Dunn rule in Texas

2008Victoria Bank & Trust v. Brady , 811 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex. 1991)." In his discussion of this element, Dunn provides no specific record references that would show any causative factors for his injury other than those enunciated by TISD, nor do we find such evidence in the record.

2008Victoria Bank & Trust v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex. 1991).” In his discussion of this element, Dunn provides no specific record references that would show any causative factors for his injury other than those enunciated by TISD, nor do we find such evidence in the record.

2014United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 , 64–67 (1984) (reaffirming Dunn rule); Jackson, 3 S.W.3d at 61 ; see Dunn, 284 U.S. at 394 .

2013United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 , 64–67 (1984) (reaffirming Dunn rule); Jackson, 3 S.W.3d at 61 ; see Dunn, 284 U.S. at 394 .

2015See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 .

2015See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 .

2024Pertaining to the charged offense of engaging in organized criminal activity, we previously concluded that legally 4 “Despite the conviction and the fact that a handgun is a per se deadly weapon, the jury failed to find the use of a deadly weapon at the punishment phase of the trial … Despite seemingly inconsistent findings, so long as the evidence supports the finding of guilt, the Dunn rule requires the trial court to accept the verdict of the jury.” West v. State, No. 03-01-00309-CR, 2002 WL 1289749 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 13, 2002, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publicati

2024Pertaining to the charged offense of engaging in organized criminal activity, we previously concluded that legally 4 “Despite the conviction and the fact that a handgun is a per se deadly weapon, the jury failed to find the use of a deadly weapon at the punishment phase of the trial … Despite seemingly inconsistent findings, so long as the evidence supports the finding of guilt, the Dunn rule requires the trial court to accept the verdict of the jury.” West v. State, No. 03-01-00309-CR, 2002 WL 1289749 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 13, 2002, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publicati

2015We note that this approach has met with resistance over the years in the federal courts of appeals, see Agofsky, 516 F.3d at 283–84 (noting that Powell reaffirmed the Dunn rule because courts of appeal tried to erode its application), and with criticism from the legal scholars.

2015We note that this approach has met with resistance over the years in the federal courts of appeals, see Agofsky, 516 F.3d at 283–84 (noting that Powell reaffirmed the Dunn rule because courts of appeal tried to erode its application), and with criticism from the legal scholars.

2015E.g., State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 732 (Tenn. 2010) (identifying as the emerging “majority position among the states which have considered the question” that apartment and condominium dwellers have no reasonable expectation of privacy in common hallways even when they are secured against access by the general public); State v. Nguyen, 841 N.W.2d 676, 680-81 (N.D. 2013) (same).7 Application of the Dunn factors to the instant case counsels against our holding that the area immediately surrounding Appellee’s front door constitutes curtilage.

2015E.g., State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 732 (Tenn. 2010) (identifying as the emerging “majority position among the states which have considered the question” that apartment and condominium dwellers have no reasonable expectation of privacy in common hallways even when they are secured against access by the general public); State v. Nguyen, 841 N.W.2d 676, 680-81 (N.D. 2013) (same).7 Application of the Dunn factors to the instant case counsels against our holding that the area immediately surrounding Appellee’s front door constitutes curtilage.

2015E.g., State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 732 (Tenn. 2010) (identifying as the emerging “majority position among the states which have considered the question” that apartment and condominium dwellers have no reasonable expectation of privacy in common hallways even when they are secured against access by the general public); State v. Nguyen, 841 N.W.2d 676, 680-81 (N.D. 2013) (same).7 Application of the Dunn factors to the instant case counsels against our holding that the area immediately surrounding Appellee’s front door constitutes curtilage.

2015E.g., State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 732 (Tenn. 2010) (identifying as the emerging “majority position among the states which have considered the question” that apartment and condominium dwellers have no reasonable expectation of privacy in common hallways even when they are secured against access by the general public); State v. Nguyen, 841 N.W.2d 676, 680-81 (N.D. 2013) (same).7 Application of the Dunn factors to the instant case counsels against our holding that the area immediately surrounding Appellee’s front door constitutes curtilage.

2015Specifically, as lately as 1999, the 5th District Court of Appeals has itself recognized that,: "Most of the cases in this area involve inconsistent verdicts on multi^count indictments, or separate, but factually related crimes. [W]e can find no Texas or federal case applying the Dunn rule to a trial court's verdict aquitting a defendant of a greater offense and, apparantly, inconsistently convicting him of a lesser included offense..." See, Jackson v. State, 3 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Tex.App. - Dallas 1999); See also, Benavides v. State, 992 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st Dist] 1999)(concern

2015Specifically, as lately as 1999, the 5th District Court of Appeals has itself recognized that,: "Most of the cases in this area involve inconsistent verdicts on multi^count indictments, or separate, but factually related crimes. [W]e can find no Texas or federal case applying the Dunn rule to a trial court's verdict aquitting a defendant of a greater offense and, apparantly, inconsistently convicting him of a lesser included offense..." See, Jackson v. State, 3 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Tex.App. - Dallas 1999); See also, Benavides v. State, 992 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st Dist] 1999)(concern

2002Id. at 376-77.

2002Id. at 376-77.

2021Turning next to Miller’s Petition, nothing in it alleges that Dunn is the person who prevented 5 See Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. 1998); Carter v. Abbyad, 299 S.W.3d 892, 895 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.). 6 Id. 7 Wembley Inv.

2021Turning next to Miller’s Petition, nothing in it alleges that Dunn is the person who prevented 5 See Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. 1998); Carter v. Abbyad, 299 S.W.3d 892, 895 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.). 6 Id. 7 Wembley Inv.

2021Turning next to Miller’s Petition, nothing in it alleges that Dunn is the person who prevented 5 See Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. 1998); Carter v. Abbyad, 299 S.W.3d 892, 895 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.). 6 Id. 7 Wembley Inv.

2018See 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 .

2018See 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 .

2018See id.

2015Specifically, as lately as 1999, the 5th District Court of Appeals has itself recognized that,: "Most of the cases in this area involve inconsistent verdicts on multi^count indictments, or separate, but factually related crimes. [W]e can find no Texas or federal case applying the Dunn rule to a trial court's verdict aquitting a defendant of a greater offense and, apparantly, inconsistently convicting him of a lesser included offense..." See, Jackson v. State, 3 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Tex.App. - Dallas 1999); See also, Benavides v. State, 992 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st Dist] 1999)(concern

2015Specifically, as lately as 1999, the 5th District Court of Appeals has itself recognized that,: "Most of the cases in this area involve inconsistent verdicts on multi^count indictments, or separate, but factually related crimes. [W]e can find no Texas or federal case applying the Dunn rule to a trial court's verdict aquitting a defendant of a greater offense and, apparantly, inconsistently convicting him of a lesser included offense..." See, Jackson v. State, 3 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Tex.App. - Dallas 1999); See also, Benavides v. State, 992 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st Dist] 1999)(concern

2013We first consider the State’s contention that appellant failed to preserve this issue for review by failing to raise this issue in any way in the trial court citing Nelson v. State, 798 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, pet. ref’d).

2006See Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 737 (applying the Dunn test).

2006See Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 737 (applying the Dunn test).

1998See Ex parte Chambers , 898 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Tex.1995); see also Dunn v. Street, 938 S.W.2d 33 , 35 n. 3 (Tex.1997) (in a mandamus proceeding to determine the propriety of a disqualified judge’s issuance of a show cause order on the issue of Dunn’s violation of an oral order, the court stated, “any such constructive contempt judgment against Dunn would be void because Dunn did not violate a written order of the trial court.” (Emphasis added).

1998See Ex parte Chambers , 898 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Tex.1995); see also Dunn v. Street, 938 S.W.2d 33 , 35 n. 3 (Tex.1997) (in a mandamus proceeding to determine the propriety of a disqualified judge’s issuance of a show cause order on the issue of Dunn’s violation of an oral order, the court stated, “any such constructive contempt judgment against Dunn would be void because Dunn did not violate a written order of the trial court.” (Emphasis added).

1996Id., at 514 ; Culton v. State, 818 S.W.2d 839, at 840 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1991). [8] Ironically, the Culton court itself garbled a significant element in the Dunn analysis, viz: "When a trial judge orders his court reporter to prepare the entire record on appeal, a timely request to that court reporter is sufficient to comply with the timely request mandated by Rule 50(e). * * * The trial court's order in conjunction with appellant's written request for a statement of facts was sufficient to inform the court reporter of the [designated court] to prepare a statement of facts." Culton, supra

1996Id., at 514 ; Culton v. State, 818 S.W.2d 839, at 840 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1991). [8] Ironically, the Culton court itself garbled a significant element in the Dunn analysis, viz: "When a trial judge orders his court reporter to prepare the entire record on appeal, a timely request to that court reporter is sufficient to comply with the timely request mandated by Rule 50(e). * * * The trial court's order in conjunction with appellant's written request for a statement of facts was sufficient to inform the court reporter of the [designated court] to prepare a statement of facts." Culton, supra