res ipsa doctrine (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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res ipsa doctrine in Pennsylvania

12 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2023 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

CaseFollowedCited
Toogood v. Rogalgreen
pa · 2003 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2003–2023
2 sentences

2023In discussing res ipsa loquitur the court referenced its plurality opinion in Toogood v. Rogal et al., 824 A.2d 1140 (Pa. 2003) which discussed whether the res ipsa doctrine could relieve a plaintiff’s burden of producing expert testimony to demonstrate negligence in a case that was medically complex.

2003Similarly, on page 983 of its opinion, the majority indicates that the disciplinary action taken against Dr. Austin by the American Association of Neurological Surgeons (AANS) involved a medical malpractice case that “bordered on a res ipsa claim, as does his testimony here.” Id. at 983. ¶ 6 I respectfully disagree with the majority’s characterization of res ipsa as a “claim.” “Res ipsa loquitur is neither a doctrine of substantive law nor a theory of recovery; rather, it is a rule of circumstantial evidence.” Toogood v. Rogal, 573 Pa. 245 , 824 A.2d 1140, 1146 (2003).

24
Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc.green
pa · 2006 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
2 sentences

2020Fessenden, 97 A.3d at 1230 . -5- J-A11014-19 Although there was no item left behind in Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc., 907 A.2d 1061 (Pa. 2006), a res ipsa instruction was similarly warranted.

2020Fessenden, 97 A.3d at 1230 . -5- J-A11014-19 Although there was no item left behind in Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc., 907 A.2d 1061 (Pa. 2006), a res ipsa instruction was similarly warranted.

24
Hightower-Warren v. Silkgreen
pa · 1997 · cited in 3 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2003–2021
2 sentences

2003See also Checchio v. Frankford Hasp., 717 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa.Super.1998) (“Where the alleged negligence is medical in nature, the plaintiff must present evidence from an expert ‘who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered.’ ” (citation omitted)). ¶ 8 The narrow exception to the expert testimony requirement is conceptualized as the doctrine of res ipsa in which “the matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care so obvious

2003Finally, the third prong of the res ipsa test was plainly satisfied because, as this Court recognized in Hightower-Warren , it is “within the scope of [a physician’s] duty of care to protect his patient against preventable injuries which could reasonably occur during the performance of surgery,” and the same holds true for the medical procedure at issue here. 698 A.2d at 55 n. 7 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).

23
McCarthy v. Dan Lepore & Sons Co., Inc.green
pasuperct · 1998 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021Hence causation is also amatter generally requiring expert testimony. "15 An exception to this requirement only exists "'where the matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care so obvious as to be within the range of experience and comprehension of even non- professional persons...'also conceptualized as the doctrine of res ipsa /oquitor." 16 Res ipsa /oquitor is not alegal doctrine or theory of recovery, but rather arule of circumstantial evidence that allows ajury to infer negligence without direct evidence of the elements of negligence. 17 Three conditions must be met before res ipsa /oq

11
Moure v. Raeuchlegreen
pa · 1992 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006See generally Moure v. Raeuchle, 529 Pa. 394, 402 , 604 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1992) (explaining that, in reviewing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, affording it the benefit of every reasonable doubt and resolving conflicts in testimony in its favor).

2006See generally Moure v. Raeuchle, 529 Pa. 394, 402 , 604 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1992) (explaining that, in reviewing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, affording it the benefit of every reasonable doubt and resolving conflicts in testimony in its favor).

11
Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc.green
pa · 1974 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005See Gilbert v. Korvette’s Inc., 457 Pa. 602 , 327 A.2d 94 (1974).

2005See Gilbert v. Korvette’s Inc., 457 Pa. 602 , 327 A.2d 94 (1974).

11
Grandelli v. Methodist Hospitalgreen
pasuperct · 2001 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003Prong (c) of the Toogood test is similar to the second prong of the traditional res ipsa test set forth in section 328D(1)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that an inference of negligence is established when, inter alia, "other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence." [10] See Grandelli, *987 777 A.2d at 1147 (emphasis added).

11
Magette v. Goodmangreen
pasuperct · 2001 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
2 sentences

2003Magette v. Goodman, 771 A.2d 775, 779 (Pa.Super.2001).

2003Magette v. Goodman, 771 A.2d 775, 779 (Pa.Super.2001).

11
Bardessono v. Michelsgreen
cal · 1970 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
2 sentences

2003These facts, in my view, clearly satisfy the first prong of the res ipsa test because it is generally understood that in the absence of negligence, such an injection does not ordinarily puncture a lung and cause it to collapse. 1 See Killingsworth v. Poon, 167 Ga.App. 653 , 307 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1983) (“it is widely. known ... that a subcutaneous injection ostensibly given only for the relief of muscular pain should not, if administered correctly, result in the puncture of internal organs.”); see also Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal.3d 780 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 760 , 478 P.2d 480, 486-87 (1971) (“Needle

2003These facts, in my view, clearly satisfy the first prong of the res ipsa test because it is generally understood that in the absence of negligence, such an injection does not ordinarily puncture a lung and cause it to collapse. 1 See Killingsworth v. Poon, 167 Ga.App. 653 , 307 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1983) (“it is widely. known ... that a subcutaneous injection ostensibly given only for the relief of muscular pain should not, if administered correctly, result in the puncture of internal organs.”); see also Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal.3d 780 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 760 , 478 P.2d 480, 486-87 (1971) (“Needle

11
Killingsworth v. Poongreen
gactapp · 1983 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
2 sentences

2003These facts, in my view, clearly satisfy the first prong of the res ipsa test because it is generally understood that in the absence of negligence, such an injection does not ordinarily puncture a lung and cause it to collapse. 1 See Killingsworth v. Poon, 167 Ga.App. 653 , 307 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1983) (“it is widely. known ... that a subcutaneous injection ostensibly given only for the relief of muscular pain should not, if administered correctly, result in the puncture of internal organs.”); see also Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal.3d 780 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 760 , 478 P.2d 480, 486-87 (1971) (“Needle

2003These facts, in my view, clearly satisfy the first prong of the res ipsa test because it is generally understood that in the absence of negligence, such an injection does not ordinarily puncture a lung and cause it to collapse. 1 See Killingsworth v. Poon, 167 Ga.App. 653 , 307 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1983) (“it is widely. known ... that a subcutaneous injection ostensibly given only for the relief of muscular pain should not, if administered correctly, result in the puncture of internal organs.”); see also Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal.3d 780 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 760 , 478 P.2d 480, 486-87 (1971) (“Needle

11
Checchio Ex Rel. Checchio v. Frankford Hospital-Torres-Dale Divisiongreen
pasuperct · 1998 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
2 sentences

2003See also Checchio v. Frankford Hasp., 717 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa.Super.1998) (“Where the alleged negligence is medical in nature, the plaintiff must present evidence from an expert ‘who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered.’ ” (citation omitted)). ¶ 8 The narrow exception to the expert testimony requirement is conceptualized as the doctrine of res ipsa in which “the matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care so obvious

2003See also Checchio v. Frankford Hasp., 717 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa.Super.1998) (“Where the alleged negligence is medical in nature, the plaintiff must present evidence from an expert ‘who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered.’ ” (citation omitted)). ¶ 8 The narrow exception to the expert testimony requirement is conceptualized as the doctrine of res ipsa in which “the matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care so obvious

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
MacNutt v. Temple University Hospital, Inc. green
pasuperct · 2007
2 sentences

2020MacNutt, 932 A.2d at 987 .

2020MacNutt, 932 A.2d at 987 .

22020–2020
Fessenden v. Robert Packer Hospital green
pasuperct · 2014
2 sentences

2020Fessenden, 97 A.3d at 1230 . -5- J-A11014-19 Although there was no item left behind in Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc., 907 A.2d 1061 (Pa. 2006), a res ipsa instruction was similarly warranted.

2020Fessenden, 97 A.3d at 1230 . -5- J-A11014-19 Although there was no item left behind in Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc., 907 A.2d 1061 (Pa. 2006), a res ipsa instruction was similarly warranted.

22020–2020
George S. Weigand v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, a Corporation green
ca3 · 1959
2 sentences

1998The law in Pennsylvania is clear from the following language in Hollywood Shop, Inc. v. Pa. Gas & Water Co., supra, in which the superior court adopted the rationale of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Weigand v. Pa. Railroad Co., 267 F.2d 281 (3rd Cir.1959) (applying Pennsylvania law): ‘[W]e have before us not only a res ipsa claim but one capable of some specific proof regarding the railroad’s alleged negligence.

1998The law in Pennsylvania is clear from the following language in Hollywood Shop, Inc. v. Pa. Gas & Water Co., supra, in which the superior court adopted the rationale of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Weigand v. Pa. Railroad Co., 267 F.2d 281 (3rd Cir.1959) (applying Pennsylvania law): ‘[W]e have before us not only a res ipsa claim but one capable of some specific proof regarding the railroad’s alleged negligence.

21979–1998
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. green
scotus · 1993
2 sentences

2003However, Appellant has not pursued a res ipsa claim. .We note that the United States Supreme Court renounced the Frye rule in its 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), holding that Frye had been superceded by the Federal Rules of Evidence.

2003However, Appellant has not pursued a res ipsa claim. .We note that the United States Supreme Court renounced the Frye rule in its 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), holding that Frye had been superceded by the Federal Rules of Evidence.

12003–2003
Boyer v. Walker green
pasuperct · 1998
1 sentence

2003When it granted allowance of appeal, the Court asked the parties to address the admissibility of the proposed evidence under both Frye and Daubert . [7] Indeed, he appears to have learned from his past transgressions. [8] Because of our disposition of this issue, we need not address Appellant's second claim on appeal. [9] "It is well settled that where the result is correct, an appellate court may affirm a lower court's decision on any ground without regard to the ground relied upon by the lower court itself." Boyer v. Walker, 714 A.2d 458 , 463 n. 10 (Pa.Super.1998) (affirming trial court ord

12003–2003
Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hospital green
pa · 1981
2 sentences

2003In Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hasp., 496 Pa. 465 , 437 A.2d 1134 (1981), our Supreme Court stated that there are “two avenues to avoid the production of direct medical evidence of the facts establishing liability.” Toogood at 1148 (quoting Jones, 437 A.2d at 1138 ).

2003In Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hasp., 496 Pa. 465 , 437 A.2d 1134 (1981), our Supreme Court stated that there are “two avenues to avoid the production of direct medical evidence of the facts establishing liability.” Toogood at 1148 (quoting Jones, 437 A.2d at 1138 ).

12003–2003
Hollywood Shop, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co. green
pasuperct · 1979
1 sentence

1998In these peculiar circumstances to force the plaintiff to abandon one of his theories is not only illogical but unfair.’ Hollywood Shop, Inc. v. Pa. Gas & Water Co., supra at 250-52, 411 A.2d at 512 , quoting Weigand v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 267 F.2d at 284 .

11998–1998
Stewart v. Motts green
pa · 1995
1 sentence

1998Stewart v. Motts, supra at 605-07, 654 A.2d at 540 .

11998–1998

Where else courts name it

MO 58 (1931–2004) CA 37 (1934–2013) TX 34 (1972–2025) IL 27 (1926–2026) IA 25 (1915–2026) NY 22 (1943–2019) NJ 18 (1950–2026) FL 16 (1946–2017) LA 14 (1942–2017) PA 12 (1979–2023) MN 12 (1921–2023) AZ 9 (1955–2008) MD 9 (1970–2011) OH 8 (1929–2008) NC 7 (1906–2013) TN 7 (1946–2011) MT 6 (1918–1983) ME 5 (1946–2021) OR 5 (1951–2011) IN 5 (1928–2007) UT 4 (1984–1996) KY 4 (1944–1957) WI 4 (1975–2022) CO 4 (1960–2009) ID 3 (1949–1979) CT 3 (1947–1999) DC 3 (1970–2026) OK 3 (1952–1997) NM 3 (1992–1996) MS 3 (1970–2022) AR 3 (1968–2001) SD 2 (1975–1981) SC 2 (1958–1984) GA 2 (1958–1975) KS 2 (1934–2000) MA 2 (1996–2010)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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