Ramos error in California

2001In 1987, we affirmed the guilt judgment, struck one of the multiple-murder special circumstances, and reversed the penalty judgment for so-called Ramos error ( People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 [improper Briggs instruction on Governor's commutation power] ). ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ( Anderson I. )) In December 1990 and January 1991, defendant was retried on the issue of penalty.

2001In 1987, we affirmed the guilt judgment, struck one of the multiple-murder special circumstances, and reversed the penalty judgment for so-called Ramos error ( People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 [improper Briggs instruction on Governor's commutation power] ). ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ( Anderson I. )) In December 1990 and January 1991, defendant was retried on the issue of penalty.

1992(See People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [ 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ] [ Ramos II ]; People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553 [ 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 , 639 P.2d 908 ] [ Ramos I ].) Lasting's absence did not affect Reilly's defense, however, because it is unreasonable to assume Lasting would have argued in favor of giving the Ramos instruction.

1992(See People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [ 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ] [ Ramos II ]; People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553 [ 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 , 639 P.2d 908 ] [ Ramos I ].) Lasting's absence did not affect Reilly's defense, however, because it is unreasonable to assume Lasting would have argued in favor of giving the Ramos instruction.

2022(Id. at pp. 102-103.) Ramos reversed the conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial, but was not persuaded that it was proper to assess the instructional error “under the harmless error rubric.” ( Ramos, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 103-104.) The court reasoned that the 57 application of the retroactive amendment impermissibly deprived the defendant of her “constitutional right to a jury on an element of the charged offense.” (Id. at p. 104.) But the court also ruled that, even if it was proper to assess the error under the Chapman standard, the error was not harmless beyond a reasona

2021(Id. at pp. 102-103.) Ramos reversed the conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial, but was not persuaded that it was proper to assess the instructional error “under the harmless error rubric.” ( Ramos, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 103-104.) The court reasoned that the 57 application of the retroactive amendment impermissibly deprived the defendant of her “constitutional right to a jury on an element of the charged offense.” (Id. at p. 104.) But the court also ruled that, even if it was proper to assess the error under the Chapman standard, the error was not harmless beyond a reasona

1992We must determine whether the error was prejudicial, more specifically, whether there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the jury's penalty determination. ( People v. Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d 749, 780-782 ; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 918-919 [ 4 Cal. Rptr.2d 765 , 824 P.2d 571 ].) Respondent's entire prejudice argument is that "[T]here was very little credible mitigating evidence, if any, whereas the evidence in aggravation was simply overwhelming." Although this naked assertion is singularly unpersuasive, our independent review of the record convinces us that the

1989Cf. People v. Hamilton (1988) 45 Cal.3d 351, 375-376 [ 247 Cal. Rptr. 31 , 753 P.2d 1109 ]; People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749 [ 251 Cal. Rptr. 83 , 759 P.2d 1260 ]; People v. Griffin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011 [ 251 Cal. Rptr. 643 , 761 P.2d 103 ].) In the instant case, the court did not elaborate on the Governor's commutation power, and the prosecutor did not refer to the instruction in his argument to the jury.

2025(See People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781-783 ; accord, People v. Lee (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 254 , 263-264.) We decline the invitation because the trial court expressly refused to consider the briefing filed in connection with Ramos’s motion to dismiss.

2025(See People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781-783 ; accord, People v. Lee (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 254 , 263-264.) We decline the invitation because the trial court expressly refused to consider the briefing filed in connection with Ramos’s motion to dismiss.

2025To preserve a claim that a trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence, a party must make a timely and specific objection. (§ 353, subd. (a); People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 42 .) Ordinarily, this means that to argue on appeal that evidence should have been excluded under section 352, the party needs to have made a meaningful objection on those specific grounds in the trial court.

2023People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th 494 (Ramos) The Ramos defendant pleaded guilty to multiple murders.

2023People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th 494 (Ramos) The Ramos defendant pleaded guilty to multiple murders.

2017(Id. at p. 725.) The appellate court held that Ramos’s motion to dismiss should have been granted, holding that “on its face section 859b’s 60-day rule is absolute and requires dismissal of a felony complaint against a nonconsenting defendant whose preliminary hearing is set or continued more than 60 days from arraignment.” (Id. at p. 730.) The Ramos court quoted Mackey, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at page 183 , that “ ‘[t]he ordinary import of this language [describing the 60-day rule] is that, excepting only his own waiver, a defendant has a right to a preliminary hearing within 60 consecutive cal

2017(Id. at p. 725.) The appellate court held that Ramos’s motion to dismiss should have been granted, holding that “on its face section 859b’s 60-day rule is absolute and requires dismissal of a felony complaint against a nonconsenting defendant whose preliminary hearing is set or continued more than 60 days from arraignment.” (Id. at p. 730.) The Ramos court quoted Mackey, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at page 183 , that “ ‘[t]he ordinary import of this language [describing the 60-day rule] is that, excepting only his own waiver, a defendant has a right to a preliminary hearing within 60 consecutive cal

2016(Chapin v. Superior Court (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 571, 575 .) Because the interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo review where the interpretation does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence (Hot Rods, LLC v. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1178 ), we apply de novo review to this aspect of Ramos's appeal. 7 Ramos's brief on appeal appears also to suggest the judgment must be reversed as lacking substantial evidentiary support.

2016(Chapin v. Superior Court (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 571, 575 .) Because the interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo review where the interpretation does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence (Hot Rods, LLC v. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1178 ), we apply de novo review to this aspect of Ramos's appeal. 7 Ramos's brief on appeal appears also to suggest the judgment must be reversed as lacking substantial evidentiary support.

2014“Under the circumstances, we decline to disregard the California Supreme Court’s decision without specific guidance from our high court.” (Truly Nolen, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 507 .)7 7 Fry’s has never argued Ramos’s claim for injunctive relief under section 17200 does not fall within the Cruz rule.

2014At least one court has concluded that, to establish that an injunctive relief claim falls within Cruz, the plaintiff must make a factual showing the relief sought would “more than incidentally benefit the public.” (Nelsen, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136 .) Because Fry’s has not argued that Ramos failed to show an injunction in this case would have more than an incidental benefit to the public, we need not address that issue. 28 E.

2002(See e.g., People v. Thomas (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1122, 1129 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 642 , 988 P.2d 563 ; In re Mitchell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 653, 656 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 ; People v. Caceres (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 106, 111 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 415 .) [8] Drawing on this phrase, the trial court here issued the writ, rejecting section 2933.1's application to Reeves's 10year prison sentence on the drug case after finding the drug conviction was not "current" with the violent felony of assault with great bodily injury.

2002(See e.g., People v. Thomas (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1122, 1129 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 642 , 988 P.2d 563 ; In re Mitchell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 653, 656 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 ; People v. Caceres (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 106, 111 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 415 .) [8] Drawing on this phrase, the trial court here issued the writ, rejecting section 2933.1's application to Reeves's 10year prison sentence on the drug case after finding the drug conviction was not "current" with the violent felony of assault with great bodily injury.

2002The lower court noted that the Ramos rule is applicable to cases in which subordinate felonies are not violent felonies (see People v. Palacios (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 252, 255-256 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 318 ), but distinguished subordinate felonies filed within the same pleading from those filed in separate cases. [7] *322 To reach its finding, the lower court relied on three cases that involved defendants whose "current convictions" were for violent felonies.

2002The lower court noted that the Ramos rule is applicable to cases in which subordinate felonies are not violent felonies (see People v. Palacios (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 252, 255-256 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 318 ), but distinguished subordinate felonies filed within the same pleading from those filed in separate cases. [7] *322 To reach its finding, the lower court relied on three cases that involved defendants whose "current convictions" were for violent felonies.

2002(See e.g., People v. Thomas (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1122, 1129 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 642 , 988 P.2d 563 ; In re Mitchell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 653, 656 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 ; People v. Caceres (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 106, 111 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 415 .) [8] Drawing on this phrase, the trial court here issued the writ, rejecting section 2933.1's application to Reeves's 10year prison sentence on the drug case after finding the drug conviction was not "current" with the violent felony of assault with great bodily injury.

2002(See e.g., People v. Thomas (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1122, 1129 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 642 , 988 P.2d 563 ; In re Mitchell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 653, 656 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 ; People v. Caceres (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 106, 111 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 415 .) [8] Drawing on this phrase, the trial court here issued the writ, rejecting section 2933.1's application to Reeves's 10year prison sentence on the drug case after finding the drug conviction was not "current" with the violent felony of assault with great bodily injury.

2002(See e.g., People v. Thomas (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1122, 1129 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 642 , 988 P.2d 563 ; In re Mitchell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 653, 656 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 ; People v. Caceres (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 106, 111 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 415 .) [8] Drawing on this phrase, the trial court here issued the writ, rejecting section 2933.1's application to Reeves's 10year prison sentence on the drug case after finding the drug conviction was not "current" with the violent felony of assault with great bodily injury.

2002(See e.g., People v. Thomas (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1122, 1129 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 642 , 988 P.2d 563 ; In re Mitchell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 653, 656 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 ; People v. Caceres (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 106, 111 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 415 .) [8] Drawing on this phrase, the trial court here issued the writ, rejecting section 2933.1's application to Reeves's 10year prison sentence on the drug case after finding the drug conviction was not "current" with the violent felony of assault with great bodily injury.

2001Counsel informed Ramos the deal "would not be discussed on the record during his plea" and thus "[Ramos should] just answer *455 [the court's] questions at the plea as if no deals had been made," and to "`just go along with what the judge asked me.'" ( Id. at pp. 562-563.) The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Ramos's claim, noting "the state trial court specifically asked Ramos, `Do you understand that [rape] is not a probationable offense, that you are not going to receive probation under any circumstances?'" ( Id. at p. 565.) Recalling this express advisement, the Sixth Circuit found

2001(Dennis v. People of State of California (9th Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 424, 425 .) The Dennis court refused to vacate the plea, emphasizing the colloquy in which both counsel and the court described the sentence as being “ ‘without possibility of parole.’ ” (Id. at p. 426, fn. 2.) Furthermore, the People need not prevail in a credibility contest to protect the plea from collateral attack; the rule is the same even where the trial and appellate court agree that (1) counsel provided misadvice; and (2) it amounted to “ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Warner v. U.S. (6th Cir. 1992) 975 F.2d 1207 ,

1989Cf. People v. Hamilton (1988) 45 Cal.3d 351, 375-376 [ 247 Cal. Rptr. 31 , 753 P.2d 1109 ]; People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749 [ 251 Cal. Rptr. 83 , 759 P.2d 1260 ]; People v. Griffin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011 [ 251 Cal. Rptr. 643 , 761 P.2d 103 ].) In the instant case, the court did not elaborate on the Governor's commutation power, and the prosecutor did not refer to the instruction in his argument to the jury.

1989Cf. People v. Hamilton (1988) 45 Cal.3d 351, 375-376 [ 247 Cal. Rptr. 31 , 753 P.2d 1109 ]; People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749 [ 251 Cal. Rptr. 83 , 759 P.2d 1260 ]; People v. Griffin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011 [ 251 Cal. Rptr. 643 , 761 P.2d 103 ].) In the instant case, the court did not elaborate on the Governor's commutation power, and the prosecutor did not refer to the instruction in his argument to the jury.