18 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. Harrisgreen2 sentences1988See Harris v. Harris, supra. Accordingly, in Smith v. Rowell, supra, where the executrix of the wife's estate and the wife's mother brought a wrongful death action against the husband for the murder of the wife, we held that the interspousal immunity doctrine would not necessarily bar the action so long as the facts at trial showed at the time of the wife's death there was no marital harmony remaining to preserve and showed there was no collusive activity between plaintiffs and the defendants. 1988Harris v. Harris, supra. Now that the marital unity statute has been repealed, the interspousal immunity doctrine is merely the codified public policy of this state. | 2 | 5 |
Fowlkes v. Ray-O-Vac Co.green2 sentences1991"In Fowlkes v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 52 Ga. App. 338, 340 ( 183 SE 210 ) [(1935)], this court held that `an action is maintainable, if the child was emancipated at the time of the tort and the action.' The Supreme Court, however, declined to follow this narrow view in [ Nelson, supra], concluding that the interspousal immunity doctrine was applicable where, after the collision giving rise to the cause of action, the plaintiff married the defendant. 1991"In Fowlkes v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 52 Ga. App. 338, 340 ( 183 SE 210 ) [(1935)], this court held that `an action is maintainable, if the child was emancipated at the time of the tort and the action.' The Supreme Court, however, declined to follow this narrow view in [ Nelson, supra], concluding that the interspousal immunity doctrine was applicable where, after the collision giving rise to the cause of action, the plaintiff married the defendant. | 2 | 2 |
Robeson v. International Indemnity Co.green2 sentences2024See Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175 ( 58 SE2d 32 ) (2003) (parties involved in a car accident prior to marriage and along with the petition for divorce one year later, the soon-to-be ex-spouse filed a negligence claim), overruled on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63-64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021); Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307 (1) (pre-marital claim for negligence related to a car accident barred because parties later married before the spouse filed the claim at issue); Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127 ( 601 SE2d 487 ) (2004) (applying the interspousal immunity doctrine to a negligence cas 2013Indemnity Co., 248 Ga. 306 (1) ( 282 SE2d 896 ) (1981), this Court held that interspousal immunity prevented a person from recovering from that person’s spouse for “personal torts,” and described said torts as “tortious injury to [the] person.” Quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court of Appeals construed “personal tort” as used in the interspousal immunity statute as “ ‘one involving or consisting in an injury to the person or to the reputation or feelings, as distinguished from an injury or damage to real or personal property....’ ” Hubbard v. Ruff, 97 Ga. App. 251, 253 ( 103 SE2d 134 ) (19 | 1 | 4 |
Hubbard v. Ruffgreen2 sentences2014In Hubbard, this Court construed “personal tort” as used in the interspousal immunity statute as “one involving or consisting in an injury to the person or to the reputation or feelings, as distinguished from an injury or damage to real or personal property.” 97 Ga. App. at 253 . 2013Indemnity Co., 248 Ga. 306 (1) ( 282 SE2d 896 ) (1981), this Court held that interspousal immunity prevented a person from recovering from that person’s spouse for “personal torts,” and described said torts as “tortious injury to [the] person.” Quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court of Appeals construed “personal tort” as used in the interspousal immunity statute as “ ‘one involving or consisting in an injury to the person or to the reputation or feelings, as distinguished from an injury or damage to real or personal property....’ ” Hubbard v. Ruff, 97 Ga. App. 251, 253 ( 103 SE2d 134 ) (19 | 1 | 2 |
Jones v. Swettgreen2 sentences1982In its opinion, Bennett v. Bennett, 162 Ga. App. 311 (2) ( 290 SE2d 206 ) (1982), the Court of Appeals, citing Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715 ( 261 SE2d 610 ) (1979), held as follows: “Because the father would, if he were living, be barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity from bringing a personal injury action against his wife, and because the appellant’s right of action for wrongful death is derivative from his father, the trial court was correct in granting Mrs. Bennett’s motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of interspousal immunity.” There is no question that the Court of 1982In its opinion, Bennett v. Bennett, 162 Ga. App. 311 (2) ( 290 SE2d 206 ) (1982), the Court of Appeals, citing Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715 ( 261 SE2d 610 ) (1979), held as follows: “Because the father would, if he were living, be barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity from bringing a personal injury action against his wife, and because the appellant’s right of action for wrongful death is derivative from his father, the trial court was correct in granting Mrs. Bennett’s motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of interspousal immunity.” There is no question that the Court of | 1 | 2 |
Gilliam v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175 ( 58 SE2d 32 ) (2003) (parties involved in a car accident prior to marriage and along with the petition for divorce one year later, the soon-to-be ex-spouse filed a negligence claim), overruled on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63-64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021); Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307 (1) (pre-marital claim for negligence related to a car accident barred because parties later married before the spouse filed the claim at issue); Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127 ( 601 SE2d 487 ) (2004) (applying the interspousal immunity doctrine to a negligence cas 2024See Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175 ( 58 SE2d 32 ) (2003) (parties involved in a car accident prior to marriage and along with the petition for divorce one year later, the soon-to-be ex-spouse filed a negligence claim), overruled on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63-64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021); Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307 (1) (pre-marital claim for negligence related to a car accident barred because parties later married before the spouse filed the claim at issue); Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127 ( 601 SE2d 487 ) (2004) (applying the interspousal immunity doctrine to a negligence cas | 1 | 1 |
Fleming v. Fleminggreen2 sentences2024But see Harris, 252 Ga. at 388 (2) (allowing claims in a car accident because of lengthy separation of spouses); Fleming v. Fleming, 246 Ga. App. 69, 70-71 ( 539 SE2d 563 ) (2000) (allowing property tort 7 marital harmony to preserve, and there exists no possibility of collusion between spouses, interspousal immunity does not automatically bar an action sounding in tort.”12 Based on the record at this point in the proceedings, the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss on the basis of interspousal tort immunity.13 Accordingly, the trial court’s order is vacated to the extent that 2024But see Harris, 252 Ga. at 388 (2) (allowing claims in a car accident because of lengthy separation of spouses); Fleming v. Fleming, 246 Ga. App. 69, 70-71 ( 539 SE2d 563 ) (2000) (allowing property tort 7 marital harmony to preserve, and there exists no possibility of collusion between spouses, interspousal immunity does not automatically bar an action sounding in tort.”12 Based on the record at this point in the proceedings, the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss on the basis of interspousal tort immunity.13 Accordingly, the trial court’s order is vacated to the extent that | 1 | 1 |
Gates v. Gatesgreen1 sentence2024See Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175 ( 58 SE2d 32 ) (2003) (parties involved in a car accident prior to marriage and along with the petition for divorce one year later, the soon-to-be ex-spouse filed a negligence claim), overruled on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63-64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021); Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307 (1) (pre-marital claim for negligence related to a car accident barred because parties later married before the spouse filed the claim at issue); Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127 ( 601 SE2d 487 ) (2004) (applying the interspousal immunity doctrine to a negligence cas | 1 | 1 |
New v. Hubbardgreen1 sentence2024See Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175 ( 58 SE2d 32 ) (2003) (parties involved in a car accident prior to marriage and along with the petition for divorce one year later, the soon-to-be ex-spouse filed a negligence claim), overruled on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63-64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021); Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307 (1) (pre-marital claim for negligence related to a car accident barred because parties later married before the spouse filed the claim at issue); Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127 ( 601 SE2d 487 ) (2004) (applying the interspousal immunity doctrine to a negligence cas | 1 | 1 |
City of South Norfolk v. City of Norfolkgreen1 sentence2024See Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175 ( 58 SE2d 32 ) (2003) (parties involved in a car accident prior to marriage and along with the petition for divorce one year later, the soon-to-be ex-spouse filed a negligence claim), overruled on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63-64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021); Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307 (1) (pre-marital claim for negligence related to a car accident barred because parties later married before the spouse filed the claim at issue); Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127 ( 601 SE2d 487 ) (2004) (applying the interspousal immunity doctrine to a negligence cas | 1 | 1 |
Barnett v. Farmergreen2 sentences2020See also Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589 , 589 n.1 ( 774 SE2d 688 ) (2015) (not distinguishing between the main tort claim and the loss of consortium claim); Barnett v. Farmer, 308 Ga. App. 358, 362 ( 707 SE2d 570 ) (2011) (physical precedent only) (holding that OCGA § 51-12-33 required the jury to apportion the wife’s award for loss of consortium based on the fault of her husband and the tortfeasor, and rejecting the argument that such apportionment violates the interspousal immunity doctrine). amount of damages to be awarded, if any, shall determine the percentage of fault of the plaintiff 2020See also Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589 , 589 n.1 ( 774 SE2d 688 ) (2015) (not distinguishing between the main tort claim and the loss of consortium claim); Barnett v. Farmer, 308 Ga. App. 358, 362 ( 707 SE2d 570 ) (2011) (physical precedent only) (holding that OCGA § 51-12-33 required the jury to apportion the wife’s award for loss of consortium based on the fault of her husband and the tortfeasor, and rejecting the argument that such apportionment violates the interspousal immunity doctrine). amount of damages to be awarded, if any, shall determine the percentage of fault of the plaintiff | 1 | 1 |
Zaldivar v. Prickettgreen2 sentences2020See also Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589 , 589 n.1 ( 774 SE2d 688 ) (2015) (not distinguishing between the main tort claim and the loss of consortium claim); Barnett v. Farmer, 308 Ga. App. 358, 362 ( 707 SE2d 570 ) (2011) (physical precedent only) (holding that OCGA § 51-12-33 required the jury to apportion the wife’s award for loss of consortium based on the fault of her husband and the tortfeasor, and rejecting the argument that such apportionment violates the interspousal immunity doctrine). amount of damages to be awarded, if any, shall determine the percentage of fault of the plaintiff 2020See also Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589 , 589 n.1 ( 774 SE2d 688 ) (2015) (not distinguishing between the main tort claim and the loss of consortium claim); Barnett v. Farmer, 308 Ga. App. 358, 362 ( 707 SE2d 570 ) (2011) (physical precedent only) (holding that OCGA § 51-12-33 required the jury to apportion the wife’s award for loss of consortium based on the fault of her husband and the tortfeasor, and rejecting the argument that such apportionment violates the interspousal immunity doctrine). amount of damages to be awarded, if any, shall determine the percentage of fault of the plaintiff | 1 | 1 |
Swanson v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.green2 sentences1998Ms. Bearden's conclusory statements in her affidavit that there was no marital harmony to preserve and that her suit was not collusive were not sufficient to establish that the doctrine does not apply. "[C]onclusory allegations by way of an affidavit, unsupported by specific allegations of fact, will not be sufficient to avoid summary judgment." Swanson v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 181 Ga.App. 876, 879 , 354 S.E.2d 204 (1987). 1998Ms. Bearden's conclusory statements in her affidavit that there was no marital harmony to preserve and that her suit was not collusive were not sufficient to establish that the doctrine does not apply. "[C]onclusory allegations by way of an affidavit, unsupported by specific allegations of fact, will not be sufficient to avoid summary judgment." Swanson v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 181 Ga.App. 876, 879 , 354 S.E.2d 204 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Arnold v. Arnoldgreen2 sentences1991Thereafter, this court held that in determining whether a defendant is immune from suit, we will not find controlling the status of the `relationship' at the time the cause of action accrued, rather we will look `to the status of the relationship at the filing of suit and thereafter.' (Emphasis supplied.) [Cits.] Clearly under the precedent established by this authority, the [status of the parties] at the time of the accident was not controlling." Arnold v. Arnold, 189 Ga. App. 101, 103-104 ( 375 SE2d 225 ) (1988). 1991Thereafter, this court held that in determining whether a defendant is immune from suit, we will not find controlling the status of the `relationship' at the time the cause of action accrued, rather we will look `to the status of the relationship at the filing of suit and thereafter.' (Emphasis supplied.) [Cits.] Clearly under the precedent established by this authority, the [status of the parties] at the time of the accident was not controlling." Arnold v. Arnold, 189 Ga. App. 101, 103-104 ( 375 SE2d 225 ) (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Harrell v. Gardnergreen2 sentences1986Harrell v. Gardner, 115 Ga. App. 171, 173 (2) ( 154 SE2d 265 ), having held that the “fact that the husband is dead at the time of the suit is immaterial [to the application of the doctrine of interspousal immunity].” The plaintiff wife also contends that recent Georgia cases such as Harris v. Harris, 252 Ga. 387 ( 313 SE2d 88 ); Smith v. Rowell, 176 Ga. *889 App. 100 ( 335 SE2d 461 ), and Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151 ( 336 SE2d 221 ), preclude application of the doctrine of interspousal immunity to bar the wife’s claims. 1986Harrell v. Gardner, 115 Ga. App. 171, 173 (2) ( 154 SE2d 265 ), having held that the “fact that the husband is dead at the time of the suit is immaterial [to the application of the doctrine of interspousal immunity].” The plaintiff wife also contends that recent Georgia cases such as Harris v. Harris, 252 Ga. 387 ( 313 SE2d 88 ); Smith v. Rowell, 176 Ga. *889 App. 100 ( 335 SE2d 461 ), and Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151 ( 336 SE2d 221 ), preclude application of the doctrine of interspousal immunity to bar the wife’s claims. | 1 | 1 |
| Bradley v. Tenneco Oil Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. Harrisgreen2 sentences1988See Harris v. Harris, supra. Accordingly, in Smith v. Rowell, supra, where the executrix of the wife's estate and the wife's mother brought a wrongful death action against the husband for the murder of the wife, we held that the interspousal immunity doctrine would not necessarily bar the action so long as the facts at trial showed at the time of the wife's death there was no marital harmony remaining to preserve and showed there was no collusive activity between plaintiffs and the defendants. 1988Harris v. Harris, supra. Now that the marital unity statute has been repealed, the interspousal immunity doctrine is merely the codified public policy of this state. | 1 | 5 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stanfield v. Stanfield
green
2 sentences2024See Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175 ( 58 SE2d 32 ) (2003) (parties involved in a car accident prior to marriage and along with the petition for divorce one year later, the soon-to-be ex-spouse filed a negligence claim), overruled on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63-64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021); Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307 (1) (pre-marital claim for negligence related to a car accident barred because parties later married before the spouse filed the claim at issue); Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127 ( 601 SE2d 487 ) (2004) (applying the interspousal immunity doctrine to a negligence cas 2024See Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175 ( 58 SE2d 32 ) (2003) (parties involved in a car accident prior to marriage and along with the petition for divorce one year later, the soon-to-be ex-spouse filed a negligence claim), overruled on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63-64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021); Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307 (1) (pre-marital claim for negligence related to a car accident barred because parties later married before the spouse filed the claim at issue); Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127 ( 601 SE2d 487 ) (2004) (applying the interspousal immunity doctrine to a negligence cas | 2 | 1998–2024 |
Hutcherson v. Durden
green
2 sentences2014Similarly, Hutcherson determined that “injuries done to the person” included “all actionable injuries to the individual himself” and cited physical and bodily injury, injury to the reputation, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, and injury to one’s health, in contrast to injury done to the person’s property. 113 Ga. at 990 . 2013In Hutcherson v. Durden, 113 Ga. 987, 989-990 ( 39 SE 495 ) (1901), this Court determined that “injuries done to the person” included “all actionable injuries to the individual himself,” citing physical and bodily injury, injury to the reputation, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, and injury to one’s health, in contrast to injury done to the person’s property. | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Bennett v. Bennett
neutral
2 sentences1982In its opinion, Bennett v. Bennett, 162 Ga. App. 311 (2) ( 290 SE2d 206 ) (1982), the Court of Appeals, citing Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715 ( 261 SE2d 610 ) (1979), held as follows: “Because the father would, if he were living, be barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity from bringing a personal injury action against his wife, and because the appellant’s right of action for wrongful death is derivative from his father, the trial court was correct in granting Mrs. Bennett’s motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of interspousal immunity.” There is no question that the Court of 1982In its opinion, Bennett v. Bennett, 162 Ga. App. 311 (2) ( 290 SE2d 206 ) (1982), the Court of Appeals, citing Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715 ( 261 SE2d 610 ) (1979), held as follows: “Because the father would, if he were living, be barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity from bringing a personal injury action against his wife, and because the appellant’s right of action for wrongful death is derivative from his father, the trial court was correct in granting Mrs. Bennett’s motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of interspousal immunity.” There is no question that the Court of | 2 | 1982–1988 |
Smith v. Rowell
green
2 sentences1988The only cases in which our courts have held the doctrine of interspousal immunity would not bar an action by one spouse (or the spouse's representative) against another involve situations where the marriage ended in the death of one or both spouses at the time of the alleged negligent act (see Trust Co. Bank v. Thornton, 186 Ga. App. 706 ( 368 SE2d 158 ) (1988), and Smith v. Rowell, 176 Ga. App. 100 ( 335 SE2d 461 ) (1985)) or where the parties had not lived together as husband and wife for an extended period of time so that, de facto, no marital relationship existed at the time of the allege 1988The only cases in which our courts have held the doctrine of interspousal immunity would not bar an action by one spouse (or the spouse's representative) against another involve situations where the marriage ended in the death of one or both spouses at the time of the alleged negligent act (see Trust Co. Bank v. Thornton, 186 Ga. App. 706 ( 368 SE2d 158 ) (1988), and Smith v. Rowell, 176 Ga. App. 100 ( 335 SE2d 461 ) (1985)) or where the parties had not lived together as husband and wife for an extended period of time so that, de facto, no marital relationship existed at the time of the allege | 2 | 1986–1988 |
Shoemake v. Shoemake
green
2 sentences2024See Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175 ( 58 SE2d 32 ) (2003) (parties involved in a car accident prior to marriage and along with the petition for divorce one year later, the soon-to-be ex-spouse filed a negligence claim), overruled on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63-64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021); Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307 (1) (pre-marital claim for negligence related to a car accident barred because parties later married before the spouse filed the claim at issue); Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127 ( 601 SE2d 487 ) (2004) (applying the interspousal immunity doctrine to a negligence cas 2024See Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175 ( 58 SE2d 32 ) (2003) (parties involved in a car accident prior to marriage and along with the petition for divorce one year later, the soon-to-be ex-spouse filed a negligence claim), overruled on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63-64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021); Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307 (1) (pre-marital claim for negligence related to a car accident barred because parties later married before the spouse filed the claim at issue); Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127 ( 601 SE2d 487 ) (2004) (applying the interspousal immunity doctrine to a negligence cas | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Wallach v. Wallach
green
2 sentences2024See Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175 ( 58 SE2d 32 ) (2003) (parties involved in a car accident prior to marriage and along with the petition for divorce one year later, the soon-to-be ex-spouse filed a negligence claim), overruled on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63-64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021); Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307 (1) (pre-marital claim for negligence related to a car accident barred because parties later married before the spouse filed the claim at issue); Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127 ( 601 SE2d 487 ) (2004) (applying the interspousal immunity doctrine to a negligence cas 2024See Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175 ( 58 SE2d 32 ) (2003) (parties involved in a car accident prior to marriage and along with the petition for divorce one year later, the soon-to-be ex-spouse filed a negligence claim), overruled on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63-64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021); Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307 (1) (pre-marital claim for negligence related to a car accident barred because parties later married before the spouse filed the claim at issue); Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127 ( 601 SE2d 487 ) (2004) (applying the interspousal immunity doctrine to a negligence cas | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Larkin v. Larkin
green
2 sentences2024See Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175 ( 58 SE2d 32 ) (2003) (parties involved in a car accident prior to marriage and along with the petition for divorce one year later, the soon-to-be ex-spouse filed a negligence claim), overruled on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63-64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021); Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307 (1) (pre-marital claim for negligence related to a car accident barred because parties later married before the spouse filed the claim at issue); Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127 ( 601 SE2d 487 ) (2004) (applying the interspousal immunity doctrine to a negligence cas 2024See Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175 ( 58 SE2d 32 ) (2003) (parties involved in a car accident prior to marriage and along with the petition for divorce one year later, the soon-to-be ex-spouse filed a negligence claim), overruled on other grounds by Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63-64 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021); Robeson, 248 Ga. at 307 (1) (pre-marital claim for negligence related to a car accident barred because parties later married before the spouse filed the claim at issue); Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127 ( 601 SE2d 487 ) (2004) (applying the interspousal immunity doctrine to a negligence cas | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Jones v. Jones
green
1 sentence1999Id. at 49-50 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Nelson v. Spalding County
green
2 sentences1991"In Fowlkes v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 52 Ga. App. 338, 340 ( 183 SE 210 ) [(1935)], this court held that `an action is maintainable, if the child was emancipated at the time of the tort and the action.' The Supreme Court, however, declined to follow this narrow view in [ Nelson, supra], concluding that the interspousal immunity doctrine was applicable where, after the collision giving rise to the cause of action, the plaintiff married the defendant. 1991“In Fowlkes v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 52 Ga. App. 338, 340 ( 183 SE 210 ) [(1935)], this court held that ‘an action is maintainable, if the child was emancipated at the time of the tort and the action.’ The Supreme Court, however, declined to follow this narrow view in [Nelson, supra], concluding that the interspousal immunity doctrine was applicable where, after the collision giving rise to the cause of action, the plaintiff married the defendant. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Trust Company Bank v. Thornton
green
2 sentences1988The only cases in which our courts have held the doctrine of interspousal immunity would not bar an action by one spouse (or the spouse's representative) against another involve situations where the marriage ended in the death of one or both spouses at the time of the alleged negligent act (see Trust Co. Bank v. Thornton, 186 Ga. App. 706 ( 368 SE2d 158 ) (1988), and Smith v. Rowell, 176 Ga. App. 100 ( 335 SE2d 461 ) (1985)) or where the parties had not lived together as husband and wife for an extended period of time so that, de facto, no marital relationship existed at the time of the allege 1988The only cases in which our courts have held the doctrine of interspousal immunity would not bar an action by one spouse (or the spouse's representative) against another involve situations where the marriage ended in the death of one or both spouses at the time of the alleged negligent act (see Trust Co. Bank v. Thornton, 186 Ga. App. 706 ( 368 SE2d 158 ) (1988), and Smith v. Rowell, 176 Ga. App. 100 ( 335 SE2d 461 ) (1985)) or where the parties had not lived together as husband and wife for an extended period of time so that, de facto, no marital relationship existed at the time of the allege | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Warren v. State
green
2 sentences1986Harrell v. Gardner, 115 Ga. App. 171, 173 (2) ( 154 SE2d 265 ), having held that the “fact that the husband is dead at the time of the suit is immaterial [to the application of the doctrine of interspousal immunity].” The plaintiff wife also contends that recent Georgia cases such as Harris v. Harris, 252 Ga. 387 ( 313 SE2d 88 ); Smith v. Rowell, 176 Ga. *889 App. 100 ( 335 SE2d 461 ), and Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151 ( 336 SE2d 221 ), preclude application of the doctrine of interspousal immunity to bar the wife’s claims. 1986Harrell v. Gardner, 115 Ga. App. 171, 173 (2) ( 154 SE2d 265 ), having held that the “fact that the husband is dead at the time of the suit is immaterial [to the application of the doctrine of interspousal immunity].” The plaintiff wife also contends that recent Georgia cases such as Harris v. Harris, 252 Ga. 387 ( 313 SE2d 88 ); Smith v. Rowell, 176 Ga. *889 App. 100 ( 335 SE2d 461 ), and Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151 ( 336 SE2d 221 ), preclude application of the doctrine of interspousal immunity to bar the wife’s claims. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Williams v. Ray
green
2 sentences1982See Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715 ( 261 SE2d 610 ) (1979); Williams v. Ray, 146 Ga. App. 333 ( 246 SE2d 387 ) (1978). 1982See Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715 ( 261 SE2d 610 ) (1979); Williams v. Ray, 146 Ga. App. 333 ( 246 SE2d 387 ) (1978). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Eddleman v. Eddleman
green
2 sentences1981First, the majority finds that a judgment ordering one spouse to pay another for personal injury is, "in essence, a taking from Peter to pay Paul[ine]." The majority seems to be unaware of the following: 1) under Georgia law, one spouse may sue another for violation of property rights ( Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766 ( 189 SE 833 ) (1937)); 2) many judgments in personal injury suits between spouses would ultimately be paid by insurance companies; and 3) the doctrine of interspousal immunity has been abandoned even in community property states (see, e.g., Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183 ( 1981First, the majority finds that a judgment ordering one spouse to pay another for personal injury is, "in essence, a taking from Peter to pay Paul[ine]." The majority seems to be unaware of the following: 1) under Georgia law, one spouse may sue another for violation of property rights ( Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766 ( 189 SE 833 ) (1937)); 2) many judgments in personal injury suits between spouses would ultimately be paid by insurance companies; and 3) the doctrine of interspousal immunity has been abandoned even in community property states (see, e.g., Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183 ( | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| St. Regis Paper Co. v. Brown green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Freehe v. Freehe
green
2 sentences1981First, the majority finds that a judgment ordering one spouse to pay another for personal injury is, "in essence, a taking from Peter to pay Paul[ine]." The majority seems to be unaware of the following: 1) under Georgia law, one spouse may sue another for violation of property rights ( Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766 ( 189 SE 833 ) (1937)); 2) many judgments in personal injury suits between spouses would ultimately be paid by insurance companies; and 3) the doctrine of interspousal immunity has been abandoned even in community property states (see, e.g., Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183 ( 1981First, the majority finds that a judgment ordering one spouse to pay another for personal injury is, "in essence, a taking from Peter to pay Paul[ine]." The majority seems to be unaware of the following: 1) under Georgia law, one spouse may sue another for violation of property rights ( Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766 ( 189 SE 833 ) (1937)); 2) many judgments in personal injury suits between spouses would ultimately be paid by insurance companies; and 3) the doctrine of interspousal immunity has been abandoned even in community property states (see, e.g., Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183 ( | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Taylor v. Vezzani
neutral
2 sentences1981The doctrine of interspousal immunity stems from the common law notion that "a husband and wife [are], in legal fiction, one and the same person." Taylor v. Vezzani, 109 Ga. App. 167 (1) ( 135 SE2d 522 ) (1964). 1981The doctrine of interspousal immunity stems from the common law notion that "a husband and wife [are], in legal fiction, one and the same person." Taylor v. Vezzani, 109 Ga. App. 167 (1) ( 135 SE2d 522 ) (1964). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Walker v. Walker green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.