Thereafter defendant in New York

1920A trial was thereafter had which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff which, on appeal to this court, was reversed and a new trial ordered. ( 170 App. Div. 725 .) Thereafter defendant moved to be allowed to serve an amended answer and was allowed to do so upon payment of costs to date.

1916A trial was thereafter had which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff, which on appeal to this court was reversed and a new trial ordered. ( 170 App. Div. 725 .) Thereafter defendant moved to be allowed to serve an amended answer and was allowed to do so upon the payment of costs to date.

1996By her expert’s affidavit, plaintiff raised an issue of fact whether the retained root tip was visible in the presurgical x-ray that defendant reviewed before he performed the procedure and, thus, whether defendant provided "the level of care acceptable in the professional community in which he practices” (Schrempf v State of New York, 66 NY2d 289, 295 ).

1985The trial court agreed and granted the motion, stating that since defendants were not charged in the indictment with criminal facilitation, the defect was jurisdictional and nonwaivable under People v Ford ( 91 AD2d 589 ) and other cases.

1985We now affirm defendant’s conviction as we find that the facts from which the inference of guilt was drawn excluded to a moral certainty every other hypothesis which the evidence could reasonably support (People v Cleague, 22 NY2d 363 ).

1984Said defendants are entitled to judgment for that sum, together with interest as of the respective dates the payments were made, since those payments were not necessarily the result of the usurious agreement (see Pisano v Rand, 30 AD2d 173, 176 ).

1983Special Term denied the motions, except as to the Jackson, Lewis contract cause of action ( 108 Misc 2d 458 ).

1967The United States Supreme Court ordered that the State accord Jackson a hearing by a Judge without jury as to the voluntariness of his confession ; or accord him a new trial; or release him (Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 [1964]).

1962The Circuit Court made a finding that “Personal service was effected upon both defendants so as to give the Court personal jurisdiction of the parties ” and on March 27, 1959, “ Ordered and Adjudged that the defendants’ motion to set aside the default be, and the same is hereby denied.” Defendants appealed from such order to the District Court of Appeal which court on December 17, 1959, affirmed the order in the following Per Curiam opinion: “Affirmed upon authority of the rule stated in Barnes v. Willis, 65 Fla. 363 , 61 So. 828 ; Clements Naval Stores Co. v. J.

1962The Circuit Court made a finding that “Personal service was effected upon both defendants so as to give the Court personal jurisdiction of the parties ” and on March 27, 1959, “ Ordered and Adjudged that the defendants’ motion to set aside the default be, and the same is hereby denied.” Defendants appealed from such order to the District Court of Appeal which court on December 17, 1959, affirmed the order in the following Per Curiam opinion: “Affirmed upon authority of the rule stated in Barnes v. Willis, 65 Fla. 363 , 61 So. 828 ; Clements Naval Stores Co. v. J.

1960On June 10, 1960 Mr. Justice Hudson after examining the testimony before the Grand Jury and reviewing at length the judicial interpretation of section 1053-a of the Penal Law, particularly the cases of People v. Gardner ( 255 App. Div. 683 ) and People v. Bearden ( 290 N. Y. 478 ) in a memorandum opinion ( 24 Misc 2d 1033 ) concluded (p. 1035) that, “ Under the above decisions, I believe that the defendant is justified in seeking to move to dismiss the indictment and should have permission to examine the Grand Jury minutes for the purpose of making such application.” On the 15th day of Novembe

1960On June 10, 1960 Mr. Justice Hudson after examining the testimony before the Grand Jury and reviewing at length the judicial interpretation of section 1053-a of the Penal Law, particularly the cases of People v. Gardner ( 255 App. Div. 683 ) and People v. Bearden ( 290 N. Y. 478 ) in a memorandum opinion ( 24 Misc 2d 1033 ) concluded (p. 1035) that, “ Under the above decisions, I believe that the defendant is justified in seeking to move to dismiss the indictment and should have permission to examine the Grand Jury minutes for the purpose of making such application.” On the 15th day of Novembe

1960On June 10, 1960 Mr. Justice Hudson after examining the testimony before the Grand Jury and reviewing at length the judicial interpretation of section 1053-a of the Penal Law, particularly the cases of People v. Gardner ( 255 App. Div. 683 ) and People v. Bearden ( 290 N. Y. 478 ) in a memorandum opinion ( 24 Misc 2d 1033 ) concluded (p. 1035) that, “ Under the above decisions, I believe that the defendant is justified in seeking to move to dismiss the indictment and should have permission to examine the Grand Jury minutes for the purpose of making such application.” On the 15th day of Novembe

1960The second motion was likewise granted and likewise reversed ( 229 App. Div. 363 ).

1953(Chaffee v. State of New York, 279 App. Div. 682 .) Thereafter defendant moved to amend his answer in the Supreme Court action to plead that the judgment of the Court of Claims was res judicata.

1947Thereafter defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as authorized by rule 113 of the Buies of Civil Practice (Lederer v. Wise Shoe Co., 276 N. Y. 459 ) upon the ground that for the year 1941 the income to defendant had not equalled and that the net profit of the corpora tion had not been in excess of, the sum of $20,000.

1946(People v. Migliori, 269 App. Div. 996 .) Thereafter defendant moved'to dismiss the first three counts in the indictment.

1946This judgment was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division, Second Department, citing Kaufman v. Kaufman ( 177 App. Div. 162 ); Krause v. Krause (supra) and Heller v. Heller ( 259 App. Div. 852 , affd. 285 N. Y. 572 ) without deciding whether the plaintiff therein is estopped from prosecuting the action for annulment.

1946This judgment was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division, Second Department, citing Kaufman v. Kaufman ( 177 App. Div. 162 ); Krause v. Krause (supra) and Heller v. Heller ( 259 App. Div. 852 , affd. 285 N. Y. 572 ) without deciding whether the plaintiff therein is estopped from prosecuting the action for annulment.

1946This judgment was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division, Second Department, citing Kaufman v. Kaufman ( 177 App. Div. 162 ); Krause v. Krause (supra) and Heller v. Heller ( 259 App. Div. 852 , affd. 285 N. Y. 572 ) without deciding whether the plaintiff therein is estopped from prosecuting the action for annulment.

1946This judgment was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division, Second Department, citing Kaufman v. Kaufman ( 177 App. Div. 162 ); Krause v. Krause (supra) and Heller v. Heller ( 259 App. Div. 852 , affd. 285 N. Y. 572 ) without deciding whether the plaintiff therein is estopped from prosecuting the action for annulment.

1942Plaintiff contends that by the agreement of modification, the parties ¡ adopted the lease as modified for the remainder of its term, and1 that defendant became liable thereby for the default of its! assignee, while defendant contends that the agreement did not, have that effect. ¡ Beading the agreement as a whole, as it must be read (Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 320 ), and in the light of the attendant circumstances and of the matter with which the parties dealt, it ¡ is clear that the parties modified the lease and adopted it as modified for the remainder of its term.

1942This motion was denied and the order was affirmed on appeal by the Appellate Division, First Department. ( 262 App. Div. 989 .) The defendant then appeared generally and served its answer.

1938Thereafter defendant made a motion to dismiss the amended complaint principally “ on the ground that the amended complaint was improperly served after a motion addressed to the merits of the original complaint had been made.” On this ground alone an order was made dismissing the amended complaint, in reliance upon Snedecor v. Chapel ( 192 App. Div. 915 ) and Dorf v. Corsa ( 163 N. Y.

1927It is urged that the court had no jurisdiction to strike out the answer, and the case of Levine v. Moskowitz ( 206 App. Div 194 ). is cited in support of that proposition.

1924Boiko & Co. v. Atlantic Woolen Mills, 195 App. Div. 207 ; affd., 234 N. Y. 583 ; Berkshire Cotton Mfg.

1924Boiko & Co. v. Atlantic Woolen Mills, 195 App. Div. 207 ; affd., 234 N. Y. 583 ; Berkshire Cotton Mfg.

1917The Appellate Term has modified this order by granting a new trial. ( 95 Misc.

1913From the order entered on this motion defendant appealed and the order was on March 14, 1913, affirmed by this court. ( 155 App. Div. 931 .) On February eleventh defendant’s attorney applied to the - presiding justice of this court for an order for plaintiffs to show cause why an order should not be made suspending the operation of the judgment until after the determination of the defendant’s appeal from the order of the Special Term denying his motion for a stay.

1912The Appellate Term ( 77 Misc.