Franks hearing in Iowa

2025Then, “[i]f that preliminary showing is made, the court holds a hearing—referred to as a ‘Franks hearing’—where evidence may be presented to show whether the statements are knowingly or recklessly false.” Id.

2025If, after the Franks hearing, the court concludes “that any misstatements or material omissions were made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, [then] the false statements are excised, the omitted statements are added, and the affidavit’s remaining content is examined to determine whether it establishes probable cause to support issuing the search warrant.” Id.

2024Although we apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether the defendant has shown the officer intentionally or recklessly included false statements, see Groff, 323 N.W.2d at 206–07 (adopting the Franks standard, which applied a preponderance of the evidence standard), “[a] showing of deliberate or reckless falsehood is ‘not lightly met,’ ” United States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955, 961 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 1987)).

2024Although we apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether the defendant has shown the officer intentionally or recklessly included false statements, see Groff, 323 N.W.2d at 206–07 (adopting the Franks standard, which applied a preponderance of the evidence standard), “[a] showing of deliberate or reckless falsehood is ‘not lightly met,’ ” United States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955, 961 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 1987)).

2023See State v. Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d 184, 188 (Iowa 1990) (“[O]ne focus of a Franks inquiry is on whether the affiant consciously presented false or misleading information to the issuing magistrate, or acted recklessly in presenting the factual information in such a way that it could mislead the magistrate.”).

2023See State v. Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d 184, 188 (Iowa 1990) (“[O]ne focus of a Franks inquiry is on whether the affiant consciously presented false or misleading information to the issuing magistrate, or acted recklessly in presenting the factual information in such a way that it could mislead the magistrate.”).

2024State v. Baker, 925 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Iowa 2019) (“We give deference to the district court’s factual findings, but they do not bind us.” (quoting State v. Scheffert, 910 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Iowa 2018))); State v. Simpson, 528 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Iowa 1995) (en banc) (“We defer to the trial court on matters of credibility of witnesses” who testify live at a Franks hearing), overruled on other grounds by State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 2002).

2024State v. Baker, 925 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Iowa 2019) (“We give deference to the district court’s factual findings, but they do not bind us.” (quoting State v. Scheffert, 910 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Iowa 2018))); State v. Simpson, 528 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Iowa 1995) (en banc) (“We defer to the trial court on matters of credibility of witnesses” who testify live at a Franks hearing), overruled on other grounds by State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 2002).

2023Boyd appeals, challenging the search warrant under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.1 Reviewing Boyd’s appellate brief, we distill his claims down to three points: (1) he asks us to overturn State v. Groff, 323 N.W.2d 204 (Iowa 1982) and revert to the test articulated in State v. Boyd, 224 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 1974) to review a claim that a search warrant application contained false information under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution; (2) he contends the district court should have granted his request for

2023Boyd appeals, challenging the search warrant under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.1 Reviewing Boyd’s appellate brief, we distill his claims down to three points: (1) he asks us to overturn State v. Groff, 323 N.W.2d 204 (Iowa 1982) and revert to the test articulated in State v. Boyd, 224 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 1974) to review a claim that a search warrant application contained false information under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution; (2) he contends the district court should have granted his request for

2024The Franks doctrine applies to “situations involving the omission of crucial information from a warrant application as well as the inclusion of inaccurate information.” State v. Poulin, 620 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Iowa 2000) (en banc).

2024The Franks doctrine applies to “situations involving the omission of crucial information from a warrant application as well as the inclusion of inaccurate information.” State v. Poulin, 620 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Iowa 2000) (en banc).

2025Under the Franks test, preemption applies “only [to] laws that have the effect of managing or governing rail transportation.” Franks Investment Co., 593 F.3d at 410 .

2025Under the Franks test, preemption applies “only [to] laws that have the effect of managing or governing rail transportation.” Franks Investment Co., 593 F.3d at 410 .

2025Under the Franks test, “laws, ordinances, and common-law damage actions challenging where and when railroads placed their railcars on their transportation lines or how they constructed those lines are generally preempted.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 283–84 (noting that the ICCTA can preempt common-law actions for damage “as well as state statutes that would regulate railroad transportation” (emphasis added)).

2025Under the Franks test, “laws, ordinances, and common-law damage actions challenging where and when railroads placed their railcars on their transportation lines or how they constructed those lines are generally preempted.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 283–84 (noting that the ICCTA can preempt common-law actions for damage “as well as state statutes that would regulate railroad transportation” (emphasis added)).

2025Griffioen, 914 N.W.2d at 285–87; see also Tubbs, 812 F.3d at 1144–45 (employing the Franks test and listing other federal circuits that have applied the same test).

2025Griffioen, 914 N.W.2d at 285–87; see also Tubbs, 812 F.3d at 1144–45 (employing the Franks test and listing other federal circuits that have applied the same test).

2025See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“When a district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, the party who raised the issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve error for appeal.”).

2024See United States v. Finley, 612 F.3d 998 , 1003 n.7 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Refusing to consider evidence from beyond the affidavit would contravene the purpose of a Franks hearing and run contrary to common sense.”).

2024See United States v. Finley, 612 F.3d 998 , 1003 n.7 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Refusing to consider evidence from beyond the affidavit would contravene the purpose of a Franks hearing and run contrary to common sense.”).

2024State v. Baker, 925 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Iowa 2019) (“We give deference to the district court’s factual findings, but they do not bind us.” (quoting State v. Scheffert, 910 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Iowa 2018))); State v. Simpson, 528 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Iowa 1995) (en banc) (“We defer to the trial court on matters of credibility of witnesses” who testify live at a Franks hearing), overruled on other grounds by State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 2002).

2024State v. Baker, 925 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Iowa 2019) (“We give deference to the district court’s factual findings, but they do not bind us.” (quoting State v. Scheffert, 910 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Iowa 2018))); State v. Simpson, 528 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Iowa 1995) (en banc) (“We defer to the trial court on matters of credibility of witnesses” who testify live at a Franks hearing), overruled on other grounds by State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 2002).

2024Although we apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether the defendant has shown the officer intentionally or recklessly included false statements, see Groff, 323 N.W.2d at 206–07 (adopting the Franks standard, which applied a preponderance of the evidence standard), “[a] showing of deliberate or reckless falsehood is ‘not lightly met,’ ” United States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955, 961 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 1987)).

2024Although we apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether the defendant has shown the officer intentionally or recklessly included false statements, see Groff, 323 N.W.2d at 206–07 (adopting the Franks standard, which applied a preponderance of the evidence standard), “[a] showing of deliberate or reckless falsehood is ‘not lightly met,’ ” United States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955, 961 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 1987)).

2024When a defendant challenges 17 omitted information, he must show “(1) that facts were omitted with the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of whether they make, the affidavit misleading; and (2) that the affidavit, if supplemented by the omitted information, could not support a finding of probable cause.” United States v. Johnson, 75 F.4th 833, 841 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Conant, 799 F.3d 1195, 1200 (8th Cir. 2015)).

2024When a defendant challenges 17 omitted information, he must show “(1) that facts were omitted with the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of whether they make, the affidavit misleading; and (2) that the affidavit, if supplemented by the omitted information, could not support a finding of probable cause.” United States v. Johnson, 75 F.4th 833, 841 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Conant, 799 F.3d 1195, 1200 (8th Cir. 2015)).

2024Although we apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether the defendant has shown the officer intentionally or recklessly included false statements, see Groff, 323 N.W.2d at 206–07 (adopting the Franks standard, which applied a preponderance of the evidence standard), “[a] showing of deliberate or reckless falsehood is ‘not lightly met,’ ” United States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955, 961 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 1987)).

2024Although we apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether the defendant has shown the officer intentionally or recklessly included false statements, see Groff, 323 N.W.2d at 206–07 (adopting the Franks standard, which applied a preponderance of the evidence standard), “[a] showing of deliberate or reckless falsehood is ‘not lightly met,’ ” United States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955, 961 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 1987)).

2024State v. Baker, 925 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Iowa 2019) (“We give deference to the district court’s factual findings, but they do not bind us.” (quoting State v. Scheffert, 910 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Iowa 2018))); State v. Simpson, 528 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Iowa 1995) (en banc) (“We defer to the trial court on matters of credibility of witnesses” who testify live at a Franks hearing), overruled on other grounds by State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 2002).

2024State v. Baker, 925 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Iowa 2019) (“We give deference to the district court’s factual findings, but they do not bind us.” (quoting State v. Scheffert, 910 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Iowa 2018))); State v. Simpson, 528 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Iowa 1995) (en banc) (“We defer to the trial court on matters of credibility of witnesses” who testify live at a Franks hearing), overruled on other grounds by State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 2002).

2024When a defendant challenges 17 omitted information, he must show “(1) that facts were omitted with the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of whether they make, the affidavit misleading; and (2) that the affidavit, if supplemented by the omitted information, could not support a finding of probable cause.” United States v. Johnson, 75 F.4th 833, 841 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Conant, 799 F.3d 1195, 1200 (8th Cir. 2015)).

2024When a defendant challenges 17 omitted information, he must show “(1) that facts were omitted with the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of whether they make, the affidavit misleading; and (2) that the affidavit, if supplemented by the omitted information, could not support a finding of probable cause.” United States v. Johnson, 75 F.4th 833, 841 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Conant, 799 F.3d 1195, 1200 (8th Cir. 2015)).

2023See McPhillips, 580 N.W.2d at 750–51 (noting that to succeed in a Franks claim, the defendant must show the officer purposely untruthful over a material fact in the warrant application or acted with reckless disregard for the truth such that the magistrate was misled into believing certain facts used to evaluate probable cause).

2023See McPhillips, 580 N.W.2d at 750–51 (noting that to succeed in a Franks claim, the defendant must show the officer purposely untruthful over a material fact in the warrant application or acted with reckless disregard for the truth such that the magistrate was misled into believing certain facts used to evaluate probable cause).

2022However, Allison is clear that there must be “a successive PCR petition alleging postconviction counsel was ineffective in presenting the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.” 914 N.W.2d at 891 (emphasis added).

2022However, Allison is clear that there must be “a successive PCR petition alleging postconviction counsel was ineffective in presenting the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.” 914 N.W.2d at 891 (emphasis added).

2020See Leutfaimany, 585 N.W.2d at 208 .

2020See Leutfaimany, 585 N.W.2d at 208 .

2020And in State v. Seager, 341 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Iowa 1983), our supreme court stated, “[U]nder Franks, intentionally false statements and false statements made with a reckless disregard for the truth are treated the same.” The issuing magistrate must have been misled “into believing the existence of certain facts which enter into [her or] his thought process in evaluating probable cause.” Groff, 323 N.W.2d at 210 .

2020And in State v. Seager, 341 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Iowa 1983), our supreme court stated, “[U]nder Franks, intentionally false statements and false statements made with a reckless disregard for the truth are treated the same.” The issuing magistrate must have been misled “into believing the existence of certain facts which enter into [her or] his thought process in evaluating probable cause.” Groff, 323 N.W.2d at 210 .

2018To illustrate, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which originated the test, found that a nuisance claim brought by property owners based on a railroad’s construction and use of a new side track was preempted, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ contention that their claim was “not directly related to the operation and use of the side track.” Pace v. CSX Transp., Inc., 613 F.3d 1066, 1069 (11th Cir. 2010). 19 And the court distinguished its own precedent that preempted “a state law tort suit against a railroad company for allowing trains to block railroad crossings.” Id.

2018To illustrate, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which originated the test, found that a nuisance claim brought by property owners based on a railroad's construction and use of a new side track was preempted, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' contention that their claim was "not directly related to the operation and use of the side track." Pace v. CSX Transp., Inc ., 613 F.3d 1066 , 1069 (11th Cir. 2010).

2018See Jones Creek , 98 F.Supp.3d at 1291 ; Waubay Lake Farmers Ass'n , 2014 WL 4287086 , at *5-6.

2018See Jones Creek , 98 F.Supp.3d at 1291 ; Waubay Lake Farmers Ass'n , 2014 WL 4287086 , at *5-6.

2018We also find no abuse of 5 See State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001) (giving “deference to the district court’s fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses at trial”). 14 discretion in the court’s denial of Robbins’s request to reopen the first suppression hearing record.

2018We also find no abuse of 5 See State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001) (giving “deference to the district court’s fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses at trial”). 14 discretion in the court’s denial of Robbins’s request to reopen the first suppression hearing record.

2016In a Franks hearing, the court determines “whether the affiant was purposefully untruthful with regard to a material fact in his application for the warrant, or acted with 9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 7 reckless disregard for the truth.” State v. Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d 184, 186 (Iowa 1990).

2016In a Franks hearing, the court determines “whether the affiant was purposefully untruthful with regard to a material fact in his application for the warrant, or acted with 9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 7 reckless disregard for the truth.” State v. Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d 184, 186 (Iowa 1990).

2016Our supreme court has also stated that counsel must “ensure that the State abides by the time restrictions established by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33.” State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Iowa 2011).11 “Counsel’s failure to do so amounts to a failure to perform an essential duty.” Id. 10 We also note even if the Franks challenge was successful and evidence obtained from the search warrant was suppressed, the remaining evidence may still have supported Harrington’s convictions for second-degree theft and third-degree burglary.

2016Our supreme court has also stated that counsel must “ensure that the State abides by the time restrictions established by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33.” State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Iowa 2011).11 “Counsel’s failure to do so amounts to a failure to perform an essential duty.” Id. 10 We also note even if the Franks challenge was successful and evidence obtained from the search warrant was suppressed, the remaining evidence may still have supported Harrington’s convictions for second-degree theft and third-degree burglary.

2016See Bailey v. Lancaster, 470 N.W.2d 351, 357 (Iowa 1991).

2016See Bailey v. Lancaster, 470 N.W.2d 351, 357 (Iowa 1991).