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28 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Russeau v. Stategreen2 sentences1997The Court of Criminal Appeals overturned the voucher rule in Russeau v. State, 785 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), holding that the rationale behind this rule is effectively destroyed by Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 607. 1996Russeau v. State, 785 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), abolished the voucher rule. | 10 | 11 |
Palafox v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Under the criminal version of the voucher rule, "when the State introduce[d] a defendant's confession in evidence, it [was] bound by any exculpatory statements contained therein unless such statements [were] disproved." Palafox v. State , 608 S.W.2d 177, 183 (Tex. Crim. 2000Under the criminal version of the voucher rule, "when the State introduce[d] a defendant's confession in evidence, it [was] bound by any exculpatory statements contained therein unless such statements [were] disproved." Palafox , 608 S.W.2d at 183 (Dally, J. dissenting). 7. | 5 | 11 |
Ibanez v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Because Ibanez was based on the now defunct “voucher rule,” appellant’s reliance upon Ibanez is unavailing.2 2 The dissent in Ibanez noted that the voucher rule “seems to be abolished by the soon-to-be-effective Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence” because “[t]he rationale behind the voucher rule is effectively destroyed by Rule 607.” Ibanez v. State, 749 S.W.2d 804, 812 (Tex. Crim. 2020Id. at 807 n.3. 8 Nevertheless, appellant argues that Russeau was wrongly decided and urges this court to reconsider the applicability of the voucher rule and apply it in this case, as it was in Ibanez. | 2 | 5 |
Stills v. Stategreen2 sentences1990Guerra v. State, 760 S.W.2d 681, 696 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, review ref’d); Gale v. State, 747 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, no pet.); Stills v. State, 728 S.W.2d 422, 425-28 (Tex.App.-Eastland, no pet.); Brown v. State, 725 S.W.2d 801, 808 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987), remanded on other grounds, 761 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). 1988See Stills, 728 S.W.2d at 426 . | 2 | 3 |
Hernandez v. Stategreen2 sentences2025“The voucher rule required the State to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt all exculpatory assertions in a defendant’s confession if the State offered the confession into evidence.” Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 813 (Tex. Crim. 2025“The voucher rule required the State to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt all exculpatory assertions in a defendant’s confession if the State offered the confession into evidence.” Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 813 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences1990Guerra v. State, 760 S.W.2d 681, 696 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, review ref’d); Gale v. State, 747 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, no pet.); Stills v. State, 728 S.W.2d 422, 425-28 (Tex.App.-Eastland, no pet.); Brown v. State, 725 S.W.2d 801, 808 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987), remanded on other grounds, 761 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). 1988Gale, 747 S.W.2d at 566 ; Stills, 728 S.W.2d at 428 ; Brown v. State, 725 S.W.2d 801 , 808 n. 7 (Tex.App.—Austin 1987, pet. granted). | 1 | 2 |
Gale v. Stategreen2 sentences1990Guerra v. State, 760 S.W.2d 681, 696 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, review ref’d); Gale v. State, 747 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, no pet.); Stills v. State, 728 S.W.2d 422, 425-28 (Tex.App.-Eastland, no pet.); Brown v. State, 725 S.W.2d 801, 808 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987), remanded on other grounds, 761 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). 1988Ibanez v. State, 749 S.W.2d 804 , 807 n. 3, 812 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (Davis, J., dissenting, but noted as correct in this observation by majority opinion); Gale v. State, 747 S.W.2d 564 , 566 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1988, no pet.); Stills v. State, 728 S.W.2d 422 , 425 n. 2 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1987, no pet.). | 1 | 2 |
Guzman v. Stategreen1 sentence2020“When the Court of Criminal Appeals has deliberately and unequivocally interpreted the law in a criminal matter, we must adhere to its interpretation under the dictates of vertical stare decisis.” Guzman v. State, 539 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (quoting Mason v. State, 416 S.W.3d 720 , 728 n.10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d); see also State of Tex. ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Tex.R.Evid. 607; Hughes v. State, 4 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim.App.1999). 2001Tex.R.Evid. 607; Hughes v. State, 4 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Coleman v. Stategreen1 sentence1997See Coleman v. State, 832 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd). | 1 | 1 |
Guerra v. Stategreen1 sentence1990Guerra v. State, 760 S.W.2d 681, 696 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, review ref’d); Gale v. State, 747 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, no pet.); Stills v. State, 728 S.W.2d 422, 425-28 (Tex.App.-Eastland, no pet.); Brown v. State, 725 S.W.2d 801, 808 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987), remanded on other grounds, 761 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Howard Lipinski v. People of the State of New Yorkgreen1 sentence1990The common law voucher rule is premised upon the notion that a party may not impeach his own witness; a party who calls a witness to the stand “vouches for his credibility.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 296 , 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1046 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Lipinski v. New York, 557 F.2d 289, 292-94 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 , 98 S.Ct. 1262 , 55 L.Ed.2d 779 (1978); Palafox, 608 S.W.2d at 183-84 (Dally, J., dissenting); C. | 1 | 1 |
Banks v. Stategreen2 sentences1990Palafox v. State, 608 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (quoting Banks v. State, 56 Tex.Crim. 262 , 119 S.W. 847, 848 (1909)). 1990Palafox v. State, 608 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (quoting Banks v. State, 56 Tex.Crim. 262 , 119 S.W. 847, 848 (1909)). | 1 | 1 |
Mahavier v. Stategreen1 sentence1987Chambers v. Mississippi, supra at 410 U.S. 296 n. 8, 93 S.Ct. 1046 n. 8, 35 L.Ed.2d 309 n. 8; Ibanez v. State, No. 69,330 supra at 4; Mahavier v. State, 644 S.W.2d 129, 134-35 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1982, no pet’n) (Cantu, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chambers v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences2010Furthermore, McDonald, the third-party was present in the courtroom, under oath and subject to cross-examination.108 The State of Mississippi, however, did not recognize the “admission against penal interest” exception to the hearsay rule; as a result, the trial court refused to allow the defendant to introduce the testimony of the three persons to whom the confessions were made.109 The second evidentiary barrier to the appellant was Mississippi’s “voucher” rule, which prevented the defendant from being able to cross-examine the third-party witness (whom the defendant called because the State 2010Furthermore, McDonald, the third-party was present in the courtroom, under oath and subject to cross-examination.108 The State of Mississippi, however, did not recognize the “admission against penal interest” exception to the hearsay rule; as a result, the trial court refused to allow the defendant to introduce the testimony of the three persons to whom the confessions were made.109 The second evidentiary barrier to the appellant was Mississippi’s “voucher” rule, which prevented the defendant from being able to cross-examine the third-party witness (whom the defendant called because the State | 3 | 1990–2010 |
Fuller v. State
green
2 sentences2025App. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. 2025App. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Trent Mason v. State
green
1 sentence2020“When the Court of Criminal Appeals has deliberately and unequivocally interpreted the law in a criminal matter, we must adhere to its interpretation under the dictates of vertical stare decisis.” Guzman v. State, 539 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (quoting Mason v. State, 416 S.W.3d 720 , 728 n.10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d); see also State of Tex. ex rel. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Crane v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2008The Court pointed to several of its past cases striking down similar rules that were disproportionate or served no legitimate purpose. 547 U.S. at 325 , 126 S.Ct. at 1732 B 33 (citing Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (state law that barred defendants from presenting the testimony of any co‑defendant, unless the co‑defendant had been acquitted, but imposed no such restriction on the prosecution); Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (state A voucher rule, @ which barred any party from impeaching its own witness) 2008The Court pointed to several of its past cases striking down similar rules that were disproportionate or served no legitimate purpose. 547 U.S. at 325 , 126 S.Ct. at 1732 B 33 (citing Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (state law that barred defendants from presenting the testimony of any co‑defendant, unless the co‑defendant had been acquitted, but imposed no such restriction on the prosecution); Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (state A voucher rule, @ which barred any party from impeaching its own witness) | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Holmes v. South Carolina
green
2 sentences2008The Court pointed to several of its past cases striking down similar rules that were disproportionate or served no legitimate purpose. 547 U.S. at 325 , 126 S.Ct. at 1732 B 33 (citing Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (state law that barred defendants from presenting the testimony of any co‑defendant, unless the co‑defendant had been acquitted, but imposed no such restriction on the prosecution); Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (state A voucher rule, @ which barred any party from impeaching its own witness) 2008The Court pointed to several of its past cases striking down similar rules that were disproportionate or served no legitimate purpose. 547 U.S. at 325 , 126 S.Ct. at 1732 B 33 (citing Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (state law that barred defendants from presenting the testimony of any co‑defendant, unless the co‑defendant had been acquitted, but imposed no such restriction on the prosecution); Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (state A voucher rule, @ which barred any party from impeaching its own witness) | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Washington v. Texas
green
2 sentences2008The Court pointed to several of its past cases striking down similar rules that were disproportionate or served no legitimate purpose. 547 U.S. at 325 , 126 S.Ct. at 1732 B 33 (citing Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (state law that barred defendants from presenting the testimony of any co‑defendant, unless the co‑defendant had been acquitted, but imposed no such restriction on the prosecution); Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (state A voucher rule, @ which barred any party from impeaching its own witness) 2008The Court pointed to several of its past cases striking down similar rules that were disproportionate or served no legitimate purpose. 547 U.S. at 325 , 126 S.Ct. at 1732 B 33 (citing Washington v. Texas , 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (state law that barred defendants from presenting the testimony of any co‑defendant, unless the co‑defendant had been acquitted, but imposed no such restriction on the prosecution); Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (state A voucher rule, @ which barred any party from impeaching its own witness) | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Brown v. State
green
1 sentence1990Guerra v. State, 760 S.W.2d 681, 696 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, review ref’d); Gale v. State, 747 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, no pet.); Stills v. State, 728 S.W.2d 422, 425-28 (Tex.App.-Eastland, no pet.); Brown v. State, 725 S.W.2d 801, 808 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987), remanded on other grounds, 761 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Butler v. State
green
1 sentence1990Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Barbosa v. Texas
green
1 sentence1990The common law voucher rule is premised upon the notion that a party may not impeach his own witness; a party who calls a witness to the stand “vouches for his credibility.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 296 , 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1046 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Lipinski v. New York, 557 F.2d 289, 292-94 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 , 98 S.Ct. 1262 , 55 L.Ed.2d 779 (1978); Palafox, 608 S.W.2d at 183-84 (Dally, J., dissenting); C. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Lipinski v. New York
green
1 sentence1990The common law voucher rule is premised upon the notion that a party may not impeach his own witness; a party who calls a witness to the stand “vouches for his credibility.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 296 , 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1046 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Lipinski v. New York, 557 F.2d 289, 292-94 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 , 98 S.Ct. 1262 , 55 L.Ed.2d 779 (1978); Palafox, 608 S.W.2d at 183-84 (Dally, J., dissenting); C. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Cozad v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1990The common law voucher rule is premised upon the notion that a party may not impeach his own witness; a party who calls a witness to the stand “vouches for his credibility.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 296 , 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1046 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Lipinski v. New York, 557 F.2d 289, 292-94 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 , 98 S.Ct. 1262 , 55 L.Ed.2d 779 (1978); Palafox, 608 S.W.2d at 183-84 (Dally, J., dissenting); C. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Rogers v. State
green
1 sentence1987Ibanez v. State, No. 69,330, Tex.Cr.App., June 11, 1986 (not yet reported); Rogers v. State, 687 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Palafox v. State, 608 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). 7 This voucher rule, as it is sometimes called, is two-fold: first, the statement must amount to an admission; second, it must contain an assertion which exculpates the accused from the charged offense. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
United States v. Anthony Anibal Torres
green
1 sentence1987(Emphasis added) Similarly, in United States v. Torres, 719 F.2d 549 , 557 n. 5 (2d Cir.1983), the Second Circuit concluded that the voucher rule was no longer viable in light of FED.R.EVID. 607: The situation was compounded further by the court’s misapprehension of a rule of evidence. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Bradley v. United States green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. Morris C. Fancher green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
United States v. Rex Don Stamps
green
2 sentences1982The voucher rule has been universally criticized as having "no place in a rational system of investigation in modern society... all attempts to modify or qualify it so as to reach sensible results serves only to demonstrate its irrationality and to increase the uncertainties of litigation." 1 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, p. 64 (1954 Ed.); See also 3 Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 896-899 (3rd Ed. 1940); Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U.Chi.L.Rev. 69 (1936); U.S. v. Norman, 518 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir.1975); U.S. v. Lineberger, 444 F.2d 122 (4th Cir.1971), cert. denied 40 1982The voucher rule has been universally criticized as having “no place in a rational system of investigation in modern society ... all attempts to modify or qualify it so as to reach sensible results serves only to demonstrate its irrationality and to increase the uncertainties of litigation.” 1 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, p. 64 (1954 Ed.); See also 3 Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 896-899 (3rd Ed. 1940); Ladd, Impeachment of One’s Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U.Chi.L.Rev. 69 (1936); U.S. v. Norman, 518 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir.1975); U.S. v. Lineberger, 444 F.2d 122 (4th Cir.1971), cert. denied 4 | 1 | 1982–1982 |
United States v. David Leonard Edwards, Jr.
green
2 sentences1982The voucher rule has been universally criticized as having "no place in a rational system of investigation in modern society... all attempts to modify or qualify it so as to reach sensible results serves only to demonstrate its irrationality and to increase the uncertainties of litigation." 1 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, p. 64 (1954 Ed.); See also 3 Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 896-899 (3rd Ed. 1940); Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U.Chi.L.Rev. 69 (1936); U.S. v. Norman, 518 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir.1975); U.S. v. Lineberger, 444 F.2d 122 (4th Cir.1971), cert. denied 40 1982The voucher rule has been universally criticized as having “no place in a rational system of investigation in modern society ... all attempts to modify or qualify it so as to reach sensible results serves only to demonstrate its irrationality and to increase the uncertainties of litigation.” 1 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, p. 64 (1954 Ed.); See also 3 Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 896-899 (3rd Ed. 1940); Ladd, Impeachment of One’s Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U.Chi.L.Rev. 69 (1936); U.S. v. Norman, 518 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir.1975); U.S. v. Lineberger, 444 F.2d 122 (4th Cir.1971), cert. denied 4 | 1 | 1982–1982 |
United States v. William Clemothy Norman and Ernest Lester
green
2 sentences1982The voucher rule has been universally criticized as having "no place in a rational system of investigation in modern society... all attempts to modify or qualify it so as to reach sensible results serves only to demonstrate its irrationality and to increase the uncertainties of litigation." 1 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, p. 64 (1954 Ed.); See also 3 Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 896-899 (3rd Ed. 1940); Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U.Chi.L.Rev. 69 (1936); U.S. v. Norman, 518 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir.1975); U.S. v. Lineberger, 444 F.2d 122 (4th Cir.1971), cert. denied 40 1982The voucher rule has been universally criticized as having “no place in a rational system of investigation in modern society ... all attempts to modify or qualify it so as to reach sensible results serves only to demonstrate its irrationality and to increase the uncertainties of litigation.” 1 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, p. 64 (1954 Ed.); See also 3 Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 896-899 (3rd Ed. 1940); Ladd, Impeachment of One’s Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U.Chi.L.Rev. 69 (1936); U.S. v. Norman, 518 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir.1975); U.S. v. Lineberger, 444 F.2d 122 (4th Cir.1971), cert. denied 4 | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| James E. Simon Co. v. Ardelt-Horn Construction Co. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.