state due process clause in Washington

2013Restraint of Matteson, 142 Wn.2d 298, 310 , 12 P.3d 585 (2000) (determining that “there are no material differences between the ‘nearly identical’ federal and state provisions” and, thus, that the state due process clause does not provide greater protection than the federal due process clause); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 679 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996) (“The [State u.] Gunwall[, 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986)] factors do not favor an independent inquiry under article I, section 3 of the state constitution”).

2013Restraint of Matteson, 142 Wn.2d 298, 310 , 12 P.3d 585 (2000) (determining that “there are no material differences between the ‘nearly identical’ federal and state provisions” and, thus, that the state due process clause does not provide greater protection than the federal due process clause); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 679 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996) (“The [State u.] Gunwall[, 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986)] factors do not favor an independent inquiry under article I, section 3 of the state constitution”).

2008App. at 506-07 . ¶22 Turner argues that analysis of the fourth factor, preexisting state law, and the sixth factor, matters of particular state concern, support reaching a different result. 5 ¶23 As to the fourth factor, the only authority Turner cites in support of his argument that the state due process clause provides greater protection than the federal due process clause is State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631 , 683 P.2d 1079 (1984), State v. Davis, 38 Wn.

2008Spurgeon, 63 Wash.App. at 506-07 , 820 P.2d 960 . ¶ 22 Turner argues that analysis of the fourth factor, preexisting state law, and the sixth factor, matters of particular state concern, support reaching a different result. [5] ¶ 23 As to the fourth factor, the only authority Turner cites in support of his argument that the state due process clause provides greater protection than the federal due process clause is State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash.2d 631 , 683 P.2d 1079 (1984), State v. Davis, 38 Wash.App. 600 , 686 P.2d 1143 (1984), and the dissenting opinion in State v. Ortiz, 119 Wash.2d 294 ,

2021In re Dependency of E.H., 191 Wn.2d 872 , 887, 427 P.3d 587 (2018) (plurality opinion); State v. Jordan, 180 Wn.2d 456, 462 , 325 P.3d 181 (2014); In re Personal Restraint of Rhome, 43 No. 37467-0-III Stevens County v. Stevens County Sheriff’s Office (dissent) 172 Wn.2d 654 , 665 n.3, 260 P.3d 874 (2011).

2020In re Dependency of E.H., 191 Wn.2d 872 , 884-85, 427 P.3d 587 (2018).

2021State v. McCullough, 56 Wn.

2021State v. McCullough, 56 Wn.

2018Dist. v. E.S., 171 Wn.2d 695, 711 , 257 P.3d 570 (2011).

2018Dist. v. E.S., 171 Wash.2d 695 , 711, 257 P.3d 570 (2011).

2013Restraint of Matteson, 142 Wn.2d 298, 310 , 12 P.3d 585 (2000) (determining that “there are no material differences between the ‘nearly identical’ federal and state provisions” and, thus, that the state due process clause does not provide greater protection than the federal due process clause); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 679 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996) (“The [State u.] Gunwall[, 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986)] factors do not favor an independent inquiry under article I, section 3 of the state constitution”).

2013Restraint of Matteson. 142 Wn.2d 298, 310 , 12 P.3d 585 (2000) (determining that "there are no material differences between the 'nearly identical' federal and state provisions," and, thus, that the state due process clause does not provide greater protection than the federal due process clause); State v. Manussier. 129 Wn.2d 652, 679 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996) ("The [State v.] Gunwallf. 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986)] factors do not favor an independent inquiry under article I, section 3 of the state constitution.").

2013Restraint of Matteson, 142 Wn.2d 298, 310 , 12 P.3d 585 (2000) (determining that “there are no material differences between the ‘nearly identical’ federal and state provisions” and, thus, that the state due process clause does not provide greater protection than the federal due process clause); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 679 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996) (“The [State u.] Gunwall[, 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986)] factors do not favor an independent inquiry under article I, section 3 of the state constitution”).

2013Restraint of Matteson. 142 Wn.2d 298, 310 , 12 P.3d 585 (2000) (determining that "there are no material differences between the 'nearly identical' federal and state provisions," and, thus, that the state due process clause does not provide greater protection than the federal due process clause); State v. Manussier. 129 Wn.2d 652, 679 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996) ("The [State v.] Gunwallf. 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986)] factors do not favor an independent inquiry under article I, section 3 of the state constitution.").

2011The District responded by pointing out that in In re Marriage of King, 162 Wash.2d 378, 391-95 , 174 P.3d 659 (2007), we declined to independently analyze the State's due process clause and that we should decline to do so here as well.

2011The District responded by pointing out that in In re Marriage of King, 162 Wn.2d 378, 391-95 , 174 P.3d 659 (2007), we declined to independently analyze the State’s due process clause and that we should decline to do so here as well.

2011The District responded by pointing out that in In re Marriage of King, 162 Wash.2d 378, 391-95 , 174 P.3d 659 (2007), we declined to independently analyze the State's due process clause and that we should decline to do so here as well.

2011The District responded by pointing out that in In re Marriage of King, 162 Wn.2d 378, 391-95 , 174 P.3d 659 (2007), we declined to independently analyze the State’s due process clause and that we should decline to do so here as well.

2008See United States v. Coades, 549 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir. 1977) (rejecting request that the court adopt a rule requiring confessions to police be recorded because “such a rule” is a matter for consideration by Congress); United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 477 (3d Cir. 2006) (it is clear that “recording of interrogations ... is not mandated by the United States Constitution”); United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 968 (2005) (recording of police interrogations is not “constitutionally required”). ¶20 To determine whether the state due pr

2008See United States v. Coades, 549 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir.1977) (rejecting request that the court adopt a rule requiring confessions to police be recorded because "such a rule" is a matter for consideration by Congress); United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 477 (3d Cir.2006) (it is clear that "recording of interrogations . . . is not mandated by the United States Constitution"); United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 968 , 125 S.Ct. 1750 , 161 L.Ed.2d 614 (2005) (recording of police interrogations is not "constitutionally required"). ¶ 20 To deter

2008Because the state due process clause does not require greater protection for the preservation of evidence, there is no basis to interpret the due process clause to impose a duty to record interrogations. ¶25 As to the sixth Gunwall factor, Turner cites Heinemann v. Whitman County, 105 Wn.2d 796 , 718 P.2d 789 (1986), to argue that preventing police from engaging in deceptive and coercive practices is of particular concern in Washington.

2008Because the state due process clause does not require greater protection for the preservation of evidence, there is no basis to interpret the due process clause to impose a duty to record interrogations. ¶25 As to the sixth Gunwall factor, Turner cites Heinemann v. Whitman County, 105 Wn.2d 796 , 718 P.2d 789 (1986), to argue that preventing police from engaging in deceptive and coercive practices is of particular concern in Washington.

2008In State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994), the Minnesota court declined to reach the question of whether the state due process clause required recording police interrogations, but the court imposed a requirement to do so after years of warning law enforcement that it was necessary.

2008In State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn.1994), the Minnesota court declined to reach the question of whether the state due process clause required recording police interrogations, but the court imposed a requirement to do so after years of warning law enforcement that it was necessary.

2024A. Substantive Due Process “The substantive component of the due process clause bars wrongful and arbitrary government conduct, notwithstanding the fairness of the implementing procedures.” Beaver, 184 Wn.2d at 332 .

2021In re Dependency of E.H., 191 Wn.2d 872 , 887, 427 P.3d 587 (2018) (plurality opinion); State v. Jordan, 180 Wn.2d 456, 462 , 325 P.3d 181 (2014); In re Personal Restraint of Rhome, 43 No. 37467-0-III Stevens County v. Stevens County Sheriff’s Office (dissent) 172 Wn.2d 654 , 665 n.3, 260 P.3d 874 (2011).

2021In re Dependency of E.H., 191 Wn.2d 872 , 887, 427 P.3d 587 (2018) (plurality opinion); State v. Jordan, 180 Wn.2d 456, 462 , 325 P.3d 181 (2014); In re Personal Restraint of Rhome, 43 No. 37467-0-III Stevens County v. Stevens County Sheriff’s Office (dissent) 172 Wn.2d 654 , 665 n.3, 260 P.3d 874 (2011).

2021In re Dependency of E.H., 191 Wn.2d 872 , 887, 427 P.3d 587 (2018) (plurality opinion); State v. Jordan, 180 Wn.2d 456, 462 , 325 P.3d 181 (2014); In re Personal Restraint of Rhome, 43 No. 37467-0-III Stevens County v. Stevens County Sheriff’s Office (dissent) 172 Wn.2d 654 , 665 n.3, 260 P.3d 874 (2011).

2021In re Dependency of E.H., 191 Wn.2d 872 , 887, 427 P.3d 587 (2018) (plurality opinion); State v. Jordan, 180 Wn.2d 456, 462 , 325 P.3d 181 (2014); In re Personal Restraint of Rhome, 43 No. 37467-0-III Stevens County v. Stevens County Sheriff’s Office (dissent) 172 Wn.2d 654 , 665 n.3, 260 P.3d 874 (2011).

2018However, it is not true that this long-standing requirement "cuts against any finding that the state due process clause expands protections for the appointment of attorneys for children, as historically children have not had the right to appear in court at all, let alone with counsel." Id.

2018However, it is not true that this long-standing requirement "cuts against any finding that the state due process clause expands protections for the appointment of attorneys for children, as historically children have not had the right to appear in court at all, let alone with counsel." Id.

2018This cuts against any finding that the state due process clause expands protections for the appointment of attorneys for children, as historically children have not had the right to appear in court at all, let alone with counsel.^ ^ The dissent cites In re Dependency ofJ.H, 117 Wn.2d 460 , All, 815 P.2d 1380 (1991)in support ofthe proposition that children are parties in dependency proceedings.

2018This cuts against any finding that the state due process clause expands protections for the appointment of attorneys for children, as historically children have not had the right to appear in court at all, let alone with counsel.^ ^ The dissent cites In re Dependency ofJ.H, 117 Wn.2d 460 , All, 815 P.2d 1380 (1991)in support ofthe proposition that children are parties in dependency proceedings.