27 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1926–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Napoli v. Hinsdale Hospitalgreen2 sentences2022However, “while reliance on the res ipsa doctrine may normally require that the injury can be traced to a specific cause for which the defendant is responsible, Illinois law also authorizes use of the doctrine where it can be shown that the defendant was responsible for all reasonable causes to which the accident could be attributed.” Heastie, 226 Ill. 2d at 538 (citing Napoli v. Hinsdale Hospital, 213 Ill. 2007See Napoli v. Hinsdale Hospital, 213 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Spidle v. Stewardgreen2 sentences2021Spidle, 79 Ill. 2d at 9 . -8- ¶ 55 2. 2020Spidle v. Steward, 79 Ill. 2d 1, 4, 7-8 (1980). | 2 | 5 |
Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co.green2 sentences2007The nature and purpose of the res ipsa doctrine were aptly described by this court in Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co., 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49 (1965), where we wrote: “When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from want of proper care. [Citations.] This in e 2007The nature and purpose of the res ipsa doctrine were aptly described by this court in Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co., 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49 (1965), where we wrote: “When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the 4 Because the negligence count based on res ipsa was dismissed prior to comme | 2 | 3 |
Sullivan v. Edward Hospitalgreen2 sentences2007In defendants’ view, the acts or omissions asserted in this case were in the nature of “nursing negligence,” and the only medical expert proffered by plaintiff was a doctor who was not competent under our court’s decision in Sullivan v. Edward Hospital, 209 Ill. 2d 100, 121-23 (2004), to render an opinion on the standard of care applicable to the nursing profession. 2007Plaintiff has not raised the failure to give the res ipsa instruction as an additional source of reversible error, and in light of our conclusion that plaintiff is entitled to a new trial in any event based on the dismissal of his res ipsa count, resolution of the question could have no possible effect on the outcome of the case. -21- In contesting the appellate court’s judgments in this case, defendants have focused on the viability of plaintiff’s res ipsa count and the applicability of our decision in of Sullivan v. Edward Hospital, 209 Ill. 2d 100 (2004). | 2 | 2 |
Collgood, Inc. v. Sands Drug Co.green2 sentences2007See Collgood, Inc. v. Sands Drug Co., 5 Ill. 2007See Collgood, Inc. v. Sands Drug Co., 5 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Heastie v. Robertsgreen2 sentences2022However, “while reliance on the res ipsa doctrine may normally require that the injury can be traced to a specific cause for which the defendant is responsible, Illinois law also authorizes use of the doctrine where it can be shown that the defendant was responsible for all reasonable causes to which the accident could be attributed.” Heastie, 226 Ill. 2d at 538 (citing Napoli v. Hinsdale Hospital, 213 Ill. 2022She relies on the principle that, “if the specific and actual force which initiated the motion or set the - 18 - instrumentality in operation were known unequivocally, leaving no reason for inference that some other unknown negligent act or force was responsible, the res ipsa doctrine could not even be invoked.” Heastie, 226 Ill. 2d at 539 . ¶ 62 As we explained in Kolakowski, 83 Ill. 2d at 397 , this “would be accurate if the evidence introduced by plaintiff conclusively established the exact cause of his injuries.” But where plaintiff’s expert merely opines upon some cause of the injury, rat | 1 | 4 |
Collins v. Superior Air-Ground Ambulance Service, Inc.green2 sentences2022“To the contrary, if the specific and actual force which initiated the motion or set the instrumentality in operation were known unequivocally, leaving no reason for inference that some other unknown negligent act or force was responsible, the res ipsa doctrine could not even be invoked.” Id. ¶ 44 As for identifying the defendant or defendants, “plaintiff is not required to show that his injuries were more likely caused by any particular one of the defendants in order to proceed with his res ipsa claim, nor must he eliminate all causes of his injuries other than the negligence of one or more o 2022“To the contrary, if the specific and actual force which initiated the motion or set the instrumentality in operation were known unequivocally, leaving no reason for inference that some other unknown negligent act or force was responsible, the res ipsa doctrine could not even be invoked.” Id. ¶ 44 As for identifying the defendant or defendants, “plaintiff is not required to show that his injuries were more likely caused by any particular one of the defendants in order to proceed with his res ipsa claim, nor must he eliminate all causes of his injuries other than the negligence of one or more o | 1 | 2 |
Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Industrial Commissiongreen1 sentence2022She relies on the principle that, “if the specific and actual force which initiated the motion or set the - 18 - instrumentality in operation were known unequivocally, leaving no reason for inference that some other unknown negligent act or force was responsible, the res ipsa doctrine could not even be invoked.” Heastie, 226 Ill. 2d at 539 . ¶ 62 As we explained in Kolakowski, 83 Ill. 2d at 397 , this “would be accurate if the evidence introduced by plaintiff conclusively established the exact cause of his injuries.” But where plaintiff’s expert merely opines upon some cause of the injury, rat | 1 | 1 |
McMillen v. Carlinville Area Hospitalgreen1 sentence2021See McMillen v. Carlinville Area Hospital, 114 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Poole v. University of Chicagogreen1 sentence2021App. 3d 554, 558 , 542 N.E.2d 746, 748-49 (1989). ¶ 42 “The trial court must decide whether the doctrine applies as a question of law, subject to de novo review.” Willis v. Morales, 2020 IL App (1st) 180718, ¶ 36 , 169 N.E.3d 74 . “[A] plaintiff seeking to rely on the res ipsa doctrine must plead and prove that he or she was injured (1) in an occurrence that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence, (2) by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control.” Heastie v. Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 515, 531-32 , 877 N.E.2d 1064, 1076 (2007). ¶ 43 “If the plaintiff was | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gatlin v. Ruder
green
2 sentences2022We reaffirmed this principle from Kolakowski in Gatlin, 137 Ill. 2d at 298-99 . 2007Gatlin v. Ruder, 137 Ill. 2d at 295 . | 6 | 1994–2022 |
Taylor v. City of Beardstown
green
2 sentences2022In so holding, the court declined to follow its own decision in Taylor v. City of Beardstown, 142 Ill. 2021Id. at 593 . | 2 | 2021–2022 |
Cassady v. Hendrickson
green
2 sentences1992Spidle v. Steward (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 1, 10 , 402 N.E.2d 216, 220 ; Cassady v. Hendrickson (1985), 138 Ill. 1986(Spidle v. Steward (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 1, 10 , 402 N.E.2d 216, 220 ; Cassady v. Hendrickson (1985), 138 Ill. | 2 | 1986–1992 |
Guebard v. Jabaay
green
2 sentences1992App. 3d 1, 13 , 452 N.E.2d 751, 759 .) To submit a res ipsa claim to a jury, there must be evidence or testimony to establish the rare and unusual event or condition coupled with proof of a negligent act. 1986App. 3d 1, 13 , 452 N.E.2d 751, 759 .) To submit a res ipsa claim to a jury, there must be evidence or testimony to establish the rare and unusual event or condition coupled with proof of a negligent act. | 2 | 1986–1992 |
Drewick v. Interstate Terminals, Inc.
green
2 sentences1990On the basis of this evidence and the record as a whole, we hold it was not error for the trial court to send the case to the jury on a res ipsa instruction, particularly where the jury was expressly instructed that control on defendant’s part was a prerequisite to its liability. *** The verdict *** establishes that the jury was convinced that the injury would not have occurred except for the negligence of the [defendant] in the intervening period prior to the injury.” (Drewick, 42 Ill. 2d at 351-52 .) In the case at bar, as in Drewick, the trier of fact should decide who maintained control, R 1990On the basis of this evidence and the record as a whole, we hold it was not error for the trial court to send the case to the jury on a res ipsa instruction, particularly where the jury was expressly instructed that control on defendant's part was a prerequisite to its liability. * * * The verdict * * * establishes that the jury was convinced that the injury would not have occurred except for the negligence of the [defendant] in the intervening period prior to the injury." ( Drewick, 42 Ill.2d at 351-52 .) In the case at bar, as in Drewick , the trier of fact should decide who maintained contr | 2 | 1980–1990 |
Decatur & MacOn County Hospital Ass'n v. Erie City Iron Works
green
2 sentences1973Freer v. Rowden (1969), 108 Ill.App.2d 335 , 247 N.E.2d 635 ; Decatur & Macon County Hospital Ass’n v. Erie City Iron Works (1966), 75 Ill.App.2d 144 , 220 N.E.2d 590 ; Turner v. Wallace (1966), 71 Ill.App.2d 160 , 217 N.E.2d 11 ; 8 Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 918. 1973Freer v. Rowden (1969), 108 Ill.App.2d 335 , 247 N.E.2d 635 ; Decatur & Macon County Hospital Ass’n v. Erie City Iron Works (1966), 75 Ill.App.2d 144 , 220 N.E.2d 590 ; Turner v. Wallace (1966), 71 Ill.App.2d 160 , 217 N.E.2d 11 ; 8 Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 918. | 2 | 1969–1973 |
Turner v. Wallace
green
2 sentences1973Freer v. Rowden (1969), 108 Ill.App.2d 335 , 247 N.E.2d 635 ; Decatur & Macon County Hospital Ass’n v. Erie City Iron Works (1966), 75 Ill.App.2d 144 , 220 N.E.2d 590 ; Turner v. Wallace (1966), 71 Ill.App.2d 160 , 217 N.E.2d 11 ; 8 Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 918. 1969App.2d 160 , 217 NE2d 11 (1966), it is stated that if at the close of the case, the evidence fails to reveal the specific forces which produced the injury and there is sufficient proof to certain affirmative findings on each of the necessary elements from which the inference of negligence is permitted, the jury should be instructed in terms of res ipsa loquitur as well as specific negligence, but that if the evidence from all sources shows the facts and reveals the precise causes of the injury there remains nothing for inference and the res ipsa instruction should not be given. | 2 | 1969–1973 |
Kaider v. Hamos
green
1 sentence2026Kaider v. Jamos, 2012 IL App (1st) 111109, ¶ 9 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Johnson v. Armstrong
neutral
1 sentence2022The court further held that no additional expert testimony was needed to establish Harden’s standard of care, saying: “In essence, the control element of the res ipsa doctrine is sufficient to establish a duty of care.” (Emphasis in original.) 2021 IL App (4th) 210038, ¶ 68 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Kolakowski v. Voris
green
2 sentences2022She relies on the principle that, “if the specific and actual force which initiated the motion or set the - 18 - instrumentality in operation were known unequivocally, leaving no reason for inference that some other unknown negligent act or force was responsible, the res ipsa doctrine could not even be invoked.” Heastie, 226 Ill. 2d at 539 . ¶ 62 As we explained in Kolakowski, 83 Ill. 2d at 397 , this “would be accurate if the evidence introduced by plaintiff conclusively established the exact cause of his injuries.” But where plaintiff’s expert merely opines upon some cause of the injury, rat 2022She relies on the principle that, “if the specific and actual force which initiated the motion or set the - 18 - instrumentality in operation were known unequivocally, leaving no reason for inference that some other unknown negligent act or force was responsible, the res ipsa doctrine could not even be invoked.” Heastie, 226 Ill. 2d at 539 . ¶ 62 As we explained in Kolakowski, 83 Ill. 2d at 397 , this “would be accurate if the evidence introduced by plaintiff conclusively established the exact cause of his injuries.” But where plaintiff’s expert merely opines upon some cause of the injury, rat | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Willis v. Morales
neutral
2 sentences2021App. 3d 554, 558 , 542 N.E.2d 746, 748-49 (1989). ¶ 42 “The trial court must decide whether the doctrine applies as a question of law, subject to de novo review.” Willis v. Morales, 2020 IL App (1st) 180718, ¶ 36 , 169 N.E.3d 74 . “[A] plaintiff seeking to rely on the res ipsa doctrine must plead and prove that he or she was injured (1) in an occurrence that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence, (2) by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control.” Heastie v. Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 515, 531-32 , 877 N.E.2d 1064, 1076 (2007). ¶ 43 “If the plaintiff was 2021App. 3d 554, 558 , 542 N.E.2d 746, 748-49 (1989). ¶ 42 “The trial court must decide whether the doctrine applies as a question of law, subject to de novo review.” Willis v. Morales, 2020 IL App (1st) 180718, ¶ 36 , 169 N.E.3d 74 . “[A] plaintiff seeking to rely on the res ipsa doctrine must plead and prove that he or she was injured (1) in an occurrence that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence, (2) by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control.” Heastie v. Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 515, 531-32 , 877 N.E.2d 1064, 1076 (2007). ¶ 43 “If the plaintiff was | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Adams v. Family Planning Associates Medical Group, Inc.
green
1 sentence2007The nature and purpose of the res ipsa doctrine were aptly described by this court in Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co., 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49 (1965), where we wrote: “When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the 4 Because the negligence count based on res ipsa was dismissed prior to comme | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Imig v. Beck
green
2 sentences1994(Gatlin v. Ruder (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 284 , 560 N.E.2d 586 ; Imig v. Beck (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 18 , 503 N.E.2d 324 .) In Krump v. Highlander Ice Cream Co. (1961), 30 Ill. 1994(Gatlin v. Ruder (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 284 , 560 N.E.2d 586 ; Imig v. Beck (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 18 , 503 N.E.2d 324 .) In Krump v. Highlander Ice Cream Co. (1961), 30 Ill. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Krump v. Highlander Ice Cream Co.
green
1 sentence1994(Gatlin v. Ruder (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 284 , 560 N.E.2d 586 ; Imig v. Beck (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 18 , 503 N.E.2d 324 .) In Krump v. Highlander Ice Cream Co. (1961), 30 Ill. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Lynch v. Precision MacHine Shop, Ltd.
green
2 sentences1983Plaintiffs strongly urge that the trial court’s denial of their instruction was inexplicable in view of the evidence and the recent holding in Lynch v. Precision Machine Shop, Ltd. (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 266 , 443 N.E.2d 569 . 1983Plaintiffs strongly urge that the trial court’s denial of their instruction was inexplicable in view of the evidence and the recent holding in Lynch v. Precision Machine Shop, Ltd. (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 266 , 443 N.E.2d 569 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
May v. Columbian Rope Co.
green
1 sentence1981(May v. Columbian Rope Co. (1963), 40 Ill. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Clark v. Gibbons
green
2 sentences1980Mr. Justice Tobriner stated: "To give a res ipsa instruction under such circumstances invites a purely speculative leap and entrusts the jury with unreviewable power to impose or withhold liability as it sees fit." ( Clark v. Gibbons (1967), 66 Cal.2d 399, 415-16 , 426 P.2d 525, 536-37 , 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 136-37 .) Mr. Justice Tobriner further observed: "[T]he rarity of an event may well bear no relationship to negligence. 1980Mr. Justice Tobriner stated: "To give a res ipsa instruction under such circumstances invites a purely speculative leap and entrusts the jury with unreviewable power to impose or withhold liability as it sees fit." ( Clark v. Gibbons (1967), 66 Cal.2d 399, 415-16 , 426 P.2d 525, 536-37 , 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 136-37 .) Mr. Justice Tobriner further observed: "[T]he rarity of an event may well bear no relationship to negligence. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Moore v. Jewel Tea Co.
green
2 sentences1973A similar argument was rejected in Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill.App.2d 109 , 253 N.E.2d 636 , aff’d 46 Ill.2d 288 , 263 N.E.2d 103 , where a can of Drano exploded while in the possession of the purchaser some 10 months after it had left defendants’ control. 1973A similar argument was rejected in Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill.App.2d 109 , 253 N.E.2d 636 , aff’d 46 Ill.2d 288 , 263 N.E.2d 103 , where a can of Drano exploded while in the possession of the purchaser some 10 months after it had left defendants’ control. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Freer v. Rowden
green
2 sentences1973Freer v. Rowden (1969), 108 Ill.App.2d 335 , 247 N.E.2d 635 ; Decatur & Macon County Hospital Ass’n v. Erie City Iron Works (1966), 75 Ill.App.2d 144 , 220 N.E.2d 590 ; Turner v. Wallace (1966), 71 Ill.App.2d 160 , 217 N.E.2d 11 ; 8 Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 918. 1973Freer v. Rowden (1969), 108 Ill.App.2d 335 , 247 N.E.2d 635 ; Decatur & Macon County Hospital Ass’n v. Erie City Iron Works (1966), 75 Ill.App.2d 144 , 220 N.E.2d 590 ; Turner v. Wallace (1966), 71 Ill.App.2d 160 , 217 N.E.2d 11 ; 8 Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 918. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Moore v. Jewel Tea Co.
green
2 sentences1973A similar argument was rejected in Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill.App.2d 109 , 253 N.E.2d 636 , aff’d 46 Ill.2d 288 , 263 N.E.2d 103 , where a can of Drano exploded while in the possession of the purchaser some 10 months after it had left defendants’ control. 1973A similar argument was rejected in Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill.App.2d 109 , 253 N.E.2d 636 , aff’d 46 Ill.2d 288 , 263 N.E.2d 103 , where a can of Drano exploded while in the possession of the purchaser some 10 months after it had left defendants’ control. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Neering v. I.C.R.R. Co. green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal red | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Katamay v. Chicago Transit Authority green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Shramek v. General Motors Corp. green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Edmonds v. Heil green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Anderson v. Wormser green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Manning v. St. Paul Gaslight Co. green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Kerby v. Chicago Motor Coach Co. green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Roberts v. Economy Cabs, Inc. green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Jackson v. 919 CORPORATION green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| McClure v. Hoopeston Gas & Electric Co. green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Cobb v. Marshall Field & Co. green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Chattanooga Gas Company v. Underwood green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| George v. Shannon green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.