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7 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Romain v. Grantgreen2 sentences2014Although the Target defendants’ contention that the injured plaintiff was not engaged in an activity protected under Labor Law § 240 (1) is raised for the first time on appeal, we reach this issue, as it raises a purely legal question that appears on the face of the record which, had it been presented to the Supreme Court, could not have been avoided (see Romain v Grant, 60 AD3d 838, 839 [2009]). 2014Although the Target defendants’ contention that the injured plaintiff was not engaged in an activity protected under Labor Law § 240 (1) is raised for the first time on appeal, we reach this issue, as it raises a purely legal question that appears on the face of the record which, had it been presented to the Supreme Court, could not have been avoided (see Romain v Grant, 60 AD3d 838, 839 [2009]). | 2 | 2 |
Murray v. Arts Center & Theater of Schenectady, Inc.green2 sentences2014In addition, CTS and the Target defendants did not establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff was a recalcitrant worker (see Gallagher v New York Post, 14 NY3d 83, 88-89 [2010]; Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35, 39 [2004]), as they failed to eliminate all issues of fact, inter alia, as to whether the injured plaintiff knew that he was expected to use the lift or a CTS ladder, and not the ladder inside the stockroom, and whether the injured plaintiff had a good reason for using the ladder from which he fell (see Gallagher v New York Post, 14 NY3d at 89; Murray v Arts Ctr. & 2014In addition, CTS and the Target defendants did not establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff was a recalcitrant worker (see Gallagher v New York Post, 14 NY3d 83, 88-89 [2010]; Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35, 39 [2004]), as they failed to eliminate all issues of fact, inter alia, as to whether the injured plaintiff knew that he was expected to use the lift or a CTS ladder, and not the ladder inside the stockroom, and whether the injured plaintiff had a good reason for using the ladder from which he fell (see Gallagher v New York Post, 14 NY3d at 89; Murray v Arts Ctr. & | 2 | 2 |
Randall v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.green2 sentences2014However, the contention is without merit (see Randall v Time Warner Cable, Inc., 81 AD3d 1149, 1150-1151 [2011]; Becker v ADN Design Corp., 51 AD3d 834, 837 [2008]). 2014However, the contention is without merit (see Randall v Time Warner Cable, Inc., 81 AD3d 1149, 1150-1151 [2011]; Becker v ADN Design Corp., 51 AD3d 834, 837 [2008]). | 2 | 2 |
Gallagher v. New York Postgreen2 sentences2014In addition, CTS and the Target defendants did not establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff was a recalcitrant worker (see Gallagher v New York Post, 14 NY3d 83, 88-89 [2010]; Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35, 39 [2004]), as they failed to eliminate all issues of fact, inter alia, as to whether the injured plaintiff knew that he was expected to use the lift or a CTS ladder, and not the ladder inside the stockroom, and whether the injured plaintiff had a good reason for using the ladder from which he fell (see Gallagher v New York Post, 14 NY3d at 89; Murray v Arts Ctr. & 2014In addition, CTS and the Target defendants did not establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff was a recalcitrant worker (see Gallagher v New York Post, 14 NY3d 83, 88-89 [2010]; Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35, 39 [2004]), as they failed to eliminate all issues of fact, inter alia, as to whether the injured plaintiff knew that he was expected to use the lift or a CTS ladder, and not the ladder inside the stockroom, and whether the injured plaintiff had a good reason for using the ladder from which he fell (see Gallagher v New York Post, 14 NY3d at 89; Murray v Arts Ctr. & | 2 | 2 |
Cahill v. TRIBOROUGHgreen2 sentences2014In addition, CTS and the Target defendants did not establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff was a recalcitrant worker (see Gallagher v New York Post, 14 NY3d 83, 88-89 [2010]; Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35, 39 [2004]), as they failed to eliminate all issues of fact, inter alia, as to whether the injured plaintiff knew that he was expected to use the lift or a CTS ladder, and not the ladder inside the stockroom, and whether the injured plaintiff had a good reason for using the ladder from which he fell (see Gallagher v New York Post, 14 NY3d at 89; Murray v Arts Ctr. & 2014In addition, CTS and the Target defendants did not establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff was a recalcitrant worker (see Gallagher v New York Post, 14 NY3d 83, 88-89 [2010]; Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35, 39 [2004]), as they failed to eliminate all issues of fact, inter alia, as to whether the injured plaintiff knew that he was expected to use the lift or a CTS ladder, and not the ladder inside the stockroom, and whether the injured plaintiff had a good reason for using the ladder from which he fell (see Gallagher v New York Post, 14 NY3d at 89; Murray v Arts Ctr. & | 2 | 2 |
Becker v. ADN Design Corp.green2 sentences2014However, the contention is without merit (see Randall v Time Warner Cable, Inc., 81 AD3d 1149, 1150-1151 [2011]; Becker v ADN Design Corp., 51 AD3d 834, 837 [2008]). 2014However, the contention is without merit (see Randall v Time Warner Cable, Inc., 81 AD3d 1149, 1150-1151 [2011]; Becker v ADN Design Corp., 51 AD3d 834, 837 [2008]). | 2 | 2 |
Pavon v. Rudingreen1 sentence2010Likewise, here, since the motion sensor was located on top of the automatic doors, there is no real likelihood that the public could have altered it (see Pavon v Rudin, 254 AD2d 143, 146 [1998] [“The appropriate target of inquiry is whether the broken component itself was generally handled by the public, not whether the public used the larger object to which the defective piece was attached”]). | 1 | 1 |
Wen-Yu Chang v. F. W. Woolworth Co.green1 sentence1998This conclusion is supported by case law applying res ipsa loquitur to accidents involving items exposed to significant public trafile, where the specific mechanism that malfunctioned was not handled by the general public (e.g., Wen-Yu Chang v Woolworth Co., 196 AD2d 708, 709 [plaintiff’s leg caught in gap between stairs of escalator]; Nesbit v New York City Tr. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hughes v. Brooklyn Skating, LLC
green
1 sentence2019In sum, based on the plaintiff's failure to comply with the conditional order of preclusion, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant that branch of the Target defendants' motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the basis that under the order of preclusion, the plaintiff was prohibited from offering any evidence at trial ( see id. ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Morrello v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
neutral
1 sentence2018The motor vehicle accident happened in Suffolk County, plaintiffs and codefendants live in that county, the decedent received her medical treatment there ( see Lopez v Chaliwit , 268 AD2d 377 [1st Dept 2000]). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010Because issues of fact exist as to the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, UCP is not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. 2 The court correctly denied UCP’s and Reliable’s respective motions for summary judgment on the third-party complaint because there are triable issues of fact as to whether plaintiffs accident was due to Reliable’s negligence (see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136 [2002]; Mendez v Union Theol. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence1968He urges that, within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona ( 384 U. S. 436 ), his interrogation by police officers took place while he was in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way; that he was the target of the inquiry which was focused upon him as evidenced by the fact that a confrontation between him and a witness took place after the termination of such interrogation, intended to produce an identification; that he was led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he was being deprived or restricted of his freedom of action or movement; that, accordingly, th | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.