state due process clause in Connecticut

2017By contrast, in testifying that the text message was not inculpatory, the defendant stated that "I might have been drinking and that's how something could have happened, but as far as I know nothing has happened, and I didn't do anything." 10 In State v. Walker , supra, 147 Conn.App. at 29 n.4, 82 A.3d 630 , this court further stated: "Although our Supreme Court in Darden remanded the case to the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing and to apply the Asherman balancing test, such a remand was appropriate in that case because the defendant had raised a state due process claim before the tr

2017By contrast, in testifying that the text message was not inculpatory, the defendant stated that "I might have been drinking and that's how something could have happened, but as far as I know nothing has happened, and I didn't do anything." 10 In State v. Walker , supra, 147 Conn.App. at 29 n.4, 82 A.3d 630 , this court further stated: "Although our Supreme Court in Darden remanded the case to the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing and to apply the Asherman balancing test, such a remand was appropriate in that case because the defendant had raised a state due process claim before the tr

1994Nevertheless, on the basis of my analysis in State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 696 , 613 A.2d 788 (1992) (Berdon, J., dissenting), which noted that prior to the adoption of the state constitution in 1818, the common law required that the prosecution prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt, I conclude that Colorado v. Connelly, supra, must be rejected under the state due process clause.

1994Nevertheless, on the basis of my analysis in State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 696 , 613 A.2d 788 (1992) (Berdon, J., dissenting), which noted that prior to the adoption of the state constitution in 1818, the common law required that the prosecution prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt, I conclude that Colorado v. Connelly, supra, must be rejected under the state due process clause.

2025Nevertheless, it has been well settled since Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473 , 378 A.2d 553 (1977), that the state due process clause ‘‘shares but is not limited by the content of its federal counterpart.’’ Id., 475 .

2025Nevertheless, it has been well settled since Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473 , 378 A.2d 553 (1977), that the state due process clause ‘‘shares but is not limited by the content of its federal counterpart.’’ Id., 475 .

2025As for the historical circumstances surrounding the adoption of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, the defendant correctly notes that the right to counsel has deep roots in Connecticut, predating the adoption of the state constitution in 1818, and well before Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S. Ct. 792 , 9 L.

2025As for the historical circumstances surrounding the adoption of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, the defendant correctly notes that the right to counsel has deep roots in Connecticut, predating the adoption of the state constitution in 1818, and well before Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S. Ct. 792 , 9 L.

2021Applying the factors set forth in State v. Geisler ( 222 Conn. 672 ), this court declined the defendant’s request to adopt a prophylactic rule under the state constitution requiring Connecticut trial courts to consider whether coercive interrogation tactics, such as those employed in the present case, raise questions about the voluntariness of a confession: the text of the state due process clause did not support the defendant’s claim, the defendant did not cite to any federal or Connecticut authority in support of his claim that the state due process clause requires a more stringent analysis

2017By contrast, in testifying that the text message was not inculpatory, the defendant stated that "I might have been drinking and that's how something could have happened, but as far as I know nothing has happened, and I didn't do anything." 10 In State v. Walker , supra, 147 Conn.App. at 29 n.4, 82 A.3d 630 , this court further stated: "Although our Supreme Court in Darden remanded the case to the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing and to apply the Asherman balancing test, such a remand was appropriate in that case because the defendant had raised a state due process claim before the tr

2017By contrast, in testifying that the text message was not inculpatory, the defendant stated that "I might have been drinking and that's how something could have happened, but as far as I know nothing has happened, and I didn't do anything." 10 In State v. Walker , supra, 147 Conn.App. at 29 n.4, 82 A.3d 630 , this court further stated: "Although our Supreme Court in Darden remanded the case to the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing and to apply the Asherman balancing test, such a remand was appropriate in that case because the defendant had raised a state due process claim before the tr

2010He does, however, rely on the independent state due process analysis from State v. Morales, supra, 232 Conn. 707 , in support of his argument that “the state constitution offers defendants vast protections regarding the calling of witnesses — even greater than those offered by the federal constitution — to ensure that defendants may adequately defend themselves against criminal charges.” In Morales , in considering whether the state’s failure to preserve potentially useful evidence, specifically a jacket worn by a sexual assault victim that had contained semen stains from the attack, violated

2010He does, however, rely on the independent state due process analysis from State v. Morales, supra, 232 Conn. 707 , in support of his argument that “the state constitution offers defendants vast protections regarding the calling of witnesses — even greater than those offered by the federal constitution — to ensure that defendants may adequately defend themselves against criminal charges.” In Morales , in considering whether the state’s failure to preserve potentially useful evidence, specifically a jacket worn by a sexual assault victim that had contained semen stains from the attack, violated

2010See State v. Coleman, 242 Conn. 523, 534 , 700 A.2d 14 (1997) (“[w]e need not decide and, therefore, express no opinion regarding, the defendant’s state constitutional claim because we conclude, under our supervisory power, that, upon request by a defendant, a trial court should articulate its reasons for imposing a longer sentence after trial than was imposed previously pursuant to that defendant’s vacated guilty plea” [emphasis added]); see also State v. Faria, 254 Conn. 613, 628-29 , 758 A.2d 348 (2000) (not reaching state due process claim wherein “[t]he defendant, relying on State v. Cole

2010See State v. Coleman, 242 Conn. 523, 534 , 700 A.2d 14 (1997) (“[w]e need not decide and, therefore, express no opinion regarding, the defendant’s state constitutional claim because we conclude, under our supervisory power, that, upon request by a defendant, a trial court should articulate its reasons for imposing a longer sentence after trial than was imposed previously pursuant to that defendant’s vacated guilty plea” [emphasis added]); see also State v. Faria, 254 Conn. 613, 628-29 , 758 A.2d 348 (2000) (not reaching state due process claim wherein “[t]he defendant, relying on State v. Cole

2006United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681-82 , 105 S. Ct. 3375 , 87 L.

2006United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681-82 , 105 S. Ct. 3375 , 87 L.

2006In State v. Baldwin., 224 Conn. 347, 365 , 618 A.2d 513 (1993), a case involving the destruction of evidence, decided before the Morales court’s rejection of the Youngblood bad faith litmus test in a state due process analysis, this court stated that, in the absence of bad faith, “we apply a balancing test and first evaluate whether the missing evidence was material; that is, would the outcome of the trial have been different if the evidence had been made available?

2006In State v. Baldwin., 224 Conn. 347, 365 , 618 A.2d 513 (1993), a case involving the destruction of evidence, decided before the Morales court’s rejection of the Youngblood bad faith litmus test in a state due process analysis, this court stated that, in the absence of bad faith, “we apply a balancing test and first evaluate whether the missing evidence was material; that is, would the outcome of the trial have been different if the evidence had been made available?

2005“Although the defendant also claims a violation under the state due process clause, our decision is confined to the federal constitution because the defendant has failed to provide an independent analysis of the state constitutional issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ceballos, 266 Conn. 364 , 367 n.4, 832 A.2d 14 (2003). 6 “Under Golding , a defendant can prevail on an unpreserved claim of constitutional error only if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging t

2005“Although the defendant also claims a violation under the state due process clause, our decision is confined to the federal constitution because the defendant has failed to provide an independent analysis of the state constitutional issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ceballos, 266 Conn. 364 , 367 n.4, 832 A.2d 14 (2003). 6 “Under Golding , a defendant can prevail on an unpreserved claim of constitutional error only if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging t

2005“Although the defendant also claims a violation under the state due process clause, our decision is confined to the federal constitution because the defendant has failed to provide an independent analysis of the state constitutional issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ceballos, 266 Conn. 364 , 367 n.4, 832 A.2d 14 (2003). 6 “Under Golding , a defendant can prevail on an unpreserved claim of constitutional error only if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging t

2005“Although the defendant also claims a violation under the state due process clause, our decision is confined to the federal constitution because the defendant has failed to provide an independent analysis of the state constitutional issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ceballos, 266 Conn. 364 , 367 n.4, 832 A.2d 14 (2003). 6 “Under Golding , a defendant can prevail on an unpreserved claim of constitutional error only if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging t

2004I, § 8; were violated by the trial court’s instructions. “ ‘Although the defendant also claims a violation under the state due process clause, our decision is confined to the federal constitution because the defendant has failed to provide an independent analysis of the state constitutional issue.’ ”State v. Coney, 266 Conn. 787 , 790-91 n.4, 835 A.2d 977 (2003).

2004I, § 8; were violated by the trial court’s instructions. “ ‘Although the defendant also claims a violation under the state due process clause, our decision is confined to the federal constitution because the defendant has failed to provide an independent analysis of the state constitutional issue.’ ”State v. Coney, 266 Conn. 787 , 790-91 n.4, 835 A.2d 977 (2003).

2003Accordingly, we need not reach the defendant’s alternate request that we exercise our supervisory powers to reverse his conviction “to redress repeated and deliberate misconduct by a prosecutor seeking to increase the likelihood of conviction even though that conduct does not necessarily require reversal as a due process violation.” State v. Payne, 260 Conn. 446, 451-52 , 797 A.2d 1088 (2002).

2003Accordingly, we need not reach the defendant’s alternate request that we exercise our supervisory powers to reverse his conviction “to redress repeated and deliberate misconduct by a prosecutor seeking to increase the likelihood of conviction even though that conduct does not necessarily require reversal as a due process violation.” State v. Payne, 260 Conn. 446, 451-52 , 797 A.2d 1088 (2002).

2001In his brief to this court, the defendant claims, for the first time, that the state due process clause offers more extensive protection than the federal due process clause and that the Whelan rule, which deals with the admissibility of hearsay evidence, runs afoul of the fundamental fairness guarantee of the state due process clause when its application allows the admission into evidence of statements given to the police when no one was present to represent the interests of the defendant. “[Rjeview of evidentiary rulings made by the trial court is limited to the specific legal ground raised i

2001In his brief to this court, the defendant claims, for the first time, that the state due process clause offers more extensive protection than the federal due process clause and that the Whelan rule, which deals with the admissibility of hearsay evidence, runs afoul of the fundamental fairness guarantee of the state due process clause when its application allows the admission into evidence of statements given to the police when no one was present to represent the interests of the defendant. “[Rjeview of evidentiary rulings made by the trial court is limited to the specific legal ground raised i

1997RPTR. 425 (July 24, 1996) (Booth, J.) (the court granted a motion to strike the state due process claim adopting the reasoning set forth in Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, supra, 226 Conn. 314 ); Thomas v. City of West Haven, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 284555 (August 24, 1995) (Gordon, J.) (the court found that the plaintiffs did not have a "clear entitlement to the property interest sought).

1997RPTR. 425 (July 24, 1996) (Booth, J.) (the court granted a motion to strike the state due process claim adopting the reasoning set forth in Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, supra, 226 Conn. 314 ); Thomas v. City of West Haven, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 284555 (August 24, 1995) (Gordon, J.) (the court found that the plaintiffs did not have a "clear entitlement to the property interest sought).

1997“Although we often look to United States Supreme Court precedent when construing related provisions in our state constitution, we may determine that the protections afforded to the citizens of this state by our constitution go beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” (Interned quotation marks omitted.) State v. Linares, 232 Conn. 345, 378-79 , 655 A.2d 737 (1995).

1997“Although we often look to United States Supreme Court precedent when construing related provisions in our state constitution, we may determine that the protections afforded to the citizens of this state by our constitution go beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” (Interned quotation marks omitted.) State v. Linares, 232 Conn. 345, 378-79 , 655 A.2d 737 (1995).