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32 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 1994–2026 20 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ungergreen2 sentences2025Loc.R. 4(H) provides that ‘[a]ll motions for continuance . . . must be on a form promulgated by the court,’ ” and reiterated our prior holding that the court “does not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a continuance when the local rules require motions for continuance to be in writing and no written continuance is filed.” Id. at ¶ 10, quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 2015-Ohio-4103, ¶ 10 (7th Dist.). {¶ 11} When denying Penny’s request for continuance, the trial court relied upon the analysis set forth in State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65 (1981), and the court considered each of the Unger f 2025Loc.R. 4(H) provides that ‘[a]ll motions for continuance . . . must be on a form promulgated by the court,’ ” and reiterated our prior holding that the court “does not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a continuance when the local rules require motions for continuance to be in writing and no written continuance is filed.” Id. at ¶ 10, quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 2015-Ohio-4103, ¶ 10 (7th Dist.). {¶ 11} When denying Penny’s request for continuance, the trial court relied upon the analysis set forth in State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65 (1981), and the court considered each of the Unger f | 4 | 11 |
State v. Coombsgreen2 sentences2026This court has held that “nothing requires trial courts to specifically articulate an analysis of each Unger factor.” State v. Dickens, 2009-Ohio-4541 , ¶ 13 (4th Dist.) (Citation omitted.) Further, absent evidence to the contrary, we “must presume that the trial court applied the law [in this case, the Unger factors] correctly.” State v. Coombs, 18 Ohio St.3d 123, 125 (1985) (Citation omitted.) A denial of a request for continuance does not necessarily abuse discretion or create a manifest injustice. 2026This court has held that “nothing requires trial courts to specifically articulate an analysis of each Unger factor.” State v. Dickens, 2009-Ohio-4541 , ¶ 13 (4th Dist.) (Citation omitted.) Further, absent evidence to the contrary, we “must presume that the trial court applied the law [in this case, the Unger factors] correctly.” State v. Coombs, 18 Ohio St.3d 123, 125 (1985) (Citation omitted.) A denial of a request for continuance does not necessarily abuse discretion or create a manifest injustice. | 4 | 6 |
Hartt v. Munobegreen2 sentences2026Further, absent evidence to the contrary, we “must presume that the trial court applied the law [in this case, the Unger factors] correctly.” State v. Coombs, 18 Ohio St.3d 123, 125 (1985); Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 7 (1993). {¶43} Although appellant argues that the Unger factors favor the grant of his continuance request, based on our analysis we ROSS, 25CA23 24 disagree. 2026Further, absent evidence to the contrary, we “must presume that the trial court applied the law [in this case, the Unger factors] correctly.” State v. Coombs, 18 Ohio St.3d 123, 125 (1985); Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 7 (1993). {¶43} Although appellant argues that the Unger factors favor the grant of his continuance request, based on our analysis we ROSS, 25CA23 24 disagree. | 3 | 4 |
State v. Palmergreen2 sentences2019See Palmer, supra, at ¶ 75 . {¶33} Appellant’s assignments of error are overruled. {¶34} Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio, is affirmed. 2019See Palmer, supra, at ¶ 75 . {¶33} Appellant’s assignments of error are overruled. {¶34} Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio, is affirmed. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Colleygreen2 sentences2022See State v. Colley, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 09CA3323, 2010-Ohio-4834, ¶ 20 . 2022See State v. Colley, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 09CA3323, 2010-Ohio-4834, ¶ 20 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Goffeegreen2 sentences2026See State v. Goffee, 2005-Ohio-2596, at ¶ 44 (5th Dist.). {¶31} First, we point out that appellant himself never requested a continuance. 2026See State v. Goffee, 2005-Ohio-2596, at ¶ 44 (5th Dist.). {¶31} First, we point out that appellant himself never requested a continuance. | 1 | 1 |
Am. Surface Solutions, L.L.C. v. N. Am.green2 sentences2026In its November 3, 2025 journal entry, the trial court cited one of our cases, Am. Surface Solutions, L.L.C. v. Nicholas N. Am., 2019-Ohio-2909, ¶ 33-34 (8th Dist.), which stated the proper Unger test to be applied and listed the six factors. 2026In its November 3, 2025 journal entry, the trial court cited one of our cases, Am. Surface Solutions, L.L.C. v. Nicholas N. Am., 2019-Ohio-2909, ¶ 33-34 (8th Dist.), which stated the proper Unger test to be applied and listed the six factors. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ferrantogreen2 sentences2025See id., 67 Ohio St.2d at 67-68 . {¶49} Accordingly, Hall’s fourth assigned error lacks merit. {¶50} The judgment is affirmed. 2025See id., 67 Ohio St.2d at 67-68 . {¶49} Accordingly, Hall’s fourth assigned error lacks merit. {¶50} The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
Ungar v. Sarafitegreen2 sentences2025Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964). {¶13} In consideration of the Unger factors and relevant rules, this Court concludes that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s attorney’s oral motion to continue the hearing. 2025Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964). {¶13} In consideration of the Unger factors and relevant rules, this Court concludes that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s attorney’s oral motion to continue the hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2025Loc.R. 4(H) provides that ‘[a]ll motions for continuance . . . must be on a form promulgated by the court,’ ” and reiterated our prior holding that the court “does not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a continuance when the local rules require motions for continuance to be in writing and no written continuance is filed.” Id. at ¶ 10, quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 2015-Ohio-4103, ¶ 10 (7th Dist.). {¶ 11} When denying Penny’s request for continuance, the trial court relied upon the analysis set forth in State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65 (1981), and the court considered each of the Unger f 2025Loc.R. 4(H) provides that ‘[a]ll motions for continuance . . . must be on a form promulgated by the court,’ ” and reiterated our prior holding that the court “does not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a continuance when the local rules require motions for continuance to be in writing and no written continuance is filed.” Id. at ¶ 10, quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 2015-Ohio-4103, ¶ 10 (7th Dist.). {¶ 11} When denying Penny’s request for continuance, the trial court relied upon the analysis set forth in State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65 (1981), and the court considered each of the Unger f | 1 | 1 |
In Re Q.G.green2 sentences2023See Unger at 67-68 ; cf. In re Q.G., 170 Ohio App.3d 609 , 2007-Ohio-1312 , 868 N.E.2d 713, at ¶ 16-17 (juvenile court erred in “simply proceed[ing]” with adjudicatory hearing in mother’s absence, without making “additional inquiries” and taking “extra care to ensure [mother’s] presence,” where mother appeared at preliminary hearings and told her counsel that she did not have the financial resources to get to the adjudicatory hearing). 2023See Unger at 67-68 ; cf. In re Q.G., 170 Ohio App.3d 609 , 2007-Ohio-1312 , 868 N.E.2d 713, at ¶ 16-17 (juvenile court erred in “simply proceed[ing]” with adjudicatory hearing in mother’s absence, without making “additional inquiries” and taking “extra care to ensure [mother’s] presence,” where mother appeared at preliminary hearings and told her counsel that she did not have the financial resources to get to the adjudicatory hearing). | 1 | 1 |
In re A.W.green2 sentences2023See, e.g., In re A.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109239, 2020-Ohio-3373 ; In re C.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109219, 2020-Ohio-3189 ; and In re S.R., 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-09-024, 2010-Ohio-3073 . 2023See, e.g., In re A.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109239, 2020-Ohio-3373 ; In re C.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109219, 2020-Ohio-3189 ; and In re S.R., 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-09-024, 2010-Ohio-3073 . | 1 | 1 |
United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Kenneth King Kewin King, Kewin King, Defendant-Appellant/ Cross-Appelleegreen2 sentences2022See United States v. King, 127 F.3d 483, 487 (6th Cir.1997) (“The defendant demonstrates ‘actual prejudice’ by showing that a continuance would have made relevant witnesses available or added something to the defense”). {¶72} Mr. Graham’s second assignment of error has merit. 2022See United States v. King, 127 F.3d 483, 487 (6th Cir.1997) (“The defendant demonstrates ‘actual prejudice’ by showing that a continuance would have made relevant witnesses available or added something to the defense”). {¶72} Mr. Graham’s second assignment of error has merit. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Shurelds
green
2 sentences2022Furthermore, “a trial court is not even explicitly required to outline the Unger factors when denying a continuance.” State v. Shurelds, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-20-35, 2021-Ohio-1560, ¶ 56 . 2022Furthermore, “a trial court is not even explicitly required to outline the Unger factors when denying a continuance.” State v. Shurelds, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-20-35, 2021-Ohio-1560, ¶ 56 . | 2 | 2021–2022 |
United States v. Andrew F. Burton
green
2 sentences2026Id. {¶ 14} The trial court could reasonably conclude that Schweitzer's stated reasons for delay—that she needed to make sure her household and daughter were taken care of—were unpersuasive as she had seven weeks from entering her guilty plea until the sentencing hearing to take care of such responsibilities. 2026Id. {¶ 14} The trial court could reasonably conclude that Schweitzer's stated reasons for delay—that she needed to make sure her household and daughter were taken care of—were unpersuasive as she had seven weeks from entering her guilty plea until the sentencing hearing to take care of such responsibilities. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Southam
green
2 sentences2024Henry No. 7-12- 04, 2012-Ohio-5943, ¶ 29 , citing Unger at 68–69 (Rejecting argument that defendant was denied the opportunity to adequately prepare a new defense, which was necessitated by the unexpected dismissal before trial of many of the claims brought by the state). {¶ 13} Finally, the trial court specifically found that “Peeples put himself in this position,” explaining that “this is a gun case,” and given Peeples’s previous weapon’s conviction(s), he “knew the risks” and “should have well known that he couldn’t have a weapon.” We note that Peeples concedes that he “did contribute to th 2024Henry No. 7-12- 04, 2012-Ohio-5943, ¶ 29 , citing Unger at 68–69 (Rejecting argument that defendant was denied the opportunity to adequately prepare a new defense, which was necessitated by the unexpected dismissal before trial of many of the claims brought by the state). {¶ 13} Finally, the trial court specifically found that “Peeples put himself in this position,” explaining that “this is a gun case,” and given Peeples’s previous weapon’s conviction(s), he “knew the risks” and “should have well known that he couldn’t have a weapon.” We note that Peeples concedes that he “did contribute to th | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Peters v. Wendy's Internatl., Inc., Unpublished Decision (3-4-2004)
neutral
2 sentences2022Brown argues this court has found abuse of discretion in denial of a continuance request when the Unger factors weighed modestly in favor of the party seeking the continuance, citing Peters v. Wendy's Internatl., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-657, 2004-Ohio-1012 . 2022Brown argues this court has found abuse of discretion in denial of a continuance request when the Unger factors weighed modestly in favor of the party seeking the continuance, citing Peters v. Wendy's Internatl., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-657, 2004-Ohio-1012 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Blakemore v. Blakemore
green
2 sentences2022Id. at 67-68 . {¶ 21} The trial court did not expressly address the Unger factors in denying Brown's continuance request. 2022Id. at 67-68 . {¶ 21} The trial court did not expressly address the Unger factors in denying Brown's continuance request. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Fiocca v. Fiocca, Unpublished Decision (5-5-2005)
green
1 sentence2020The "balancing test" requires us to weigh "the trial court's interest in controlling its own docket, including facilitating the efficient dispensation of justice, versus the potential prejudice to No. 19AP-672 6 the moving party." Fiocca, 2005-Ohio-2199, at ¶ 7 , citing Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d, at 67 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In re Application of Am. Transm. Sys., Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2019Sys., 125 Ohio St.3d 333 , 2010-Ohio-1841 , 928 N.E.2d 427 , ¶ 32. {¶10} In this case, none of the Unger factors supported the denial of the motion. 6 O HIO F IRST D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEALS {¶11} Length of the delay requested: As to the first prong, counsel’s request was for an hour delay. 2019Sys., 125 Ohio St.3d 333 , 2010-Ohio-1841 , 928 N.E.2d 427 , ¶ 32. {¶10} In this case, none of the Unger factors supported the denial of the motion. 6 O HIO F IRST D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEALS {¶11} Length of the delay requested: As to the first prong, counsel’s request was for an hour delay. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In Re T.C.
green
2 sentences2017Hancock No. 5-10-34, 2011-Ohio-1458 , 2011 WL 1107037 , ¶ 45, citing In re T.C. , 140 Ohio App.3d 409 , 417, 747 N.E.2d 881 (3d Dist.2000), citing State v. Unger , 67 Ohio St.2d 65 , 67-68, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981). {¶ 14} When a litigant received prior continuances and requests an additional continuance of indeterminate length, the first two Unger factors weigh in favor of denying the continuance, especially in light of the fact that establishing permanency for children in temporary placement is paramount. 2017Hancock No. 5-10-34, 2011-Ohio-1458 , 2011 WL 1107037 , ¶ 45, citing In re T.C. , 140 Ohio App.3d 409 , 417, 747 N.E.2d 881 (3d Dist.2000), citing State v. Unger , 67 Ohio St.2d 65 , 67-68, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981). {¶ 14} When a litigant received prior continuances and requests an additional continuance of indeterminate length, the first two Unger factors weigh in favor of denying the continuance, especially in light of the fact that establishing permanency for children in temporary placement is paramount. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In re J.D.
green
1 sentence2017Hancock No. 5-10-34, 2011-Ohio-1458 , 2011 WL 1107037 , ¶ 45, citing In re T.C. , 140 Ohio App.3d 409 , 417, 747 N.E.2d 881 (3d Dist.2000), citing State v. Unger , 67 Ohio St.2d 65 , 67-68, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981). {¶ 14} When a litigant received prior continuances and requests an additional continuance of indeterminate length, the first two Unger factors weigh in favor of denying the continuance, especially in light of the fact that establishing permanency for children in temporary placement is paramount. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Conway
green
2 sentences2014Id.; State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214 , 2006-Ohio-791 , 842 N.E.2d 996 , ¶147. {¶ 20} In the case sub judice, we initially observe that appellant suggests that the trial court failed to use the Unger analysis when it evaluated his motion to continue. 2014Id.; State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214 , 2006-Ohio-791 , 842 N.E.2d 996 , ¶147. {¶ 20} In the case sub judice, we initially observe that appellant suggests that the trial court failed to use the Unger analysis when it evaluated his motion to continue. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Jones v. Booker
green
2 sentences2004No. 92AP-1153, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2029 at *6; Jones v. Booker (1996), 114 Ohio App. 3d 67 , 70 , 682 N.E.2d 1023 . {¶ 19} Appellant relies on Burton v. Burton, 132 Ohio App.3d 473 , 725 N.E.2d 359 , in support of her argument that the court abuses its discretion by not considering the Unger factors in determining whether or not a continuance should be granted. 2004No. 92AP-1153, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2029 at *6; Jones v. Booker (1996), 114 Ohio App. 3d 67 , 70 , 682 N.E.2d 1023 . {¶ 19} Appellant relies on Burton v. Burton, 132 Ohio App.3d 473 , 725 N.E.2d 359 , in support of her argument that the court abuses its discretion by not considering the Unger factors in determining whether or not a continuance should be granted. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Burton v. Burton
green
2 sentences2004No. 92AP-1153, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2029 at *6; Jones v. Booker (1996), 114 Ohio App. 3d 67 , 70 , 682 N.E.2d 1023 . {¶ 19} Appellant relies on Burton v. Burton, 132 Ohio App.3d 473 , 725 N.E.2d 359 , in support of her argument that the court abuses its discretion by not considering the Unger factors in determining whether or not a continuance should be granted. 2004No. 92AP-1153, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2029 at *6; Jones v. Booker (1996), 114 Ohio App. 3d 67 , 70 , 682 N.E.2d 1023 . {¶ 19} Appellant relies on Burton v. Burton, 132 Ohio App.3d 473 , 725 N.E.2d 359 , in support of her argument that the court abuses its discretion by not considering the Unger factors in determining whether or not a continuance should be granted. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Ostrander v. Parker-Fallis Insulation Co.
green
2 sentences2000With no transcript of the May 26, 1999 hearing available for review, this court must presume the regularity of the trial court proceedings, Ostrander v. Parker-Fallis (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 72 , and presume that the trial court properly applied the Unger factors to the existing facts and circumstances. 2000With no transcript of the May 26, 1999 hearing available for review, this court must presume the regularity of the trial court proceedings, Ostrander v. Parker-Fallis (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 72 , and presume that the trial court properly applied the Unger factors to the existing facts and circumstances. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.