target rule in California

2025(People v. McCloud (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 788, 803 ; Canizales, at p. 606 [defendant is liable under a “kill zone” theory if he “intentionally created a zone of fatal harm”].) Relevant circumstances from which a jury could properly infer the defendant intended to create a zone of harm include “the type of weapon used, the number of shots fired (where a firearm is used), the distance between the defendant and the alleged victims, . . . the proximity of the alleged victims to the primary target” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607 ), and the placement of the shots (People v. Vang (2001) 87 Ca

2014Rather, it is simply a reasonable inference the jury may draw in a given case: a primary intent to kill a specific target does not rule out a concurrent intent to kill others.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., quoting People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 331, fn. 6 .) Accordingly, “[i]t is . . . impossible for a trial court to commit error, much less prejudicial error, by declining to give a kill zone instruction.” (People v. McCloud (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 788, 803 , second italics added.) 20 Here, during deliberations, the foreperson sent the trial court the following note: “In the final paragraph of I

2025(Canizales, at p. 602.) In Bland, our Supreme Court endorsed the concept of a “concurrent intent” to kill, noting that “a primary intent to kill a specific target does not rule out a concurrent intent to kill others.” ( Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 330–331, fn. 6.) In so reasoning, the court found that the facts in that case “virtually compel[led]” an inference that the defendant, who shot numerous rounds into a vehicle as it drove away, not only intended to kill the primary target, a rival gang member, but “also, concurrently, intended to kill the others in the car,” or “[a]t the least, he

2025(Canizales, at p. 602.) In Bland, our Supreme Court endorsed the concept of a “concurrent intent” to kill, noting that “a primary intent to kill a specific target does not rule out a concurrent intent to kill others.” ( Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 330–331, fn. 6.) In so reasoning, the court found that the facts in that case “virtually compel[led]” an inference that the defendant, who shot numerous rounds into a vehicle as it drove away, not only intended to kill the primary target, a rival gang member, but “also, concurrently, intended to kill the others in the car,” or “[a]t the least, he

2019For example, a kill zone instruction is not appropriate where a defendant fires a deadly weapon into a group of 8 Implied malice is “ ‘an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 107 .) With regard to those in a zone of harm around the primary target, we perceive little difference between that implied malice standard and one in which the defendant acts towards a prima

2019For example, a kill zone instruction is not appropriate where a defendant fires a deadly weapon into a group of 8 Implied malice is “ ‘an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 107 .) With regard to those in a zone of harm around the primary target, we perceive little difference between that implied malice standard and one in which the defendant acts towards a prima

2019For example, a kill zone instruction is not appropriate where a defendant fires a deadly weapon into a group of 8 Implied malice is “ ‘an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 107 .) With regard to those in a zone of harm around the primary target, we perceive little difference between that implied malice standard and one in which the defendant acts towards a prima

2019For example, a kill zone instruction is not appropriate where a defendant fires a deadly weapon into a group of 8 Implied malice is “ ‘an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 107 .) With regard to those in a zone of harm around the primary target, we perceive little difference between that implied malice standard and one in which the defendant acts towards a prima

2019For example, a kill zone instruction is not appropriate where a defendant fires a deadly weapon into a group of 8 Implied malice is “ ‘an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 107 .) With regard to those in a zone of harm around the primary target, we perceive little difference between that implied malice standard and one in which the defendant acts towards a prima

2019For example, a kill zone instruction is not appropriate where a defendant fires a deadly weapon into a group of 8 Implied malice is “ ‘an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 107 .) With regard to those in a zone of harm around the primary target, we perceive little difference between that implied malice standard and one in which the defendant acts towards a prima

2016Where the means employed to commit the crime against a primary victim create a zone of harm around that victim, the factfinder can reasonably infer that the defendant intended that harm to all who are in the anticipated zone.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 329-330; People v. Perez (2010) 50 Cal.4th 222, 232 .) “[T]he ‘kill zone’ [is not] the only way to establish concurrent intent to kill more than one person in a fired-upon group.” (People v. Campos (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1242 .) Instead, the kill zone theory “‘is simply a reasonable inference the jury may draw in a given case . . . .’” (Sto

2013Rather, it is simply a reasonable inference the jury may draw in a given case: a primary intent to kill a specific target does not rule out a concurrent intent to kill others.’” (People v. Campos (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1243 , quoting Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 331, fn. 6 ; see also People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 746 .) Even if the instruction had been erroneous, any the error would be harmless in that it was not reasonably probable that if a correct instruction had been given a verdict more 25 favorable to Hernandez would have resulted.

2025(People v. McCloud (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 788, 803 ; Canizales, at p. 606 [defendant is liable under a “kill zone” theory if he “intentionally created a zone of fatal harm”].) Relevant circumstances from which a jury could properly infer the defendant intended to create a zone of harm include “the type of weapon used, the number of shots fired (where a firearm is used), the distance between the defendant and the alleged victims, . . . the proximity of the alleged victims to the primary target” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607 ), and the placement of the shots (People v. Vang (2001) 87 Ca

2023(People v. Scott (1996) 14 Cal.4th 544, 551 .) And unlike transferred intent, concurrent intent is “not a legal doctrine requiring special jury instructions.” (Bland, at p. 331, fn. 6.) “Rather, it is simply a reasonable inference the jury may draw in a given case: a primary intent to kill a specific target does not rule out a concurrent intent to kill others.” (Ibid.) Although the “reasonable inference” of concurrent intent has subsequently been referred to as the “kill zone theory,” cases after Bland have not strayed from its basic understanding.

2022Second, Chase argues that “the purported § 2924b violation caused [no] prejudice to Morris.” Chase bases this argument on the principle that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale is afforded a common law presumption that it was “ ‘conducted regularly and fairly’ ” (Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1258 ), a presumption it correctly states may be rebutted only by “substantial evidence of prejudicial procedural irregularity” (ibid.).

2013(People v. Palmer (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1157 [misdirection of the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 836 ].) The evidence of Hernandez’s intent to kill everyone in the group was overwhelming under the “kill zone” theory or otherwise.

2013(People v. Palmer (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1157 [misdirection of the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 836 ].) The evidence of Hernandez’s intent to kill everyone in the group was overwhelming under the “kill zone” theory or otherwise.

2002(See, e.g., State v. Stringfield (1980) 4 Kan.App.2d 559 , 608 P.2d 1041 [transferred intent applies to aggravated battery].) [8] Although we find the jury did not misunderstand the instructions in this case, in future cases involving both murder and attempted murder (or manslaughter) charges, it might be better for the court specifically to clarify that transferred intent does not apply to the attempt charges. [9] The court instructed: "If you find the defendant guilty of murder [or] attempted murder ..., you must determine whether the defendant intentionally and personally discharged a firea

2002(See, e.g., State v. Stringfield (1980) 4 Kan.App.2d 559 , 608 P.2d 1041 [transferred intent applies to aggravated battery].) [8] Although we find the jury did not misunderstand the instructions in this case, in future cases involving both murder and attempted murder (or manslaughter) charges, it might be better for the court specifically to clarify that transferred intent does not apply to the attempt charges. [9] The court instructed: "If you find the defendant guilty of murder [or] attempted murder ..., you must determine whether the defendant intentionally and personally discharged a firea