surrogate hearing in New York

2025Complaints of professional misconduct do not confer standing upon a patient or the patient's surrogate to challenge the discretionary determination of a disciplinary body not to pursue disciplinary action ( see [*2] Matter of Izzo New York State Dept. of Health , 134 AD3d 1514, 1515 [4th Dept 2015]; Matter of Davis v New York State Dept. of Educ. , 96 AD3d at 1262; Matter of Morrow v Cahill , 278 AD2d 123, 123 [1st Dept 2000], appeal dismissed 96 NY2d 895 [2001]; Matter of Wade v Suffolk County Med.

2025Complaints of professional misconduct do not confer standing upon a patient or the patient's surrogate to challenge the discretionary determination of a disciplinary body not to pursue disciplinary action ( see [*2] Matter of Izzo New York State Dept. of Health , 134 AD3d 1514 , 1515 [4th Dept 2015]; Matter of Davis v New York State Dept. of Educ. , 96 AD3d at 1262; Matter of Morrow v Cahill , 278 AD2d 123 , 123 [1st Dept 2000], appeal dismissed 96 NY2d 895 [2001]; Matter of Wade v Suffolk County Med.

2001However, the reasonableness of compensation is not decided by fee schedules alone, but rather by the Surrogate on the factors set forth in Matter of McDonald (supra), and the legislative memorandum.

2001(Matter of Prankard, supra.) As previously stated, the duties of an investment advisor are more limited than those of a regular fiduciary, and therefore should entail lower compensation.

1994A bequest to a child of a lawyer/draftsman can cause a Surrogate to hold a hearing prior to admitting a will to probate (see, Matter of Putnam, 257 NY 140 ) and such a hearing can delay and increase the expense of probate to the prejudice of persons inheriting under the will.

1994(See, e.g., Matter of Hardy, 172 AD2d 866, 868-869 ; Matter of Oliver, 157 AD2d 904 , 906 and 142 AD2d 831 ; Matter of Cassel, 154 AD2d 876 ; Matter of Sherbunt, 134 AD2d 723 ; 1990 Opns NY St Bar Assn Comm on Prof Ethics No. 610.) Respondent’s failure to respond to a status inquiry from the attorney for a beneficiary of the Doney estate constituted neglect of the estate and therefore conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law (as charged and specified in charge IV) but not, under the circumstances presented, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (also charged u

1994(See, e.g., Matter of Hardy, 172 AD2d 866, 868-869 ; Matter of Oliver, 157 AD2d 904 , 906 and 142 AD2d 831 ; Matter of Cassel, 154 AD2d 876 ; Matter of Sherbunt, 134 AD2d 723 ; 1990 Opns NY St Bar Assn Comm on Prof Ethics No. 610.) Respondent’s failure to respond to a status inquiry from the attorney for a beneficiary of the Doney estate constituted neglect of the estate and therefore conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law (as charged and specified in charge IV) but not, under the circumstances presented, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (also charged u

1994(See, e.g., Matter of Hardy, 172 AD2d 866, 868-869 ; Matter of Oliver, 157 AD2d 904 , 906 and 142 AD2d 831 ; Matter of Cassel, 154 AD2d 876 ; Matter of Sherbunt, 134 AD2d 723 ; 1990 Opns NY St Bar Assn Comm on Prof Ethics No. 610.) Respondent’s failure to respond to a status inquiry from the attorney for a beneficiary of the Doney estate constituted neglect of the estate and therefore conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law (as charged and specified in charge IV) but not, under the circumstances presented, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (also charged u

1994(See, e.g., Matter of Hardy, 172 AD2d 866, 868-869 ; Matter of Oliver, 157 AD2d 904 , 906 and 142 AD2d 831 ; Matter of Cassel, 154 AD2d 876 ; Matter of Sherbunt, 134 AD2d 723 ; 1990 Opns NY St Bar Assn Comm on Prof Ethics No. 610.) Respondent’s failure to respond to a status inquiry from the attorney for a beneficiary of the Doney estate constituted neglect of the estate and therefore conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law (as charged and specified in charge IV) but not, under the circumstances presented, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (also charged u

1994(See, e.g., Matter of Hardy, 172 AD2d 866, 868-869 ; Matter of Oliver, 157 AD2d 904 , 906 and 142 AD2d 831 ; Matter of Cassel, 154 AD2d 876 ; Matter of Sherbunt, 134 AD2d 723 ; 1990 Opns NY St Bar Assn Comm on Prof Ethics No. 610.) Respondent’s failure to respond to a status inquiry from the attorney for a beneficiary of the Doney estate constituted neglect of the estate and therefore conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law (as charged and specified in charge IV) but not, under the circumstances presented, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (also charged u

1994(See, e.g., Matter of Hardy, 172 AD2d 866, 868-869 ; Matter of Oliver, 157 AD2d 904 , 906 and 142 AD2d 831 ; Matter of Cassel, 154 AD2d 876 ; Matter of Sherbunt, 134 AD2d 723 ; 1990 Opns NY St Bar Assn Comm on Prof Ethics No. 610.) Respondent’s failure to respond to a status inquiry from the attorney for a beneficiary of the Doney estate constituted neglect of the estate and therefore conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law (as charged and specified in charge IV) but not, under the circumstances presented, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (also charged u

1994(See, e.g., Matter of Hardy, 172 AD2d 866, 868-869 ; Matter of Oliver, 157 AD2d 904 , 906 and 142 AD2d 831 ; Matter of Cassel, 154 AD2d 876 ; Matter of Sherbunt, 134 AD2d 723 ; 1990 Opns NY St Bar Assn Comm on Prof Ethics No. 610.) Respondent’s failure to respond to a status inquiry from the attorney for a beneficiary of the Doney estate constituted neglect of the estate and therefore conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law (as charged and specified in charge IV) but not, under the circumstances presented, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (also charged u

1994(See, e.g., Matter of Hardy, 172 AD2d 866, 868-869 ; Matter of Oliver, 157 AD2d 904 , 906 and 142 AD2d 831 ; Matter of Cassel, 154 AD2d 876 ; Matter of Sherbunt, 134 AD2d 723 ; 1990 Opns NY St Bar Assn Comm on Prof Ethics No. 610.) Respondent’s failure to respond to a status inquiry from the attorney for a beneficiary of the Doney estate constituted neglect of the estate and therefore conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law (as charged and specified in charge IV) but not, under the circumstances presented, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (also charged u

1990We, therefore, remit this matter to the Surrogate for a hearing at which extrinsic evidence may be introduced as to the testator’s intended distribution of his residual estate (see, Matter of Lust, 35 AD2d 997 ).

1988The Surrogate referred to the reports of the Temporary Commission on Modernization, Revision and Simplification of the Law of Estates (known as the Bennett Commission) which was created by the Legislature in an effort to effect remedial legislation to offer more adequate protection to a surviving spouse from gratuitous inter vivos transfers of property which rightfully belong in the estate of the deceased spouse (see, Matter of Riefberg, 58 NY2d 134, 140 ).

1983Clearly, the reform ordered in Wilson (supra) had substantially less impact than the one made by the Surrogate at bar.

1977The majority agreed with the Surrogate’s analysis awarding "appreciation damages” and found further support for his rationale in Menzel v List ( 24 NY2d 91 ).

1977Justice Kupferman, in an opinion styled "concurring in part and dissenting in part”, stated that, although he had "expressed reservations with respect to various factors to be considered in the calculation of damages”, he concurred "in the basic conclusion and, therefore, in order to resolve the matter for the purpose of appeal” voted to modify as per the Lane opinion ( 56 AD2d 499, 505-506 ).

1968In Zschernig v. Miller (supra) the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an Oregon statute similar in some respects to the New York statute.

1962That the decree was rendered on the default of the contestant does not prevent its use as a bar (Reich v. Cochran, 151 N. Y. 122 ; Goebel v. Iffla, 111 N. Y. 170 ).

1962That the decree was rendered on the default of the contestant does not prevent its use as a bar (Reich v. Cochran, 151 N. Y. 122 ; Goebel v. Iffla, 111 N. Y. 170 ).

1962Matter of Howland (supra) is not controlling here.

1962Belying principally on Matter of Howland ( 284 App. Div. 306 ), the Surrogate held that the waiver of the right of election was ineffective because (1) the statute is not satisfied by mere proof of a genuine and knowing signature, and (2) the acknowledgment was not performed during the lifetime of her husband.

1959The Surrogate held no hearing on the application, but simply determined, on the basis of his former decision in Matter of Herz ( 7 Misc 2d 217 ), that the court “ does not believe it likely that the beneficiaries would have the' use or control of the property constituting the subject matter of the application” and that ‘ ‘ courts do not favor purported assignments of funds payable to iron-enrtain country nationals and have labeled them attempts to circumvent section 269 of the Surrogate’s Court Act”.

1957In Baucus v. Stover (supra, p. 4 ) the New York Court of Appeals held that the Surrogate was in error in ruling that an executor was not liable to account for an indebtedness owed by him to the estate because he was insolvent at the time of the death of his creditor.

1956Bank v. McCarty, 149 N. Y. 71 ) We take it from the foregoing that the Surrogate held that a presumption of regularity or validity is created by the receipt in evidence of an acknowledged waiver.

1951The rule which has been stated to be applicable in probate proceedings in this connection is ‘ that the facts alleged must be sufficient to permit the Surrogate to send the case to the jury.’ ” In Matter of Maurer ( 206 App. Div. 811 ) the court reversed an order denying appellant’s motion to open a default in filing objections and remitted the matter with instructions to open the default, stating that the Surrogate was in error in holding that he did not have authority to open the default except through fraud, newly discovered evidence, clerical error or other sufficient cause.

1951(Matter of Humpfner, 163 Misc. 91 .) This discretion, however, does not exist in the ordinary case where the representative has properly administered the affairs of the estate.