res ipsa doctrine in Tennessee

2011The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that “the res ipsa doctrine is available in medical malpractice cases to raise an inference of negligence even if expert testimony is necessary to prove causation, the standard of care, and the fact that the injury does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence.” Id. at 97 .

2011The Seavers Court expressly overruled any prior decisions that deemed res ipsa as only applicable in cases “where the proof is such that the jury can reasonably infer from common knowledge and experience that the defendant was negligent.” Seavers, 9 S.W.3d at 92 .

2008In the Brown case, the Court of Appeals stated the following when presented with the issue of the applicability of the res ipsa doctrine under similar circumstances: In view of the fact that the doctrine has no application unless the accident in question is one of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence, Walls v. Lueking, 46 TennApp. 636, 332 S.W.2d 692 [ (1959) ], and since the Court judicially knows that the fall of an elderly person does not necessarily result alone from the negligence of another but may occur under circumstances when there is a complete absence

1992Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428 , 192 S.W.2d 992 (1946).

1992Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428 , 192 S.W.2d 992 (1946).

1985In the first instance defendant relies upon an opinion by Judge Nearn of this Court, styled German v. Nichopoulos, 577 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn.Ct.App.1978) cert. denied (1979).

1985A thorough consideration of the res ipsa doctrine can be found in the case of Sullivan v. Crabtree, 36 Tenn.App. 469 , 258 S.W.2d 782 , cert. denied (1953), wherein the doctrine is stated to be as follows: “[W]here the thing [causing the harm] is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.” Erle, C.J., Scott v. London and St.

1985A thorough consideration of the res ipsa doctrine can be found in the case of Sullivan v. Crabtree, 36 Tenn.App. 469 , 258 S.W.2d 782 , cert. denied (1953), wherein the doctrine is stated to be as follows: “[W]here the thing [causing the harm] is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.” Erle, C.J., Scott v. London and St.

1978See Brown v. University Nursing Home, Inc. (1972 Tenn.App., M.S.) 496 S.W.2d 503 ; Swiney v. Malone Freight Lines (1976 Tenn.App., E.S.) 545 S.W.2d 112 .

1976I cannot agree that it was dictum when the court said in the case of Sloan v. Nevil, 33 Tenn. App. 100, 110 , 229 S.W.2d 350 , 355: "In this case the plaintiff offered no proof of any negligence of the defendant and if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnished an inference of negligence we think this inference disappeared when the defendant explained the cause of the accident as the falling down of the front of the car on the highway." (Emphasis ours.) I think what the court said is a proper enunciation of the rule in this jurisdiction and we are cited to no authority in this state to the co

1976I cannot agree that it was dictum when the court said in the case of Sloan v. Nevil, 33 Tenn. App. 100, 110 , 229 S.W.2d 350 , 355: "In this case the plaintiff offered no proof of any negligence of the defendant and if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnished an inference of negligence we think this inference disappeared when the defendant explained the cause of the accident as the falling down of the front of the car on the highway." (Emphasis ours.) I think what the court said is a proper enunciation of the rule in this jurisdiction and we are cited to no authority in this state to the co

1946The doctrine here sought to be invoked does not ordinarily apply in malpractice cases, although this Court has held that it may apply in some exceptional cases, as in Lewis v. Casenburg, 157 Tenn. 187 , 7 S. W. (2d) 808 , where the plaintiff was severely injured by an X-ray burn, and in Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 283 , 109 S. W. (2d) 417 , where the plaintiff was operated on for appendicitis and while he was unconscious his eye, which was in no way *438 involved in tlie operation, was injured.

1946The doctrine here sought to be invoked does not ordinarily apply in malpractice cases, although this Court has held that it may apply in some exceptional cases, as in Lewis v. Casenburg, 157 Tenn. 187 , 7 S. W. (2d) 808 , where the plaintiff was severely injured by an X-ray burn, and in Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 283 , 109 S. W. (2d) 417 , where the plaintiff was operated on for appendicitis and while he was unconscious his eye, which was in no way *438 involved in tlie operation, was injured.

1946The doctrine here sought to be invoked does not ordinarily apply in malpractice cases, although this Court has held that it may apply in some exceptional cases, as in Lewis v. Casenburg, 157 Tenn. 187 , 7 S. W. (2d) 808 , where the plaintiff was severely injured by an X-ray burn, and in Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 283 , 109 S. W. (2d) 417 , where the plaintiff was operated on for appendicitis and while he was unconscious his eye, which was in no way *438 involved in tlie operation, was injured.

1946The doctrine here sought to be invoked does not ordinarily apply in malpractice cases, although this Court has held that it may apply in some exceptional cases, as in Lewis v. Casenburg, 157 Tenn. 187 , 7 S. W. (2d) 808 , where the plaintiff was severely injured by an X-ray burn, and in Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 283 , 109 S. W. (2d) 417 , where the plaintiff was operated on for appendicitis and while he was unconscious his eye, which was in no way *438 involved in tlie operation, was injured.

1946In the light of the foregoing credible testimony, the Court would not be justified in submitting the issue of negligence to the jury. •The application of the res ipsa rule was considered by this Court in Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121 , 172 S. W. (2d) 806 , where plaintiff’s intestate was killed in an airplane accident.

1946In the light of the foregoing credible testimony, the Court would not be justified in submitting the issue of negligence to the jury. •The application of the res ipsa rule was considered by this Court in Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121 , 172 S. W. (2d) 806 , where plaintiff’s intestate was killed in an airplane accident.