prehminary hearing in Kansas

2011But the Supreme Court did state that “[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a prehminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ; see Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (in context of law enforcement interrogations, statements are nontestimonial when made under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable law enforcement assistance to meet an ongoing emergency).

2007After finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in finding Hickman unavailable, the court reasoned with regard to the issue of cross-examination that “ ‘[t]he Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is satisfied if the accused confronted the witnesses against him at any stage of the proceedings in the same case and has had an opportunity of cross-examination.’ ” 277 Kan. at 598 (quoting State v. McCray, 267 Kan. 339, 353 , 979 P.2d 134 [1999], and generally citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 ).

2011“An appellate court must give deference to any factual findings made by the district court as a result of the [prehminary] hearing” and “it must apply a findings of fact and conclusions of law standard of review to determine whether the findings are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether those findings are sufficient to support its conclusions of law. [Citation omitted.]” Bellamy v. State, 285 Kan. 346, 354 , 172 P.3d 10 (2007).

2011“An appellate court must give deference to any factual findings made by the district court as a result of the [prehminary] hearing” and “it must apply a findings of fact and conclusions of law standard of review to determine whether the findings are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether those findings are sufficient to support its conclusions of law. [Citation omitted.]” Bellamy v. State, 285 Kan. 346, 354 , 172 P.3d 10 (2007).

2008Notably, our Supreme Court has set forth the legal standard for reviewing alleged errors at the prehminary hearing after a defendant has stood trial and been convicted: “[W]here an accused has gone to trial and been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, any error at the prehminary hearing stage is harmless unless it appears that the error caused prejudice at trial.” State v. Butler, 257 Kan. 1043, 1062 , 897 P.2d 1007 (1995).

2008Notably, our Supreme Court has set forth the legal standard for reviewing alleged errors at the prehminary hearing after a defendant has stood trial and been convicted: “[W]here an accused has gone to trial and been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, any error at the prehminary hearing stage is harmless unless it appears that the error caused prejudice at trial.” State v. Butler, 257 Kan. 1043, 1062 , 897 P.2d 1007 (1995).

2007K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 22-2902(3) requires the discharge of a defendant if the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing does not establish probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed: “If from the evidence it appears that a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed by the defendant, the magistrate shall order the defendant bound over to the district judge having jurisdiction to try the case; otherwise, the magistrate shall discharge the defendant.” In State v. Seems, 277 Kan. 303 , Syl. ¶ 3, 84 P.3d 606 (2004), our Supreme

2007K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 22-2902(3) requires the discharge of a defendant if the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing does not establish probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed: “If from the evidence it appears that a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed by the defendant, the magistrate shall order the defendant bound over to the district judge having jurisdiction to try the case; otherwise, the magistrate shall discharge the defendant.” In State v. Seems, 277 Kan. 303 , Syl. ¶ 3, 84 P.3d 606 (2004), our Supreme

2011After the charges were filed, the juvenile respondent requested a prehminary hearing under K.S.A. 22-2902 on the “ ‘felony charge,’ ” arguing that he was entitled to such a hearing under the reasoning of In re L.M., 286 Kan. 460 , 186 P.3d 164 (2008), which granted juvenile respondents the constitutional right to a jury trial in proceedings under the KJJC.

2011After the charges were filed, the juvenile respondent requested a prehminary hearing under K.S.A. 22-2902 on the “ ‘felony charge,’ ” arguing that he was entitled to such a hearing under the reasoning of In re L.M., 286 Kan. 460 , 186 P.3d 164 (2008), which granted juvenile respondents the constitutional right to a jury trial in proceedings under the KJJC.

2011According to the panel, the omission of a “specific waiver of Moses’ right to a prehminary hearing, as mandated by K.S.A. 22-2909(a),” rendered the diversion agreement “invalid and unenforceable.” 38 Kan.

2010In In re D.E.R., 290 Kan. 306, 225 P.3d 1187 (2010), the Supreme Court considered whether a juvenile charged with an offense that would constitute a felony under tire crimes code should have tire right to a prehminary hearing.

2010In In re D.E.R., 290 Kan. 306, 225 P.3d 1187 (2010), the Supreme Court considered whether a juvenile charged with an offense that would constitute a felony under tire crimes code should have tire right to a prehminary hearing.

2010Therefore, at the prehminary hearing stage, the Act “provides no effective method of litigating the question of whether the medical expenses being billed and paid are necessary and reasonable until after the claim has been disposed of.” Beisel v. Boeing Co., 23 Kan.

2010App. 2d 572, 575 , 932 P.2d 1050 (1997).

2009To further emphasize its point, the Boone court explained that a district magistrate judge’s authority to conduct a prehminary hearing did not equate to the authority to conduct an arraignment, stating: “[A] magistrate conducting a prehminary examination serves a limited function — to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused committed it.” 218 Kan. at 485 .

2009While the State presents a multitude of arguments for why Pennington should lose, we need look no further than State v. Smith, *602 225 Kan. 796 , 594 P.2d 218 (1979), which is clearly dispositive in the State’s favor.

2009While the State presents a multitude of arguments for why Pennington should lose, we need look no further than State v. Smith, *602 225 Kan. 796 , 594 P.2d 218 (1979), which is clearly dispositive in the State’s favor.

2008State v. Anderson, 270 Kan. 68, 71 , 12 P.3d 883 (2000); Berg, 270 Kan. at 238 .

2008State v. Anderson, 270 Kan. 68, 71 , 12 P.3d 883 (2000); Berg, 270 Kan. at 238 .

2008State v. Anderson, 270 Kan. 68, 71 , 12 P.3d 883 (2000); Berg, 270 Kan. at 238 .

2007In support of this argument that the allegedly new developments after the prehminary hearing rendered his first opportunity for cross-examination inadequate, the defendant cites two out-of-state *143 cases: People v. Osio, 2005 WL 1231402 (Cal. App. 2005), unpublished opinion filed May 25, 2005, and People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004).

2007While Fry did hold that a defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine a witness during a prehminary hearing was not constitutionally adequate for Confrontation Clause purposes, this holding was demanded by case precedent within that state and by “the limited nature of the prehminary hearing” in Colorado. 92 P.3d at 976-77 .

2007Laymon v. State, 280 Kan. 430 , Syl. ¶ 1, 122 P.3d 326 (2005).

2007Laymon v. State, 280 Kan. 430 , Syl. ¶ 1, 122 P.3d 326 (2005).

2007See State v. Ruebke, 240 Kan. 493, 517-18 , 731 P.2d 842 , cert. denied 483 U.S. 1024 (1987) (finding that the admission of the transcript of an unavailable witness’ prehminary hearing testimony did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights under the United States Constitution or the Kansas Constitution Bill of *142 Rights); State v. Lashley, 233 Kan. 620, 627-28 , 664 P.2d 1358 (1983) (holding that the trial court did not err in admitting preliminary hearing testimony of a witness in the same proceeding when the witness was unavailable at trial and the defendant had the opportunity to

2007See State v. Ruebke, 240 Kan. 493, 517-18 , 731 P.2d 842 , cert. denied 483 U.S. 1024 (1987) (finding that the admission of the transcript of an unavailable witness’ prehminary hearing testimony did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights under the United States Constitution or the Kansas Constitution Bill of *142 Rights); State v. Lashley, 233 Kan. 620, 627-28 , 664 P.2d 1358 (1983) (holding that the trial court did not err in admitting preliminary hearing testimony of a witness in the same proceeding when the witness was unavailable at trial and the defendant had the opportunity to

2007Setting forth the standard used in determining whether the evidence presented at the prehminary hearing establishes probable *491 cause, our Supreme Court in State v. Huser, 265 Kan. 228 , Syl. ¶ 2, 959 P.2d 908 (1998), stated: “While the judge at a preliminary hearing must determine that there is some evidence to support a finding that a felony has been committed and the person charged committed it, the evidence need not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, only probably cause.

2007Setting forth the standard used in determining whether the evidence presented at the prehminary hearing establishes probable *491 cause, our Supreme Court in State v. Huser, 265 Kan. 228 , Syl. ¶ 2, 959 P.2d 908 (1998), stated: “While the judge at a preliminary hearing must determine that there is some evidence to support a finding that a felony has been committed and the person charged committed it, the evidence need not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, only probably cause.

2007On appeal, we concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the prior prehminary hearing testimony. 277 Kan. at 597-99 .

2007After finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in finding Hickman unavailable, the court reasoned with regard to the issue of cross-examination that “ ‘[t]he Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is satisfied if the accused confronted the witnesses against him at any stage of the proceedings in the same case and has had an opportunity of cross-examination.’ ” 277 Kan. at 598 (quoting State v. McCray, 267 Kan. 339, 353 , 979 P.2d 134 [1999], and generally citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 ).

2007After finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in finding Hickman unavailable, the court reasoned with regard to the issue of cross-examination that “ ‘[t]he Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is satisfied if the accused confronted the witnesses against him at any stage of the proceedings in the same case and has had an opportunity of cross-examination.’ ” 277 Kan. at 598 (quoting State v. McCray, 267 Kan. 339, 353 , 979 P.2d 134 [1999], and generally citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 ).

2007After finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in finding Hickman unavailable, the court reasoned with regard to the issue of cross-examination that “ ‘[t]he Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is satisfied if the accused confronted the witnesses against him at any stage of the proceedings in the same case and has had an opportunity of cross-examination.’ ” 277 Kan. at 598 (quoting State v. McCray, 267 Kan. 339, 353 , 979 P.2d 134 [1999], and generally citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 ).

2007See State v. Ruebke, 240 Kan. 493, 517-18 , 731 P.2d 842 , cert. denied 483 U.S. 1024 (1987) (finding that the admission of the transcript of an unavailable witness’ prehminary hearing testimony did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights under the United States Constitution or the Kansas Constitution Bill of *142 Rights); State v. Lashley, 233 Kan. 620, 627-28 , 664 P.2d 1358 (1983) (holding that the trial court did not err in admitting preliminary hearing testimony of a witness in the same proceeding when the witness was unavailable at trial and the defendant had the opportunity to

2007See State v. Ruebke, 240 Kan. 493, 517-18 , 731 P.2d 842 , cert. denied 483 U.S. 1024 (1987) (finding that the admission of the transcript of an unavailable witness’ prehminary hearing testimony did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights under the United States Constitution or the Kansas Constitution Bill of *142 Rights); State v. Lashley, 233 Kan. 620, 627-28 , 664 P.2d 1358 (1983) (holding that the trial court did not err in admitting preliminary hearing testimony of a witness in the same proceeding when the witness was unavailable at trial and the defendant had the opportunity to

2007See State v. Ruebke, 240 Kan. 493, 517-18 , 731 P.2d 842 , cert. denied 483 U.S. 1024 (1987) (finding that the admission of the transcript of an unavailable witness’ prehminary hearing testimony did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights under the United States Constitution or the Kansas Constitution Bill of *142 Rights); State v. Lashley, 233 Kan. 620, 627-28 , 664 P.2d 1358 (1983) (holding that the trial court did not err in admitting preliminary hearing testimony of a witness in the same proceeding when the witness was unavailable at trial and the defendant had the opportunity to

2007See State v. Ruebke, 240 Kan. 493, 517-18 , 731 P.2d 842 , cert. denied 483 U.S. 1024 (1987) (finding that the admission of the transcript of an unavailable witness’ prehminary hearing testimony did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights under the United States Constitution or the Kansas Constitution Bill of *142 Rights); State v. Lashley, 233 Kan. 620, 627-28 , 664 P.2d 1358 (1983) (holding that the trial court did not err in admitting preliminary hearing testimony of a witness in the same proceeding when the witness was unavailable at trial and the defendant had the opportunity to