mitigating and aggravating factors in California

2016In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held imposition of punishment for crimes committed as a juvenile constitutes a task "demanding individualized sentencing." ( Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 2467.) After noting its earlier decisions requiring consideration of the mitigating and aggravating factors unique to each case of sentencing for crimes committed as a minor, the Miller court emphasized that, "[o]f special pertinence here, we insisted in these rulings that a sentencer have the ability to consider the 'mitigating qualities of youth. ' " ( Id. at p. 2467, quoting Johnson v. Texas (19

2016In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held imposition of punishment for crimes committed as a juvenile constitutes a task "demanding individualized sentencing." ( Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 2467.) After noting its earlier decisions requiring consideration of the mitigating and aggravating factors unique to each case of sentencing for crimes committed as a minor, the Miller court emphasized that, "[o]f special pertinence here, we insisted in these rulings that a sentencer have the ability to consider the 'mitigating qualities of youth. ' " ( Id. at p. 2467, quoting Johnson v. Texas (19

1997(People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 539 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 788 P.2d 640 ].) In addition to the mitigating and aggravating factors, the court discussed the strength of the evidence that defendant committed these crimes.

1997(People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 539 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 788 P.2d 640 ].) In addition to the mitigating and aggravating factors, the court discussed the strength of the evidence that defendant committed these crimes.

2016In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held imposition of punishment for crimes committed as a juvenile constitutes a task "demanding individualized sentencing." ( Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 2467.) After noting its earlier decisions requiring consideration of the mitigating and aggravating factors unique to each case of sentencing for crimes committed as a minor, the Miller court emphasized that, "[o]f special pertinence here, we insisted in these rulings that a sentencer have the ability to consider the 'mitigating qualities of youth. ' " ( Id. at p. 2467, quoting Johnson v. Texas (19

2015In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held imposition of punishment for crimes committed as a juvenile constitutes a task “demanding individualized sentencing . . . .” ( Miller, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [ 183 L.Ed.2d at p. 421 ].) After noting its earlier decisions requiring consideration of the mitigating and aggravating factors unique to each case of sentencing for crimes committed as a minor, the Miller court emphasized that, “[o]f special pertinence here, we insisted in these rulings that a sentencer have the ability to consider the ‘mitigating qualities of youth.’ ” (Id. at p. ___ [

2026We cannot conclude the weight the court afforded to the mitigating and aggravating factors was “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Carmony, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377 .) Because dismissal of an enhancement is only in the furtherance of justice if it does not endanger public safety, the trial court’s conclusion that Lewis is “a serious danger to others” demonstrates dismissal is not in furtherance of justice.

2024As the People contend, the court “properly considered” multiple factors favoring dismissal yet concluded, given Angelo’s unlawful carrying of a loaded firearm while driving under the influence, dismissing the enhancements “would result in physical injury or other serious injury to others.” On this record, which clearly shows Angelo’s history of substance abuse, we cannot conclude the weight the court afforded the mitigating and aggravating factors was “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 (Carmony).) C.

2025(Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391 [if it is shown that trial court was unaware of its full sentencing discretion, proper remedy is remand unless the record clearly indicates trial court would have reached the same conclusion]; People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 431 (Salazar) [remand required for resentencing unless record clearly shows it would be an idle act].) We therefore conclude that even if this claim were not forfeited, and even if error had been shown, any such error would be harmless.

2021To the contrary, the court listed the mitigating and aggravating factors it considered on the record, and Panozo’s service-related PTSD was not among them.15 While the People are correct that sentencing courts are generally presumed to have acted in accordance with legitimate sentencing objectives (see Ferguson, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1091 ; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.409), we cannot rely on that presumption here. “ ‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court.’ ” ( Gutierrez, supra, 58 14 For example, there i

2007(People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 104 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 117 P.3d 622 ].) Defendant also argues that the instructions regarding the mitigating and aggravating factors in Penal Code section 190.3 and their application render defendant’s death sentence unconstitutional.

2007(People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 104 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 117 P.3d 622 ].) Defendant also argues that the instructions regarding the mitigating and aggravating factors in Penal Code section 190.3 and their application render defendant’s death sentence unconstitutional.

2025(Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391 [if it is shown that trial court was unaware of its full sentencing discretion, proper remedy is remand unless the record clearly indicates trial court would have reached the same conclusion]; People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 431 (Salazar) [remand required for resentencing unless record clearly shows it would be an idle act].) We therefore conclude that even if this claim were not forfeited, and even if error had been shown, any such error would be harmless.

2016He acknowledges that he "did not object after sentence was pronounced." In People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 (Scott), the California Supreme Court held that a party in a criminal case may not raise on appeal "claims involving the trial court's failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices" (id. at p. 353) if the party did not object to the sentence at trial, provided the party had a "meaningful opportunity to object." (Id. at p. 356.) The Scott rule applies to "cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which t

2016(Id. at pp. 1223- 1224; see People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 752 (Gonzalez).) Because of the 21 immediate recess, the Dorsey court held that "the prosecutor had no opportunity, meaningful or otherwise, to object." (Dorsey, at p. 1224; see Gonzalez, at p. 752.) Here, Flores forfeited his claim that the court abused its sentencing discretion in denying probation and imposing the upper prison term of three years because he is complaining on appeal that the court misweighed the various mitigating and aggravating factors, he had a meaningful opportunity to object to the court's discretiona

2016(Id. at pp. 1223- 1224; see People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 752 (Gonzalez).) Because of the 21 immediate recess, the Dorsey court held that "the prosecutor had no opportunity, meaningful or otherwise, to object." (Dorsey, at p. 1224; see Gonzalez, at p. 752.) Here, Flores forfeited his claim that the court abused its sentencing discretion in denying probation and imposing the upper prison term of three years because he is complaining on appeal that the court misweighed the various mitigating and aggravating factors, he had a meaningful opportunity to object to the court's discretiona

2011(People v. Superior Court (Harris) (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1332, 1341 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 563 ].) 23 This statute sets forth the mitigating and aggravating factors to be considered in the penalty phase of a federal capital trial.

2011(People v. Superior Court (Harris) (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1332, 1341 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 563 ].) 23 This statute sets forth the mitigating and aggravating factors to be considered in the penalty phase of a federal capital trial.

2001We decline defendant’s belated invitation to modify the judgment. “[T]he wiser course is to remand for resentencing rather than have us hazard a guess in the first instance as to the likely sentence that would have been imposed had the trial court been advised of our interpretation.” (People v. Scott (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1388 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 46 ].) *671 IV, V * Disposition The convictions are affirmed.

2001We decline defendant’s belated invitation to modify the judgment. “[T]he wiser course is to remand for resentencing rather than have us hazard a guess in the first instance as to the likely sentence that would have been imposed had the trial court been advised of our interpretation.” (People v. Scott (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1388 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 46 ].) *671 IV, V * Disposition The convictions are affirmed.

1992(Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 380-381 [ 108 L.Ed.2d 316, 328-329 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 ].) *1113 Appellant next argues, without any supporting authority, that the court was required to include in its response to the jury’s question an admonition that each juror was required to reach an individual decision.

1992(Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 380-381 [ 108 L.Ed.2d 316, 328-329 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 ].) *1113 Appellant next argues, without any supporting authority, that the court was required to include in its response to the jury’s question an admonition that each juror was required to reach an individual decision.

1986(See Doyle v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 12, 23 [ 184 Cal. Rptr. 720 , 648 P.2d 942 ]; see also In re Bogart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 743, 749 [ 108 Cal. Rptr. 815 , 511 P.2d 1167 ]; Honoroff v. State Bar (1958) 50 Cal.2d 202, 210 [ 323 P.2d 1003 ].) A 45-day period of actual suspension takes into account the seriousness of petitioner's misconduct and the mitigating and aggravating factors. *711 Protection of the public and preservation of confidence in the legal profession render imposition of less than 45 days of actual suspension inappropriate.

1986(See Doyle v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 12, 23 [ 184 Cal. Rptr. 720 , 648 P.2d 942 ]; see also In re Bogart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 743, 749 [ 108 Cal. Rptr. 815 , 511 P.2d 1167 ]; Honoroff v. State Bar (1958) 50 Cal.2d 202, 210 [ 323 P.2d 1003 ].) A 45-day period of actual suspension takes into account the seriousness of petitioner's misconduct and the mitigating and aggravating factors. *711 Protection of the public and preservation of confidence in the legal profession render imposition of less than 45 days of actual suspension inappropriate.

1986(See Doyle v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 12, 23 [ 184 Cal. Rptr. 720 , 648 P.2d 942 ]; see also In re Bogart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 743, 749 [ 108 Cal. Rptr. 815 , 511 P.2d 1167 ]; Honoroff v. State Bar (1958) 50 Cal.2d 202, 210 [ 323 P.2d 1003 ].) A 45-day period of actual suspension takes into account the seriousness of petitioner's misconduct and the mitigating and aggravating factors. *711 Protection of the public and preservation of confidence in the legal profession render imposition of less than 45 days of actual suspension inappropriate.

1986(See Doyle v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 12, 23 [ 184 Cal. Rptr. 720 , 648 P.2d 942 ]; see also In re Bogart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 743, 749 [ 108 Cal. Rptr. 815 , 511 P.2d 1167 ]; Honoroff v. State Bar (1958) 50 Cal.2d 202, 210 [ 323 P.2d 1003 ].) A 45-day period of actual suspension takes into account the seriousness of petitioner's misconduct and the mitigating and aggravating factors. *711 Protection of the public and preservation of confidence in the legal profession render imposition of less than 45 days of actual suspension inappropriate.

1986(See Doyle v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 12, 23 [ 184 Cal. Rptr. 720 , 648 P.2d 942 ]; see also In re Bogart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 743, 749 [ 108 Cal. Rptr. 815 , 511 P.2d 1167 ]; Honoroff v. State Bar (1958) 50 Cal.2d 202, 210 [ 323 P.2d 1003 ].) A 45-day period of actual suspension takes into account the seriousness of petitioner's misconduct and the mitigating and aggravating factors. *711 Protection of the public and preservation of confidence in the legal profession render imposition of less than 45 days of actual suspension inappropriate.

1986(See Doyle v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 12, 23 [ 184 Cal. Rptr. 720 , 648 P.2d 942 ]; see also In re Bogart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 743, 749 [ 108 Cal. Rptr. 815 , 511 P.2d 1167 ]; Honoroff v. State Bar (1958) 50 Cal.2d 202, 210 [ 323 P.2d 1003 ].) A 45-day period of actual suspension takes into account the seriousness of petitioner's misconduct and the mitigating and aggravating factors. *711 Protection of the public and preservation of confidence in the legal profession render imposition of less than 45 days of actual suspension inappropriate.