state due process requirement in New York

1989(People v Singer, 44 NY2d 241 , 253-254 [1978].) Indeed, the Court of Appeals has emphasized that "the State due process requirement of a prompt prosecution is broader than the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by statute (see CPL 30.20; see, also, CPL 30.30) and the Sixth Amendment (see United States v Marion, 404 US 307 , supra; Klopfer v North Carolina, 386 US 213 )” and is "less rigid” than the right to due process guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.

1982(Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12,18 ; Matter of Mitchell, 40 NY2d 153, 157 .) Although we have never “drawn a fine distinction between due process and speedy trial standards”, we have held that “the State due process requirement of a prompt prosecution is broader than the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by statute (see CPL 30.20; see, also, CPL 30.30) and the Sixth Amendment (see United States v Marion, 404 US 307 , supra; Klopfer v North Carolina, 386 US 213 ).” (People v Singer, 44 NY2d 241 , 253.) The extent of those due process rights, however, cannot be ascertained by the application of

2005(See Penal Law §§ 255.17, 255.25, 230.00; Domestic Relations Law § 170 [4]; § 200 [4].) In Cooper the Court utilized a state due process analysis, but the holding that “pretrial detainees are entitled to contact visits of reasonable duration” (Cooper v Morin, 49 NY2d at 73 ) was explicitly narrow.

1984With respect to the recreational and medical complaints under the State due process clause (NY Const, art I, § 6), it discerned no violation concluding under the “balancing test” established in Cooper v Morin ( 49 NY2d 69 ) that the claimed harm caused by the conditions imposed was outweighed by the resultant benefit to the government.

2008As an alternative holding, we find it without merit (see Almendarez-Torres v United States, 523 US 224 [1998]).

2005The limited nature of the holding in Cooper is evident from the later decision of Matter of Doe v Coughlin ( 71 NY2d 48 [1987], cert denied 488 US 879 [1988]), where the Court held that prison inmates have no state or federal constitutional right to conjugal visits.

2005The limited nature of the holding in Cooper is evident from the later decision of Matter of Doe v Coughlin ( 71 NY2d 48 [1987], cert denied 488 US 879 [1988]), where the Court held that prison inmates have no state or federal constitutional right to conjugal visits.

1985There is a similar absence of any explicit State action requirement in the State equal protection clause. 2 Furthermore, because a long line of authority holds that the protection of a due process clause contains within it the requirement of equal protection (Examining Bd. v Flores de Otero, 426 US 572, 601 ; Weinberger v Wiesenfeld, 420 US 636, 638, n 2 ; Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677, 680, n 5 ; Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 641-642 ; Schneider v Rusk, 377 US 163, 168 ; Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 499 ), it makes little sense to have differing standards for State action under the St

1985There is a similar absence of any explicit State action requirement in the State equal protection clause. 2 Furthermore, because a long line of authority holds that the protection of a due process clause contains within it the requirement of equal protection (Examining Bd. v Flores de Otero, 426 US 572, 601 ; Weinberger v Wiesenfeld, 420 US 636, 638, n 2 ; Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677, 680, n 5 ; Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 641-642 ; Schneider v Rusk, 377 US 163, 168 ; Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 499 ), it makes little sense to have differing standards for State action under the St

1985There is a similar absence of any explicit State action requirement in the State equal protection clause. 2 Furthermore, because a long line of authority holds that the protection of a due process clause contains within it the requirement of equal protection (Examining Bd. v Flores de Otero, 426 US 572, 601 ; Weinberger v Wiesenfeld, 420 US 636, 638, n 2 ; Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677, 680, n 5 ; Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 641-642 ; Schneider v Rusk, 377 US 163, 168 ; Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 499 ), it makes little sense to have differing standards for State action under the St

1985There is a similar absence of any explicit State action requirement in the State equal protection clause. 2 Furthermore, because a long line of authority holds that the protection of a due process clause contains within it the requirement of equal protection (Examining Bd. v Flores de Otero, 426 US 572, 601 ; Weinberger v Wiesenfeld, 420 US 636, 638, n 2 ; Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677, 680, n 5 ; Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 641-642 ; Schneider v Rusk, 377 US 163, 168 ; Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 499 ), it makes little sense to have differing standards for State action under the St

1984Finally, defendant’s sentence, in our view, was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 ).

1984In Cooper v Morin ( 49 NY2d 69 , supra) the Court of Appeals concluded that the State due process clause accords greater protection for pretrial detainees than the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Bell v Wolfish (supra) and held: “In our view what is required is a balancing of the harm to the individual resulting from the condition imposed against the benefit sought by the government through its enforcement” (Cooper v Morin, supra, p 79 ).

1982(Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12,18 ; Matter of Mitchell, 40 NY2d 153, 157 .) Although we have never “drawn a fine distinction between due process and speedy trial standards”, we have held that “the State due process requirement of a prompt prosecution is broader than the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by statute (see CPL 30.20; see, also, CPL 30.30) and the Sixth Amendment (see United States v Marion, 404 US 307 , supra; Klopfer v North Carolina, 386 US 213 ).” (People v Singer, 44 NY2d 241 , 253.) The extent of those due process rights, however, cannot be ascertained by the application of

1982(Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12,18 ; Matter of Mitchell, 40 NY2d 153, 157 .) Although we have never “drawn a fine distinction between due process and speedy trial standards”, we have held that “the State due process requirement of a prompt prosecution is broader than the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by statute (see CPL 30.20; see, also, CPL 30.30) and the Sixth Amendment (see United States v Marion, 404 US 307 , supra; Klopfer v North Carolina, 386 US 213 ).” (People v Singer, 44 NY2d 241 , 253.) The extent of those due process rights, however, cannot be ascertained by the application of

1982(United States v Lovasco, 431 US 783, 789 , reh den 434 US 881 ; People v Staley, supra.) In the past, in considering the due process ramifications of pretrial delay, we stated: “As with the right to speedy trial, the due process right to prompt prosecution must be tested on a balancing analysis, with seriousness of the crime and length of the delay being significant factors, among others”.

1982(United States v Lovasco, 431 US 783, 789 , reh den 434 US 881 ; People v Staley, supra.) In the past, in considering the due process ramifications of pretrial delay, we stated: “As with the right to speedy trial, the due process right to prompt prosecution must be tested on a balancing analysis, with seriousness of the crime and length of the delay being significant factors, among others”.

1981The four-Judge majority of the court in Sharrock (supra) rendered its decision despite the strongly stressed arguments of the three dissenting Judges that the provisions of the State and Federal due process clauses should be held coextensive and that if extension of the provisions of the State due process clause were permitted beyond that in the Federal Constitution, it could lead to the anomalous result that if the New York warehouseman’s lien statute, upheld by the Supreme Court in Flagg Bros. v Brooks (supra) was subsequently attacked in the State courts of New York, under the application o

1981The four-Judge majority of the court in Sharrock (supra) rendered its decision despite the strongly stressed arguments of the three dissenting Judges that the provisions of the State and Federal due process clauses should be held coextensive and that if extension of the provisions of the State due process clause were permitted beyond that in the Federal Constitution, it could lead to the anomalous result that if the New York warehouseman’s lien statute, upheld by the Supreme Court in Flagg Bros. v Brooks (supra) was subsequently attacked in the State courts of New York, under the application o

1979Thus, in People v Isaacson ( 44 NY2d 511 , 521-522), the court held: "Illustrative of factors to be considered are: (1) whether the police manufactured a crime which otherwise would not likely have occurred, or merely involved themselves in an ongoing criminal activity (compare Greene v United States, 454 F2d 783, with United States v Russell, 411 US 423 , supra); (2) whether the police themselves engaged in criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a sense of justice (see United States v Archer, 486 F2d 670, supra; cf. Rochin v California, 342 US 165 , supra); (3) whether the defendant’s relu

1979Thus, in People v Isaacson ( 44 NY2d 511 , 521-522), the court held: "Illustrative of factors to be considered are: (1) whether the police manufactured a crime which otherwise would not likely have occurred, or merely involved themselves in an ongoing criminal activity (compare Greene v United States, 454 F2d 783, with United States v Russell, 411 US 423 , supra); (2) whether the police themselves engaged in criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a sense of justice (see United States v Archer, 486 F2d 670, supra; cf. Rochin v California, 342 US 165 , supra); (3) whether the defendant’s relu

1979In some respects the State rule is less rigid in its application than the right to due process recognized under the Federal Constitution because, in a proper case, a lengthy and unjustifiable delay in commencing the prosecution may require dismissal even though no actual prejudice to the defendant is shown (People v Staley, supra; People v Winfrey, supra). * * * "Generally when there has been a protracted delay, certainly over a period of years, the burden is on the prosecution to establish good cause (People v Prosser, 309 NY 353 ; see, also, People v Winfrey, supra; People v Staley, supra).