reasonable grounds test in Pennsylvania

2024Although there is no bright line for determining reasonable grounds, “[g]enerally, the motorist’s presence in the driver’s seat of the vehicle with the engine on has been deemed sufficient to satisfy the reasonable grounds test.” Gammer, 995 A.2d at 384 .

2024In Gammer, we concluded that “the reasonable grounds test is satisfied when a police officer discovers . . . a motorist slumped over in the driver’s seat of the vehicle with the engine running while the vehicle is parked in a legal parking space in a parking lot.” Id.

2024The Banner Court subsequently reiterated that the reasonable grounds test requires “some objective evidence that the motorist exercised control over the movement of the vehicle at the time he was intoxicated.” Banner, 737 A.2d at 1207 .

2023See id. (citing Banner v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 737 A.2d 1203 (Pa. 1999), and Solomon v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 966 A.2d 640 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), partially overruled by Bold v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 285 A.3d 970 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (distinguishing Solomon and noting 3 that generally a motorist’s presence in the driver’s seat of the vehicle with the engine running satisfies the reasonable grounds test)).

2025This Court, however, need not rely on the reasoning of Common Pleas, but rather, “may affirm an order for any reason, regardless of [Common Pleas’] rationale, so long as the basis for our decision is clear on the record.” Reardon v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 935 A.2d engine running at 1:00 a.m.; opining that “[g]enerally, the motorist’s presence in the driver’s seat of the vehicle with the engine on has been deemed sufficient to satisfy the reasonable grounds test . . .” even “while the vehicle is parked in a legal parking space in a parking lot”); then citing Vinansky v. D

2022We also observed that relevant case law8 makes “clear that the reasonable grounds test is satisfied when a police officer discovers . . . a 8 See Riley v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 946 A.2d 1115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (reasonable grounds established where the licensee was discovered passed out in the driver’s seat of his car parked on the side of the road with its headlights and engine on); Vinansky; Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Paige, 665 A.2d 860 , 862- 63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (reasonable grounds established where licensee was asleep,

2025This Court, however, need not rely on the reasoning of Common Pleas, but rather, “may affirm an order for any reason, regardless of [Common Pleas’] rationale, so long as the basis for our decision is clear on the record.” Reardon v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 935 A.2d engine running at 1:00 a.m.; opining that “[g]enerally, the motorist’s presence in the driver’s seat of the vehicle with the engine on has been deemed sufficient to satisfy the reasonable grounds test . . .” even “while the vehicle is parked in a legal parking space in a parking lot”); then citing Vinansky v. D

2024See, e.g., Vinansky v. PennDOT, 665 A.2d 860, 862 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (“The arresting officer is not required to demonstrate probable cause to believe the motorist was actually driving under the influence of alcohol, only that the vehicle was under his or her control.”) (emphasis in original); Gammer v. PennDOT, 995 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (“Generally, the motorist’s presence in the driver’s seat of the vehicle with the engine on has been deemed sufficient to satisfy the reasonable grounds test.”).

2025Walkden v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 103 A.3d 432, 437 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). 5 one or more chemical tests of breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a controlled substance if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving, operating or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in violation of section . . . 3802[.] (b) Civil penalties for refusal.-- (1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of section 3802 is requested to submit to chemical testing

2019See, e.g., Walkden v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 103 A.3d 432 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (reasonable grounds to believe licensee was in actual physical control of vehicle where officer observed an odor of alcohol coming from licensee’s vehicle, an open container of alcohol in the vehicle and licensee failed field sobriety tests); Gammer v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 995 A.2d 380 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (explaining that “[g]enerally, the motorist’s presence in the driver’s seat of the vehicle with the engine on has been deemed sufficient to satis

2023See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brotherson, 888 A.2d 901 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding that defendant asleep in his car, which was parked on the basketball court of a children’s gated playground, created a strong inference that defendant was already intoxicated when he had driven to the spot).

2023Given the obvious nature of the case, the Court simply stated, “these facts alone are sufficient to satisfy the reasonable grounds test.” Id.; see also, e.g., Gammer, 995 A.2d at 382 (holding that licensee slumped over in the driver’s seat of car with engine running while parked in unusual location established reasonable grounds); Brotherson, 888 A.2d at 901 (holding that defendant asleep in his car, which was parked on the basketball court of a children’s gated playground, created a strong inference that defendant was already intoxicated when he had driven to the spot).

1999Accord Commonwealth, Pa. Dep’t of Transportation v. Johnson, 102 Pa. Commw. 302, 304 , 518 A.2d 8, 10 (1986) (reasonable grounds is less stringent standard than probable cause and is not very demanding). 11 Whether evidence is sufficient to constitute reasonable grounds for purposes of a section 7302 warrant can only be determined on a case by case basis.

1999Accord Commonwealth, Pa. Dep’t of Transportation v. Johnson, 102 Pa. Commw. 302, 304 , 518 A.2d 8, 10 (1986) (reasonable grounds is less stringent standard than probable cause and is not very demanding). 11 Whether evidence is sufficient to constitute reasonable grounds for purposes of a section 7302 warrant can only be determined on a case by case basis.

2025This Court, however, need not rely on the reasoning of Common Pleas, but rather, “may affirm an order for any reason, regardless of [Common Pleas’] rationale, so long as the basis for our decision is clear on the record.” Reardon v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 935 A.2d engine running at 1:00 a.m.; opining that “[g]enerally, the motorist’s presence in the driver’s seat of the vehicle with the engine on has been deemed sufficient to satisfy the reasonable grounds test . . .” even “while the vehicle is parked in a legal parking space in a parking lot”); then citing Vinansky v. D

2022We also observed that relevant case law8 makes “clear that the reasonable grounds test is satisfied when a police officer discovers . . . a 8 See Riley v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 946 A.2d 1115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (reasonable grounds established where the licensee was discovered passed out in the driver’s seat of his car parked on the side of the road with its headlights and engine on); Vinansky; Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Paige, 665 A.2d 860 , 862- 63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (reasonable grounds established where licensee was asleep,

1995See also Commonwealth v. Phillips, 373 Pa.Super. 193, 200-02 , 540 A.2d 933, 937 (1988) (Section 5704(2)(ii) incorporates the reasonable grounds standard); Commonwealth v. Hassine, 340 Pa.Super. 318, 351-53 , 490 A.2d 438, 456 (1985) (court rejects the appellant’s narrow interpretation of “suspected criminal activities”).

1995See also Commonwealth v. Phillips, 373 Pa.Super. 193, 200-02 , 540 A.2d 933, 937 (1988) (Section 5704(2)(ii) incorporates the reasonable grounds standard); Commonwealth v. Hassine, 340 Pa.Super. 318, 351-53 , 490 A.2d 438, 456 (1985) (court rejects the appellant’s narrow interpretation of “suspected criminal activities”).

2019“Both the Supreme Court and this Court consistently have held that . . . the legality of the underlying traffic stop [is] not relevant to an appeal of a civil license suspension matter based on a licensee’s refusal to submit to a chemical test in accordance with the Implied Consent Law.” Regula v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 146 A.3d 836, 843 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (emphasis added).

1999See also Uram, supra (section 7302 warrant based on nurse's call to mental health agency, relaying plaintiff's threats of suicide that plaintiff had made to nurse over telephone, was valid). [11] For purposes of more clearly delineating the reasonable grounds standard for section 7302 warrants, we find it appropriate to borrow principles expressed in case law addressing the reasonable grounds standard in other contexts. [12] We also take issue with the Superior Court's determination that Mr. Morrison lacked the qualifications to assess Appellee's condition for purposes of whether an involuntar

1995See also Commonwealth v. Phillips, 373 Pa.Super. 193, 200-02 , 540 A.2d 933, 937 (1988) (Section 5704(2)(ii) incorporates the reasonable grounds standard); Commonwealth v. Hassine, 340 Pa.Super. 318, 351-53 , 490 A.2d 438, 456 (1985) (court rejects the appellant’s narrow interpretation of “suspected criminal activities”).

1995See also Commonwealth v. Phillips, 373 Pa.Super. 193, 200-02 , 540 A.2d 933, 937 (1988) (Section 5704(2)(ii) incorporates the reasonable grounds standard); Commonwealth v. Hassine, 340 Pa.Super. 318, 351-53 , 490 A.2d 438, 456 (1985) (court rejects the appellant’s narrow interpretation of “suspected criminal activities”).