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14 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1975–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dunn v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932) (holding that "[c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary" and refusing to allow inconsistent verdicts to be upset by "speculation or inquiry" into the possibility of compromise or mistake on the part of the jury); United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 58 , 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (applying Dunn's rule, which the Court explained as follows: "a criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one count could not attack that conviction because it was inconsistent with the jury's verdict of acquittal on an 2025See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932) (holding that "[c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary" and refusing to allow inconsistent verdicts to be upset by "speculation or inquiry" into the possibility of compromise or mistake on the part of the jury); United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 58 , 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (applying Dunn's rule, which the Court explained as follows: "a criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one count could not attack that conviction because it was inconsistent with the jury's verdict of acquittal on an | 5 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Cartergreen2 sentences2025In affirming a verdict of aggravated assault and battery, despite the jury's acquittal of the accused on a separate count of assault and battery, this Court reiterated that "[a]n acquittal cannot be interpreted as a specific finding in relation to some of the evidence." Commonwealth v. Carter, 444 Pa. 405 , 282 A.2d 375, 376 (1971) (citation omitted). 2025In affirming a verdict of aggravated assault and battery, despite the jury's acquittal of the accused on a separate count of assault and battery, this Court reiterated that "[a]n acquittal cannot be interpreted as a specific finding in relation to some of the evidence." Commonwealth v. Carter, 444 Pa. 405 , 282 A.2d 375, 376 (1971) (citation omitted). | 4 | 5 |
United States v. Browngreen2 sentences2017See United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2016) (concluding Beene’s driveway was not curtilage where the “driveway was open and could be observed from [the street, and although fences encircled part of the driveway, nothing blocked its access or obstructed its view from the street[, and Beene failed to take] steps to protect [his] privacy, such as posting ‘no trespassing’ signs.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 113 , 196 L.Ed.2d 91 (2016); United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 6566 (1st Cir. 2007) (concluding that under the Dunn factors, the top of Brown’s driveway next to his 2017See United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2016) (concluding Beene’s driveway was not curtilage where the “driveway was open and could be observed from [the street, and although fences encircled part of the driveway, nothing blocked its access or obstructed its view from the street[, and Beene failed to take] steps to protect [his] privacy, such as posting ‘no trespassing’ signs.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 113 , 196 L.Ed.2d 91 (2016); United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 6566 (1st Cir. 2007) (concluding that under the Dunn factors, the top of Brown’s driveway next to his | 4 | 4 |
United States v. Rickey Beenegreen2 sentences2017See United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2016) (concluding Beene’s driveway was not curtilage where the “driveway was open and could be observed from [the street, and although fences encircled part of the driveway, nothing blocked its access or obstructed its view from the street[, and Beene failed to take] steps to protect [his] privacy, such as posting ‘no trespassing’ signs.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 113 , 196 L.Ed.2d 91 (2016); United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 6566 (1st Cir. 2007) (concluding that under the Dunn factors, the top of Brown’s driveway next to his 2017See United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2016) (concluding Beene’s driveway was not curtilage where the “driveway was open and could be observed from [the street, and although fences encircled part of the driveway, nothing blocked its access or obstructed its view from the street[, and Beene failed to take] steps to protect [his] privacy, such as posting ‘no trespassing’ signs.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 113 , 196 L.Ed.2d 91 (2016); United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 6566 (1st Cir. 2007) (concluding that under the Dunn factors, the top of Brown’s driveway next to his | 4 | 4 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017See United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2016) (concluding Beene’s driveway was not curtilage where the “driveway was open and could be observed from [the street, and although fences encircled part of the driveway, nothing blocked its access or obstructed its view from the street[, and Beene failed to take] steps to protect [his] privacy, such as posting ‘no trespassing’ signs.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 113 , 196 L.Ed.2d 91 (2016); United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 6566 (1st Cir. 2007) (concluding that under the Dunn factors, the top of Brown’s driveway next to his 2017See United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2016) (concluding Beene’s driveway was not curtilage where the “driveway was open and could be observed from [the street, and although fences encircled part of the driveway, nothing blocked its access or obstructed its view from the street[, and Beene failed to take] steps to protect [his] privacy, such as posting ‘no trespassing’ signs.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 113 , 196 L.Ed.2d 91 (2016); United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 6566 (1st Cir. 2007) (concluding that under the Dunn factors, the top of Brown’s driveway next to his | 4 | 4 |
Armstrong v. Atlantic Coast Line R.green2 sentences2017See United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2016) (concluding Beene’s driveway was not curtilage where the “driveway was open and could be observed from [the street, and although fences encircled part of the driveway, nothing blocked its access or obstructed its view from the street[, and Beene failed to take] steps to protect [his] privacy, such as posting ‘no trespassing’ signs.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 113 , 196 L.Ed.2d 91 (2016); United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 6566 (1st Cir. 2007) (concluding that under the Dunn factors, the top of Brown’s driveway next to his 2017See United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2016) (concluding Beene’s driveway was not curtilage where the “driveway was open and could be observed from [the street, and although fences encircled part of the driveway, nothing blocked its access or obstructed its view from the street[, and Beene failed to take] steps to protect [his] privacy, such as posting ‘no trespassing’ signs.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 113 , 196 L.Ed.2d 91 (2016); United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 6566 (1st Cir. 2007) (concluding that under the Dunn factors, the top of Brown’s driveway next to his | 4 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Causeygreen1 sentence2023It explained that Rule 573(E) gives the trial court broad discretion to impose remedies for discovery violations and “[a] defendant seeking relief from a discovery violation must demonstrate prejudice.” Commonwealth v. Causey, 833 A.2d 165, 171 (Pa. Super. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Spotzgreen1 sentence2022Dunn’s claim of ineffectiveness of plea counsel fails. -9- J-S06023-22 See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 1210 (Pa. 2006) (stating “[c]ounsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Powell
green
2 sentences2025See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932) (holding that "[c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary" and refusing to allow inconsistent verdicts to be upset by "speculation or inquiry" into the possibility of compromise or mistake on the part of the jury); United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 58 , 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (applying Dunn's rule, which the Court explained as follows: "a criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one count could not attack that conviction because it was inconsistent with the jury's verdict of acquittal on an 2025See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932) (holding that "[c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary" and refusing to allow inconsistent verdicts to be upset by "speculation or inquiry" into the possibility of compromise or mistake on the part of the jury); United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 58 , 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (applying Dunn's rule, which the Court explained as follows: "a criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one count could not attack that conviction because it was inconsistent with the jury's verdict of acquittal on an | 5 | 2012–2025 |
Taylor v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
green
2 sentences2000Taylor v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 446 Pa.Super. 174 , 666 A.2d 681 (1995) (holding that trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment where defendants moved for summary judgment on the morning of trial and after a jury had been empanelled thus depriving plaintiffs of adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond). 2000Taylor v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 446 Pa.Super. 174 , 666 A.2d 681 (1995) (holding that trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment where defendants moved for summary judgment on the morning of trial and after a jury had been empanelled thus depriving plaintiffs of adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Myszkowski v. Penn Stroud Hotel, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000However, in Myszkowski v. Penn Stroud Hotel, 430 Pa.Super. 315 , 634 A.2d 622 (1993), this court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding summary judgment to a defendant where the defendant filed the motion on the day of trial and the trial court had benefit of an extensive record and the parties were afforded an opportunity to argue their positions at a pretrial conference. ¶ 7 In the instant case, while the court entertained the motion on the day trial was scheduled to begin, the record shows Dunn’s motion was filed almost a month before that date and Appellants’ answ 2000However, in Myszkowski v. Penn Stroud Hotel, 430 Pa.Super. 315 , 634 A.2d 622 (1993), this court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding summary judgment to a defendant where the defendant filed the motion on the day of trial and the trial court had benefit of an extensive record and the parties were afforded an opportunity to argue their positions at a pretrial conference. ¶ 7 In the instant case, while the court entertained the motion on the day trial was scheduled to begin, the record shows Dunn’s motion was filed almost a month before that date and Appellants’ answ | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Dunn v. Merck & Company, Inc.
green
2 sentences1979In the event the Board determines that Dunn had sufficiently demonstrated the existence of pulmonary emphysema and that his employment was the cause thereof, we then direct the Board to conduct a new hearing at which Dunn may endeavor to prove his pulmonary emphysema is peculiar to his occupation by its ‘causes and the characteristics of its manifestation’.’’ 463 Pa. at 447-48 , 345 A.2d at 604 . 1 The Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board duly reviewed the record and decided that the claimant had proved the existence of pulmonary emphysema and that such pulmonary emphysema was caused by his emp 1979In the event the Board determines that Dunn had sufficiently demonstrated the existence of pulmonary emphysema and that his employment was the cause thereof, we then direct the Board to conduct a new hearing at which Dunn may endeavor to prove his pulmonary emphysema is peculiar to his occupation by its ‘causes and the characteristics of its manifestation’.’’ 463 Pa. at 447-48 , 345 A.2d at 604 . 1 The Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board duly reviewed the record and decided that the claimant had proved the existence of pulmonary emphysema and that such pulmonary emphysema was caused by his emp | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Habovick v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.
green
2 sentences1975The Board, relying upon Habovick v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 207 Pa.Super. 80 , 215 A.2d 389 (1965), held that relief could be had in accordance with the provisions of Section 108 (n) where pulmonary emphysema is found to be secondary to pulmonary fibrosis. 1975The Board, relying upon Habovick v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 207 Pa.Super. 80 , 215 A.2d 389 (1965), held that relief could be had in accordance with the provisions of Section 108 (n) where pulmonary emphysema is found to be secondary to pulmonary fibrosis. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.