28 Texas opinions name it 5 courts 1925–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Texas Water Rights Commission v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2002“A right has been defined to be ‘a well-founded claim, and a well-founded claim means nothing more nor less than a claim recognized or secured by law.’ ” Wright, 464 S.W.2d at 648 (quoting Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 45 , 3 *370 S.W. 249, 253 (1887)). 1998A vested right under the Texas Constitution has been defined as a well-founded claim that “means nothing more nor less than a claim recognized and secured by law.” Texas Water Rights Comm’n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex.1971) (quoting Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37 , 3 S.W. 249 (1887)). | 6 | 8 |
Mellinger v. City of Houston (Tex. 1-18-1887)green2 sentences2022“A right has been well defined to be a well-founded claim, and a well-founded claim means nothing more nor less than a claim recognized or secured by law.” Mellinger v. City of Houston, 3 S.W. 249, 253 (Tex. 1887). 2002“A right has been defined to be ‘a well-founded claim, and a well-founded claim means nothing more nor less than a claim recognized or secured by law.’ ” Wright, 464 S.W.2d at 648 (quoting Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 45 , 3 *370 S.W. 249, 253 (1887)). | 4 | 11 |
Ladd v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Seery, 2013 WL 683327 , at *9; see also Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 570 (Tex. Crim. 2011See Miles , 204 S.W.3d at 823–24; Tell , 908 S.W.2d at 540 ; see also Ladd v. State , 3 S.W.3d 547, 570 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Miles v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Miles , 204 S.W.3d at 823–24; Tell , 908 S.W.2d at 540 ; see also Ladd v. State , 3 S.W.3d 547, 570 (Tex. Crim. 2011See Miles, 204 S.W.3d at 823– 8 We also note that the charge in this case told the jury, ―You are instructed that any statements of counsel . . . not in harmony with the law as stated to you by me in these instructions, are to be wholly disregarded.‖ 11 24; Tell, 908 S.W.2d at 540 ; see also Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 570 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Turbeville v. Gowdygreen2 sentences1991See also Turbeville v. Gowdy, 272 S.W. 559, 561 [4] (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1925). 1991See also Turbeville v. Gowdy, 272 S.W. 559, 561 [4] (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1925). | 2 | 2 |
Paul H. Smith v. Thomas O'donnell, of the Estate of Corwin Denneygreen1 sentence2022“As a general rule, an estate’s personal representative may bring the decedent’s survivable claims on behalf of the estate.” Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 421 (Tex. 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridgegreen1 sentence2015Thus, necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation.'" Keefe the railroads conclude, the Court of Appeals correctly v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393, 397 (1944) (quoting Charles held that the 1979 and 1981 amendments substantially River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 548 (1837)). impaired their contractual rights and violated due process, Thus, the party asserting the creation of a contract must but incorrectly ruled that the 1972 amendment, which overcome this well-founded presumption, Dodge, supra, required only that the railroads pay for the incremental at 79, and we proceed cautiously both | 1 | 1 |
Keefe v. Clarkgreen1 sentence2015Thus, necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation.'" Keefe the railroads conclude, the Court of Appeals correctly v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393, 397 (1944) (quoting Charles held that the 1979 and 1981 amendments substantially River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 548 (1837)). impaired their contractual rights and violated due process, Thus, the party asserting the creation of a contract must but incorrectly ruled that the 1972 amendment, which overcome this well-founded presumption, Dodge, supra, required only that the railroads pay for the incremental at 79, and we proceed cautiously both | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc.green2 sentences2011Robinson, 335 S.W.3d at 139 ; see id. at 151 (Medina J., concurring) (“Along the way, the [court‟s Robinson opinion] grapples with the nature of the underlying property interest and its impairment, ultimately concluding that the Robinsons possessed a substantial interest in a well- founded claim (dare I say a vested property right) that Chapter 149 retroactively impaired. 2011Robinson, 335 S.W.3d at 139 ; see id. at 151 (Medina J., concurring) (“Along the way, the [court‟s Robinson opinion] grapples with the nature of the underlying property interest and its impairment, ultimately concluding that the Robinsons possessed a substantial interest in a well- founded claim (dare I say a vested property right) that Chapter 149 retroactively impaired. | 1 | 1 |
Dyer v. Metallic Building Companygreen2 sentences1983In Von Brandenstein v. Ebensberger, 71 Tex. 267 , 9 S.W. 153 (1888), this Court held: "There can be no doubt that an agreement to forbear to prosecute to enforce a well-founded claim in law or equity is a sufficient consideration to support the promissory note of the debtor, or of a third person, where the creditor has, in pursuance of such agreement, actually forborne." Id. (emphasis added); see also Wortham v. Lake Jackson State Bank, 435 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dyer v. Metallic Building Co., 410 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.Civ.App.Tyler 1966, no 1983In Von Brandenstein v. Ebensberger, 71 Tex. 267 , 9 S.W. 153 (1888), this Court held: “There can be no doubt that an agreement to forbear to prosecute to enforce a well-founded claim in law or equity is a sufficient consideration to support the promissory note of the debtor, or of a third person, where the creditor has, in pursuance of such agreement, actually forborne.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Wortham v. Lake Jackson State Bank, 435 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Dyer v. Metallic Building Co., 410 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1966, no | 1 | 1 |
Wortham v. Lake Jackson State Bankgreen2 sentences1983In Von Brandenstein v. Ebensberger, 71 Tex. 267 , 9 S.W. 153 (1888), this Court held: "There can be no doubt that an agreement to forbear to prosecute to enforce a well-founded claim in law or equity is a sufficient consideration to support the promissory note of the debtor, or of a third person, where the creditor has, in pursuance of such agreement, actually forborne." Id. (emphasis added); see also Wortham v. Lake Jackson State Bank, 435 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dyer v. Metallic Building Co., 410 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.Civ.App.Tyler 1966, no 1983In Von Brandenstein v. Ebensberger, 71 Tex. 267 , 9 S.W. 153 (1888), this Court held: “There can be no doubt that an agreement to forbear to prosecute to enforce a well-founded claim in law or equity is a sufficient consideration to support the promissory note of the debtor, or of a third person, where the creditor has, in pursuance of such agreement, actually forborne.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Wortham v. Lake Jackson State Bank, 435 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Dyer v. Metallic Building Co., 410 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1966, no | 1 | 1 |
Connor v. Greenville Nat. Exch. Bankgreen2 sentences1983In Von Brandenstein v. Ebensberger, 71 Tex. 267 , 9 S.W. 153 (1888), this Court held: "There can be no doubt that an agreement to forbear to prosecute to enforce a well-founded claim in law or equity is a sufficient consideration to support the promissory note of the debtor, or of a third person, where the creditor has, in pursuance of such agreement, actually forborne." Id. (emphasis added); see also Wortham v. Lake Jackson State Bank, 435 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dyer v. Metallic Building Co., 410 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.Civ.App.Tyler 1966, no 1983In Von Brandenstein v. Ebensberger, 71 Tex. 267 , 9 S.W. 153 (1888), this Court held: “There can be no doubt that an agreement to forbear to prosecute to enforce a well-founded claim in law or equity is a sufficient consideration to support the promissory note of the debtor, or of a third person, where the creditor has, in pursuance of such agreement, actually forborne.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Wortham v. Lake Jackson State Bank, 435 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Dyer v. Metallic Building Co., 410 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1966, no | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Abilene Independent School Dist.green1 sentence1980International Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Galveston Maritime Assn., 358 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1962, no writ); Wilson v. Abilene Independent School Dist., 204 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1947, writ ref’d n. r. e). | 1 | 1 |
International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Galveston Maritime Ass'ngreen1 sentence1980International Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Galveston Maritime Assn., 358 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1962, no writ); Wilson v. Abilene Independent School Dist., 204 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1947, writ ref’d n. r. e). | 1 | 1 |
Texaco Inc. v. Parkergreen1 sentence1980It was said in Texaco, Inc. v. Parker, 373 S.W.2d 870, 872-3 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1963, writ ref’d n. r. e.) “* * * a dissatisfied litigant (in a temporary injunction case) has a choice-he may appeal or seek a trial on the merits. *600 Having elected to appeal, . he should thereafter be bound by matters fully litigated and determined in the same manner as appeals from final judgments.” Where the parties elect in a temporary injunction suit to put in issue a right or a question of fact, as a ground of recovery or defense, and have it directly determined by the court, and the judgment is appeal | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co.
green
2 sentences1931Chief Justice Phillips, speaking for our Supreme Court, in the case of Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96 , 185 S. W. 556, 560 , says: “A vested right of action given by the principles of the common law is a property right, and is protected by the Constitution as is other property.” Judge Stayton, in the ease of Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37 , 3 S. W. 249, 253 , in discussing the rights based upon contracts fully protected by the Constitution of the State of Texas, as well as the Constitution of the United States, says: “A right has been well defined to be a well-foun 1931Chief Justice Phillips, speaking for our Supreme Court, in the case of Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96 , 185 S. W. 556, 560 , says: “A vested right of action given by the principles of the common law is a property right, and is protected by the Constitution as is other property.” Judge Stayton, in the ease of Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37 , 3 S. W. 249, 253 , in discussing the rights based upon contracts fully protected by the Constitution of the State of Texas, as well as the Constitution of the United States, says: “A right has been well defined to be a well-foun | 4 | 1931–2008 |
Tell v. State
green
2 sentences2011See Miles , 204 S.W.3d at 823–24; Tell , 908 S.W.2d at 540 ; see also Ladd v. State , 3 S.W.3d 547, 570 (Tex. Crim. 2011See Miles, 204 S.W.3d at 823– 8 We also note that the charge in this case told the jury, ―You are instructed that any statements of counsel . . . not in harmony with the law as stated to you by me in these instructions, are to be wholly disregarded.‖ 11 24; Tell, 908 S.W.2d at 540 ; see also Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 570 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Von Brandenstein v. Ebensberger
neutral
2 sentences1983In Von Brandenstein v. Ebensberger, 71 Tex. 267 , 9 S.W. 153 (1888), this Court held: “There can be no doubt that an agreement to forbear to prosecute to enforce a well-founded claim in law or equity is a sufficient consideration to support the promissory note of the debtor, or of a third person, where the creditor has, in pursuance of such agreement, actually forborne.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Wortham v. Lake Jackson State Bank, 435 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Dyer v. Metallic Building Co., 410 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1966, no 1983In Von Brandenstein v. Ebensberger, 71 Tex. 267 , 9 S.W. 153 (1888), this Court held: “There can be no doubt that an agreement to forbear to prosecute to enforce a well-founded claim in law or equity is a sufficient consideration to support the promissory note of the debtor, or of a third person, where the creditor has, in pursuance of such agreement, actually forborne.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Wortham v. Lake Jackson State Bank, 435 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Dyer v. Metallic Building Co., 410 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1966, no | 2 | 1925–1983 |
James v. Fulcrod
green
2 sentences1936Bank v. Voudour-is (Tex.Civ.App.) 248 S.W. 810 ; James v. Fulcrod, 5 Tex. 512 [521], 55 Am.Dec.743. 1936Bank v. Voudouris (Tex.Civ.App.) 248 S.W. 810 ; James v. Fulcrod, 5 Tex. 512 , 55 Am.Dec. 743. | 2 | 1936–1936 |
Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Voudouris
neutral
2 sentences1936Bank v. Voudour-is (Tex.Civ.App.) 248 S.W. 810 ; James v. Fulcrod, 5 Tex. 512 [521], 55 Am.Dec.743. 1936Bank v. Voudouris (Tex.Civ.App.) 248 S.W. 810 ; James v. Fulcrod, 5 Tex. 512 , 55 Am.Dec. 743. | 2 | 1936–1936 |
Ex Parte Rutledge
green
2 sentences1991Ex parte Rutledge, 741 S.W.2d at 463 , citing Mellinger, 68 Tex. at 45 , 3 S.W. at 253 . 1991Ex parte Rutledge, 741 S.W.2d at 463 , citing Mellinger, 68 Tex. at 45 , 3 S.W. at 253 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Furr's, Inc. v. United Specialty Advertising Company
green
1 sentence1980It was said in Texaco, Inc. v. Parker, 373 S.W.2d 870, 872-3 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1963, writ ref’d n. r. e.) “* * * a dissatisfied litigant (in a temporary injunction case) has a choice-he may appeal or seek a trial on the merits. *600 Having elected to appeal, . he should thereafter be bound by matters fully litigated and determined in the same manner as appeals from final judgments.” Where the parties elect in a temporary injunction suit to put in issue a right or a question of fact, as a ground of recovery or defense, and have it directly determined by the court, and the judgment is appeal | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Deacon v. City of Euless
green
1 sentence1971Deacon v. City of Euless, 405 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.1966); Norton v. Kleberg County, 149 Tex. 261 , 231 S.W.2d 716 (1950); Cathey v. Weaver, 111 Tex. 515 , 242 S.W. 447 (1922) ; Mellinger v. City of Houston, supra. These efforts to catalogue cases have provided some aid as well as confusion in the decisions. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Norton v. Kleberg County
green
2 sentences1971Deacon v. City of Euless, 405 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.1966); Norton v. Kleberg County, 149 Tex. 261 , 231 S.W.2d 716 (1950); Cathey v. Weaver, 111 Tex. 515 , 242 S.W. 447 (1922) ; Mellinger v. City of Houston, supra. These efforts to catalogue cases have provided some aid as well as confusion in the decisions. 1971Deacon v. City of Euless, 405 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.1966); Norton v. Kleberg County, 149 Tex. 261 , 231 S.W.2d 716 (1950); Cathey v. Weaver, 111 Tex. 515 , 242 S.W. 447 (1922) ; Mellinger v. City of Houston, supra. These efforts to catalogue cases have provided some aid as well as confusion in the decisions. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Cathey v. Weaver
green
2 sentences1971Deacon v. City of Euless, 405 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.1966); Norton v. Kleberg County, 149 Tex. 261 , 231 S.W.2d 716 (1950); Cathey v. Weaver, 111 Tex. 515 , 242 S.W. 447 (1922) ; Mellinger v. City of Houston, supra. These efforts to catalogue cases have provided some aid as well as confusion in the decisions. 1971Deacon v. City of Euless, 405 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.1966); Norton v. Kleberg County, 149 Tex. 261 , 231 S.W.2d 716 (1950); Cathey v. Weaver, 111 Tex. 515 , 242 S.W. 447 (1922) ; Mellinger v. City of Houston, supra. These efforts to catalogue cases have provided some aid as well as confusion in the decisions. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Republic National Bank of Dallas v. Fredericks
green
1 sentence1968Halff Foundation v. Calvert, 281 S.W.2d 178 (San Antonio Tex.Civ.App. 1955, ref., n. r. e.), the court quoted with approval from 41 Am.Jur., Powers, § 70, p. 857, as follows: “It is a well-founded principle that where a person takes by execution of a power, he takes, under the authority of the power, as if the power and the instrument executing the power had been incorporated in one instrument. * * * An appointee takes from the donor, the donee being treated as the agent of the donor. * * * An appointee under a power, even though he is a child of the donee, does not take by descent from the do | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Hill v. Conrad
green
2 sentences1968The will must refer to the power of appointment or to the property subject to such power, or the donee of the power must have owned no other property to which the will could have attached and thus the will have been a vain and useless thing except it be held to be an exercise of the power. * * * ‘ * * * If, from the circumstances or the instrument executed, it be doubtful as to whether it was the intention to execute the power possessed by the grantor, then it will not be held that by such act or conveyance that power was in fact executed.’ Hill v. Conrad, 1897, 91 Tex. 341 , 43 S.W. 789, 791 1968The will must refer to the power of appointment or to the property subject to such power, or the donee of the power must have owned no other property to which the will could have attached and thus the will have been a vain and useless thing except it be held to be an exercise of the power. * * * ‘ * * * If, from the circumstances or the instrument executed, it be doubtful as to whether it was the intention to execute the power possessed by the grantor, then it will not be held that by such act or conveyance that power was in fact executed.’ Hill v. Conrad, 1897, 91 Tex. 341 , 43 S.W. 789, 791 | 1 | 1968–1968 |
G. A. C. Halff Foundation v. Calvert
green
1 sentence1968Halff Foundation v. Calvert, 281 S.W.2d 178 (San Antonio Tex.Civ.App. 1955, ref., n. r. e.), the court quoted with approval from 41 Am.Jur., Powers, § 70, p. 857, as follows: “It is a well-founded principle that where a person takes by execution of a power, he takes, under the authority of the power, as if the power and the instrument executing the power had been incorporated in one instrument. * * * An appointee takes from the donor, the donee being treated as the agent of the donor. * * * An appointee under a power, even though he is a child of the donee, does not take by descent from the do | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Ramsey v. Farmers' & Citizens' Savings Bank
neutral
1 sentence1947Bass v. Wallace, Tex.Civ.App., 199 S.W. 506 ; Ramsey v. Farmers’ & Citizens’ Savings Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 177 S.W. 209 ; W. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Bass v. Wallacie
neutral
1 sentence1947Bass v. Wallace, Tex.Civ.App., 199 S.W. 506 ; Ramsey v. Farmers’ & Citizens’ Savings Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 177 S.W. 209 ; W. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Barrett v. Featherstone green | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| Jackson v. Stockbridge neutral | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.