Franks hearing in Delaware

2024The Court does not automatically conduct an evidentiary hearing merely because a defendant alleges a falsity or a material omission, however.10 The defendant bears the burden of persuading the Court to hold an evidentiary hearing.11 In the context of both Franks and reverse-Franks challenges, the defendant must provide a substantial showing that such a hearing is appropriate.12 When doing so, the Court must determine whether the alleged falsity or omission would have made a difference to the reviewing magistrate.13 In a Franks challenge, the Court excises the allegedly false facts to determine

2024The Court does not automatically conduct an evidentiary hearing merely because a defendant alleges a falsity or a material omission, however.10 The defendant bears the burden of persuading the Court to hold an evidentiary hearing.11 In the context of both Franks and reverse-Franks challenges, the defendant must provide a substantial showing that such a hearing is appropriate.12 When doing so, the Court must determine whether the alleged falsity or omission would have made a difference to the reviewing magistrate.13 In a Franks challenge, the Court excises the allegedly false facts to determine

2026To succeed on a reverse-Franks claim, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the police knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, omitted information from the search warrant affidavit that was material to a finding of probable cause.5 First, it is important to note that WPD detectives made a warrantless arrest of Defendant before Detective Deveraux drafted and filed the arrest-warrant affidavit 4 Pollard v. State, 284 A.3d 41 , 46 (Del. 2022). 5 7 A.3d 961, 968 (Del. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). at issue here.

2026On the day of Defendant’s arrest, the WPD already had a search warrant for, and were conducting surveillance of, 1021 North Lombard based on the CI’s tip that 10 Rivera, 7 A.3d at 969 (holding that a reverse-Franks claim first requires a showing of reckless disregard before determining whether the omission was material). 11 11 Del.

2024The Court does not automatically conduct an evidentiary hearing merely because a defendant alleges a falsity or a material omission, however.10 The defendant bears the burden of persuading the Court to hold an evidentiary hearing.11 In the context of both Franks and reverse-Franks challenges, the defendant must provide a substantial showing that such a hearing is appropriate.12 When doing so, the Court must determine whether the alleged falsity or omission would have made a difference to the reviewing magistrate.13 In a Franks challenge, the Court excises the allegedly false facts to determine

2024The Court does not automatically conduct an evidentiary hearing merely because a defendant alleges a falsity or a material omission, however.10 The defendant bears the burden of persuading the Court to hold an evidentiary hearing.11 In the context of both Franks and reverse-Franks challenges, the defendant must provide a substantial showing that such a hearing is appropriate.12 When doing so, the Court must determine whether the alleged falsity or omission would have made a difference to the reviewing magistrate.13 In a Franks challenge, the Court excises the allegedly false facts to determine

2016STANDARD OF REVIEW In a Motion to Suppress challenging the validity of a search warrant, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the challenged search or seizure was unlawful.2 The burden of proof in a motion to suppress is by a preponderance of the evidence.3 At a suppression hearing, the trial judge sits as the trier of fact, and determines the credibility of witnesses.4 In a Franks hearing challenging the accuracy of statements made in a probable cause affidavit, a defendant may request a hearing only upon a substantial preliminary showing that “(1) the affiant made a false statement

2016STANDARD OF REVIEW In a Motion to Suppress challenging the validity of a search warrant, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the challenged search or seizure was unlawful.2 The burden of proof in a motion to suppress is by a preponderance of the evidence.3 At a suppression hearing, the trial judge sits as the trier of fact, and determines the credibility of witnesses.4 In a Franks hearing challenging the accuracy of statements made in a probable cause affidavit, a defendant may request a hearing only upon a substantial preliminary showing that “(1) the affiant made a false statement

2010See also Reedy, 615 F.3d at 213-23 (applying the Franks analysis for omitted facts in a § 1983 case for false arrest); United States v. Eberle, 266 Fed.Appx. 200, 204-06 (3d Cir.2008) (applying the Franks analysis for omitted facts in an appeal from a denial of a suppression motion); Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787-92 (defining "materiality”). 27 .

2010See also Reedy, 615 F.3d at 213-23 (applying the Franks analysis for omitted facts in a § 1983 case for false arrest); United States v. Eberle, 266 Fed.Appx. 200, 204-06 (3d Cir.2008) (applying the Franks analysis for omitted facts in an appeal from a denial of a suppression motion); Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787-92 (defining "materiality”). 27 .

2026C. § 1904(b)(1); see also Juliano v. State, 260 A.3d 619 , 628 (Del. 2021). 12 Juliano, 260 A.3d at 628 (quoting Thompson v. State, 539 A.2d 1052, 1055 (Del. 1988)). 13 Id. at 629 (quoting Jackson v. State, 643 A.2d 1360, 1365 (Del. 1944), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1136 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2026C. § 1904(b)(1); see also Juliano v. State, 260 A.3d 619 , 628 (Del. 2021). 12 Juliano, 260 A.3d at 628 (quoting Thompson v. State, 539 A.2d 1052, 1055 (Del. 1988)). 13 Id. at 629 (quoting Jackson v. State, 643 A.2d 1360, 1365 (Del. 1944), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1136 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2026Moreover, even if the Court were to consider the merits of Defendant’s reverse-Franks claim, there is no showing that the detectives acted 6 Gordon v. State, 245 A.3d 499 , 512 (Del. 2021). 7 Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d 571 , 573–74 (Del. 1975). 8 Gordon, 245 A.3d at 515. 9 Id. at 514; see also Pierson, 338 A.2d at 574 (reasoning that review of a warrant affidavit should be limited to the four corners of the warrant affidavit to ensure that “the reviewing court may determine whether the constitutional requirements have been met without reliance upon faded and often confused memories”) (internal

2026Moreover, even if the Court were to consider the merits of Defendant’s reverse-Franks claim, there is no showing that the detectives acted 6 Gordon v. State, 245 A.3d 499 , 512 (Del. 2021). 7 Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d 571 , 573–74 (Del. 1975). 8 Gordon, 245 A.3d at 515. 9 Id. at 514; see also Pierson, 338 A.2d at 574 (reasoning that review of a warrant affidavit should be limited to the four corners of the warrant affidavit to ensure that “the reviewing court may determine whether the constitutional requirements have been met without reliance upon faded and often confused memories”) (internal

2026C. § 1904(b)(1); see also Juliano v. State, 260 A.3d 619 , 628 (Del. 2021). 12 Juliano, 260 A.3d at 628 (quoting Thompson v. State, 539 A.2d 1052, 1055 (Del. 1988)). 13 Id. at 629 (quoting Jackson v. State, 643 A.2d 1360, 1365 (Del. 1944), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1136 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2026C. § 1904(b)(1); see also Juliano v. State, 260 A.3d 619 , 628 (Del. 2021). 12 Juliano, 260 A.3d at 628 (quoting Thompson v. State, 539 A.2d 1052, 1055 (Del. 1988)). 13 Id. at 629 (quoting Jackson v. State, 643 A.2d 1360, 1365 (Del. 1944), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1136 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2026Super.). 26 State v. Holden, 60 A.3d 1110, 1114 (Del. 2013) quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 238– 39 (U.S. 1983). 27 Id. at 1116 (citation omitted). 28 Id. at 1114 citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 237 . 29 Mr. Vonduyke’s counsel was clear that a Franks hearing was not requested in this case.

2026Super.). 26 State v. Holden, 60 A.3d 1110, 1114 (Del. 2013) quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 238– 39 (U.S. 1983). 27 Id. at 1116 (citation omitted). 28 Id. at 1114 citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 237 . 29 Mr. Vonduyke’s counsel was clear that a Franks hearing was not requested in this case.

2024STANDARD OF REVIEW As a general rule, the burden of proof is on the defendant who seeks to suppress evidence.”3 But once the defendant has established a basis for his motion, the burden shifts to the State to show that the warrantless search or seizure was reasonable. 4 In the context of a DUI arrest, the State bears the burden to prove the legality and the reasonableness of the underlying stop and subsequent arrest by a preponderance of the evidence.5 In determining whether an officer's actions were supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion, the Court examines the totality of the circums

2024STANDARD OF REVIEW As a general rule, the burden of proof is on the defendant who seeks to suppress evidence.”3 But once the defendant has established a basis for his motion, the burden shifts to the State to show that the warrantless search or seizure was reasonable. 4 In the context of a DUI arrest, the State bears the burden to prove the legality and the reasonableness of the underlying stop and subsequent arrest by a preponderance of the evidence.5 In determining whether an officer's actions were supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion, the Court examines the totality of the circums

2023As to McGriff’s invocation of Franks, a defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing when he makes a “substantial preliminary showing” that 3 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996). 4 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 5 Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485, 487-88 (Del. 2003). 6 police knowingly or “with reckless disregard for the truth” relied on a false statement to establish probable cause for a search or arrest warrant.6 In challenging the lack of an identification of the attacker through photographic line-up, a description of the amount of money taken from

2023As to McGriff’s invocation of Franks, a defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing when he makes a “substantial preliminary showing” that 3 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996). 4 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 5 Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485, 487-88 (Del. 2003). 6 police knowingly or “with reckless disregard for the truth” relied on a false statement to establish probable cause for a search or arrest warrant.6 In challenging the lack of an identification of the attacker through photographic line-up, a description of the amount of money taken from

2023As to McGriff’s invocation of Franks, a defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing when he makes a “substantial preliminary showing” that 3 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996). 4 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 5 Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485, 487-88 (Del. 2003). 6 police knowingly or “with reckless disregard for the truth” relied on a false statement to establish probable cause for a search or arrest warrant.6 In challenging the lack of an identification of the attacker through photographic line-up, a description of the amount of money taken from

2023As to McGriff’s invocation of Franks, a defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing when he makes a “substantial preliminary showing” that 3 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996). 4 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 5 Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485, 487-88 (Del. 2003). 6 police knowingly or “with reckless disregard for the truth” relied on a false statement to establish probable cause for a search or arrest warrant.6 In challenging the lack of an identification of the attacker through photographic line-up, a description of the amount of money taken from

2023As to McGriff’s invocation of Franks, a defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing when he makes a “substantial preliminary showing” that 3 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996). 4 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 5 Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485, 487-88 (Del. 2003). 6 police knowingly or “with reckless disregard for the truth” relied on a false statement to establish probable cause for a search or arrest warrant.6 In challenging the lack of an identification of the attacker through photographic line-up, a description of the amount of money taken from

2023As to McGriff’s invocation of Franks, a defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing when he makes a “substantial preliminary showing” that 3 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996). 4 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 5 Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485, 487-88 (Del. 2003). 6 police knowingly or “with reckless disregard for the truth” relied on a false statement to establish probable cause for a search or arrest warrant.6 In challenging the lack of an identification of the attacker through photographic line-up, a description of the amount of money taken from

2022This appeal followed. (7) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.1 We review legal or constitutional questions, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, de novo.2 The Court must consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive issues.3 (8) As he did below, Stanley argues in his opening brief that his counsel was ineffective for: (i) failing to investigate his mental condition and request a competency hearing; (ii); failing to sufficiently challenge the search warrant, move for a Franks heari

2022This appeal followed. (7) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.1 We review legal or constitutional questions, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, de novo.2 The Court must consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive issues.3 (8) As he did below, Stanley argues in his opening brief that his counsel was ineffective for: (i) failing to investigate his mental condition and request a competency hearing; (ii); failing to sufficiently challenge the search warrant, move for a Franks heari

2022This appeal followed. (7) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.1 We review legal or constitutional questions, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, de novo.2 The Court must consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive issues.3 (8) As he did below, Stanley argues in his opening brief that his counsel was ineffective for: (i) failing to investigate his mental condition and request a competency hearing; (ii); failing to sufficiently challenge the search warrant, move for a Franks heari

2022This appeal followed. (7) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.1 We review legal or constitutional questions, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, de novo.2 The Court must consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive issues.3 (8) As he did below, Stanley argues in his opening brief that his counsel was ineffective for: (i) failing to investigate his mental condition and request a competency hearing; (ii); failing to sufficiently challenge the search warrant, move for a Franks heari

2022A successful claim of ineffective assistance requires a claimant to show that: (i) his counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) there was a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s 5 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 6 Id. 7 Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003). 6 errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial.8 Although not insurmountable, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.9 (16) As the Superior Court recognized, Benson chose

2022A successful claim of ineffective assistance requires a claimant to show that: (i) his counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) there was a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s 5 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 6 Id. 7 Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003). 6 errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial.8 Although not insurmountable, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.9 (16) As the Superior Court recognized, Benson chose

2022A successful claim of ineffective assistance requires a claimant to show that: (i) his counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) there was a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s 5 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 6 Id. 7 Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003). 6 errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial.8 Although not insurmountable, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.9 (16) As the Superior Court recognized, Benson chose

2022A successful claim of ineffective assistance requires a claimant to show that: (i) his counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) there was a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s 5 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 6 Id. 7 Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003). 6 errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial.8 Although not insurmountable, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.9 (16) As the Superior Court recognized, Benson chose

2020Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). °3 Mot. to Withdraw as Counsel Pursuant to Rule 61(e)(6) [...], App. at p.

2020Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). °3 Mot. to Withdraw as Counsel Pursuant to Rule 61(e)(6) [...], App. at p.

2020Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). °3 Mot. to Withdraw as Counsel Pursuant to Rule 61(e)(6) [...], App. at p.

2020Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). °3 Mot. to Withdraw as Counsel Pursuant to Rule 61(e)(6) [...], App. at p.

2018See Restrepo-Duque v. State , 130 A.3d 340 , 2015 WL 9268145 , at *3 (Del.

2018See Restrepo-Duque v. State , 130 A.3d 340 , 2015 WL 9268145 , at *3 (Del.

2016The risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”30 This definition of ‘reckless’ is used in both the criminal and civil 26 Id. at 301 . 27 Id. 28 Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir.1993)). 29 21 Am.

2015This Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including a denial of a motion to suppress, for abuse of discretion. 8 The trial court’s formulation and application of legal concepts are reviewed de novo,9 but the trial court’s factual findings will be upheld so long as they are not clearly erroneous. 10 (14) Under Franks, a defendant is entitled to a hearing when he has made a “substantial preliminary showing” that the police knowingly or “with reckless disregard for the truth” relied on a false statement to establish probable cause. 11 To succeed under a reverse-Franks analysis, “a d

2015This Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including a denial of a motion to suppress, for abuse of discretion. 8 The trial court’s formulation and application of legal concepts are reviewed de novo,9 but the trial court’s factual findings will be upheld so long as they are not clearly erroneous. 10 (14) Under Franks, a defendant is entitled to a hearing when he has made a “substantial preliminary showing” that the police knowingly or “with reckless disregard for the truth” relied on a false statement to establish probable cause. 11 To succeed under a reverse-Franks analysis, “a d

2015Sept. 28, 2015); Rivera v. State, 7 A.3d 961, 966 (Del. 2010). 9 Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 318 (Del. 2006). 10 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 854 (Del. 2009). 11 Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56 . 12 Rivera, 7 A.3d at 968 . 13 Id. 7 considering a search warrant affidavit, “a magistrate may find probable cause when considering the totality of the circumstances, ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” 14 (15) Restrepo argues that the police knowingly included false statements and omitted exculpatory information in the search warran

2015The 5 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 6 On the second day of trial, Small raised issues relating to the warrants again and then withdrew his objection to the DNA evidence. 6 Superior Court informed Small that the time for filing motions was over and it was a trial day, not a suppression day. (15) Absent exceptional circumstances, the Superior Court is not required to consider an untimely motion to suppress.7 In his motion for a suppression hearing, Small claimed that the attorney who represented him at the preliminary hearing felt there was a reason for a suppression hearing,

2015Sept. 28, 2015); Rivera v. State, 7 A.3d 961, 966 (Del. 2010). 9 Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 318 (Del. 2006). 10 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 854 (Del. 2009). 11 Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56 . 12 Rivera, 7 A.3d at 968 . 13 Id. 7 considering a search warrant affidavit, “a magistrate may find probable cause when considering the totality of the circumstances, ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” 14 (15) Restrepo argues that the police knowingly included false statements and omitted exculpatory information in the search warran