jury charge included instruction in Texas

2005See id . §§ 7.01-.02 (West 2003); Goff v. State , 931 S.W.2d 537, 544 (Tex. Crim.

2002See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 7.02 (West 1994); Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 544 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Rivera v. State, 990 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. refd).

2002See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 7.02 (West 1994); Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 544 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Rivera v. State, 990 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. refd).

2001Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Rivera v. State, 990 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Tex.App. — Austin 1999, pet. ref d).

2025See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594-95 .

2021Because the jury charge included an instruction on self-defense, yet the jury found Appellant guilty, the jury implicitly rejected Appellant’s claims that he acted in self-defense. 42 The jury could have disbelieved he acted in self-defense. 43 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational jury could have found against Appellant on his claim of self-defense. 44 We overrule Appellant’s second issue. 42 See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594-95 . 43 See Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 865; see also Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Tex. Crim.

2025See Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743-44 . 3 We overrule Appellant’s first issue. 3 The jury charge included an instruction on self-defense.

2024See id. at 565 .

2024App. 2013); Anderson v. State, 11 S.W.3d 369, 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (in a prosecution for aggravated assault of a public servant, appellant’s evidence must have shown that, through mistake, he formed a reasonable belief that the victim was not a public servant).

2023See Sanders, 387 S.W.3d at 686 ; see also Ratliff, 320 S.W.3d at 861 ; Dudley v. State, No. 12-15-00263-CR, 2016 WL 3475626 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 24, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 1 We overrule Appellant’s first issue. 1 The jury charge included an instruction in compliance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23 informing the jury that it should not consider illegally obtained evidence and instructing it to find Appellant 2 EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY In his second issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictio

2023See Sanders, 387 S.W.3d at 686 ; see also Ratliff, 320 S.W.3d at 861 ; Dudley v. State, No. 12-15-00263-CR, 2016 WL 3475626 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 24, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 1 We overrule Appellant’s first issue. 1 The jury charge included an instruction in compliance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23 informing the jury that it should not consider illegally obtained evidence and instructing it to find Appellant 2 EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY In his second issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictio

2022In that situation, he could easily have 6 “Although unpublished opinions have no precedential value, we may take guidance from them ‘as an aid in developing reasoning that may be employed.’” Rhymes v. State, 536 S.W.3d 85 , 99 n.9 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. ref’d) (quoting Carrillo v. State, 98 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. ref’d)). 7 The jury charge included an instruction on the defense of involuntary intoxication. 8 The Penal Code defines reckless as follows: A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result o

2021Because the jury charge included an instruction on self-defense, yet the jury found Appellant guilty, the jury implicitly rejected Appellant’s claims that he acted in self-defense. 42 The jury could have disbelieved he acted in self-defense. 43 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational jury could have found against Appellant on his claim of self-defense. 44 We overrule Appellant’s second issue. 42 See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594-95 . 43 See Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 865; see also Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Tex. Crim.

2019In re Commitment of Millar, No. 05-18-00706-CV, 2019 WL 3162463 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 16, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); Johnson, 2019 WL 364475 , at *7; In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied).

2019Evidence can be sufficient to convict under the law of parties where a defendant “is physically present at the commission of the offense and encourages its commission by words or other agreement.” Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 739 (Tex. Crim.

2016In our due process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.4 This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.5 The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence.6 Thus, when performing an

2016In our due process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.4 This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.5 The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence.6 Thus, when performing an

2016In our due process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.4 This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.5 The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence.6 Thus, when performing an

2016See Bencon Mgmt., 178 S.W.3d at 209-10 (fee award of over $282,000 compared to actual damages of $81,336.83 was not factually insufficient); see also Metroplex Mailing Services, LLC v. RR Donnelley & Sons Co., 410 S.W.3d 889, 900 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) (“[T]here is no rule that fees cannot be more than the actual damages awarded.”). *106 The jury charge included an instruction providing eight factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee, tracking Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex.1997), which included “the amount involved and the results o

2016See Bencon Mgmt., 178 S.W.3d at 209-10 (fee award of over $282,000 compared to actual damages of $81,336.83 was not factually insufficient); see also Metroplex Mailing Services, LLC v. RR Donnelley & Sons Co., 410 S.W.3d 889, 900 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) (“[T]here is no rule that fees cannot be more than the actual damages awarded.”). *106 The jury charge included an instruction providing eight factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee, tracking Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex.1997), which included “the amount involved and the results o

2016See Bencon Mgmt., 178 S.W.3d at 209-10 (fee award of over $282,000 compared to actual damages of $81,336.83 was not factually insufficient); see also Metroplex Mailing Services, LLC v. RR Donnelley & Sons Co., 410 S.W.3d 889, 900 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) (“[T]here is no rule that fees cannot be more than the actual damages awarded.”). *106 The jury charge included an instruction providing eight factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee, tracking Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex.1997), which included “the amount involved and the results o

2016See Louis, 393 S.W.3d at 252 ; Thompson, 236 S.W.3d at 800 .

2016Specifically, the jury charge included an instruction that tracked penal code section 8.04(a), stating, “You are instructed that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the commission of a criminal offense.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.04 (a) (West 2011). 5 “[A]ll alleged jury-charge error must be considered on appellate review regardless of preservation in the trial court.” Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim.

2015Mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional.132 Here, the jury charge included the presumption that “knowledge that the assaulted person was a public servant is presumed if the person was wearing a distinctive 128 Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 157 ; Ramos v. State, 991 S.W.2d 430, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). 129 R.R.III:145. 130 Alexander v. State, 757 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. App. —Dallas 1988, pet. ref’d) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 583 , 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3109 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)); Jimenez v. State, 419 S.W.3d 706, 718 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref

2015Mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional.132 Here, the jury charge included the presumption that “knowledge that the assaulted person was a public servant is presumed if the person was wearing a distinctive 128 Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 157 ; Ramos v. State, 991 S.W.2d 430, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). 129 R.R.III:145. 130 Alexander v. State, 757 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. App. —Dallas 1988, pet. ref’d) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 583 , 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3109 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)); Jimenez v. State, 419 S.W.3d 706, 718 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref

2015Mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional.132 Here, the jury charge included the presumption that “knowledge that the assaulted person was a public servant is presumed if the person was wearing a distinctive 128 Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 157 ; Ramos v. State, 991 S.W.2d 430, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). 129 R.R.III:145. 130 Alexander v. State, 757 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. App. —Dallas 1988, pet. ref’d) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 583 , 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3109 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)); Jimenez v. State, 419 S.W.3d 706, 718 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref

2015As we noted earlier, the jury charge included the instruction that “[t]he alternate juror shall not participate in any way with the deliberations.” We presume the jury understood and followed the trial court‟s instructions in the jury charge 4 In Trinidad v. State, 312 S.W.3d 23, 28 (Tex. Crim.

2015PENAL CODE §§ 2.05, 22.01(d). 132 Webber v. State, 29 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2000, pet. ref’d); Brewer v. State, 08-00-00424-CR, 2002 WL 266816 , at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso Feb. 26, 2002, pet. ref’d). 24 uniform or badge that indicated the person’s employment as a public servant.”133 III.