State argued hearing in Illinois

2018The appellate court agreed. 2016 IL App (2d) 150456, ¶ 9 . ¶ 12 The appellate court observed that Grogan held “[t]he offense of violation of bail bond, unlike the offense of escape of a convicted felon, is *** not the kind of offense that poses a continuing threat to society, nor can it *** be defined as a series of related acts constituting a single [course] of conduct, such as conspiracy or embezzlement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 15. ¶ 13 The appellate court determined that the Grogan court was wrong on both points and that it had misapprehended the nature of the offense.

2017The appellate court agreed. 2016 IL App (2d) 150456 , ¶ 9, 406 Ill.Dec. 7 , 59 N.E.3d 785 . ¶ 12 The appellate court observed that Grogan held "[t]he offense of violation of bail bond, unlike the offense of escape of a convicted felon, is * * * not the kind of offense that poses a continuing threat to society, nor can it * * * be defined as a series of related acts constituting a single [course] of conduct, such as conspiracy or embezzlement." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 15. ¶ 13 The appellate court determined that the Grogan court was wrong on both points and that it had misappr

2018Id. ¶ 41 In Russell, as in Turner and the instant case, the State argued that the claim lacked merit and, as such, counsel’s failure to amend it did not amount to unreasonable assistance.

2018Id. ¶ 41 In Russell , as in Turner and the instant case, the State argued that the claim lacked merit and, as such, counsel's failure to amend it did not amount to unreasonable assistance.

2010On appeal, the State argued that the rule of the home was a “law” under the official misconduct statute because it was “a properly promulgated administrative rule or regulation.” The appellate court rejected the State’s argument, holding that the record only demonstrated “someone in authority at the Home thought this rule to be desirable, included it in the list of employment rules to be passed out to all employees, and defendant was given a copy.” Gray, 221 Ill.

2010On appeal, the State argued that the rule of the home was a “law” under the official misconduct statute because it was “a properly promulgated administrative rule or regulation.” The appellate court rejected the State’s argument, holding that the record only demonstrated “someone in authority at the Home thought this rule to be desirable, included it in the list of employment rules to be passed out to all employees, and defendant was given a copy.” Gray, 221 Ill.

2006Gaines, 335 Ill.

2006Gaines, 335 Ill.

1985App.3d 922, 927 , 458 N.E.2d 1089 .) The State argued at the hearing on the motion to reinstate, and in its brief on appeal, that any delay is excusable and reasonable because of the complainant's mental retardation and dependency on his father for transportation to court *501 and for support while at court.

1985App. 3d 922, 927 , 458 N.E.2d 1089 .) The State argued at the hearing on the motion to reinstate, and in its brief on appeal, that any delay is excusable and reasonable because of the complainant’s mental retardation and dependency on his father for transportation to court and for support while at court.

2025Specifically, the State noted section 3-6-3(a)(2)(i) of the Unified Code had been found facially constitutional in cases like People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (2d) 170646, ¶ 10 , such that defendant could not claim the judgment against him was based on a statute that was void ab initio and, therefore, void itself.

2025At no time during the video did defendant state that he possessed cannabis either on his person or that there was cannabis in his vehicle. ¶ 11 The State argued at the hearing that the officers could ask defendant to exit the car at any time during the traffic stop under Pennsylvania v. Mims, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).

2024The defense represented that those persistent characteristics were ongoing issues that would have been present at the time of the incidents and - 21 - 2024 IL App (2d) 230259 were relevant to the “court in determining whether a crime was knowingly committed.” The trial court characterized its understanding that the defense was seeking the introduction and judicial notice of the evaluations and reports as supporting a guilty but mentally ill determination, which would not be an available result in a discharge hearing.

2024Likewise, in People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 49 (2001), the State argued that the standard of review for (constitutional) speedy-trial claims should be abuse of discretion, because the trial court must “balance” the four Barker factors (see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)), and in so doing, it necessarily “exercises discretion.” Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 49 .

2023In Brant, the State argued the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied and asserted, “because defendant hit the car[,] he therefore must not have reduced his speed to avoid the accident.” 82 Ill.

2022The focus of the PSI does not specifically include screening for an ineffectiveness claim, but courts have found such a claim in a PSI. ¶ 50 In People v. Craig, 2020 IL App (2d) 170679, ¶ 18 , the State argued that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not properly presented to the court, as the “ ‘statements were buried in the text of a PSI report prepared by court services, not defendant.’ ” The appellate court determined that the “PSI was prepared by court services, but the statements at issue were unquestionably those of defendant and, as noted, made a clear claim of ineffecti

2022Moreover, a PSI is prepared for the court, and the court is required to consider it.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id.

2021It should be carefully examined in light of the other evidence in the case.” ¶ 19 Relying on this court’s decision in People v. Rivera, 166 Ill. 2d 279 (1995), the State argued that this instruction was proper regarding McGee’s testimony.

2020Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 21 .

2015Id.

2014Blair, 215 Ill. 2d at 456 . ¶ 39 Defendant argues in his reply brief that he was “not required to seek to vacate his plea as his only available remedy for counsel’s deficient representation.” He argues that, rather than claiming that his “sentence is excessive per se,” he is alleging “that the procedures used to determine his sentence were improper because, due to ineffective representation by plea counsel, the trial judge relied on inaccurate and unreliable information when determining his sentence” (emphasis in original).

1993App. 3d 864 , 583 N.E.2d 54 , we recently invoked the plain error rule to review the validity of a jury waiver even though the State argued waiver, because the defendant did not raise the issue in his post-trial motion.

1984(See People v. Gallardo (1983), 112 Ill.

1981App. 3d 696 , 315 N.E.2d 904 , the State argued that no error resulted from the failure to give IPI Criminal No. 2.03, as the jury was adequately informed as to the presumption of innocence and burden of proof from the statements and arguments of counsel.

1981This court disagreed, however, stating: “IPI 2.03 is explicit and concise, and we find it difficult to believe that the statements and arguments of counsel, referred to by the State above, would have the same impact on the jurors as would the instruction.” ( 21 Ill.