interspousal immunity in Maryland

2022In Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 275 (1983), the Court of Appeals abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immunity in negligence cases.19 Three years later, in Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542 , 544–45 (1986), the Court of Appeals considered whether, in light of its decision in Boblitz and decisions from other states relating to parent-child immunity, Maryland should (1) abrogate the doctrine in its entirety or (2) create an exception for negligence actions arising out of the operation and use of motor vehicles.

2015In Boblitz v. Boblitz, the Court of Appeals recognized that where the legislature intends, “[the common law] may be changed by legislative act as Art. 5 of the Declaration of Rights expressly provides[.]” 296 Md. 242, 274 , 462 A.2d 506 (1983) (quoting Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 341-42 , 396 A.2d 1054 (1979)), holding modified by Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 470 , 830 A.2d 450 (2003) (judicially abrogating the interspousal immunity doctrine as “a vestige of the past [and] no longer suitable to our people” and stating that where no legislative barrier to abrogation exists, the Court of Appea

2016In Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 497 (2003), we modified Boblitz by expanding the variety of torts for which one spouse could sue another: “Joining the many of our sister States that have already done so, we abrogate the interspousal immunity rule, a vestige of the past, whose time has come and gone, as to all cases alleging an intentional tort.” 9 Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 417 (2012) identified various cases in which we overruled our prior decisions: This Court has not hesitated to overrule prior decisions which are clearly wrong.

2016In Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 497 , 830 A.2d 450 (2003), we modified Boblitz by expanding the variety of torts for which one spouse could sue another: “Joining the many of our sister States that have already done so, we abrogate the interspousal immunity rule, a vestige of the past, whose time has come and gone, as to all cases alleging an intentional tort.” .

2003Doe, supra, *469 358 Md. at 119 , 747 A.2d at 619 (“Prior to Lusby , the doctrine of interspousal immunity in tort cases was clearly recognized as part of the common law of this state.”).

2003Doe, supra, *469 358 Md. at 119 , 747 A.2d at 619 (“Prior to Lusby , the doctrine of interspousal immunity in tort cases was clearly recognized as part of the common law of this state.”).

2022The parent-child immunity doctrine in the United States In contrast to the doctrine of interspousal immunity,7 whose conceptual origins were deeply embedded in English common law, “there is nothing in the English decisions to suggest that at common law a child could not sue a parent for a personal tort.” Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 64 (1951).8 7 The history of interspousal tort immunity in Maryland is summarized in Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334 , 337–46 (1978).

2022The parent-child immunity doctrine in the United States In contrast to the doctrine of interspousal immunity,7 whose conceptual origins were deeply embedded in English common law, “there is nothing in the English decisions to suggest that at common law a child could not sue a parent for a personal tort.” Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 64 (1951).8 7 The history of interspousal tort immunity in Maryland is summarized in Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334 , 337–46 (1978).

2003We conclude, therefore, that the conduct that underlies appellant’s claim of malicious prosecution is not, in and of itself, indicative of the sort of outrageous conduct contemplated by the Lusby exception to interspousal immunity.” Id. at 197-98, 806 A.2d at 748 . 3 Accordingly, the intermediate appellate court held that “malicious prosecution is not so outrageous as to bring it within the narrow exception to the doctrine of interspousal immunity.” The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Count I of the Second Amended Complaint.

2003We conclude, therefore, that the conduct that underlies appellant’s claim of malicious prosecution is not, in and of itself, indicative of the sort of outrageous conduct contemplated by the Lusby exception to interspousal immunity.” Id. at 197-98, 806 A.2d at 748 . 3 Accordingly, the intermediate appellate court held that “malicious prosecution is not so outrageous as to bring it within the narrow exception to the doctrine of interspousal immunity.” The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Count I of the Second Amended Complaint.

2003The Court in Gregg, 199 Md. at 666 , 87 A.2d at 583 labeled the domestic tranquility rationale for the interspousal immunity doctrine “as artificial as” the unity of husband and wife rationale.

2003The Court in Gregg, 199 Md. at 666 , 87 A.2d at 583 labeled the domestic tranquility rationale for the interspousal immunity doctrine “as artificial as” the unity of husband and wife rationale.

2003Two years after Lusby , the Court of Special Appeals, in Linton v. Linton, 46 Md.App. 660, 664 , 420 A.2d 1249, 1251 (1980) construed our holding in that case to create a narrow exception to the interspousal immunity doctrine, to wit, “whenever the tort committed against the spousal victim is not only intentional, as in assault and battery, but ‘outrageous,’ as where the errant spouse’s conduct transcends common decency and accepted practices.” Subsequently, the intermediate appellate court concluded otherwise, construing Lusby more broadly as recognizing that the “intentional infliction of a

2003Two years after Lusby , the Court of Special Appeals, in Linton v. Linton, 46 Md.App. 660, 664 , 420 A.2d 1249, 1251 (1980) construed our holding in that case to create a narrow exception to the interspousal immunity doctrine, to wit, “whenever the tort committed against the spousal victim is not only intentional, as in assault and battery, but ‘outrageous,’ as where the errant spouse’s conduct transcends common decency and accepted practices.” Subsequently, the intermediate appellate court concluded otherwise, construing Lusby more broadly as recognizing that the “intentional infliction of a

2002Our decision in Bender led us, in Doe v. Doe, 122 Md.App. 295, 309 , 712 A.2d 132 (1998), rev’d, 358 Md. 113, 747 A.2d 617 (2000), to declare that neither the doctrine of interspousal immunity nor public policy barred the husband’s causes of action for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

2002Our decision in Bender led us, in Doe v. Doe, 122 Md.App. 295, 309 , 712 A.2d 132 (1998), rev’d, 358 Md. 113, 747 A.2d 617 (2000), to declare that neither the doctrine of interspousal immunity nor public policy barred the husband’s causes of action for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

2003Stokes, supra, 248 Md. at 692 , 237 A.2d at 763 (declining to change the interspousal immunity rule and noting that change, if any, would be left to Legislature); Ennis, supra, 222 Md. at 542 , 161 A.2d at 702 (“We can only repeat that if it be desirable to permit a married woman, under certain circumstances, to sue her husband in tort, this authorization should emanate from the *474 Legislature, not from the courts”); Fernandez, 214 Md. at 524 , 135 A.2d at 889 (“Those in the situation of the appellant must proceed in equity until the Legislature sees fit to change the law.”); Gregg, supra, 1

2003Stokes, supra, 248 Md. at 692 , 237 A.2d at 763 (declining to change the interspousal immunity rule and noting that change, if any, would be left to Legislature); Ennis, supra, 222 Md. at 542 , 161 A.2d at 702 (“We can only repeat that if it be desirable to permit a married woman, under certain circumstances, to sue her husband in tort, this authorization should emanate from the *474 Legislature, not from the courts”); Fernandez, 214 Md. at 524 , 135 A.2d at 889 (“Those in the situation of the appellant must proceed in equity until the Legislature sees fit to change the law.”); Gregg, supra, 1

2015In Boblitz v. Boblitz, the Court of Appeals recognized that where the legislature intends, “[the common law] may be changed by legislative act as Art. 5 of the Declaration of Rights expressly provides[.]” 296 Md. 242, 274 , 462 A.2d 506 (1983) (quoting Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 341-42 , 396 A.2d 1054 (1979)), holding modified by Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 470 , 830 A.2d 450 (2003) (judicially abrogating the interspousal immunity doctrine as “a vestige of the past [and] no longer suitable to our people” and stating that where no legislative barrier to abrogation exists, the Court of Appea

2015In Boblitz v. Boblitz, the Court of Appeals recognized that where the legislature intends, “[the common law] may be changed by legislative act as Art. 5 of the Declaration of Rights expressly provides[.]” 296 Md. 242, 274 , 462 A.2d 506 (1983) (quoting Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 341-42 , 396 A.2d 1054 (1979)), holding modified by Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 470 , 830 A.2d 450 (2003) (judicially abrogating the interspousal immunity doctrine as “a vestige of the past [and] no longer suitable to our people” and stating that where no legislative barrier to abrogation exists, the Court of Appea

2003Stokes, supra, 248 Md. at 692 , 237 A.2d at 763 (declining to change the interspousal immunity rule and noting that change, if any, would be left to Legislature); Ennis, supra, 222 Md. at 542 , 161 A.2d at 702 (“We can only repeat that if it be desirable to permit a married woman, under certain circumstances, to sue her husband in tort, this authorization should emanate from the *474 Legislature, not from the courts”); Fernandez, 214 Md. at 524 , 135 A.2d at 889 (“Those in the situation of the appellant must proceed in equity until the Legislature sees fit to change the law.”); Gregg, supra, 1

2003Stokes, supra, 248 Md. at 692 , 237 A.2d at 763 (declining to change the interspousal immunity rule and noting that change, if any, would be left to Legislature); Ennis, supra, 222 Md. at 542 , 161 A.2d at 702 (“We can only repeat that if it be desirable to permit a married woman, under certain circumstances, to sue her husband in tort, this authorization should emanate from the *474 Legislature, not from the courts”); Fernandez, 214 Md. at 524 , 135 A.2d at 889 (“Those in the situation of the appellant must proceed in equity until the Legislature sees fit to change the law.”); Gregg, supra, 1

2000This Court stated many years ago: “Maryland w[ould] not entertain a suit by one spouse against the other for his or her tort, committed during the marital status.” Tobin v. Hoffman, 202 Md. 382, 391 , 96 A.2d 597, 601 (1953).

2000This Court stated many years ago: “Maryland w[ould] not entertain a suit by one spouse against the other for his or her tort, committed during the marital status.” Tobin v. Hoffman, 202 Md. 382, 391 , 96 A.2d 597, 601 (1953).

1994Facially, the reasons for our departure from interspousal immunity, provide little support for a similar departure from parent-child immunity. ‘[T]he common law conception of unity of legal identity of husband and wife had no similar conception of unity of legal identity in the case of parent and minor child.’ ” Frye, 305 Md. at 557-58 , 505 A.2d at 834 (quoting Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 126 , 128 A.2d 617, 627 (1957)).

1994Facially, the reasons for our departure from interspousal immunity, provide little support for a similar departure from parent-child immunity. ‘[T]he common law conception of unity of legal identity of husband and wife had no similar conception of unity of legal identity in the case of parent and minor child.’ ” Frye, 305 Md. at 557-58 , 505 A.2d at 834 (quoting Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 126 , 128 A.2d 617, 627 (1957)).

2022The parent-child immunity doctrine in the United States In contrast to the doctrine of interspousal immunity,7 whose conceptual origins were deeply embedded in English common law, “there is nothing in the English decisions to suggest that at common law a child could not sue a parent for a personal tort.” Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 64 (1951).8 7 The history of interspousal tort immunity in Maryland is summarized in Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334 , 337–46 (1978).

2022The parent-child immunity doctrine in the United States In contrast to the doctrine of interspousal immunity,7 whose conceptual origins were deeply embedded in English common law, “there is nothing in the English decisions to suggest that at common law a child could not sue a parent for a personal tort.” Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 64 (1951).8 7 The history of interspousal tort immunity in Maryland is summarized in Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334 , 337–46 (1978).

2016See, e.g., Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300 , 320– 322, 26 A.3d 899 , 910–911 (2011) (The Court, in an opinion by Judge Harrell, overruled a prior decision of this court concerning waiver and adopted the position of the three dissenters in that prior case); Harris v. Board of Education, 375 13 The Supreme Court has stated that ‘it is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command,’ and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case.’ Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 , 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992).

2016See, e.g., Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300 , 320– 322, 26 A.3d 899 , 910–911 (2011) (The Court, in an opinion by Judge Harrell, overruled a prior decision of this court concerning waiver and adopted the position of the three dissenters in that prior case); Harris v. Board of Education, 375 13 The Supreme Court has stated that ‘it is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command,’ and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case.’ Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 , 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992).

2016In Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 497 (2003), we modified Boblitz by expanding the variety of torts for which one spouse could sue another: “Joining the many of our sister States that have already done so, we abrogate the interspousal immunity rule, a vestige of the past, whose time has come and gone, as to all cases alleging an intentional tort.” 9 Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 417 (2012) identified various cases in which we overruled our prior decisions: This Court has not hesitated to overrule prior decisions which are clearly wrong.

2016Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 417 , 48 A.3d 242 (2012) identified various cases in which we overruled our prior decisions: This Court has not hesitated to overrule prior decisions which are clearly wrong.