willful and substantial violation in Florida

2025As the Florida Supreme Court explained: “The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether there has been a willful and substantial violation of a term of probation and whether such a violation has been demonstrated by the greater weight of the evidence.” State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2002).

2023See State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2002) (“The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether there has been a willful and substantial violation of a term of probation and whether such a violation has been demonstrated by the greater weight of the evidence.”); Towns v. State, 259 So. 3d 291, 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (holding that the appellate 3 court reviews the trial court’s finding of willful and substantial violation for competent substantial evidence under an abuse of discretion standard).

2024See Savage v. State, 120 So. 3d 619, 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (“While . . . we review the trial court's finding of a willful and substantial violation for competent substantial evidence, our standard of review for the trial court's decision to revoke probation is abuse of discretion.

2024See Edwards v. State, 296 So. 3d 986 , 987 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (“[O]n appeal, competent substantial evidence must support a finding of a willful and substantial violation; only then will we assess whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation.” (quoting Savage v. State, 120 So. 3d 619, 624 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013))).

2014THE APPLICABLE LAW “In deciding whether to revoke a defendant’s community control, the trial court must determine whether the facts and circumstances of the case demonstrate a willful and substantial violation that is supported by the greater weight of the evidence.” Anthony v. State, 854 So.2d 744, 747 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citing State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002)).

2012In order to revoke a defendant’s probation, the facts of the case must “demonstrate a willful and substantial violation that is supported by the greater weight of the evidence.” Anthony v. State, 854 So.2d 744, 747 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

2012Id. at 1043 ; see Matthews v. State, 943 So.2d 984, 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“This court has consistently-held that such a violation will not be deemed willful and substantial if the performance parameters have not been spelled out and sufficient time remains in the probationary period for the probationer to complete the requirement.”); Pollard v. State, 930 So.2d 854, 855 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“[T]he State cannot prove a willful and substantial violation of a condition to complete community service hours, even when the order contains a per-month rate of completion, when the order does not contai

2007Without a beginning and ending date for completion, the State is limited in its ability to prove a willful and substantial violation of probation. . . ."); Shipman v. State, 903 So.2d 386, 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that "`the omission' from a probation order `of a specified date by which [a probationer] was required to complete [a particular] task' combined with `the fact that [the probationer] was not at the end of his probationary period' results in `the State's inability to prove a willful and substantial violation,'" quoting Oates v. State, 872 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)).

2025“When a sentencing judge intends for a probationer to work in community service at a continuous rate each month at the start of probation, the order must so state.” Marzendorfer v. State, 976 So. 2d 596, 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (emphasis added); see also Pollard v. State, 930 So. 2d 854, 855 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“[T]he State cannot prove a willful and substantial violation of a condition to complete community service hours, even when the order contains a per-month rate of completion, when the order does not contain a beginning and ending date for completing the hours and when there is sufficien

2012Id. at 1043 ; see Matthews v. State, 943 So.2d 984, 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“This court has consistently-held that such a violation will not be deemed willful and substantial if the performance parameters have not been spelled out and sufficient time remains in the probationary period for the probationer to complete the requirement.”); Pollard v. State, 930 So.2d 854, 855 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“[T]he State cannot prove a willful and substantial violation of a condition to complete community service hours, even when the order contains a per-month rate of completion, when the order does not contai

2011See Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

2010See State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002) (recognizing that the “trial court has broad discretion to determine whether there has been a willful and substantial violation of a term of probation and whether such a violation has been demonstrated by the greater weight of the evidence” (citing Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996))).

2007See also Jones v. State, 744 So.2d 537, 538 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) ("The community control order did not specify the period within which appellant was to complete the program or how many chances he would have to obtain success.

2002While several cases state that it is an abuse of discretion to find a willful and substantial violation of probation where a defendant has expressed a willingness to complete a program and where the order of probation did not specify a date certain for compliance, see O'Neal v. State, 801 So.2d 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); see also Jones v. State, 744 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), the instant case is distinguishable.

2023See Lopez v. State, 722 So. 2d 936, 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“Absence from the home without permission supports a finding of a willful and substantial violation of community control.”); Smith v. State, 909 So. 2d 421, 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“Appellant’s failure to report to his supervising officer in a timely manner constitutes a substantial, willful violation of the terms of his community control.”).

2020See Lopez v. State, 722 So. 2d 936, 937 (Fla 4th DCA 1988) (“Absence from the home without permission supports a finding of a willful and substantial violation of community control.”).

2007Without a beginning and ending date for completion, the State is limited in its ability to prove a willful and substantial violation of probation. . . ."); Shipman v. State, 903 So.2d 386, 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that "`the omission' from a probation order `of a specified date by which [a probationer] was required to complete [a particular] task' combined with `the fact that [the probationer] was not at the end of his probationary period' results in `the State's inability to prove a willful and substantial violation,'" quoting Oates v. State, 872 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)).

2006This court has previously held that "`the omission' from a probation order `of a specified date by which [a probationer] was required to complete [a particular] task' combined with `the fact that [the probationer] was not at the end of his probationary period' results in `the State's inability to prove a willful and substantial violation.'" Shipman v. State, 903 So.2d 386, 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quoting Oates v. State, 872 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); see also Bryant v. State, 931 So.2d 251, 253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (holding that "the State cannot prove a willful and substantial violatio

2007See also Yates v. State, 909 So.2d 974, 975 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Wilkerson v. State, 884 So.2d 153, 153-54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); O'Neal v. State, 801 So.2d 280, 280-81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Jones v. State, 744 So.2d 537, 538 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

2006See also Yates v. State, 909 So. 2d 974, 975 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Wilkerson v. State, 884 So. 2d 153, 153-54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); O'Neal v. State, 801 So. 2d 280, 280-81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Jones v. State, 744 So. 2d 537, 538 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

2005Cf. Lynom v. State, 816 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (evidence that defendant failed to continue sex offender treatment because he could not afford it was insufficient to establish a willful and substantial violation of probation); Garcia v. State, 701 So.2d 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).

2005See Hunter v. State, 855 So.2d 677, 678-79 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citing Lynom v. State, 816 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), which found insufficient evidence of a willful and substantial violation for failing to complete sex offender treatment program when defendant testified that he did not have the money to pay for the program, and Garcia v. State, 701 So.2d 607, 608 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), which reversed revocation based on failure to attend psychological evaluation when the probationer was refused evaluation because he could not pay required fee).

2005Cf. Lynom v. State, 816 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (evidence that defendant failed to continue sex offender treatment because he could not afford it was insufficient to establish a willful and substantial violation of probation); Garcia v. State, 701 So.2d 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).

2005See Hunter v. State, 855 So.2d 677, 678-79 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citing Lynom v. State, 816 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), which found insufficient evidence of a willful and substantial violation for failing to complete sex offender treatment program when defendant testified that he did not have the money to pay for the program, and Garcia v. State, 701 So.2d 607, 608 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), which reversed revocation based on failure to attend psychological evaluation when the probationer was refused evaluation because he could not pay required fee).

2026Rather, "[a] trial court may revoke a defendant's probation or community control only upon a determination that the greater weight of the evidence supports a finding of a willful and substantial violation." Dundas v. State, 891 So. 2d 1178, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

2014In other words, a trial court may revoke a defendant’s community control upon a determination that the “greater weight of the evidence supports a finding of a willful and substantial violation.” Dundas v. State, 891 So.2d 1178, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

2008Gauthier v. State, 949 So.2d 326, 326 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) ("The State bears the burden of proving a willful and substantial violation by competent evidence." (citing Stewart v. State, 926 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Robinson v. State, 907 So.2d 1284, 1286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005))).

2006And the state must establish a willful and substantial violation by the greater weight of the evidence. [1] See Robinson v. State, 907 So.2d 1284, 1286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)(violation that triggers revocation of probation must be willful and substantial and its willful and substantial nature must be supported by greater weight of evidence); Gilbert v. State, 913 So.2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)(same; although may be circumstances where revocation is patently unfair).

2024Burgin v. State, 623 So. 2d 575, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

2005The trial court "has broad discretion to determine whether there has been a willful and substantial violation of a term of probation and whether such a violation has been demonstrated by the greater weight of the evidence." State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002); see also Burgin v. State, 623 So.2d 575, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) ("A trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether a probationer has violated a condition of the probation.").

2019See King v. State, 915 So. 2d 764, 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (concluding that the State failed to meet its burden of proving a willful and substantial violation of the community service hours condition of probation, affirming the revocation of probation, and remanding for the trial court to strike the finding that appellant violated the community service hours condition); see also Bryant v. State, 931 So. 2d 251, 253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ("Bryant's failure to submit documentation of his community service hours cannot support a finding that he violated condition 27 of his probation, which requires o

2006This court has previously held that "`the omission' from a probation order `of a specified date by which [a probationer] was required to complete [a particular] task' combined with `the fact that [the probationer] was not at the end of his probationary period' results in `the State's inability to prove a willful and substantial violation.'" Shipman v. State, 903 So.2d 386, 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quoting Oates v. State, 872 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); see also Bryant v. State, 931 So.2d 251, 253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (holding that "the State cannot prove a willful and substantial violatio

2007See Campbell v. State, 939 So.2d 242, 244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (holding "`evidence of the failure to complete a counseling program is insufficient to establish a willful and substantial violation of probation if the condition in question does not specify a time for completion'" (quoting Quintero v. State, 902 So.2d 236, 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005))).

2007As we recently said in Campbell v. State, 939 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006): "Courts have held that `evidence of the failure to complete a counseling program is insufficient to establish a willful and substantial violation of probation if the condition in question does not specify a time for completion.'" Id. at 244 (quoting Quintero v. State, 902 So.2d 236, 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)).

2005"Probation can be revoked only on the basis of a willful and substantial violation, which must be shown by the greater weight of the evidence." Butler, 775 So.2d at 321 .

2004In Dunkin v. State, 780 So.2d 223, 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), this court found that evidence of unexcused absence from the sex offender treatment program was insufficient to establish a willful and substantial violation of probation where the violated condition "did not specify that treatment had to be successfully completed on the *1042 first try or how many chances the appellant would be given to complete it successfully." We reversed the revocation of probation, stating, "This court has repeatedly found similar circumstances insufficient to establish willful and substantial violations of proba

2006See also O'Neal, 801 So. 2d at 280 ("It is an abuse of discretion to find a willful and substantial violation of probation where a defendant has expressed a willingness to complete or continue with a program and where the order of probation did not specify a date certain for compliance.").

2002While several cases state that it is an abuse of discretion to find a willful and substantial violation of probation where a defendant has expressed a willingness to complete a program and where the order of probation did not specify a date certain for compliance, see O'Neal v. State, 801 So.2d 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); see also Jones v. State, 744 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), the instant case is distinguishable.

2018See Young v. State, 566 So. 2d 69 , 69–70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (“A violation which triggers a revocation of probation must be willful and substantial and the willful and substantial nature of the violation must be supported by the greater weight of the evidence.” (quoting Hightower v. State, 529 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988))).

1999See Hightower, 529 So.2d at 727 (violation of probation is not willful and substantial where it is not clear as to whether the probationer was actually aware of the condition).

2018Brown, 221 So. 3d at 733 (citing Lawson v. State, 969 So. 2d 222, 229 (Fla. 2007)).

2016As such, the conflict cases cited by Petitioner are not distinguishable on the bases offered by Respondent. -9- willfully violate a condition of probation without being on adequate notice of the conduct that is prohibited.” Lawson, 969 So. 2d at 230 .

2008Gauthier v. State, 949 So.2d 326, 326 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) ("The State bears the burden of proving a willful and substantial violation by competent evidence." (citing Stewart v. State, 926 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Robinson v. State, 907 So.2d 1284, 1286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005))).

2007See Stewart v. State, 926 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Robinson, 907 So.2d at 1286 .

2004In Dunkin v. State, 780 So.2d 223, 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), this court found that evidence of unexcused absence from the sex offender treatment program was insufficient to establish a willful and substantial violation of probation where the violated condition "did not specify that treatment had to be successfully completed on the *1042 first try or how many chances the appellant would be given to complete it successfully." We reversed the revocation of probation, stating, "This court has repeatedly found similar circumstances insufficient to establish willful and substantial violations of proba

1992Cf. Young v. State, 566 So.2d 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (reversing order that revoked probation for violation of a single condition requiring completion of sex offender program, where order lacked requisite specificity and record failed to show a willful and substantial violation of probation).