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12 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Toogood v. Rogalgreen2 sentences2023In discussing res ipsa loquitur the court referenced its plurality opinion in Toogood v. Rogal et al., 824 A.2d 1140 (Pa. 2003) which discussed whether the res ipsa doctrine could relieve a plaintiff’s burden of producing expert testimony to demonstrate negligence in a case that was medically complex. 2003Similarly, on page 983 of its opinion, the majority indicates that the disciplinary action taken against Dr. Austin by the American Association of Neurological Surgeons (AANS) involved a medical malpractice case that “bordered on a res ipsa claim, as does his testimony here.” Id. at 983. ¶ 6 I respectfully disagree with the majority’s characterization of res ipsa as a “claim.” “Res ipsa loquitur is neither a doctrine of substantive law nor a theory of recovery; rather, it is a rule of circumstantial evidence.” Toogood v. Rogal, 573 Pa. 245 , 824 A.2d 1140, 1146 (2003). | 2 | 4 |
Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc.green2 sentences2020Fessenden, 97 A.3d at 1230 . -5- J-A11014-19 Although there was no item left behind in Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc., 907 A.2d 1061 (Pa. 2006), a res ipsa instruction was similarly warranted. 2020Fessenden, 97 A.3d at 1230 . -5- J-A11014-19 Although there was no item left behind in Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc., 907 A.2d 1061 (Pa. 2006), a res ipsa instruction was similarly warranted. | 2 | 4 |
Hightower-Warren v. Silkgreen2 sentences2003See also Checchio v. Frankford Hasp., 717 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa.Super.1998) (“Where the alleged negligence is medical in nature, the plaintiff must present evidence from an expert ‘who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered.’ ” (citation omitted)). ¶ 8 The narrow exception to the expert testimony requirement is conceptualized as the doctrine of res ipsa in which “the matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care so obvious 2003Finally, the third prong of the res ipsa test was plainly satisfied because, as this Court recognized in Hightower-Warren , it is “within the scope of [a physician’s] duty of care to protect his patient against preventable injuries which could reasonably occur during the performance of surgery,” and the same holds true for the medical procedure at issue here. 698 A.2d at 55 n. 7 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). | 2 | 3 |
McCarthy v. Dan Lepore & Sons Co., Inc.green1 sentence2021Hence causation is also amatter generally requiring expert testimony. "15 An exception to this requirement only exists "'where the matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care so obvious as to be within the range of experience and comprehension of even non- professional persons...'also conceptualized as the doctrine of res ipsa /oquitor." 16 Res ipsa /oquitor is not alegal doctrine or theory of recovery, but rather arule of circumstantial evidence that allows ajury to infer negligence without direct evidence of the elements of negligence. 17 Three conditions must be met before res ipsa /oq | 1 | 1 |
Moure v. Raeuchlegreen2 sentences2006See generally Moure v. Raeuchle, 529 Pa. 394, 402 , 604 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1992) (explaining that, in reviewing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, affording it the benefit of every reasonable doubt and resolving conflicts in testimony in its favor). 2006See generally Moure v. Raeuchle, 529 Pa. 394, 402 , 604 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1992) (explaining that, in reviewing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, affording it the benefit of every reasonable doubt and resolving conflicts in testimony in its favor). | 1 | 1 |
Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc.green2 sentences2005See Gilbert v. Korvette’s Inc., 457 Pa. 602 , 327 A.2d 94 (1974). 2005See Gilbert v. Korvette’s Inc., 457 Pa. 602 , 327 A.2d 94 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Grandelli v. Methodist Hospitalgreen1 sentence2003Prong (c) of the Toogood test is similar to the second prong of the traditional res ipsa test set forth in section 328D(1)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that an inference of negligence is established when, inter alia, "other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence." [10] See Grandelli, *987 777 A.2d at 1147 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Magette v. Goodmangreen2 sentences2003Magette v. Goodman, 771 A.2d 775, 779 (Pa.Super.2001). 2003Magette v. Goodman, 771 A.2d 775, 779 (Pa.Super.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Bardessono v. Michelsgreen2 sentences2003These facts, in my view, clearly satisfy the first prong of the res ipsa test because it is generally understood that in the absence of negligence, such an injection does not ordinarily puncture a lung and cause it to collapse. 1 See Killingsworth v. Poon, 167 Ga.App. 653 , 307 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1983) (“it is widely. known ... that a subcutaneous injection ostensibly given only for the relief of muscular pain should not, if administered correctly, result in the puncture of internal organs.”); see also Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal.3d 780 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 760 , 478 P.2d 480, 486-87 (1971) (“Needle 2003These facts, in my view, clearly satisfy the first prong of the res ipsa test because it is generally understood that in the absence of negligence, such an injection does not ordinarily puncture a lung and cause it to collapse. 1 See Killingsworth v. Poon, 167 Ga.App. 653 , 307 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1983) (“it is widely. known ... that a subcutaneous injection ostensibly given only for the relief of muscular pain should not, if administered correctly, result in the puncture of internal organs.”); see also Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal.3d 780 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 760 , 478 P.2d 480, 486-87 (1971) (“Needle | 1 | 1 |
Killingsworth v. Poongreen2 sentences2003These facts, in my view, clearly satisfy the first prong of the res ipsa test because it is generally understood that in the absence of negligence, such an injection does not ordinarily puncture a lung and cause it to collapse. 1 See Killingsworth v. Poon, 167 Ga.App. 653 , 307 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1983) (“it is widely. known ... that a subcutaneous injection ostensibly given only for the relief of muscular pain should not, if administered correctly, result in the puncture of internal organs.”); see also Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal.3d 780 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 760 , 478 P.2d 480, 486-87 (1971) (“Needle 2003These facts, in my view, clearly satisfy the first prong of the res ipsa test because it is generally understood that in the absence of negligence, such an injection does not ordinarily puncture a lung and cause it to collapse. 1 See Killingsworth v. Poon, 167 Ga.App. 653 , 307 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1983) (“it is widely. known ... that a subcutaneous injection ostensibly given only for the relief of muscular pain should not, if administered correctly, result in the puncture of internal organs.”); see also Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal.3d 780 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 760 , 478 P.2d 480, 486-87 (1971) (“Needle | 1 | 1 |
Checchio Ex Rel. Checchio v. Frankford Hospital-Torres-Dale Divisiongreen2 sentences2003See also Checchio v. Frankford Hasp., 717 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa.Super.1998) (“Where the alleged negligence is medical in nature, the plaintiff must present evidence from an expert ‘who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered.’ ” (citation omitted)). ¶ 8 The narrow exception to the expert testimony requirement is conceptualized as the doctrine of res ipsa in which “the matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care so obvious 2003See also Checchio v. Frankford Hasp., 717 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa.Super.1998) (“Where the alleged negligence is medical in nature, the plaintiff must present evidence from an expert ‘who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered.’ ” (citation omitted)). ¶ 8 The narrow exception to the expert testimony requirement is conceptualized as the doctrine of res ipsa in which “the matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care so obvious | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
MacNutt v. Temple University Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020MacNutt, 932 A.2d at 987 . 2020MacNutt, 932 A.2d at 987 . | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Fessenden v. Robert Packer Hospital
green
2 sentences2020Fessenden, 97 A.3d at 1230 . -5- J-A11014-19 Although there was no item left behind in Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc., 907 A.2d 1061 (Pa. 2006), a res ipsa instruction was similarly warranted. 2020Fessenden, 97 A.3d at 1230 . -5- J-A11014-19 Although there was no item left behind in Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc., 907 A.2d 1061 (Pa. 2006), a res ipsa instruction was similarly warranted. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
George S. Weigand v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, a Corporation
green
2 sentences1998The law in Pennsylvania is clear from the following language in Hollywood Shop, Inc. v. Pa. Gas & Water Co., supra, in which the superior court adopted the rationale of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Weigand v. Pa. Railroad Co., 267 F.2d 281 (3rd Cir.1959) (applying Pennsylvania law): ‘[W]e have before us not only a res ipsa claim but one capable of some specific proof regarding the railroad’s alleged negligence. 1998The law in Pennsylvania is clear from the following language in Hollywood Shop, Inc. v. Pa. Gas & Water Co., supra, in which the superior court adopted the rationale of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Weigand v. Pa. Railroad Co., 267 F.2d 281 (3rd Cir.1959) (applying Pennsylvania law): ‘[W]e have before us not only a res ipsa claim but one capable of some specific proof regarding the railroad’s alleged negligence. | 2 | 1979–1998 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003However, Appellant has not pursued a res ipsa claim. .We note that the United States Supreme Court renounced the Frye rule in its 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), holding that Frye had been superceded by the Federal Rules of Evidence. 2003However, Appellant has not pursued a res ipsa claim. .We note that the United States Supreme Court renounced the Frye rule in its 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), holding that Frye had been superceded by the Federal Rules of Evidence. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Boyer v. Walker
green
1 sentence2003When it granted allowance of appeal, the Court asked the parties to address the admissibility of the proposed evidence under both Frye and Daubert . [7] Indeed, he appears to have learned from his past transgressions. [8] Because of our disposition of this issue, we need not address Appellant's second claim on appeal. [9] "It is well settled that where the result is correct, an appellate court may affirm a lower court's decision on any ground without regard to the ground relied upon by the lower court itself." Boyer v. Walker, 714 A.2d 458 , 463 n. 10 (Pa.Super.1998) (affirming trial court ord | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hospital
green
2 sentences2003In Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hasp., 496 Pa. 465 , 437 A.2d 1134 (1981), our Supreme Court stated that there are “two avenues to avoid the production of direct medical evidence of the facts establishing liability.” Toogood at 1148 (quoting Jones, 437 A.2d at 1138 ). 2003In Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hasp., 496 Pa. 465 , 437 A.2d 1134 (1981), our Supreme Court stated that there are “two avenues to avoid the production of direct medical evidence of the facts establishing liability.” Toogood at 1148 (quoting Jones, 437 A.2d at 1138 ). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Hollywood Shop, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co.
green
1 sentence1998In these peculiar circumstances to force the plaintiff to abandon one of his theories is not only illogical but unfair.’ Hollywood Shop, Inc. v. Pa. Gas & Water Co., supra at 250-52, 411 A.2d at 512 , quoting Weigand v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 267 F.2d at 284 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Stewart v. Motts
green
1 sentence1998Stewart v. Motts, supra at 605-07, 654 A.2d at 540 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.