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9 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Vaughn v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See also Vaughn v. State, 782 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Morse in deciding to address defendant’s challenge to constitutionality of statute even though defendant filed no motion to dismiss and State argued waiver on appeal), trans. denied; Boyd v. State, 889 N.E.2d 321, 323-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (following Morse and Vaughn in choosing to address defendant’s claim that statute was unconstitutionally vague even though he did not file proper motion to dismiss and the State argued waiver on appeal), trans. denied. [15] Ind. Code § 31-33-5-1 imposes a duty upon an individual “wh 2015As explained in Baumgartner , the Morse Court stated without mentioning Payne or Rhinehardt that “the constitutionality of a statute may be raised at any stage of the proceeding including raising the issue sua sponte by this Court.” Id. (quoting Morse, 593 N.E.2d at 197 ); See also Boyd v. State, 889 N.E.2d 321, 323-324 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (following Morse in choosing to address on the merits defendant’s claim that statute was unconstitutionally vague even though he did not file a proper motion to dismiss and the State argued waiver on appeal), trans. denied; Vaughn v. State, 782 N.E.2d 417, 420 | 6 | 6 |
Boyd v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See also Vaughn v. State, 782 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Morse in deciding to address defendant’s challenge to constitutionality of statute even though defendant filed no motion to dismiss and State argued waiver on appeal), trans. denied; Boyd v. State, 889 N.E.2d 321, 323-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (following Morse and Vaughn in choosing to address defendant’s claim that statute was unconstitutionally vague even though he did not file proper motion to dismiss and the State argued waiver on appeal), trans. denied. [15] Ind. Code § 31-33-5-1 imposes a duty upon an individual “wh 2015As explained in Baumgartner , the Morse Court stated without mentioning Payne or Rhinehardt that “the constitutionality of a statute may be raised at any stage of the proceeding including raising the issue sua sponte by this Court.” Id. (quoting Morse, 593 N.E.2d at 197 ); See also Boyd v. State, 889 N.E.2d 321, 323-324 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (following Morse in choosing to address on the merits defendant’s claim that statute was unconstitutionally vague even though he did not file a proper motion to dismiss and the State argued waiver on appeal), trans. denied; Vaughn v. State, 782 N.E.2d 417, 420 | 3 | 3 |
Morse v. Stategreen2 sentences2015As explained in Baumgartner , the Morse Court stated without mentioning Payne or Rhinehardt that “the constitutionality of a statute may be raised at any stage of the proceeding including raising the issue sua sponte by this Court.” Id. (quoting Morse, 593 N.E.2d at 197 ); See also Boyd v. State, 889 N.E.2d 321, 323-324 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (following Morse in choosing to address on the merits defendant’s claim that statute was unconstitutionally vague even though he did not file a proper motion to dismiss and the State argued waiver on appeal), trans. denied; Vaughn v. State, 782 N.E.2d 417, 420 2015As explained in Baumgartner , the Morse Court stated without mentioning Payne or Rhinehardt that “the constitutionality of a statute may be raised at any stage of the proceeding including raising the issue sua sponte by this Court.” Id. (quoting Morse, 593 N.E.2d at 197 ); See also Boyd v. State, 889 N.E.2d 321, 323-324 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (following Morse in choosing to address on the merits defendant’s claim that statute was unconstitutionally vague even though he did not file a proper motion to dismiss and the State argued waiver on appeal), trans. denied; Vaughn v. State, 782 N.E.2d 417, 420 | 2 | 3 |
Litchfield v. Stategreen1 sentence2007However, at oral argument, the State argued that the standard for a seizure should be lower than that for a search. [12] We therefore join the Florida and Pennsylvania courts, and disagree with the Illinois appellate court's holding in Kline. [13] We therefore join the Third Circuit in its disagreement with the California supreme court's holding in Randy G. [14] Our supreme court has held that in order to search an Indiana citizen's trash, officers must have "articulable individualized suspicion, essentially the same as is required for a `Terry stop' of an automobile." Litchfield v. State, 824 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Christapher Batchelor v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 556 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Johnson v. Estate of Rayburn
green
1 sentence1995The case law, developed under the now repealed statutory provisions, required indicia or "badges of fraud" such as: "'the transfer of property by a debtor during the pendency of a suit; a transfer of property that renders the debtor insolvent or greatly reduces his estate; a series of contemporaneous transactions which strip a debtor of all property available for execution; secret or hurried transactions not in the usual mode of doing business; any transaction conducted in a manner differing from customary methods; a transaction whereby the debtor retains benefits over the transferred property | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.