defendant enumerates error in Georgia

1986Held: The defendant enumerates as error the denial of his motion for a directed verdict of the two counts of “aggravated assault.” The basis for the motion is a claimed difference between the allegata et probata, in that Paramore was named in the indictments as “Jack” when in fact his name was “James.” Defendant cites, in support of his motion, Irwin v. State, 117 Ga. 722 ( 45 SE 59 ), in which the Supreme Court held that for the protection of an accused it was necessary for an indictment to refer to the correct name of the man against whom the alleged offense was committed.

1986Held: The defendant enumerates as error the denial of his motion for a directed verdict of the two counts of “aggravated assault.” The basis for the motion is a claimed difference between the allegata et probata, in that Paramore was named in the indictments as “Jack” when in fact his name was “James.” Defendant cites, in support of his motion, Irwin v. State, 117 Ga. 722 ( 45 SE 59 ), in which the Supreme Court held that for the protection of an accused it was necessary for an indictment to refer to the correct name of the man against whom the alleged offense was committed.

1985The defendant enumerates as error the denial by the trial court of his motion to suppress on the ground that “the state failed to make an affirmative showing either that the accused had requested an additional chemical test and had been given an opportunity to take the test; or that he had waived his statutory right to an additional chemical test of his own choosing.” In Steed v. City of Atlanta, 172 Ga. App. 839 ( 325 SE2d 165 ), a DUI suspect testified that he requested a blood test four times.

1985The defendant enumerates as error the denial by the trial court of his motion to suppress on the ground that “the state failed to make an affirmative showing either that the accused had requested an additional chemical test and had been given an opportunity to take the test; or that he had waived his statutory right to an additional chemical test of his own choosing.” In Steed v. City of Atlanta, 172 Ga. App. 839 ( 325 SE2d 165 ), a DUI suspect testified that he requested a blood test four times.

1984The defendant enumerates as error the court’s charge to the jury that “a witness, in a driving under the influence case, states a fact rather than an opinion when he testifies that a defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquors.” The quoted language appears in the case of Garrett v. State, 146 Ga. App. 610, 611 ( 247 SE2d 136 ) (1978), wherein Donley v. State, 72 Ga. App. 429 ( 33 SE2d 925 ) (1945), and Harris v. State, 97 Ga. App. 495 (3) ( 103 SE2d 443 ) (1958), are cited as authority for the principle involved.

1984The defendant enumerates as error the court’s charge to the jury that “a witness, in a driving under the influence case, states a fact rather than an opinion when he testifies that a defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquors.” The quoted language appears in the case of Garrett v. State, 146 Ga. App. 610, 611 ( 247 SE2d 136 ) (1978), wherein Donley v. State, 72 Ga. App. 429 ( 33 SE2d 925 ) (1945), and Harris v. State, 97 Ga. App. 495 (3) ( 103 SE2d 443 ) (1958), are cited as authority for the principle involved.

1984The defendant enumerates as error the court’s charge to the jury that “a witness, in a driving under the influence case, states a fact rather than an opinion when he testifies that a defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquors.” The quoted language appears in the case of Garrett v. State, 146 Ga. App. 610, 611 ( 247 SE2d 136 ) (1978), wherein Donley v. State, 72 Ga. App. 429 ( 33 SE2d 925 ) (1945), and Harris v. State, 97 Ga. App. 495 (3) ( 103 SE2d 443 ) (1958), are cited as authority for the principle involved.

1984The defendant enumerates as error the court’s charge to the jury that “a witness, in a driving under the influence case, states a fact rather than an opinion when he testifies that a defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquors.” The quoted language appears in the case of Garrett v. State, 146 Ga. App. 610, 611 ( 247 SE2d 136 ) (1978), wherein Donley v. State, 72 Ga. App. 429 ( 33 SE2d 925 ) (1945), and Harris v. State, 97 Ga. App. 495 (3) ( 103 SE2d 443 ) (1958), are cited as authority for the principle involved.

1984See generally OCGA § 9-11-56; Kiker v. Hefner, 119 Ga. App. 629 (1) ( 168 SE2d 637 ) (1969).

1984See generally OCGA § 9-11-56; Kiker v. Hefner, 119 Ga. App. 629 (1) ( 168 SE2d 637 ) (1969).

1983Reynolds v. State, 147 Ga. App. 488 (2) ( 249 SE2d 305 ).

1983Reynolds v. State, 147 Ga. App. 488 (2) ( 249 SE2d 305 ).

1982The defendant enumerates as error the denial of his “Motion to suppress pre-trial identification.” It is argued that the procedure followed in the instant case closely paralleled similar procedures *844 followed in Baier v. State, 124 Ga. App. 334 ( 183 SE2d 622 ); Towns v. State, 136 Ga. App. 467 ( 221 SE2d 631 ); and Bradley v. State, 148 Ga. App. 722 ( 252 SE2d 648 ).

1982The defendant enumerates as error the denial of his “Motion to suppress pre-trial identification.” It is argued that the procedure followed in the instant case closely paralleled similar procedures *844 followed in Baier v. State, 124 Ga. App. 334 ( 183 SE2d 622 ); Towns v. State, 136 Ga. App. 467 ( 221 SE2d 631 ); and Bradley v. State, 148 Ga. App. 722 ( 252 SE2d 648 ).

1982Barker v. State, 144 Ga. App. 339 ( 241 SE2d 11 ) (1977).” Stevens v. State, 242 Ga. 34, 37 ( 247 SE2d 838 ) (1978). 4.

1982Barker v. State, 144 Ga. App. 339 ( 241 SE2d 11 ) (1977).” Stevens v. State, 242 Ga. 34, 37 ( 247 SE2d 838 ) (1978). 4.

1982The defendant enumerates as error the denial of his “Motion to suppress pre-trial identification.” It is argued that the procedure followed in the instant case closely paralleled similar procedures *844 followed in Baier v. State, 124 Ga. App. 334 ( 183 SE2d 622 ); Towns v. State, 136 Ga. App. 467 ( 221 SE2d 631 ); and Bradley v. State, 148 Ga. App. 722 ( 252 SE2d 648 ).

1982The defendant enumerates as error the denial of his “Motion to suppress pre-trial identification.” It is argued that the procedure followed in the instant case closely paralleled similar procedures *844 followed in Baier v. State, 124 Ga. App. 334 ( 183 SE2d 622 ); Towns v. State, 136 Ga. App. 467 ( 221 SE2d 631 ); and Bradley v. State, 148 Ga. App. 722 ( 252 SE2d 648 ).

1982The defendant enumerates as error the charge of the court on intent, which stated, inter alia — “Intent may be shown in many ways . . . it may be presumed when it is the natural and necessary consequences of the acts.” This exact charge was approved by this court in Vaughn v. State, 159 Ga. App. 883 ( 285 SE2d 573 ) and a similar charge was approved by the Supreme Court in Adams v. State, 246 Ga. 119, 122 (3) ( 269 SE2d 11 ). 3.

1982The defendant enumerates as error the charge of the court on intent, which stated, inter alia — “Intent may be shown in many ways . . . it may be presumed when it is the natural and necessary consequences of the acts.” This exact charge was approved by this court in Vaughn v. State, 159 Ga. App. 883 ( 285 SE2d 573 ) and a similar charge was approved by the Supreme Court in Adams v. State, 246 Ga. 119, 122 (3) ( 269 SE2d 11 ). 3.

1982The defendant enumerates as error the denial of his “Motion to suppress pre-trial identification.” It is argued that the procedure followed in the instant case closely paralleled similar procedures *844 followed in Baier v. State, 124 Ga. App. 334 ( 183 SE2d 622 ); Towns v. State, 136 Ga. App. 467 ( 221 SE2d 631 ); and Bradley v. State, 148 Ga. App. 722 ( 252 SE2d 648 ).

1982The defendant enumerates as error the denial of his “Motion to suppress pre-trial identification.” It is argued that the procedure followed in the instant case closely paralleled similar procedures *844 followed in Baier v. State, 124 Ga. App. 334 ( 183 SE2d 622 ); Towns v. State, 136 Ga. App. 467 ( 221 SE2d 631 ); and Bradley v. State, 148 Ga. App. 722 ( 252 SE2d 648 ).

1982The trial judge charged in pertinent part that criminal intent “may be presumed when it is the natural and necessary consequences of the act.” (Emphasis supplied.) The charge given by the trial court in this case, of which the above-quoted language is a part, was approved as not being impermissibly burden-shifting by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Griffin v. State, 230 Ga. 449 (3) ( 197 SE2d 723 ) (1973).

1982The trial judge charged in pertinent part that criminal intent “may be presumed when it is the natural and necessary consequences of the act.” (Emphasis supplied.) The charge given by the trial court in this case, of which the above-quoted language is a part, was approved as not being impermissibly burden-shifting by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Griffin v. State, 230 Ga. 449 (3) ( 197 SE2d 723 ) (1973).

1981The defendant enumerates error upon the trial court’s refusing to give his request to charge the fourth headnote in Simpson v. State, 12 Ga. App. 292 (4) ( 77 SE 105 ) (1912), which reads as follows: “If a jury, upon the trial of a criminal case, are satisfied from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused is guilty of one of two or more offenses of which the defendant may lawfully be convicted under the indictment against him, but have reasonable doubt as to which of these offenses the defendant is guilty of, it is their duty to give him the benefit of the doubt and find him g

1981The defendant enumerates error upon the trial court’s refusing to give his request to charge the fourth headnote in Simpson v. State, 12 Ga. App. 292 (4) ( 77 SE 105 ) (1912), which reads as follows: “If a jury, upon the trial of a criminal case, are satisfied from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused is guilty of one of two or more offenses of which the defendant may lawfully be convicted under the indictment against him, but have reasonable doubt as to which of these offenses the defendant is guilty of, it is their duty to give him the benefit of the doubt and find him g

1979"In Pitts v. Glass, 231 Ga. 638 ( 203 SE2d 515 ) (1974), [the Supreme Court] adopted the standard for determining the effectiveness of counsel as enunciated in MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960).

1979"In Pitts v. Glass, 231 Ga. 638 ( 203 SE2d 515 ) (1974), [the Supreme Court] adopted the standard for determining the effectiveness of counsel as enunciated in MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960).

1978The plaintiff argues that the instant action was essentially a motion and therefore findings of fact and conclusions of law were not necessary under the ruling in Hines v. Hines, 237 Ga. 755 , supra. See also CPA § 81A-152.

1978See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (96 SC 2240, 49 LE2d 91) (1976); DeBerry v. State, 241 Ga. 204 (1) ( 243 SE2d 864 ) (1978).

1978See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (96 SC 2240, 49 LE2d 91) (1976); DeBerry v. State, 241 Ga. 204 (1) ( 243 SE2d 864 ) (1978).

1978Relying on United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (96 SC 2392, 49 LE2d 342) (1975), the defendant enumerates as error the prosecutor’s failure to disclose, without request, an allegedly exculpatory statement contained in the police file.