Franks hearing in Texas

2025See generally Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). -3- 04-24-00152-CR During the Franks hearing, Mena testified: at the crash scene, he was unable to determine if Del Toro was intoxicated because of Del Toro’s injures, but that he did attempt to make contact with Del Toro at the hospital but was unsuccessful; he did not ask Del Toro for a breath sample given the facts of the case but, before beginning the process of requesting a warrant, he attempted to investigate the crash using other “driving factors;” 1 he never asked Del Toro to conduct field sobriety tests at the scene or any other t

2025See generally Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). -3- 04-24-00152-CR During the Franks hearing, Mena testified: at the crash scene, he was unable to determine if Del Toro was intoxicated because of Del Toro’s injures, but that he did attempt to make contact with Del Toro at the hospital but was unsuccessful; he did not ask Del Toro for a breath sample given the facts of the case but, before beginning the process of requesting a warrant, he attempted to investigate the crash using other “driving factors;” 1 he never asked Del Toro to conduct field sobriety tests at the scene or any other t

2025Because “[a]n affidavit supporting a search warrant begins with a presumption of validity . . . the defendant has the burden of making a preliminary showing of deliberate falsehoods in that affidavit before he is entitled to a Franks hearing.” Cates, 120 S.W.3d at 355 .

2025Because “[a]n affidavit supporting a search warrant begins with a presumption of validity . . . the defendant has the burden of making a preliminary showing of deliberate falsehoods in that affidavit before he is entitled to a Franks hearing.” Cates, 120 S.W.3d at 355 .

2014In Brooks v. State, 642 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Crim.App.1982), the defendant attacked the probable cause affidavit for its failure to disclose “that the confidential informant relied on therein was paid by the police, had been convicted of criminal offenses, and had previously provided affiant with false information.” We did not extend a Franks analysis to appellant’s claims [[Image here]] Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141 , 146 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

2014In Brooks v. State, 642 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Crim.App.1982), the defendant attacked the probable cause affidavit for its failure to disclose “that the confidential informant relied on therein was paid by the police, had been convicted of criminal offenses, and had previously provided affiant with false information.” We did not extend a Franks analysis to appellant’s claims [[Image here]] Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141 , 146 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

2014Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 462 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). (1) The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Verde a Suppression Hearing The State argues the threshold issue that Verde never showed himself entitled to a hearing on whether a Franks violation had occurred.

2014Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 462 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). (1) The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Verde a Suppression Hearing The State argues the threshold issue that Verde never showed himself entitled to a hearing on whether a Franks violation had occurred.

2025App. 2003) (stating that trial court is required to go behind affidavit’s four corners during Franks hearing only “if a defendant has made a substantial preliminary showing of deliberate falsity”); Brooks, 642 S.W.2d at 796–97 (explaining that “[a]bsent such a showing as would warrant a Franks hearing, this Court will not look beyond the four corners of the affidavit”); Jordan v. State, 271 S.W.3d 850, 854 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d) (noting that it is during the hearing “that appellant may present evidence that goes behind the four corners of the affidavit”).

2025App. 2003) (stating that trial court is required to go behind affidavit’s four corners during Franks hearing only “if a defendant has made a substantial preliminary showing of deliberate falsity”); Brooks, 642 S.W.2d at 796–97 (explaining that “[a]bsent such a showing as would warrant a Franks hearing, this Court will not look beyond the four corners of the affidavit”); Jordan v. State, 271 S.W.3d 850, 854 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d) (noting that it is during the hearing “that appellant may present evidence that goes behind the four corners of the affidavit”).

2005Compare United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir.l980)(recognizing that allegations of material omissions should be treated essentially like claims of material misstatements under Franks), and Melton v. State, 750 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.)(treating omissions essentially the same as material misstatements), with Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Tex.Crim.App.l996)(not- *640 ing that it has not extended the Franks analysis to omissions), and Brooks v. State, 642 S.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982)(noting that appellant’s reliance

2005Compare United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir.l980)(recognizing that allegations of material omissions should be treated essentially like claims of material misstatements under Franks), and Melton v. State, 750 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.)(treating omissions essentially the same as material misstatements), with Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Tex.Crim.App.l996)(not- *640 ing that it has not extended the Franks analysis to omissions), and Brooks v. State, 642 S.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982)(noting that appellant’s reliance

2023Yet, pursuant to Franks, a defendant must make a request for a Franks hearing and then make a substantial preliminary showing that the affidavit supporting the complained-of warrant contained a false statement that was made “knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth.” Harris v. State, 227 S.W.3d 83, 85 (Tex. Crim.

2023We overrule Love’s first point of error. 3 In Harris, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained that, in order for a defendant to be successful in a Franks hearing, he must (1) “[a]llege a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth by the affiant, specifically pointing out the portions of the affidavit claimed to be false,” (2) make “an offer of proof stating the supporting reasons,” and (3) “[s]how that when the portion[s] of the affidavit alleged to be false” are removed “from the affidavit, the remaining content is insufficient to support the issuance of the warrant.” Harr

2015The Franks rule applies to “both misstatements and misleading omissions, as well as outright falsehoods.” Norris v. State, 1992 WL 234902 , *3 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. refd ) (not designated for publication), citing United States v. Cronan, 937 F.2d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1991) (omissions) and United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 1980) (misstatements and omissions). 19 McCord knew or should have known that the statement was misleading; it was at least reckless to include the statement without clarifying that the pat-down search was only “possibly” effective for pu

2015The Franks rule applies to “both misstatements and misleading omissions, as well as outright falsehoods.” Norris v. State, 1992 WL 234902 , *3 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. refd ) (not designated for publication), citing United States v. Cronan, 937 F.2d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1991) (omissions) and United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 1980) (misstatements and omissions). 19 McCord knew or should have known that the statement was misleading; it was at least reckless to include the statement without clarifying that the pat-down search was only “possibly” effective for pu

2025See Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53. 12 warrant affidavit,” the trial court did not err in denying his Franks claim).

2015Engle complains that Doe was a “transient person” not known to Greenville police and that the law enforcement officers did not corroborate the information Doe gave to them. 9 As with other probable cause issues, our review of a trial court’s decision on a Franks issue is made pursuant to a dual standard: “We give almost total deference to a trial court’s rulings on questions of historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor while we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor.”

2015Applying the Franks analysis in Blake, we determined that the officer’s affidavit was not invalid because “the record contains no evidence that . . . the affiant, intentionally or knowingly, with reckless disregard for the truth, made any misstatements or omissions in the affidavit that would affect the finding of probable cause in support of the issuance of the search warrant.” Id.

2015Applying the Franks analysis in Blake, we determined that the officer’s affidavit was not invalid because “the record contains no evidence that . . . the affiant, intentionally or knowingly, with reckless disregard for the truth, made any misstatements or omissions in the affidavit that would affect the finding of probable cause in support of the issuance of the search warrant.” Id.

2019Hinojosa v. State, 4 S.W.3d 240, 247 (Tex. Crim.

2015Second, when a defendant seeks a Franks hearing, the defendant must proffer to the trial court an allegation: (1) of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth, accompanied by an offer of proof [Hinojosa v. State, 4 S.W.3d 240, 247 (Tex. Crim.

2014Emack, 354 S.W.3d at 838 ; Jordan v. State, 271 S.W.3d 850, 854 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d); Fenoglio, 252 S.W.3d at 473 ; see Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644 , 652–53 (Tex. Crim.

2014Emack, 354 S.W.3d at 838 ; Jordan v. State, 271 S.W.3d 850, 854 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d); Fenoglio, 252 S.W.3d at 473 ; see Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644 , 652–53 (Tex. Crim.

2020App. 1996) (court has not applied Franks analysis to allegations of intentional and material omissions) (internal citations omitted); Darby v. State, 145 S.W.3d 714 , 721–22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d) (expressly agreeing with Fifth Circuit and intermediate Texas appellate courts’ application of Franks analysis to material omissions); Blake v. State, 125 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (same).

2005Compare United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir.l980)(recognizing that allegations of material omissions should be treated essentially like claims of material misstatements under Franks), and Melton v. State, 750 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.)(treating omissions essentially the same as material misstatements), with Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Tex.Crim.App.l996)(not- *640 ing that it has not extended the Franks analysis to omissions), and Brooks v. State, 642 S.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982)(noting that appellant’s reliance

2003The procedure for invoking a Franks hearing was set out in Dancy , 728 S.W.2d at 781 , and in Ramsey , 579 S.W.2d at 922 .

2003The procedure for invoking a Franks hearing was set out in Dancy , 728 S.W.2d at 781 , and in Ramsey , 579 S.W.2d at 922 .

2025App. 2003) (stating that trial court is required to go behind affidavit’s four corners during Franks hearing only “if a defendant has made a substantial preliminary showing of deliberate falsity”); Brooks, 642 S.W.2d at 796–97 (explaining that “[a]bsent such a showing as would warrant a Franks hearing, this Court will not look beyond the four corners of the affidavit”); Jordan v. State, 271 S.W.3d 850, 854 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d) (noting that it is during the hearing “that appellant may present evidence that goes behind the four corners of the affidavit”).

2025App. 2003) (stating that trial court is required to go behind affidavit’s four corners during Franks hearing only “if a defendant has made a substantial preliminary showing of deliberate falsity”); Brooks, 642 S.W.2d at 796–97 (explaining that “[a]bsent such a showing as would warrant a Franks hearing, this Court will not look beyond the four corners of the affidavit”); Jordan v. State, 271 S.W.3d 850, 854 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d) (noting that it is during the hearing “that appellant may present evidence that goes behind the four corners of the affidavit”).

2013See Hennessy v. State, 660 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (holding that appellant’s offer of proof was insufficient to make the substantial preliminary showing necessary to require a Franks hearing); United States v. Williams, 576 F.3d 1149, 1161-62 (10th Cir.2009) (holding that defendant’s affidavit and other evidence was insufficient to make the substantial preliminary showing necessary to require a Franks hearing); United States v. Reed, 726 F.2d 339, 341-42 (7th Cir.1984) (holding that self-serving testimony that attempted to show that informant either did not exist or could not have be

2013See Hennessy v. State, 660 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (holding that appellant’s offer of proof was insufficient to make the substantial preliminary showing necessary to require a Franks hearing); United States v. Williams, 576 F.3d 1149, 1161-62 (10th Cir.2009) (holding that defendant’s affidavit and other evidence was insufficient to make the substantial preliminary showing necessary to require a Franks hearing); United States v. Reed, 726 F.2d 339, 341-42 (7th Cir.1984) (holding that self-serving testimony that attempted to show that informant either did not exist or could not have be

2009Dancy, 728 S.W.2d at 782 . 12 Having reviewed the record of the hearing, and applying the standard of review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the suppression motion relating to appellant’s Franks claim.

2003The procedure for invoking a Franks hearing was set out in Dancy , 728 S.W.2d at 781 , and in Ramsey , 579 S.W.2d at 922 .

2015Even if there was a Franks violation, the trial court still erred by suppressing the evidence in this case ............. 25-27 PRAYER .................................................................................................. 28 SIGNATURE ........................................................................................... 28 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................................................... 29 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................. 30 Brief of Appellant iii Victoria County Criminal District Attorney No. 13-14-00588-CR INDEX

2015Even if there was a Franks violation, the trial court still erred by suppressing the evidence in this case ............. 25-27 PRAYER .................................................................................................. 28 SIGNATURE ........................................................................................... 28 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................................................... 29 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................. 30 Brief of Appellant iii Victoria County Criminal District Attorney No. 13-14-00588-CR INDEX

2020App. 1996) (court has not applied Franks analysis to allegations of intentional and material omissions) (internal citations omitted); Darby v. State, 145 S.W.3d 714 , 721–22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d) (expressly agreeing with Fifth Circuit and intermediate Texas appellate courts’ application of Franks analysis to material omissions); Blake v. State, 125 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (same).

2005Compare United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir.l980)(recognizing that allegations of material omissions should be treated essentially like claims of material misstatements under Franks), and Melton v. State, 750 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.)(treating omissions essentially the same as material misstatements), with Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Tex.Crim.App.l996)(not- *640 ing that it has not extended the Franks analysis to omissions), and Brooks v. State, 642 S.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982)(noting that appellant’s reliance

2010See Blocker, 264 S.W.3d at 359–60 (observing, during discussion of Franks claim, that even if defendant were “only a houseguest, living in the trailer with the permission of the host, he had apparent authority over the residence”).

2010See Blocker, 264 S.W.3d at 359–60 (observing, during discussion of Franks claim, that even if defendant were “only a houseguest, living in the trailer with the permission of the host, he had apparent authority over the residence”).

2010See Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 59-60 ; Harris, 227 S.W.3d at 86 ; see also Athey, 2007 WL 2389599 , at *7.

2010See Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 59-60 ; Harris, 227 S.W.3d at 86 ; see also Athey, 2007 WL 2389599 , at *7.

2014Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 ; Cates v. State, 120 S.W.3d 352 , 355 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Davis, 144 S.W.3d at 201 .

2006Ross , 32 S.W.3d at 855 ; Davis v. State , 144 S.W.3d 192, 201 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d) (noting that trial court’s decision at Franks hearing is reviewed under same standard as probable cause determination).

2024“We review the trial court’s ruling on a Franks issue under the same standard applied to search and seizure issues generally.” Emack v. State, 354 S.W.3d 828, 838 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.). “[W]e give almost total deference to the court’s rulings on questions of historical fact and mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, but we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to those facts.” Id. 21 While the United States Supreme Court has been silent on the matter, the Court of Criminal Appeals has assumed that Franks applies to m

2024“We review the trial court’s ruling on a Franks issue under the same standard applied to search and seizure issues generally.” Emack v. State, 354 S.W.3d 828, 838 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.). “[W]e give almost total deference to the court’s rulings on questions of historical fact and mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, but we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to those facts.” Id. 21 While the United States Supreme Court has been silent on the matter, the Court of Criminal Appeals has assumed that Franks applies to m

2008Probable cause Although the magistrate’s determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant necessarily was made solely from his review of the officer’s affidavit and its accompanying photographs, and we have the same information in front of us, our review of the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant is not de novo, but one in which we must give great deference to the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. 4 Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 59-60 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting).

2008Probable cause Although the magistrate’s determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant necessarily was made solely from his review of the officer’s affidavit and its accompanying photographs, and we have the same information in front of us, our review of the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant is not de novo, but one in which we must give great deference to the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. 4 Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 59-60 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting).

2004Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652-53 ; Carmouche , 10 S.W.3d at 327 ; Guzman , 955 S.W.2d at 89 . 3: A copy of the officer’s affidavit is attached as appendix "A" to this opinion, and a copy of the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law is attached as appendix "B" to this opinion. 4: In its brief, the State challenges the trial court’s decision to even hold a Franks hearing, claiming appellant failed to make a preliminary showing of deliberate, false statements.

2004Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652-53 ; Carmouche , 10 S.W.3d at 327 ; Guzman , 955 S.W.2d at 89 . 3: A copy of the officer’s affidavit is attached as appendix "A" to this opinion, and a copy of the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law is attached as appendix "B" to this opinion. 4: In its brief, the State challenges the trial court’s decision to even hold a Franks hearing, claiming appellant failed to make a preliminary showing of deliberate, false statements.

2005Id. at 236 , 103 S.Ct. at 2331 ; see Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 902 (Tex.Crim.App.) (holding we do not conduct a de novo review but look to the evidence as a whole and determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the magistrate’s decision), cert, denied, 492 U.S. 927 , 109 S.Ct. 3266 , 106 L.Ed.2d 611 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 , 685 n. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); see also Cates, 120 S.W.3d at 355 n. 3 (recognizing that before a Franks hearing may be held, defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing of falsity in the "four comer

2005Id. at 236 , 103 S.Ct. at 2331 ; see Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 902 (Tex.Crim.App.) (holding we do not conduct a de novo review but look to the evidence as a whole and determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the magistrate’s decision), cert, denied, 492 U.S. 927 , 109 S.Ct. 3266 , 106 L.Ed.2d 611 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 , 685 n. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); see also Cates, 120 S.W.3d at 355 n. 3 (recognizing that before a Franks hearing may be held, defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing of falsity in the "four comer

2008Id. at 774.

2008Id. at 774 .

2007Because the trial court is the sole finder of fact at a Franks hearing and may believe or disbelieve any or all of the testimony presented, we are to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and determine if the trial court abused its discretion. 15 See Washington v. State, 902 S.W.2d 649 , 655 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d) (citing Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. Crim.

2007Because the trial court is the sole finder of fact at a Franks hearing and may believe or disbelieve any or all of the testimony presented, we are to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and determine if the trial court abused its discretion. 15 See Washington v. State, 902 S.W.2d 649 , 655 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d) (citing Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. Crim.

2007Because the trial court is the sole finder of fact at a Franks hearing and may believe or disbelieve any or all of the testimony presented, we are to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and determine if the trial court abused its discretion. 15 See Washington v. State, 902 S.W.2d 649 , 655 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d) (citing Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. Crim.

2007Because the trial court is the sole finder of fact at a Franks hearing and may believe or disbelieve any or all of the testimony presented, we are to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and determine if the trial court abused its discretion. 15 See Washington v. State, 902 S.W.2d 649 , 655 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d) (citing Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. Crim.

2024But “[a]pplying the Franks analysis to material omissions requires varying the analysis somewhat.” Id.

2024But “[a]pplying the Franks analysis to material omissions requires varying the analysis somewhat.” Id.