estoppel by verdict doctrine in Illinois

1963Regarding the limitations on the doctrine of estoppel by verdict, this court stated in Hoffman v. Hoffman, 330 Ill. 413 , 418: “To operate as an estoppel by verdict it is absolutely necessary that there shall have been a finding of a specific fact in the former judgment of record that is material and controlling in that case and also material and controlling in the pending case.

1959One of the leading cases in Illinois concerning the doctrine of estoppel by verdict is Hoffman v. Hoffman, 330 Ill. 413 , 161 N. E. 723 , wherein the Supreme Court stated at page 417 of 330 Ill. and at page 725 of 161 N. E., the following: “Where a former adjudication is relied upon as an absolute bar, there must be, as between the actions, identity of parties, of subject-matter and of cause of action.

1925The cases in Illinois that follow and support Hanna v. Read, supra, are Leopold v. City of Chicago, 150 Ill. 568 , Wright v. Griffey, 147 id. 496, Attorney General v. Chicago and Evanston Railroad Co. 112 id. 520, and Markley v. People, 171 id. 260, in which the State was estopped; and Brack v. Boyd, supra; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Storage Co. 260 Ill. 485 ; City of Chicago v. Partridge, 248 id. 442; Silurian Oil Co. v. Neal, 277 id. 45.

1919Markley v. People, supra; Hanna v. Read, 102 Ill. 596 .

1985App.3d 1077, 1082 , 454 N.E.2d 379, 383 , "[u]nder the doctrine of estoppel by verdict, a former judgment bars only those questions actually decided in the prior suit — the scope of the bar is narrower than under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment. ( City of Peoria v. Peoria City Lines, Inc. (1962), 24 Ill.2d 457 , 182 N.E.2d 164 .)" As between the doctrines of estoppel by judgment and estoppel by verdict, there is a fundamental difference in the breadth of a former judgment's conclusiveness. ( Housing Authority v. YMCA (1984), 101 Ill.2d 246 , 461 N.E.2d 959 .) If the arbitration award is b

1985App.3d 1077, 1082 , 454 N.E.2d 379, 383 , "[u]nder the doctrine of estoppel by verdict, a former judgment bars only those questions actually decided in the prior suit — the scope of the bar is narrower than under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment. ( City of Peoria v. Peoria City Lines, Inc. (1962), 24 Ill.2d 457 , 182 N.E.2d 164 .)" As between the doctrines of estoppel by judgment and estoppel by verdict, there is a fundamental difference in the breadth of a former judgment's conclusiveness. ( Housing Authority v. YMCA (1984), 101 Ill.2d 246 , 461 N.E.2d 959 .) If the arbitration award is b

1970“When some specific fact or question has been actually and directly in issue and has been adjudicated and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a former suit, and the same fact or question is again put in issue in a subsequent suit between parties or their privities who were parties in the former suit, its determination in the former suit, if properly presented and relied upon, is conclusive upon the parties and persons in privity with them in the latter suit, without regard to whether or not the cause of action is the same in both suits, and it cannot be again litigated in the su

1965Hoffman v. Hoffman, 330 Ill 413, 161 NE 723 ; Rose v. Dolejs, 7 Ill App2d 267, 129 NE2d 281 .

1969In Smith v. Bishop, 26 Ill2d 434, 187 NE2d 217 , relied on heavily by the defendant, the Supreme Court laid down the following general rules as to when the doctrine of estoppel by verdict applies: “When the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.

1963Therefore, he will not be permitted to re-try that issue. . . .” The basis of the doctrine of estoppel by verdict is that the party to be affected, or someone with whom he is in privity, has litigated or has had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action; one is not estopped or barred by a prior adjudication if he was not a party to such action or does not stand in the relation of privy to one who has a party: Smith v. Bishop (1962) 26 Ill2d 434, 187 NE2d 217 .

1938In discussing the doctrine of estoppel by verdict, in Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. National Storage Co., 260 Ill. 485 , the court said at p. 493: “An estoppel by verdict is but another branch of the doctrine of res judicata, and it rests upon the same principle of law, — that is, that a matter once litigated between parties to a final judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction cannot again be controverted.

1925The cases in Illinois that follow and support Hanna v. Read, supra, are Leopold v. City of Chicago, 150 Ill. 568 , Wright v. Griffey, 147 id. 496, Attorney General v. Chicago and Evanston Railroad Co. 112 id. 520, and Markley v. People, 171 id. 260, in which the State was estopped; and Brack v. Boyd, supra; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Storage Co. 260 Ill. 485 ; City of Chicago v. Partridge, 248 id. 442; Silurian Oil Co. v. Neal, 277 id. 45.

1989App.3d 682 , 510 N.E.2d 1122 .) Res judicata acts as an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action, where the parties and subject matter also are the same. ( Martinez, 157 Ill.

1989Plaintiff also sets forth the doctrine of estoppel by verdict. • 4 The doctrine of res judicata bars a second adjudication where there is a former adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. ( Martinez v. Admiral Maintenance Service (1987), 157 Ill.

1987(Turn Verein Lincoln v. Paschen (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 229, 231 , 170 N.E.2d 111 ; Oak Park Club v. Brenza (1955), 7 Ill. 2d 389, 392 , 131 N.E.2d 89 ; see also Chicago Historical Society v. Paschen (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 378, 381 , 137 N.E.2d 832 .) However, the court has also determined that the doctrine does not apply against a State or county in the collection of public revenues by taxation (People ex rel.

1987(Turn Verein Lincoln v. Paschen (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 229, 231 , 170 N.E.2d 111 ; Oak Park Club v. Brenza (1955), 7 Ill. 2d 389, 392 , 131 N.E.2d 89 ; see also Chicago Historical Society v. Paschen (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 378, 381 , 137 N.E.2d 832 .) However, the court has also determined that the doctrine does not apply against a State or county in the collection of public revenues by taxation (People ex rel.

1987(Turn Verein Lincoln v. Paschen (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 229, 231 , 170 N.E.2d 111 ; Oak Park Club v. Brenza (1955), 7 Ill. 2d 389, 392 , 131 N.E.2d 89 ; see also Chicago Historical Society v. Paschen (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 378, 381 , 137 N.E.2d 832 .) However, the court has also determined that the doctrine does not apply against a State or county in the collection of public revenues by taxation (People ex rel.

1987(Turn Verein Lincoln v. Paschen (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 229, 231 , 170 N.E.2d 111 ; Oak Park Club v. Brenza (1955), 7 Ill. 2d 389, 392 , 131 N.E.2d 89 ; see also Chicago Historical Society v. Paschen (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 378, 381 , 137 N.E.2d 832 .) However, the court has also determined that the doctrine does not apply against a State or county in the collection of public revenues by taxation (People ex rel.

1985App.3d 1077, 1082 , 454 N.E.2d 379, 383 , "[u]nder the doctrine of estoppel by verdict, a former judgment bars only those questions actually decided in the prior suit — the scope of the bar is narrower than under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment. ( City of Peoria v. Peoria City Lines, Inc. (1962), 24 Ill.2d 457 , 182 N.E.2d 164 .)" As between the doctrines of estoppel by judgment and estoppel by verdict, there is a fundamental difference in the breadth of a former judgment's conclusiveness. ( Housing Authority v. YMCA (1984), 101 Ill.2d 246 , 461 N.E.2d 959 .) If the arbitration award is b

1985Merritt v. Merritt (1850), 11 Ill. 565, 569 . • 6 With respect to the last arguments of the defendants, we conclude that the subject matter of the grievance underlying the prior arbitration and the instant grievance was the same, i.e., whether Pullen is to be given one year of credit, or step advancement, for that portion of school year 1981-82 which she taught.

1985App.3d 1077, 1082 , 454 N.E.2d 379, 383 , "[u]nder the doctrine of estoppel by verdict, a former judgment bars only those questions actually decided in the prior suit — the scope of the bar is narrower than under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment. ( City of Peoria v. Peoria City Lines, Inc. (1962), 24 Ill.2d 457 , 182 N.E.2d 164 .)" As between the doctrines of estoppel by judgment and estoppel by verdict, there is a fundamental difference in the breadth of a former judgment's conclusiveness. ( Housing Authority v. YMCA (1984), 101 Ill.2d 246 , 461 N.E.2d 959 .) If the arbitration award is b

1985App.3d 1077, 1082 , 454 N.E.2d 379, 383 , "[u]nder the doctrine of estoppel by verdict, a former judgment bars only those questions actually decided in the prior suit — the scope of the bar is narrower than under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment. ( City of Peoria v. Peoria City Lines, Inc. (1962), 24 Ill.2d 457 , 182 N.E.2d 164 .)" As between the doctrines of estoppel by judgment and estoppel by verdict, there is a fundamental difference in the breadth of a former judgment's conclusiveness. ( Housing Authority v. YMCA (1984), 101 Ill.2d 246 , 461 N.E.2d 959 .) If the arbitration award is b

1984App. 3d 1110 , 418 N.E.2d 63 , involved application of the doctrine of estoppel by verdict, or collateral estoppel, which poses a narrower bar than estoppel by judgment.

1982People v. Bone (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 282 , 412 N.E.2d 444 ; Cromwell v. County of Sac (1877), 94 U.S. 351, 353 , 24 L.

1982People v. Bone (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 282 , 412 N.E.2d 444 ; Cromwell v. County of Sac (1877), 94 U.S. 351, 353 , 24 L.

1982People v. Bone (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 282 , 412 N.E.2d 444 ; Cromwell v. County of Sac (1877), 94 U.S. 351, 353 , 24 L.

1982People v. Bone (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 282 , 412 N.E.2d 444 ; Cromwell v. County of Sac (1877), 94 U.S. 351, 353 , 24 L.

1982The related doctrine of estoppel by verdict, which would not require identity of cause of action (Healea v. Verne (1931), 343 Ill. 325 , 175 N.E. 562 ), would only conclude matters in issue or points controverted upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.

1982The related doctrine of estoppel by verdict, which would not require identity of cause of action (Healea v. Verne (1931), 343 Ill. 325 , 175 N.E. 562 ), would only conclude matters in issue or points controverted upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.

1981(Consolidated Distilled Products, Inc. v. Allphin (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 19, 26 .) It is evident from our review of the Federal court’s decision in question that it did not adjudicate any issue pending between the parties in this matter.

1979App. 3d 783, 789 , 370 N.E.2d 564, 569 .) Based upon the rationale that no final judgment on the merits was rendered in the original suit, we find that the doctrine of estoppel by verdict is also not applicable to this case.

1979App. 3d 787 , 368 N.E.2d 159 , decided by this court, and the trial court granted these judgments based upon the application of the doctrine of estoppel by verdict, finding that the issues sought to be herein litigated had been finally determined in the earlier case.

1976(Kedzierski v. Kedzierski, 86 Ill.

1969It expressly overruled the prior case of People v. Psi Upsilon Fraternity, 324 Ill 540, 155 NE 279 (1927), which had come to a contrary result.

1964Franciscy v. Jordan, 43 Ill App2d 344, 193 NE2d 219 .

1963(People v. Allen, 368 Ill. 368 .) The question here is whether the doctrine of estoppel by verdict precluded the State from introducing any evidence of the act of intercourse at the second trial.

1962(Cf. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 .) In this case there is no suggestion of such a controversy, and the doctrine of estoppel by verdict, or collateral estoppel, should be applied.

1962(Cf. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 .) In this case there is no suggestion of such a controversy, and the doctrine of estoppel by verdict, or collateral estoppel, should be applied.

1962In determining the applicability of either of these doctrines to the case at bar we must examine first our prior decision in 11 Ill.2d 520 .

1962(Lusk v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 183 .)” (Italics added.) However, even if analogy were made to the tax cases, as defendant insists, this would mean only that the causes of action would be deemed different, and hence, the doctrine of estoppel by verdict, rather than res judicata, would apply.