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13 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Griffith v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2007See Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314 , 321 at fn. 6, citing United States v. Johnson (1982), 457 U.S. 537 , 542 , at fn. 8, citing Linkletter v. Walker (1965), 381 U.S. 618 , 622 , at fn. 5. 2007See, Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314 , 321 at fn. 6, citing United States v. Johnson (1982), 457 U.S. 537 , 542 , at fn. 8, and Linkletter v. Walker (1965), 381 U.S. 618 , 622 , at fn. 5. {¶ 12} Dunn's motion asks the court to reconsider the sentence it imposed upon him in its September 5, 2003 judgment entry. | 2 | 2 |
Linkletter v. Walkerred2 sentences2007See Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314 , 321 at fn. 6, citing United States v. Johnson (1982), 457 U.S. 537 , 542 , at fn. 8, citing Linkletter v. Walker (1965), 381 U.S. 618 , 622 , at fn. 5. 2007See, Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314 , 321 at fn. 6, citing United States v. Johnson (1982), 457 U.S. 537 , 542 , at fn. 8, and Linkletter v. Walker (1965), 381 U.S. 618 , 622 , at fn. 5. {¶ 12} Dunn's motion asks the court to reconsider the sentence it imposed upon him in its September 5, 2003 judgment entry. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Johnsonred2 sentences2007See Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314 , 321 at fn. 6, citing United States v. Johnson (1982), 457 U.S. 537 , 542 , at fn. 8, citing Linkletter v. Walker (1965), 381 U.S. 618 , 622 , at fn. 5. 2007See, Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314 , 321 at fn. 6, citing United States v. Johnson (1982), 457 U.S. 537 , 542 , at fn. 8, and Linkletter v. Walker (1965), 381 U.S. 618 , 622 , at fn. 5. {¶ 12} Dunn's motion asks the court to reconsider the sentence it imposed upon him in its September 5, 2003 judgment entry. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Powellgreen2 sentences2014State v. Adams, 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 228 , 374 N.E.2d 137 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 811 , 99 S.Ct. 69 , 58 L.Ed.2d 103 (1978); accord Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); see also -43- Case No. 13-13-36 United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63-64 , 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (criticizing courts that carved exceptions to the Dunn rule). [W]here truly inconsistent verdicts have been reached, “[t]he most that can be said ... is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real 2014State v. Adams, 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 228 , 374 N.E.2d 137 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 811 , 99 S.Ct. 69 , 58 L.Ed.2d 103 (1978); accord Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); see also -43- Case No. 13-13-36 United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63-64 , 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (criticizing courts that carved exceptions to the Dunn rule). [W]here truly inconsistent verdicts have been reached, “[t]he most that can be said ... is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real | 1 | 4 |
Dunn v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment.’ ” Id. at 62 , quoting Dunn at 393 . “ ‘ “The Pickaway App. No. 21CA8 25 most that can be said” ’ ” when there are inconsistent verdicts “ ‘ “is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt.” ’ ” Id. at 63, quoting Dunn at 393 , quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir.1925). {¶43} Powell rejected the contention “that an exception to the Dunn rule should be 2022Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment.’ ” Id. at 62 , quoting Dunn at 393 . “ ‘ “The Pickaway App. No. 21CA8 25 most that can be said” ’ ” when there are inconsistent verdicts “ ‘ “is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt.” ’ ” Id. at 63, quoting Dunn at 393 , quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir.1925). {¶43} Powell rejected the contention “that an exception to the Dunn rule should be | 1 | 2 |
Steckler v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment.’ ” Id. at 62 , quoting Dunn at 393 . “ ‘ “The Pickaway App. No. 21CA8 25 most that can be said” ’ ” when there are inconsistent verdicts “ ‘ “is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt.” ’ ” Id. at 63, quoting Dunn at 393 , quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir.1925). {¶43} Powell rejected the contention “that an exception to the Dunn rule should be 2022Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment.’ ” Id. at 62 , quoting Dunn at 393 . “ ‘ “The Pickaway App. No. 21CA8 25 most that can be said” ’ ” when there are inconsistent verdicts “ ‘ “is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt.” ’ ” Id. at 63, quoting Dunn at 393 , quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir.1925). {¶43} Powell rejected the contention “that an exception to the Dunn rule should be | 1 | 1 |
Strack v. Peltongreen1 sentence2013See Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174 (1994) (A trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bill Rucinski, and Alfred Medinagreen2 sentences1987See United States v. Reed (C.A.8, 1984), 733 F. 2d 492 , and United States v. Rucinski (C.A.10, 1981), 658 F. 2d 741 . 1987See United States v. Reed (C.A.8, 1984), 733 F. 2d 492 , and United States v. Rucinski (C.A.10, 1981), 658 F. 2d 741 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. George Reed, Paul Sheary, Johnathan Riebli, Thomas Schenk, Peter Millergreen2 sentences1987See United States v. Reed (C.A.8, 1984), 733 F. 2d 492 , and United States v. Rucinski (C.A.10, 1981), 658 F. 2d 741 . 1987See United States v. Reed (C.A.8, 1984), 733 F. 2d 492 , and United States v. Rucinski (C.A.10, 1981), 658 F. 2d 741 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Dunn
green
2 sentences2008Id. {¶ 13} We look to the Dunn factors to determine whether an area qualifies as curtilage, which factors include "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by." Dunn , supra. {¶ 14} Here, the backyard was fenced in. 2008Id. {¶ 13} We look to the Dunn factors to determine whether an area qualifies as curtilage, which factors include "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by." Dunn , supra. {¶ 14} Here, the backyard was fenced in. | 2 | 2006–2008 |
State v. Adams
green
2 sentences2014State v. Adams, 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 228 , 374 N.E.2d 137 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 811 , 99 S.Ct. 69 , 58 L.Ed.2d 103 (1978); accord Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); see also -43- Case No. 13-13-36 United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63-64 , 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (criticizing courts that carved exceptions to the Dunn rule). [W]here truly inconsistent verdicts have been reached, “[t]he most that can be said ... is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real 2014State v. Adams, 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 228 , 374 N.E.2d 137 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 811 , 99 S.Ct. 69 , 58 L.Ed.2d 103 (1978); accord Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); see also -43- Case No. 13-13-36 United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63-64 , 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (criticizing courts that carved exceptions to the Dunn rule). [W]here truly inconsistent verdicts have been reached, “[t]he most that can be said ... is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Donoho v. United States
green
2 sentences2014State v. Adams, 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 228 , 374 N.E.2d 137 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 811 , 99 S.Ct. 69 , 58 L.Ed.2d 103 (1978); accord Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); see also -43- Case No. 13-13-36 United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63-64 , 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (criticizing courts that carved exceptions to the Dunn rule). [W]here truly inconsistent verdicts have been reached, “[t]he most that can be said ... is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real 2014State v. Adams, 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 228 , 374 N.E.2d 137 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 811 , 99 S.Ct. 69 , 58 L.Ed.2d 103 (1978); accord Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); see also -43- Case No. 13-13-36 United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63-64 , 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (criticizing courts that carved exceptions to the Dunn rule). [W]here truly inconsistent verdicts have been reached, “[t]he most that can be said ... is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Miller v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2014State v. Adams, 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 228 , 374 N.E.2d 137 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 811 , 99 S.Ct. 69 , 58 L.Ed.2d 103 (1978); accord Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); see also -43- Case No. 13-13-36 United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63-64 , 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (criticizing courts that carved exceptions to the Dunn rule). [W]here truly inconsistent verdicts have been reached, “[t]he most that can be said ... is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real 2014State v. Adams, 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 228 , 374 N.E.2d 137 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 811 , 99 S.Ct. 69 , 58 L.Ed.2d 103 (1978); accord Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); see also -43- Case No. 13-13-36 United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63-64 , 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (criticizing courts that carved exceptions to the Dunn rule). [W]here truly inconsistent verdicts have been reached, “[t]he most that can be said ... is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In re Antwon C.
green
2 sentences2012State v. Dunn, 128 Ohio St.3d 1458 , 2011-Ohio- 1829, 945 N.E.2d 522 . 3 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO II. 2012State v. Dunn, 128 Ohio St.3d 1458 , 2011-Ohio- 1829, 945 N.E.2d 522 . 3 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO II. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Woljevach
green
2 sentences2008Id. {¶ 13} We look to the Dunn factors to determine whether an area qualifies as curtilage, which factors include "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by." Dunn , supra. {¶ 14} Here, the backyard was fenced in. 2008Id. {¶ 13} We look to the Dunn factors to determine whether an area qualifies as curtilage, which factors include "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by." Dunn , supra. {¶ 14} Here, the backyard was fenced in. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Wilson, Unpublished Decision (4-17-2006)
green
2 sentences2007State v. Wilson , Lawrence App. No. 05CA22, 2006-Ohio-2049 , at ¶ 15 , citing State v. Barkley , Summit App. No. 22351, 2005-Ohio-1268 . {¶ 19} To the extent that the trial court could construe Dunn's motion for resentencing as a petition for postconviction relief, it was neither timely filed, nor did it satisfy the statutory requirements for the filing of a delay petition for postconviction relief. 2007State v. Wilson , Lawrence App. No. 05CA22, 2006-Ohio-2049 , at ¶ 15 , citing State v. Barkley , Summit App. No. 22351, 2005-Ohio-1268 . {¶ 19} To the extent that the trial court could construe Dunn's motion for resentencing as a petition for postconviction relief, it was neither timely filed, nor did it satisfy the statutory requirements for the filing of a delay petition for postconviction relief. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Foster
green
1 sentence2007Foster , *Page 4 [ 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 ]." In response to Dunn's motion, the court scheduled and conducted a resentencing hearing. {¶ 7} At the outset of the hearing, the court noted the Supreme Court's recent decision in Foster , and stated: "Okay, I want to make it clear, that even though he wasn't on direct appeal and doesn't come within the direct dictates of the Supreme Court decision, I believe they held the sentencing — previous sentencing statute unconstitutional, and those sentences void, but I believe they left it — those that are serving the sentences, they didn't speci | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Gibson, Unpublished Decision (9-28-2005)
green
1 sentence2007Gibson , supra. {¶ 20} Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to either reconsider its own valid final judgment entered on September 5, 2003, or properly consider Dunn's motion for resentencing as a petition for postconviction relief, we find that the court's May 23, 2006 *Page 10 judgment resentencing Dunn is a nullity. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Barkley, Unpublished Decision (3-23-2005)
green
2 sentences2007State v. Wilson , Lawrence App. No. 05CA22, 2006-Ohio-2049 , at ¶ 15 , citing State v. Barkley , Summit App. No. 22351, 2005-Ohio-1268 . {¶ 19} To the extent that the trial court could construe Dunn's motion for resentencing as a petition for postconviction relief, it was neither timely filed, nor did it satisfy the statutory requirements for the filing of a delay petition for postconviction relief. 2007State v. Wilson , Lawrence App. No. 05CA22, 2006-Ohio-2049 , at ¶ 15 , citing State v. Barkley , Summit App. No. 22351, 2005-Ohio-1268 . {¶ 19} To the extent that the trial court could construe Dunn's motion for resentencing as a petition for postconviction relief, it was neither timely filed, nor did it satisfy the statutory requirements for the filing of a delay petition for postconviction relief. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Wilson, Unpublished Decision (6-1-2006)
green
1 sentence2007State v. Wilson , Franklin App. Nos. 05AP-939, 05AP-940, 05AP-941, 2006-Ohio-2750 , at ¶ 9 , citing State v. Steele , 10 Dist. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
City of Xenia v. Wallace
green
2 sentences2006State v. Peagler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 496 , 500 , citing Xenia v. Wallace (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 216 , paragraph two of the syllabus. 2006State v. Peagler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 496 , 500 , citing Xenia v. Wallace (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 216 , paragraph two of the syllabus. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Peagler
green
2 sentences2006State v. Peagler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 496 , 500 , citing Xenia v. Wallace (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 216 , paragraph two of the syllabus. 2006State v. Peagler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 496 , 500 , citing Xenia v. Wallace (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 216 , paragraph two of the syllabus. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2006Pietrykowski, J., Singer, P.J., Skow, J., concur. 1 The Dunn factors to determine whether an area qualifies as curtilage include: "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by." Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 . 2 State v. Waddy was superceded by constitutional amendment as stated by State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89 . 3 Interestingly, that court also suppressed the def 2006Pietrykowski, J., Singer, P.J., Skow, J., concur. 1 The Dunn factors to determine whether an area qualifies as curtilage include: "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by." Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 . 2 State v. Waddy was superceded by constitutional amendment as stated by State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89 . 3 Interestingly, that court also suppressed the def | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Bailin
green
2 sentences1997Demonstrative of this trend is the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in United States v. Bailin (C.A.7, 1992), 977 F.2d 270 , 275-276, which has been either expressly adopted or cited with approval by many state and federal courts. 1997Demonstrative of this trend is the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in United States v. Bailin (C.A.7, 1992), 977 F.2d 270 , 275-276, which has been either expressly adopted or cited with approval by many state and federal courts. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Liberatore
green
2 sentences1997The majority’s attempt to distinguish State v. Liberatore (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 13 , 4 OBR 11, 445 N.E.2d 1116 , fails. 1997The majority’s attempt to distinguish State v. Liberatore (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 13 , 4 OBR 11, 445 N.E.2d 1116 , fails. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Geauga County Bar Ass'n v. Taber
green
2 sentences1997It is noteworthy that the lead opinion in Painter, supra, echoed the following language from Smorgala, supra, 50 Ohio St.3d at 223 , 553 N.E.2d at 674 , in denying the Greeley claim under consideration: “Where the General Assembly has spoken, and in so speaking violated no constitutional provision, the courts of this state must not contravene the legislature's expression of public policy. ‘Judicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid legislative enactments, for the General Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.’" Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 385 , 639 N.E.2d at 57 1997It is noteworthy that the lead opinion in Painter, supra, echoed the following language from Smorgala, supra, 50 Ohio St.3d at 223 , 553 N.E.2d at 674 , in denying the Greeley claim under consideration: “Where the General Assembly has spoken, and in so speaking violated no constitutional provision, the courts of this state must not contravene the legislature's expression of public policy. ‘Judicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid legislative enactments, for the General Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.’" Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 385 , 639 N.E.2d at 57 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Smorgala
green
2 sentences1997It is noteworthy that the lead opinion in Painter, supra, echoed the following language from Smorgala, supra, 50 Ohio St.3d at 223 , 553 N.E.2d at 674 , in denying the Greeley claim under consideration: “Where the General Assembly has spoken, and in so speaking violated no constitutional provision, the courts of this state must not contravene the legislature's expression of public policy. ‘Judicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid legislative enactments, for the General Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.’" Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 385 , 639 N.E.2d at 57 1997It is noteworthy that the lead opinion in Painter, supra, echoed the following language from Smorgala, supra, 50 Ohio St.3d at 223 , 553 N.E.2d at 674 , in denying the Greeley claim under consideration: “Where the General Assembly has spoken, and in so speaking violated no constitutional provision, the courts of this state must not contravene the legislature's expression of public policy. ‘Judicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid legislative enactments, for the General Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.’" Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 385 , 639 N.E.2d at 57 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Ashe v. Swenson
green
2 sentences1997In making that determination, a court must “‘examine the record of the prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.’” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 , 25 L.Ed.2d at 475-476 , quoting Mayers & Yarborough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions (1960), 74 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 38-39. 1997In making that determination, a court must “‘examine the record of the prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.’” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 , 25 L.Ed.2d at 475-476 , quoting Mayers & Yarborough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions (1960), 74 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 38-39. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Painter v. Graley
green
2 sentences1997It is noteworthy that the lead opinion in Painter, supra, echoed the following language from Smorgala, supra, 50 Ohio St.3d at 223 , 553 N.E.2d at 674 , in denying the Greeley claim under consideration: “Where the General Assembly has spoken, and in so speaking violated no constitutional provision, the courts of this state must not contravene the legislature's expression of public policy. ‘Judicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid legislative enactments, for the General Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.’" Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 385 , 639 N.E.2d at 57 1997It is noteworthy that the lead opinion in Painter, supra, echoed the following language from Smorgala, supra, 50 Ohio St.3d at 223 , 553 N.E.2d at 674 , in denying the Greeley claim under consideration: “Where the General Assembly has spoken, and in so speaking violated no constitutional provision, the courts of this state must not contravene the legislature's expression of public policy. ‘Judicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid legislative enactments, for the General Assembly should be the final arbiter of public policy.’" Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 385 , 639 N.E.2d at 57 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.