Franks hearing in New Jersey

2025A defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing to challenge the veracity of a search warrant affidavit by demonstrating a "substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and . . . the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause." Id. at 155-56 ; see also State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 567-68 (1979) (adopting the Franks standard in New Jersey).

2025A defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing to challenge the veracity of a search warrant affidavit by demonstrating a "substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and . . . the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause." Id. at 155-56 ; see also State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 567-68 (1979) (adopting the Franks standard in New Jersey).

2024Where the defendant fails to make this substantial preliminary showing, "no hearing is required." Franks, 438 U.S. at 172 . "[A] Franks hearing is not directed at picking apart minor technical problems with a warrant application; it is aimed at warrants obtained through intentional wrongdoing by law enforcement agents." State v. Broom-Smith, 406 N.J.

2024He ignores, however, that "a Franks hearing is not directed at picking apart minor technical problems with a warrant application; it is aimed at warrants obtained through intentional wrongdoing by law enforcement agents." State v. Broom- Smith, 406 N.J.

2025Pertinent to this appeal, after he was indicted, defendant moved to suppress evidence seized from Unit 126 pursuant to the search warrant and for a Franks hearing.5 We glean from the motion judge's March 5, 2020 oral decision, defendant's arguments were limited to: "the search warrant was [improperly] based on the words of an untested and uncorroborated informant"; "police did not conduct an adequate investigation"; "it's unclear whether the canine actually alerted to the storage unit at 126"; and "police relied on the unverified word of an anonymous allied law enforcement agency." The judge n

2025Pertinent to this appeal, after he was indicted, defendant moved to suppress evidence seized from Unit 126 pursuant to the search warrant and for a Franks hearing.5 We glean from the motion judge's March 5, 2020 oral decision, defendant's arguments were limited to: "the search warrant was [improperly] based on the words of an untested and uncorroborated informant"; "police did not conduct an adequate investigation"; "it's unclear whether the canine actually alerted to the storage unit at 126"; and "police relied on the unverified word of an anonymous allied law enforcement agency." The judge n

2020When a defendant challenges the veracity of a search warrant affidavit and demands a Franks hearing, that defendant must make "a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit." State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 7 (2009) (citation omitted).

2020When a defendant challenges the veracity of a search warrant affidavit and demands a Franks hearing, that defendant must make "a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit." State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 7 (2009) (citation omitted).

2018The primary purpose of a Franks hearing is to "determine whether the police made material misrepresentations and/or omissions in seeking [a search warrant] and, if so, whether the evidence gathered from [a] defective warrant[] [must] be 19 A-1442-16T4 suppressed." State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 413-14 (2012).

2018The primary purpose of a Franks hearing is to "determine whether the police made material misrepresentations and/or omissions in seeking [a search warrant] and, if so, whether the evidence gathered from [a] defective warrant[] [must] be 19 A-1442-16T4 suppressed." State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 413-14 (2012).

2024The Franks hearing "requirements apply where the allegations are that the affidavit, though facially accurate, omits material facts." State v. Stelzner, 257 N.J.

2024The Franks hearing "requirements apply where the allegations are that the affidavit, though facially accurate, omits material facts." State v. Stelzner, 257 N.J.

2020We find defendant's arguments the court erred by rejecting his request for an evidentiary hearing or for a Franks hearing to be without sufficient merit 7 We note the drawing showed stairs leading from the first floor of the main residence to the floor above. 8 Because we find there is no evidence the main residence consisted of separate living units, it is unnecessary that we decide whether the search was otherwise lawful because the alleged "multiple-unit character of the premises [was] not known or [was] not reasonably apparent to the officer[s] applying for and executing the warrant." Shee

2020We find defendant's arguments the court erred by rejecting his request for an evidentiary hearing or for a Franks hearing to be without sufficient merit 7 We note the drawing showed stairs leading from the first floor of the main residence to the floor above. 8 Because we find there is no evidence the main residence consisted of separate living units, it is unnecessary that we decide whether the search was otherwise lawful because the alleged "multiple-unit character of the premises [was] not known or [was] not reasonably apparent to the officer[s] applying for and executing the warrant." Shee

2021The Appellate Division concluded that, because defendant was not able to investigate anything in the detective’s affidavit by obtaining routine discovery that should have been automatically provided to him, defendant did not have a fair opportunity to pursue his motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search authorized by the warrant or to obtain a Franks hearing. [Id. at 194.] The Appellate Division permitted defendant, after receiving discovery, “either to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial . . . or to accept his earlier conviction 7 and sentence.” Ibid. (omission in original)

2021The Appellate Division concluded that, because defendant was not able to investigate anything in the detective’s affidavit by obtaining routine discovery that should have been automatically provided to him, defendant did not have a fair opportunity to pursue his motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search authorized by the warrant or to obtain a Franks hearing. [Id. at 194.] The Appellate Division permitted defendant, after receiving discovery, “either to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial . . . or to accept his earlier conviction 7 and sentence.” Ibid. (omission in original)

2020See State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 193 (1997) (explaining the Franks standard applies to false statements as well as the omission of material facts from a search warrant affidavit).

2020See State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 193 (1997) (explaining the Franks standard applies to false statements as well as the omission of material facts from a search warrant affidavit).

1979In reaching the conclusion that Franks should not be applied retroactively the court adopted a three-pronged test: (1) the purpose of the rule, and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive application; (2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice, quoting in support State v. Nash, 64 N.J. 464, 469-470 (1974), and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535 , 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2316 , 45 L.Ed. 2d 374, 380 (1975), and noting: The Franks rule, being a new variant of the ex

1979In reaching the conclusion that Franks should not be applied retroactively the court adopted a three-pronged test: (1) the purpose of the rule, and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive application; (2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice, quoting in support State v. Nash, 64 N.J. 464, 469-470 (1974), and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535 , 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2316 , 45 L.Ed. 2d 374, 380 (1975), and noting: The Franks rule, being a new variant of the ex

2021"Reviewing courts 'accord substantial deference to the discretionary determination resulting in the issuance of the [search] warrant.'" Id. at 427 9 In his reply brief, defendant for the first time reasserts the claim of material misrepresentations in applications for the warrants compelled a Franks hearing. "[R]aising an issue for the first time in a reply brief is improper." Goldsmith v. Camden County Surrogate's Office, 408 N.J.

2017Super. at 240 . "[A] search executed pursuant to a warrant is presumed to be valid and . . . a defendant challenging its validity has the burden to prove 'that there was no probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant or that the search was otherwise unreasonable.'" State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 388 (2004) (quoting State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 133 (1983)).

1979In reaching the conclusion that Franks should not be applied retroactively the court adopted a three-pronged test: (1) the purpose of the rule, and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive application; (2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice, quoting in support State v. Nash, 64 N.J. 464, 469-470 (1974), and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535 , 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2316 , 45 L.Ed. 2d 374, 380 (1975), and noting: The Franks rule, being a new variant of the ex

1979In reaching the conclusion that Franks should not be applied retroactively the court adopted a three-pronged test: (1) the purpose of the rule, and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive application; (2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice, quoting in support State v. Nash, 64 N.J. 464, 469-470 (1974), and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535 , 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2316 , 45 L.Ed. 2d 374, 380 (1975), and noting: The Franks rule, being a new variant of the ex

2026Citing State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 134 (2003), the judge found defense counsel was not ineffective for mis-advising defendant about his prison housing and privileges because "counsel only needs to explain the direct or penal consequences of a guilty plea." Defendant's concerns regarding the security status and prison programs were "administrative consequences imposed by the prison administration . . . .

2026Citing State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 134 (2003), the judge found defense counsel was not ineffective for mis-advising defendant about his prison housing and privileges because "counsel only needs to explain the direct or penal consequences of a guilty plea." Defendant's concerns regarding the security status and prison programs were "administrative consequences imposed by the prison administration . . . .

2024Defendant argues the court erred by rejecting his claim that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a Franks hearing because had the request been made, "it would have been successful, and the boots at defendant's residence would have been suppressed." A-3651-21 23 "In order to satisfy the Strickland standard when an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on the failure to file a suppression motion, a defendant must establish 'that [their] Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious.'" State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 618-19 (2007) (quoting State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (199

2024Defendant argues the court erred by rejecting his claim that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a Franks hearing because had the request been made, "it would have been successful, and the boots at defendant's residence would have been suppressed." A-3651-21 23 "In order to satisfy the Strickland standard when an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on the failure to file a suppression motion, a defendant must establish 'that [their] Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious.'" State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 618-19 (2007) (quoting State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (199

2024Defendant argues the court erred by rejecting his claim that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a Franks hearing because had the request been made, "it would have been successful, and the boots at defendant's residence would have been suppressed." A-3651-21 23 "In order to satisfy the Strickland standard when an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on the failure to file a suppression motion, a defendant must establish 'that [their] Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious.'" State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 618-19 (2007) (quoting State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (199

2024Defendant argues the court erred by rejecting his claim that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a Franks hearing because had the request been made, "it would have been successful, and the boots at defendant's residence would have been suppressed." A-3651-21 23 "In order to satisfy the Strickland standard when an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on the failure to file a suppression motion, a defendant must establish 'that [their] Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious.'" State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 618-19 (2007) (quoting State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (199

2024Defendant argues the court erred by rejecting his claim that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a Franks hearing because had the request been made, "it would have been successful, and the boots at defendant's residence would have been suppressed." A-3651-21 23 "In order to satisfy the Strickland standard when an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on the failure to file a suppression motion, a defendant must establish 'that [their] Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious.'" State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 618-19 (2007) (quoting State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (199

2024Defendant argues the court erred by rejecting his claim that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a Franks hearing because had the request been made, "it would have been successful, and the boots at defendant's residence would have been suppressed." A-3651-21 23 "In order to satisfy the Strickland standard when an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on the failure to file a suppression motion, a defendant must establish 'that [their] Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious.'" State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 618-19 (2007) (quoting State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (199

2021Super. 376, 387 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Eng'rs, 337 N.J.

2021"Reviewing courts 'accord substantial deference to the discretionary determination resulting in the issuance of the [search] warrant.'" Id. at 427 9 In his reply brief, defendant for the first time reasserts the claim of material misrepresentations in applications for the warrants compelled a Franks hearing. "[R]aising an issue for the first time in a reply brief is improper." Goldsmith v. Camden County Surrogate's Office, 408 N.J.

2020Super. at 28 n.1; see also Garrison, 480 U.S. at 85 (observing officers would be required to further particularize the request for a search of a structure's third floor "if the officers had known, or even if they should have known, that there were two separate dwelling units on the third floor"); see also Wright, 61 N.J. at 149 ; Ratushny, 82 N.J.

2020Super. at 28 n.1; see also Garrison, 480 U.S. at 85 (observing officers would be required to further particularize the request for a search of a structure's third floor "if the officers had known, or even if they should have known, that there were two separate dwelling units on the third floor"); see also Wright, 61 N.J. at 149 ; Ratushny, 82 N.J.

2020The A-5558-17T3 15 motion court therefore correctly determined defendant failed to establish his entitlement to the requested Franks hearing.6 "A search that is executed pursuant to a warrant is 'presumptively valid,' and a defendant challenging the issuance of that warrant has the burden of proof to establish a lack of probable cause 'or that the search was otherwise unreasonable.'" State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 427 (2017) (quoting State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 513-14 (2015) (citation omitted)).

2020The A-5558-17T3 15 motion court therefore correctly determined defendant failed to establish his entitlement to the requested Franks hearing.6 "A search that is executed pursuant to a warrant is 'presumptively valid,' and a defendant challenging the issuance of that warrant has the burden of proof to establish a lack of probable cause 'or that the search was otherwise unreasonable.'" State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 427 (2017) (quoting State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 513-14 (2015) (citation omitted)).

2020Super. at 28 n.1; see also Garrison, 480 U.S. at 85 (observing officers would be required to further particularize the request for a search of a structure's third floor "if the officers had known, or even if they should have known, that there were two separate dwelling units on the third floor"); see also Wright, 61 N.J. at 149 ; Ratushny, 82 N.J.

2020Super. at 28 n.1; see also Garrison, 480 U.S. at 85 (observing officers would be required to further particularize the request for a search of a structure's third floor "if the officers had known, or even if they should have known, that there were two separate dwelling units on the third floor"); see also Wright, 61 N.J. at 149 ; Ratushny, 82 N.J.

2019According to the detective's testimony at the Franks hearing, he and two deputy attorneys general assigned to the investigation met with the issuing judge who "had a few general questions and specifically asked about the v[e]racity of the confidential informant[,] noting that there was no language in [the affidavit] asserting that the confidential informant had provided reliable information in the past." See State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 93 (1998) (recognizing an informant's veracity and basis of knowledge for the information supplied are two important factors in determining whether the informa

2019According to the detective's testimony at the Franks hearing, he and two deputy attorneys general assigned to the investigation met with the issuing judge who "had a few general questions and specifically asked about the v[e]racity of the confidential informant[,] noting that there was no language in [the affidavit] asserting that the confidential informant had provided reliable information in the past." See State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 93 (1998) (recognizing an informant's veracity and basis of knowledge for the information supplied are two important factors in determining whether the informa

2019A-5031-16T4 16 "[t]ogether with the element of time . . . the nature of the unlawful activity" must be considered in determining if there is probable cause to believe there is evidence of that activity at the time the search warrant is sought (quoting United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972))).

2019A-5031-16T4 16 "[t]ogether with the element of time . . . the nature of the unlawful activity" must be considered in determining if there is probable cause to believe there is evidence of that activity at the time the search warrant is sought (quoting United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972))).

2019See State v. Green, 346 N.J.

2019See State v. Green, 346 N.J.

2018Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. at 361 (indicating that no hearing is necessary based upon "[a] defendant's submission of his own counter- interpretation" of facts leading to affiant's conclusion that drugs and money were moved into and out of a location); Gotti, 771 F. Supp. at 539 (stating that no hearing is necessary where defendants' only challenge was a disagreement with affiant "on the interpretation of what was overheard on" certain tapes).

2018Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. at 361 (indicating that no hearing is necessary based upon "[a] defendant's submission of his own counter- interpretation" of facts leading to affiant's conclusion that drugs and money were moved into and out of a location); Gotti, 771 F. Supp. at 539 (stating that no hearing is necessary where defendants' only challenge was a disagreement with affiant "on the interpretation of what was overheard on" certain tapes).