instrument presumption in Illinois

1955(Emerich Outfitting Co. v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 237 Ill. 610 .) The intention must be determined from the language used in the instrument and not from any surmise that the parties used the language to express an intention or meaning they had in mind but failed to express, and if they have overlooked a condition which they would perhaps have provided for if it had occurred to them, the court cannot guess at the provision they would probably have made and by construction read it into the instrument on the presumption that they would naturally have made such provision if they had thought of it.

1935(Emerich Outfitting Co. v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 237 Ill. 610 .) The intention must be determined from the language used in the instrument and not from any surmise that the parties used the language to express an intention or meaning they had in mind bnt failed to express, and if they have overlooked a condition which they would perhaps have provided for if it had occurred to them, the court cannot guess at the provision they would probably have made and by construction read it into the instrument on the presumption that they would naturally have made such provision if they had thought of it.”

2011Garrison, 308 Ill.

2011Garrison, 308 Ill.

1955(LaRocque v. Martin, 344 Ill. 522 ; Foss v. State Bank and Trust Co., 343 Ill. 94 .) If the words of a contract are plain and unambiguous the contract must be so construed as to give effect to the plain and obvious import of the language used.

1931(LaRocque v. Martin, 344 Ill. 522 ; Foss v. State Bank and Trust Co. 343 id. 94.) If the words of a contract are plain and unambiguous the contract must be so construed as to give effect to the plain and obvious import of the language used.

1974However, as stated in Keuper v. Unknown Heirs of Mette, 239 Ill. 586 , 88 N.E. 218 , the burden of establishing that the tenants in common were not intended to share equally is upon the person attempting to overcome the presumption of equality, in this case Hulcher.

1974However, as stated in Keuper v. Unknown Heirs of Mette, 239 Ill. 586 , 88 N.E. 218 , the burden of establishing that the tenants in common were not intended to share equally is upon the person attempting to overcome the presumption of equality, in this case Hulcher.

1955(LaRocque v. Martin, 344 Ill. 522 ; Foss v. State Bank and Trust Co., 343 Ill. 94 .) If the words of a contract are plain and unambiguous the contract must be so construed as to give effect to the plain and obvious import of the language used.

1949(Noe v. Mosely , 377 Ill. 152 .) Section 13 of the Conveyances Act provides, "Every estate in lands which shall be granted, conveyed or devised, although other words heretofore necessary to transfer an estate of inheritance be not added, shall be deemed a fee simple estate of inheritance, if a less estate be not limited by express words, or does not appear to have been granted, conveyed or devised by construction or operation of law." (Ill.

1941Buck v. Garber, 261 Ill. 378 ; Bauman v. Stoller, 233 id. 480 ; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. West, 374 id. 516 .

1941Buck v. Garber, 261 Ill. 378 ; Bauman v. Stoller, 233 id. 480 ; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. West, 374 id. 516 .

1935(Emerich Outfitting Co. v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 237 Ill. 610 .) The intention must be determined from the language used in the instrument and not from any surmise that the parties used the language to express an intention or meaning they had in mind bnt failed to express, and if they have overlooked a condition which they would perhaps have provided for if it had occurred to them, the court cannot guess at the provision they would probably have made and by construction read it into the instrument on the presumption that they would naturally have made such provision if they had thought of it.”

1935In Davie v. Lumberman’s Mining Co., 93 Mich. 491 , the court had before it for construction a miner’s contract containing a provision “as long as we can make it pay.” The court held that the wording was vague and that it was impossible to say that the minds of the parties concurred on the meaning of the words used.

1915Bank, 198 Ill. 307 , that the rule of construction of contracts by the parties to them as governing the construction by the court can only be used to assist in arriving at the intention of the parties, not to force a new and different meaning into the contract, and where no ambiguity appears in the contract and the intention is clear on the face of the instrument the rule is not applied.

1915But if the contract is ambiguous, “no extrinsic aid can be more valuable” than “the interpretation that the parties thereto have placed thereon in its performance for assisting in ascertaining its true meaning.” Slack v. Knox, 213 Ill. 190 , and cases there cited.

1898Purdy v. Peters, 35 Barb. 239 .