instrument bar in New York

2024Turning to the branch of the motion to dismiss the objections based upon due execution, submission of the offered instrument which includes an attestation clause and a contemporaneous self-proving affidavit affords the instrument a presumption of compliance with the statutory formalities of EPTL 3-2.1 ( see Matter of Sabatelli , 161 AD3d 872 [2d Dept 2018]; Matter of Mele , 113 AD3d 858 [2d Dept 2014]).

2024Turning to the branch of the motion to dismiss the objections based upon due execution, submission of the offered instrument which includes an attestation clause and a contemporaneous self-proving affidavit affords the instrument a presumption of compliance with the statutory formalities of EPTL 3-2.1 ( see Matter of Sabatelli , 161 AD3d 872 [2d Dept 2018]; Matter of Mele , 113 AD3d 858 [2d Dept 2014]).

2024Further, where an attorney supervises the instrument's execution, the instrument is generally afforded a presumption of regularity and compliance ( see Matter of Templeton , 116 AD3d 781 [2d Dept 2014]; Matter of Tuccio , 38 AD3d 791, 792 [2d Dept 2007]).

2024Further, where an attorney supervises the instrument's execution, the instrument is generally afforded a presumption of regularity and compliance ( see Matter of Templeton , 116 AD3d 781 [2d Dept 2014]; Matter of Tuccio , 38 AD3d 791, 792 [2d Dept 2007]).

1994Because " 'only a person with rights in the instrument may claim conversion’ ” under UCC 3-419 (State of New York v Barclays Bank of N. Y., 76 NY2d 533, 537 , quoting Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks § 27.8, at 27-23), the termination of plaintiff’s interest in the insurance proceeds concomitantly terminates his rights in the check and is fatal to the cause of action against Citibank and Shawmut.

1990Co., 508 SW2d 253 [Mo App 1974]; 1 White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 15-5, at 757 [Practitioner’s-3d ed 1988] ["court(s) should not recognize a conversion cause of action for one who, though a payee on a check, has never received actual or constructive possession of that check”]; Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks, op. cit., § 27.8, at 27-23 [payee who has not received delivery of check cannot sue depositary bank for converting it because "only a person with rights in the instrument may claim conversion”]).

1990In addition, the certificates of calibration and certificates of analysis for the ampoules and simulator solution, which had been admitted into evidence, provided a proper foundation for admission of the breathalyzer test results (cf., People v Freeland, 68 NY2d 699, 700-701 ; People v Mertz, 68 NY2d 136, 148 ).

1990In addition, the certificates of calibration and certificates of analysis for the ampoules and simulator solution, which had been admitted into evidence, provided a proper foundation for admission of the breathalyzer test results (cf., People v Freeland, 68 NY2d 699, 700-701 ; People v Mertz, 68 NY2d 136, 148 ).

1983Electron Power, 37 NY2d 151 ; Haug v Metal City Findings Corp., 47 AD2d 837 ; Times Sq.

1983Electron Power, 37 NY2d 151 ; Haug v Metal City Findings Corp., 47 AD2d 837 ; Times Sq.

1982An official bank check, such as the instrument at bar, is deemed to be accepted upon issuance, and a stop payment order following issuance is therefore ineffective (see Uniform Commercial Code, §§ 3-410,4-403, subd [1]; Dziurak v Chase Manhattan Bank, 58 AD2d 103 ; Taboada v Bank of Babylon, 95 Mise 2d 1000; Moon Over Mountain v Marine Midland Bank, 87 Mise 2d 918; see, also, Kaufman v Chase Manhattan Bank, Nat.

1982The instrument at bar, on the front and dated side, refers to funeral arrangements and continues on the reverse side with dispositive provisions concluding three and one-half lines from the bottom of the card at a point which is clearly the physical end of the instrument as well as its logical and natural end (see Matter of Field, 204 NY 448, 457 ).

1982CPL 200.70 is the only express provision 4 authorizing amendments of indictments as to mere matters of time, place, names of persons and the like (People v Pacifico, 105 Misc 2d 396 [O’Brien, J.]).

1982Assn., 370 F Supp 276 ; 9 NY Jur 2d, Banks and Financial Institutions, § 387).

1968It was held in People v. Gass ( 206 N. Y. 609, 616 ): “ None of these definitions [Tax Law, § 250] tends in any way to restrict the meaning of the word ‘ mortgage They all tend rather to broaden it. ’ ’ Upon the present record we cannot say as a matter of law that the Tax Commission erred in determining that the subject instrument constituted a mortgage within the meaning of the Tax Law.

1963He who finds a lost instrument and uses it by completing it is virtually a thief, and not thus a bona fide holder thereof (Linick v. Nutting & Co., 140 App. Div. 265 ).

1963That section precludes the instrument at bar from having validity (cf. Ledwich v. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307 ).

1960It has been said that a gift will be confined to one legacy where its language indicates it is substitutional or purely reiterative. (6 Jessup-Redfield, Surrogates’ Law Practice, § 4690, pp. 28-29; Meeker v. Meeker, 4 Redfield 29.) We believe the rule to be followed here is correctly expressed in Matter of Neill ( 177 Misc. 534, 535-536 ), where the court indicated: “ The general rule on this question is that where the legacies are contained in the same instrument the presumption is that the latter gift is substitutional and where the legacies are contained in separate instruments the presumpt

1950The same result was reached in Matter of Aspenleiter ( 187 Misc. 167 , supra).

1941(Matter of Rogers, 250 App. Div. 26 ; Matter of Market, 175 Misc. 570 ; affd., 261 App. Div. 950 ; Matter of Moore, 165 Misc. 683 ; affd., 254 App. Div. 856 ; affd., 280 N. Y. 733 .) The terms of the will which include the pecuniary bequest, of $2,500 to the widow and the direction for the payment to her of an income of $200 per month cannot be nullified and must stand.

1941(Matter of Rogers, 250 App. Div. 26 ; Matter of Market, 175 Misc. 570 ; affd., 261 App. Div. 950 ; Matter of Moore, 165 Misc. 683 ; affd., 254 App. Div. 856 ; affd., 280 N. Y. 733 .) The terms of the will which include the pecuniary bequest, of $2,500 to the widow and the direction for the payment to her of an income of $200 per month cannot be nullified and must stand.

1941(Matter of Rogers, 250 App. Div. 26 ; Matter of Market, 175 Misc. 570 ; affd., 261 App. Div. 950 ; Matter of Moore, 165 Misc. 683 ; affd., 254 App. Div. 856 ; affd., 280 N. Y. 733 .) The terms of the will which include the pecuniary bequest, of $2,500 to the widow and the direction for the payment to her of an income of $200 per month cannot be nullified and must stand.

1941(Matter of Rogers, 250 App. Div. 26 ; Matter of Market, 175 Misc. 570 ; affd., 261 App. Div. 950 ; Matter of Moore, 165 Misc. 683 ; affd., 254 App. Div. 856 ; affd., 280 N. Y. 733 .) The terms of the will which include the pecuniary bequest, of $2,500 to the widow and the direction for the payment to her of an income of $200 per month cannot be nullified and must stand.

1941(Matter of Rogers, 250 App. Div. 26 ; Matter of Market, 175 Misc. 570 ; affd., 261 App. Div. 950 ; Matter of Moore, 165 Misc. 683 ; affd., 254 App. Div. 856 ; affd., 280 N. Y. 733 .) The terms of the will which include the pecuniary bequest, of $2,500 to the widow and the direction for the payment to her of an income of $200 per month cannot be nullified and must stand.

1941(Matter of Rogers, 250 App. Div. 26 ; Matter of Market, 175 Misc. 570 ; affd., 261 App. Div. 950 ; Matter of Moore, 165 Misc. 683 ; affd., 254 App. Div. 856 ; affd., 280 N. Y. 733 .) The terms of the will which include the pecuniary bequest, of $2,500 to the widow and the direction for the payment to her of an income of $200 per month cannot be nullified and must stand.

1939(Carnwright v. Gray, 127 N. Y. 92 ; Gilbert v. Adams, 146 App. Div. 864 ; Gunther v. Marteau, 73 Misc. 43 .) In Hegeman v. Moon (supra) an indebtedness was acknowledged but a distinct promise to pay was embodied in the direction to the maker’s executors to pay one year after the maker’s death.

1939(Carnwright v. Gray, 127 N. Y. 92 ; Gilbert v. Adams, 146 App. Div. 864 ; Gunther v. Marteau, 73 Misc. 43 .) In Hegeman v. Moon (supra) an indebtedness was acknowledged but a distinct promise to pay was embodied in the direction to the maker’s executors to pay one year after the maker’s death.