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34 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mobil Chemical Company v. Bellgreen2 sentences2023Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. 1982). 6 See Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 250 (“[M]eaning ‘the thing speaks for itself,’ . . . [res ipsa] has come to signify that in certain limited types of cases[,] 4 that “invite[s] res ipsa loquitur treatment” is when a foreign object is left in a patient after surgery. 7 Our caselaw has articulated two mandatory elements for the doctrine’s application: (1) the character of the accident must be such that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; and (2) the instrumentality causing the injury must be shown to have been under the management and contro 2023See, e.g., Haddock v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. 1990) (citing 8 Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 251 ). 9 Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 252 . 10 Id. at 251 . 5 instruction is “essentially [a] ‘no evidence’ point[]”. 11 Evidentiary support for the “type of accident” and “control” factors is the minimum requirement for a res ipsa instruction and will not entitle the plaintiff to an instruction in every case. 12 “[I]n any Res ipsa case, the particular facts surrounding the event are extremely important.” 13 That means that determining the applicability of res ipsa is a case-specific exercise. | 9 | 17 |
Haddock v. Arnspigergreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., Haddock v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. 1990) (citing 8 Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 251 ). 9 Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 252 . 10 Id. at 251 . 5 instruction is “essentially [a] ‘no evidence’ point[]”. 11 Evidentiary support for the “type of accident” and “control” factors is the minimum requirement for a res ipsa instruction and will not entitle the plaintiff to an instruction in every case. 12 “[I]n any Res ipsa case, the particular facts surrounding the event are extremely important.” 13 That means that determining the applicability of res ipsa is a case-specific exercise. 2003Haddock v. Arnspiger , 793 S.W.2d 948, 950 ( Tex. 1990). | 3 | 3 |
Porterfield v. Brinegargreen2 sentences2023Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. 1982). 6 See Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 250 (“[M]eaning ‘the thing speaks for itself,’ . . . [res ipsa] has come to signify that in certain limited types of cases[,] 4 that “invite[s] res ipsa loquitur treatment” is when a foreign object is left in a patient after surgery. 7 Our caselaw has articulated two mandatory elements for the doctrine’s application: (1) the character of the accident must be such that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; and (2) the instrumentality causing the injury must be shown to have been under the management and contro 2023Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. 1982). 6 See Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 250 (“[M]eaning ‘the thing speaks for itself,’ . . . [res ipsa] has come to signify that in certain limited types of cases[,] 4 that “invite[s] res ipsa loquitur treatment” is when a foreign object is left in a patient after surgery. 7 Our caselaw has articulated two mandatory elements for the doctrine’s application: (1) the character of the accident must be such that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; and (2) the instrumentality causing the injury must be shown to have been under the management and contro | 2 | 3 |
Texas Pipe Bending Co. v. Gibbsgreen2 sentences2025Discussion of the pleadings requirements only surfaces in a footnote of the dissenting opinion, where Justice Higley wrote, almost as an aside, that “[i]f a plaintiff’s petition ‘gives fair notice that he is not relying solely on specific acts but instead intends to also rely on any other negligent acts reasonably inferable from the circumstances of the accident, his pleading is sufficient to invoke the res ipsa doctrine.’” Sanders, 498 S.W.3d at 263 n.1 (quoting Tex. Pipe Bending Co. v. Gibbs, 580 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Tex. Civ. 2016If a plaintiff's, petition “gives fair notice that he is not relying solely on specific acts but instead intends to also rely on any other negligent acts’ reasonably inferable from the circumstances of the accident, his pleading is sufficient to invoke the res ipsa doctrine.” Tex. Pipe Bending Co. v. Gibbs, 580 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979), writ refused n.r.e., 584 S.W.2d 702 (Tex.1979). | 2 | 2 |
Marathon Oil Co. v. Sternergreen2 sentences2023Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. 1982). 6 See Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 250 (“[M]eaning ‘the thing speaks for itself,’ . . . [res ipsa] has come to signify that in certain limited types of cases[,] 4 that “invite[s] res ipsa loquitur treatment” is when a foreign object is left in a patient after surgery. 7 Our caselaw has articulated two mandatory elements for the doctrine’s application: (1) the character of the accident must be such that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; and (2) the instrumentality causing the injury must be shown to have been under the management and contro 2023INST. 2010). 13 Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 248 . 14 Id. at 253 . 15 Sterner, 632 S.W.2d at 573-574 . 16 Bond v. Otis Elevator Co., 388 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. 1965). 6 vehicle is defective.” 17 A res ipsa instruction should not be given when it is used to suggest that liability for an accident can be imposed without negligence. | 2 | 2 |
Bond v. Otis Elevator Companygreen2 sentences2023INST. 2010). 13 Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 248 . 14 Id. at 253 . 15 Sterner, 632 S.W.2d at 573-574 . 16 Bond v. Otis Elevator Co., 388 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. 1965). 6 vehicle is defective.” 17 A res ipsa instruction should not be given when it is used to suggest that liability for an accident can be imposed without negligence. 2000Id . at 918, Citing Bond v. Otis Elevator Company, 388 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1965) and further: the control that is required for the application of the res ipsa rule is not necessarily control exercised at the time of the injury, but it may be control exercised at the time of the negligent act which subsequently leads to the injury. | 1 | 4 |
Aguilar v. Trujillogreen2 sentences2025See Aguilar v. Trujillo, 162 S.W.3d 839, 850 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied) (“The res ipsa doctrine is inapplicable to this case. 2018“The effect of successfully invoking the res ipsa doctrine is that the plaintiff can survive no-evidence procedural challenges.” Aguilar, 162 S.W.3d at 850 . | 1 | 2 |
Estrada v. Central Power & Light Companygreen1 sentence2025Res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable where, as here (1) the plaintiff cannot rely on general knowledge to show that the accident would not occur without negligence, and (2) the plaintiff has not produced expert Gearhart-Owen Industries, Inc., 626 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1981, no writ) (“A plaintiff is not entitled to invoke the res ipsa doctrine when he pleads specific acts of negligence and does not give the defendant fair notice in his pleadings that he intends to rely upon the doctrine.”); Estrada v. Central Power & Light Co., 336 S.W.2d 768, 768 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Lambert v. Gearhart-Owen Industries, Inc.green1 sentence2025Res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable where, as here (1) the plaintiff cannot rely on general knowledge to show that the accident would not occur without negligence, and (2) the plaintiff has not produced expert Gearhart-Owen Industries, Inc., 626 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1981, no writ) (“A plaintiff is not entitled to invoke the res ipsa doctrine when he pleads specific acts of negligence and does not give the defendant fair notice in his pleadings that he intends to rely upon the doctrine.”); Estrada v. Central Power & Light Co., 336 S.W.2d 768, 768 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
John R. Francis Building Co., Inc. v. Bob Meador Co., Inc.green1 sentence2025App.—San Antonio 1960, writ ref’d) (“In order to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur there are four elements which must be pleaded and proved: [stating elements].”) (emphasis added); Prieto v. Val Verde Memorial Hospital, 747 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ) (“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may not be invoked where the petition alleges specific acts of negligence on the part of a defendant, and does not generally allege negligence or specifically plead reliance on res ipsa.”) (citing Francis v. Bob Meador Company, Inc., 517 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Prieto v. Val Verde Memorial Hospitalgreen1 sentence2025App.—San Antonio 1960, writ ref’d) (“In order to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur there are four elements which must be pleaded and proved: [stating elements].”) (emphasis added); Prieto v. Val Verde Memorial Hospital, 747 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ) (“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may not be invoked where the petition alleges specific acts of negligence on the part of a defendant, and does not generally allege negligence or specifically plead reliance on res ipsa.”) (citing Francis v. Bob Meador Company, Inc., 517 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Walters v. Cleveland Regional Medical Centergreen1 sentence2023Ctr., 307 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Tarrant Utility Co.green1 sentence2023Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. 1982). 6 See Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 250 (“[M]eaning ‘the thing speaks for itself,’ . . . [res ipsa] has come to signify that in certain limited types of cases[,] 4 that “invite[s] res ipsa loquitur treatment” is when a foreign object is left in a patient after surgery. 7 Our caselaw has articulated two mandatory elements for the doctrine’s application: (1) the character of the accident must be such that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; and (2) the instrumentality causing the injury must be shown to have been under the management and contro | 1 | 1 |
Railroad Commission v. Gulf Energy Exploration Corp.green1 sentence2021Schindler argues that the instruction was harmful and requires reversal because (1) the instruction was “incorrect law” that was inapplicable to the case and (2) it related to a “contested, critical issue[,]” citing to Glenn v. Leal, 596 S.W.3d 769 , 772 (Tex. 2020) and Railroad Commission of Texas v. Gulf Energy Exploration Corp., 482 S.W.3d 559, 571 (Tex. 2016). | 1 | 1 |
American Transitional Care Centers of Texas, Inc. v. Palaciosgreen1 sentence2018Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 196 (Tex. 2012) (noting “the long- recognized principle that a physician who exercises ordinary care . . . is not liable to a patient for a bad outcome”); Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880 (stating breach of standard of care cannot be inferred from existence of injury alone because doctrine of res ipsa 11 loquitor does not generally apply in medical malpractice cases). | 1 | 1 |
Texas West Oaks Hospital, LP v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2018Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 196 (Tex. 2012) (noting “the long- recognized principle that a physician who exercises ordinary care . . . is not liable to a patient for a bad outcome”); Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880 (stating breach of standard of care cannot be inferred from existence of injury alone because doctrine of res ipsa 11 loquitor does not generally apply in medical malpractice cases). | 1 | 1 |
Soto v. Texas Industries, Inc.green1 sentence2004Inc ., 820 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. App. C Fort Worth 1991, no writ) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a res ipsa instruction when plaintiffs presented no expert knowledge that concrete walls do not ordinarily fall in the absence of negligence, and general knowledge could not support the contention). | 1 | 1 |
Trans America Holding, Inc. v. Market-Antiques & Home Furnishings, Inc.green1 sentence2003See Trans Am. , 39 S.W.3d at 650 . | 1 | 1 |
Harmon v. Sohio Pipeline Co.green1 sentence1988See Harmon v. Sohio Pipeline Co., 623 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.1981) (oil pipeline spill). | 1 | 1 |
| Sims v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Texas Sling Company v. Emanuelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Texas Pipe Bending Co. v. Gibbs
green
2 sentences2025App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979), writ ref’d n.r.e., 584 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. 1979)). 2016If a plaintiff's, petition “gives fair notice that he is not relying solely on specific acts but instead intends to also rely on any other negligent acts’ reasonably inferable from the circumstances of the accident, his pleading is sufficient to invoke the res ipsa doctrine.” Tex. Pipe Bending Co. v. Gibbs, 580 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979), writ refused n.r.e., 584 S.W.2d 702 (Tex.1979). | 2 | 2016–2025 |
Martin v. Petta
green
2 sentences1993The court stated that "a plaintiff is not automatically precluded *662 from pleading a cause of action in common law negligence, but in a proper case may plead a cause of action in common law negligence and also rely upon the common law doctrine of res ipsa [loquitur].” Petta, 694 S.W.2d at 238 . 1993The court stated that "a plaintiff is not automatically precluded from pleading a cause of action in common law negligence, but in a proper case may plead a cause of action in common law negligence and also rely upon the common law doctrine of res ipsa [loquitur]." Petta , 694 S.W.2d at 238 . | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Sanders v. Naes Central, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025Discussion of the pleadings requirements only surfaces in a footnote of the dissenting opinion, where Justice Higley wrote, almost as an aside, that “[i]f a plaintiff’s petition ‘gives fair notice that he is not relying solely on specific acts but instead intends to also rely on any other negligent acts reasonably inferable from the circumstances of the accident, his pleading is sufficient to invoke the res ipsa doctrine.’” Sanders, 498 S.W.3d at 263 n.1 (quoting Tex. Pipe Bending Co. v. Gibbs, 580 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Graham v. Fed-X, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018Dist./Titus Mem'l Hosp. , 964 S.W.2d 144 , 156 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (rejecting the application of the res ipsa doctrine "because the chair was in a public waiting area, [and] it [was] possible that someone other than the Hospital broke the recliner before [the plaintiff was injured]"); Graham v. Fed-X, Inc. , 384 S.W.2d 785 , 787 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lucas v. Titus County Hospital District
green
1 sentence2018Dist./Titus Mem'l Hosp. , 964 S.W.2d 144 , 156 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (rejecting the application of the res ipsa doctrine "because the chair was in a public waiting area, [and] it [was] possible that someone other than the Hospital broke the recliner before [the plaintiff was injured]"); Graham v. Fed-X, Inc. , 384 S.W.2d 785 , 787 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Island Recreational Development Corp. v. Republic of Texas Savings Ass'n
green
1 sentence2003Appellant has not shown, nor do we find, any harm by the trial court’s use of the circumstantial evidence instruction in lieu of the requested res ipsa instruction. [3] See Trans Am. at 650; Island Recreational , 710 S.W.2d at 555 . class=Section3> Second, the res ipsa doctrine only applies when the character of the particular injury or accident is such that it could not have occurred without negligence. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna
green
1 sentence1996Browning-Ferris, 865 S.W.2d at 928 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Gulf Liquid Fertilizer Co. v. Titus
green
1 sentence1988Gulf Liquid Fertilizer Co. v. Titus, 354 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.1962). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Brown Exp. Co., Inc. v. Burns
green
1 sentence1981Mobil Chemical v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 254 (Tex.1974); Brown Express Co., Inc. v. Burns, 608 S.W.2d 291 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1980, no writ). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Elliott
green
2 sentences1979Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Elliott, 125 Tex. 248 , 81 S.W.2d 659 (1935). 1979Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Elliott, 125 Tex. 248 , 81 S.W.2d 659 (1935). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Peterson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Pittsburg v. Ponder green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Owen v. Brown
green
2 sentences1974Owen v. Brown, 447 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.1969); Bond v. Otis Elevator Co., 388 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.1965); McCray v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. 1974Owen v. Brown, 447 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.1969); Bond v. Otis Elevator Co., 388 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.1965); McCray v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Honea, by Next Friend v. Coca Cola Bot. Co. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Hankins v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.