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28 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Sandersgreen2 sentences2023IN RE SANDERS AND THE ONE PARENT DOCTRINE In light of our Supreme Court’s holding in In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 422 ; 852 NW2d 524 (2014) and its abolition of the one parent doctrine, I do not believe that the circuit court had any legal authority upon which to base its decision to leave AKD in foster care during the interim period between respondent-father being established as the legal father and the court assuming jurisdiction. 2023IN RE SANDERS AND THE ONE PARENT DOCTRINE In light of our Supreme Court’s holding in In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 422 ; 852 NW2d 524 (2014) and its abolition of the one parent doctrine, I do not believe that the circuit court had any legal authority upon which to base its decision to leave AKD in foster care during the interim period between respondent-father being established as the legal father and the court assuming jurisdiction. | 10 | 22 |
In re Wanglergreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., In re Wangler, 305 Mich App 438, 445-448 ; 853 NW2d 402 (2014), application for leave to appeal held in abeyance in unpublished order, entered September 19, 2014 (Docket No. 149537), see In re Wangler, 852 NW2d 903 (Mich, 2014) (holding that the respondent’s challenge to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction— based on the fact that a written plea was allegedly invalid and the fact that the respondent was not present at the adjudication trial — was collateral, and therefore precluded); In re Curran, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 15, 2014 (Doc 2014See, e.g., In re Wangler, 305 Mich App 438, 445-448 ; 853 NW2d 402 (2014), application for leave to appeal held in abeyance in unpublished order, entered September 19, 2014 (Docket No. 149537), see In re Wangler, 852 NW2d 903 (Mich, 2014) (holding that the respondent’s challenge to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction— based on the fact that a written plea was allegedly invalid and the fact that the respondent was not present at the adjudication trial — was collateral, and therefore precluded); In re Curran, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 15, 2014 (Doc | 4 | 4 |
In Re CRgreen2 sentences2014In justifying its orders, the court relied on the one-parent doctrine and the Court of Appeals’ decision in In re CR, 250 Mich App 185 ; 646 NW2d 506 (2002), from which that doctrine derives. 2014In justifying its orders, the court relied on the one-parent doctrine and the Court of Appeals’ decision in In re CR, 250 Mich App 185 ; 646 NW2d 506 (2002), from which that doctrine derives. | 2 | 4 |
In Re Weldongreen2 sentences2014An incarcerated parent can exercise the constitutional right to direct the care of his or her children while incarcerated, and Laird has tried to do just that.18 For example, an 17 Because we hold that the one-parent doctrine violates the due process rights of unadjudicated parents, we need not consider Laird’s argument that the doctrine also violates the Equal Protection Clause. 18 See, e.g., In re Weldon, 397 Mich 225, 296 ; 244 NW2d 827 (1976) (“Some parents, however, because of illness, incarceration, employment or other reason, entrust the care of their children for extended periods of ti 2014An incarcerated parent can exercise the constitutional right to direct the care of his or her children while incarcerated, and Laird has tried to do just that.18 For example, an 17 Because we hold that the one-parent doctrine violates the due process rights of unadjudicated parents, we need not consider Laird’s argument that the doctrine also violates the Equal Protection Clause. 18 See, e.g., In re Weldon, 397 Mich 225, 296 ; 244 NW2d 827 (1976) (“Some parents, however, because of illness, incarceration, employment or other reason, entrust the care of their children for extended periods of ti | 2 | 2 |
In Re ARgreen2 sentences2014See, for example, In re AR, 330 SW3d 858 (Mo App, 2011); In re CR, 108 Ohio St 3d 369; 843 NE2d 1188 (2006); In re Amber G, 250 Neb 973; 554 NW2d 142 (1996). 11 2d 49 (2000) (opinion by O’Connor, J.).12 And this interest “does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.” Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753 ; 102 S Ct 1388 ; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982). 2014See, for example, In re AR, 330 SW3d 858 (Mo App, 2011); In re CR, 108 Ohio St 3d 369; 843 NE2d 1188 (2006); In re Amber G, 250 Neb 973; 554 NW2d 142 (1996). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2011 PA 38green2 sentences2014Once again, it is important to remember that the issue before this Court is not whether requiring a finding of unfitness to be made during the adjudicative phase would be a wise policy decision, only whether the Constitution requires that this finding be made during that phase. 18 The majority opinion, although it apparently recognizes that the permanency planning 21 While I agree with the majority opinion that the state, absent exigent circumstances,19 cannot remove a child from a parent’s custody or otherwise interfere with a parent’s parental rights without first finding that the parent is 2014If “the court determines at a permanency planning hearing that the return of the child to his or her parent would not cause a substantial risk of harm to the child’s life, physical health, or mental well-being, the court shall order the child returned to his or her parent.” MCL 712A.19a(5); see also MCR 3.976(E)(2). 18 While I agree with the majority opinion that the state, absent exigent circumstances, 19 cannot remove a child from a parent’s custody or otherwise interfere with a parent’s parental rights without first finding that the parent is unfit, I do not believe that our current statuto | 2 | 2 |
Troxel v. Granvillegreen2 sentences2014Indeed, “[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 65 ; 120 S Ct 2054 ; 147 L Ed 11 “Nearly every state” has adopted the one-parent doctrine, Sankaran, 82 Temp L Rev at 57, and this “near-universal approach,” id., has been upheld against similar constitutional challenges in other states. 2014Indeed, “[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 65 ; 120 S Ct 2054 ; 147 L Ed 11 “Nearly every state” has adopted the one-parent doctrine, Sankaran, 82 Temp L Rev at 57, and this “near-universal approach,” id., has been upheld against similar constitutional challenges in other states. | 1 | 3 |
In Re Roodgreen2 sentences2018Cf. In re Rood , 483 Mich. 73 , 111, 763 N.W.2d 587 (2009) (opinion by CORRIGAN, J. ) (reversing a termination order because the trial court did not provide parent with proper notice of dispositional hearings). 2018Cf. In re Rood , 483 Mich. 73 , 111, 763 N.W.2d 587 (2009) (opinion by CORRIGAN, J. ) (reversing a termination order because the trial court did not provide parent with proper notice of dispositional hearings). | 1 | 2 |
Trustees of Metropolitan Detroit Plumbing Industry Training Trust Fund v. Ridenourgreen1 sentence2019But as discussed above at note 7, those procedural steps occurred well before the trial court’s error. 18 one parent was improperly adjudicated as unfit and holding that the one-parent doctrine is unconstitutional); In re Mays, 490 Mich 993 (2012) (reversing a termination after the trial court made an erroneous factual finding during the adjudication phase); In re Mason, 486 Mich 142 ; 782 NW2d 747 (2010) (reversing a termination based on the failure to facilitate the respondent’s involvement and participation during the adjudication and dispositional phases); In re Hudson, 483 Mich 928 (reman | 1 | 1 |
In Re Hatcherred2 sentences2015See In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 436, 444 ; 505 NW2d 834 (1993); In re SLH, 277 Mich App at 668 (“[A]n adjudication cannot be . . . attacked following an order terminating parental rights” unless the “termination occurs at the initial disposition as a result of a request for termination contained in the original, or amended, petition for jurisdiction[.]”).2 To the extent that respondent is also arguing that the adjudication violated our Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394 ; 852 NW2d 524 (2014), the argument lacks merit, as the one-parent doctrine, which was rejected 2015See In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 436, 444 ; 505 NW2d 834 (1993); In re SLH, 277 Mich App at 668 (“[A]n adjudication cannot be . . . attacked following an order terminating parental rights” unless the “termination occurs at the initial disposition as a result of a request for termination contained in the original, or amended, petition for jurisdiction[.]”).2 To the extent that respondent is also arguing that the adjudication violated our Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394 ; 852 NW2d 524 (2014), the argument lacks merit, as the one-parent doctrine, which was rejected | 1 | 1 |
In Re SLH, AJH, & VAHgreen1 sentence2015See In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 436, 444 ; 505 NW2d 834 (1993); In re SLH, 277 Mich App at 668 (“[A]n adjudication cannot be . . . attacked following an order terminating parental rights” unless the “termination occurs at the initial disposition as a result of a request for termination contained in the original, or amended, petition for jurisdiction[.]”).2 To the extent that respondent is also arguing that the adjudication violated our Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394 ; 852 NW2d 524 (2014), the argument lacks merit, as the one-parent doctrine, which was rejected | 1 | 1 |
Ingham County Department of Social Services v. Currygreen2 sentences2014This they may do without interference by the state as long as the child is adequately cared for.”) (opinion by LEVIN, J.), overruled in part on other grounds by Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 47 ; 490 NW2d 568 (1992); In re Curry, 113 Mich App 821, 826-827 ; 318 NW2d 567 (1982) (“Until 21 incarcerated parent can choose who will care for his children while he is imprisoned. 2014This they may do without interference by the state as long as the child is adequately cared for.”) (opinion by LEVIN, J.), overruled in part on other grounds by Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 47 ; 490 NW2d 568 (1992); In re Curry, 113 Mich App 821, 826-827 ; 318 NW2d 567 (1982) (“Until 21 incarcerated parent can choose who will care for his children while he is imprisoned. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jahner v. Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences2014With respect to the second factor, reliance on the old rule, Jahner, 197 Mich App at 114 , the one-parent doctrine has been relied upon in numerous cases since CR was decided, including the instant case. 2014Turning to the second factor, reliance on the old rule, Jahner, 197 Mich App at 114 , the one-parent doctrine has been relied on in numerous cases since CR was decided and, until Sanders was decided, the DHS and the trial court would have been justified in relying on CR and the one-parent doctrine. | 4 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Mason
green
2 sentences2019But as discussed above at note 7, those procedural steps occurred well before the trial court’s error. 18 one parent was improperly adjudicated as unfit and holding that the one-parent doctrine is unconstitutional); In re Mays, 490 Mich 993 (2012) (reversing a termination after the trial court made an erroneous factual finding during the adjudication phase); In re Mason, 486 Mich 142 ; 782 NW2d 747 (2010) (reversing a termination based on the failure to facilitate the respondent’s involvement and participation during the adjudication and dispositional phases); In re Hudson, 483 Mich 928 (reman 2019But as discussed above at note 7, those procedural steps occurred well before the trial court’s error. 18 one parent was improperly adjudicated as unfit and holding that the one-parent doctrine is unconstitutional); In re Mays, 490 Mich 993 (2012) (reversing a termination after the trial court made an erroneous factual finding during the adjudication phase); In re Mason, 486 Mich 142 ; 782 NW2d 747 (2010) (reversing a termination based on the failure to facilitate the respondent’s involvement and participation during the adjudication and dispositional phases); In re Hudson, 483 Mich 928 (reman | 3 | 2018–2019 |
In Re Mitchell
green
2 sentences2019But as discussed above at note 7, those procedural steps occurred well before the trial court’s error. 18 one parent was improperly adjudicated as unfit and holding that the one-parent doctrine is unconstitutional); In re Mays, 490 Mich 993 (2012) (reversing a termination after the trial court made an erroneous factual finding during the adjudication phase); In re Mason, 486 Mich 142 ; 782 NW2d 747 (2010) (reversing a termination based on the failure to facilitate the respondent’s involvement and participation during the adjudication and dispositional phases); In re Hudson, 483 Mich 928 (reman 2018See, e.g., Sanders , 495 Mich. 394 , 852 N.W.2d 524 (reversing a termination in which one parent was improperly adjudicated as unfit and holding the one-parent doctrine unconstitutional); In re Mays , 490 Mich. 993 , 807 N.W.2d 307 (2012) (reversing a termination after the trial court made an erroneous factual finding during the adjudication phase); In re Mason , 486 Mich. 142 , 782 N.W.2d 747 (2010) (reversing a termination *263 for failure to facilitate the parent's involvement during the adjudication and dispositional phases); In re Hudson , 483 Mich. 928 , 763 N.W.2d 618 (2009) (remanding | 3 | 2018–2019 |
People v. LaBreck
green
2 sentences2019But as discussed above at note 7, those procedural steps occurred well before the trial court’s error. 18 one parent was improperly adjudicated as unfit and holding that the one-parent doctrine is unconstitutional); In re Mays, 490 Mich 993 (2012) (reversing a termination after the trial court made an erroneous factual finding during the adjudication phase); In re Mason, 486 Mich 142 ; 782 NW2d 747 (2010) (reversing a termination based on the failure to facilitate the respondent’s involvement and participation during the adjudication and dispositional phases); In re Hudson, 483 Mich 928 (reman 2018See, e.g., Sanders , 495 Mich. 394 , 852 N.W.2d 524 (reversing a termination in which one parent was improperly adjudicated as unfit and holding the one-parent doctrine unconstitutional); In re Mays , 490 Mich. 993 , 807 N.W.2d 307 (2012) (reversing a termination after the trial court made an erroneous factual finding during the adjudication phase); In re Mason , 486 Mich. 142 , 782 N.W.2d 747 (2010) (reversing a termination *263 for failure to facilitate the parent's involvement during the adjudication and dispositional phases); In re Hudson , 483 Mich. 928 , 763 N.W.2d 618 (2009) (remanding | 3 | 2018–2019 |
In re Kanjia
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 666 . 2016Id. at 666 . | 2 | 2016–2016 |
McNeel v. Farm Bureau General Insurance
green
2 sentences2014McNeel, 289 Mich App at 94-95 . 2014McNeel, 289 Mich App at 94-95 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
In Re LE
green
2 sentences2014See, e.g., In re Sanders, 498 Mich at 413; In re LE, 278 Mich App at 17-18 . 2014See, e.g., In re Sanders, 498 Mich at 413; In re LE, 278 Mich App at 17-18 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Interest of Amber G.
green
2 sentences2014See, for example, In re AR, 330 SW3d 858 (Mo App, 2011); In re CR, 108 Ohio St 3d 369; 843 NE2d 1188 (2006); In re Amber G, 250 Neb 973; 554 NW2d 142 (1996). 11 2d 49 (2000) (opinion by O’Connor, J.).12 And this interest “does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.” Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753 ; 102 S Ct 1388 ; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982). 2014See, for example, In re AR, 330 SW3d 858 (Mo App, 2011); In re CR, 108 Ohio St 3d 369; 843 NE2d 1188 (2006); In re Amber G, 250 Neb 973; 554 NW2d 142 (1996). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Stanley v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2014Admittedly, in some cases this process may impose a greater burden on the state than would application of the one-parent doctrine because “[p]rocedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination.” Stanley, 405 US at 656-657 . 2014Admittedly, in some cases this process may impose a greater burden on the state than would application of the one-parent doctrine because “[procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination.” Stanley, 405 US at 656-657 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Graham v. Foster
green
1 sentence2019But as discussed above at note 7, those procedural steps occurred well before the trial court’s error. 18 one parent was improperly adjudicated as unfit and holding that the one-parent doctrine is unconstitutional); In re Mays, 490 Mich 993 (2012) (reversing a termination after the trial court made an erroneous factual finding during the adjudication phase); In re Mason, 486 Mich 142 ; 782 NW2d 747 (2010) (reversing a termination based on the failure to facilitate the respondent’s involvement and participation during the adjudication and dispositional phases); In re Hudson, 483 Mich 928 (reman | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Department of Human Services v. Morgan
green
1 sentence2018See, e.g., Sanders , 495 Mich. 394 , 852 N.W.2d 524 (reversing a termination in which one parent was improperly adjudicated as unfit and holding the one-parent doctrine unconstitutional); In re Mays , 490 Mich. 993 , 807 N.W.2d 307 (2012) (reversing a termination after the trial court made an erroneous factual finding during the adjudication phase); In re Mason , 486 Mich. 142 , 782 N.W.2d 747 (2010) (reversing a termination *263 for failure to facilitate the parent's involvement during the adjudication and dispositional phases); In re Hudson , 483 Mich. 928 , 763 N.W.2d 618 (2009) (remanding | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bowie v. Arder
green
2 sentences2014This they may do without interference by the state as long as the child is adequately cared for.”) (opinion by LEVIN, J.), overruled in part on other grounds by Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 47 ; 490 NW2d 568 (1992); In re Curry, 113 Mich App 821, 826-827 ; 318 NW2d 567 (1982) (“Until 21 incarcerated parent can choose who will care for his children while he is imprisoned. 2014This they may do without interference by the state as long as the child is adequately cared for.”) (opinion by LEVIN, J.), overruled in part on other grounds by Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 47 ; 490 NW2d 568 (1992); In re Curry, 113 Mich App 821, 826-827 ; 318 NW2d 567 (1982) (“Until 21 incarcerated parent can choose who will care for his children while he is imprisoned. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania
green
1 sentence2014Furthermore, as explained earlier, although Laird did not have a right to a jury trial, he did have a right to a hearing in which he was allowed to introduce “[a]ll relevant and material evidence,” including “any written or oral information concerning the child from the child’s parents,” MCR 3.973(E)(2), to “examine and controvert written reports” offered to the court, MCR 3.973(E)(3), and to “cross-examine individuals making the reports when those individuals [were] reasonably available,” id. 26 As explained by the Court of Appeals in Slater/Weimer, unpub op at 3-4: The case at bar is disting | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Hunter v. Hunter
green
2 sentences2014Nevertheless, temporary deprivation of custody is an “intrusion into the family sphere,” Hunter v Hunter, 484 Mich 247, 269 ; 771 NW2d 694 (2009), and plainly infringes on Laird’s constitutional rights as a parent, see Troxel, 530 US at 68 (opinion by O’Connor, J.) (recognizing that parental rights are implicated in grandparent-visitation cases). 14 The DHS responds that Laird was afforded all the process that he was due by virtue of the dispositional proceedings. 2014Nevertheless, temporary deprivation of custody is an “intrusion into the family sphere,” Hunter v Hunter, 484 Mich 247, 269 ; 771 NW2d 694 (2009), and plainly infringes on Laird’s constitutional rights as a parent, see Troxel, 530 US at 68 (opinion by O’Connor, J.) (recognizing that parental rights are implicated in grandparent-visitation cases). 14 The DHS responds that Laird was afforded all the process that he was due by virtue of the dispositional proceedings. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
McLAREN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER v. City of Owosso
neutral
1 sentence2014See, e.g., In re Slater/Weimer, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 25, 2014 (Docket No. 317132), p 2 (opinion by MARKEY, J.); In re Farris, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued August 8, 2013 (Docket Nos. 311967, 312193, and 312194), pp 5-6; 9 In re Mays, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 6, 2012 (Docket No. 309577), p4 (Mays II); 10 In re Rohmer, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued August 14, 2012 (Docket No. 308745), p 3; In re Camp, unpublished memorandum opinion of the Court of | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Church
green
1 sentence2014See, e.g., In re Slater/Weimer, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 25, 2014 (Docket No. 317132), p 2 (opinion by MARKEY, J.); In re Farris, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued August 8, 2013 (Docket Nos. 311967, 312193, and 312194), pp 5-6; 9 In re Mays, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 6, 2012 (Docket No. 309577), p4 (Mays II); 10 In re Rohmer, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued August 14, 2012 (Docket No. 308745), p 3; In re Camp, unpublished memorandum opinion of the Court of | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences2014See, for example, In re AR, 330 SW3d 858 (Mo App, 2011); In re CR, 108 Ohio St 3d 369; 843 NE2d 1188 (2006); In re Amber G, 250 Neb 973; 554 NW2d 142 (1996). 11 2d 49 (2000) (opinion by O’Connor, J.).12 And this interest “does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.” Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753 ; 102 S Ct 1388 ; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982). 2014See, for example, In re AR, 330 SW3d 858 (Mo App, 2011); In re CR, 108 Ohio St 3d 369; 843 NE2d 1188 (2006); In re Amber G, 250 Neb 973; 554 NW2d 142 (1996). 11 2d 49 (2000) (opinion by O’Connor, J.).12 And this interest “does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.” Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753 ; 102 S Ct 1388 ; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.