 sentence2005Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 , 77 (2nd Cir. 1999); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1983); Balding v. State, 812 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re D.L.C., 124 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993); Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Doles v. State
green
1 sentence2005Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 , 77 (2nd Cir. 1999); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1983); Balding v. State, 812 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re D.L.C., 124 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993); Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
In Re DLC
green
1 sentence2005Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 , 77 (2nd Cir. 1999); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1983); Balding v. State, 812 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re D.L.C., 124 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993); Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
cluster 766353
green
1 sentence2005Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 , 77 (2nd Cir. 1999); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1983); Balding v. State, 812 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re D.L.C., 124 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993); Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Norman C. Green, Jr., Donald Lee, Glenn Turner, and Dennis E. Jones-El v. Gerald A. Berge and James E. Doyle, Attorney General
green
1 sentence2005Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 , 77 (2nd Cir. 1999); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1983); Balding v. State, 812 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re D.L.C., 124 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993); Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315 (Wyo. 1999). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Kelley v. 3-M CO.
green
1 sentence1991See Burris v. Cross Mountain Coal, 798 S.W.2d 746 (Tenn.1990) (commutation approved to purchase house); Clark v. National Union Fire Ins., 774 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn.1989) (partial commutation approved for downpayment on house); Flowers v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 672 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tenn.1984) (commutation approved for purchase of condominium, so disabled employee would not be burdened with yard work and maintenance); Kelley v. 3-M Co., 639 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn.1982) (commutation approved for purchase of mobile home and rehabilitation program to develop new skills); Smith v. Gallatin Nursing | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Clark v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1991See Burris v. Cross Mountain Coal, 798 S.W.2d 746 (Tenn.1990) (commutation approved to purchase house); Clark v. National Union Fire Ins., 774 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn.1989) (partial commutation approved for downpayment on house); Flowers v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 672 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tenn.1984) (commutation approved for purchase of condominium, so disabled employee would not be burdened with yard work and maintenance); Kelley v. 3-M Co., 639 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn.1982) (commutation approved for purchase of mobile home and rehabilitation program to develop new skills); Smith v. Gallatin Nursing | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Smith v. Gallatin Nursing Home
green
1 sentence1991See Burris v. Cross Mountain Coal, 798 S.W.2d 746 (Tenn.1990) (commutation approved to purchase house); Clark v. National Union Fire Ins., 774 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn.1989) (partial commutation approved for downpayment on house); Flowers v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 672 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tenn.1984) (commutation approved for purchase of condominium, so disabled employee would not be burdened with yard work and maintenance); Kelley v. 3-M Co., 639 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn.1982) (commutation approved for purchase of mobile home and rehabilitation program to develop new skills); Smith v. Gallatin Nursing | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.