22 California opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Boehm & Associates v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences2018Appeals Bd. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 137 , 150, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 396 [right to due process "guarantees lien claimants a right to notice and to participate at trial"].) Despite the above authority, the Government argues there can never be a state due process violation related to worker's compensation legislation. 2018Appeals Bd. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 137 , 150, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 396 [right to due process "guarantees lien claimants a right to notice and to participate at trial"].) Despite the above authority, the Government argues there can never be a state due process violation related to worker's compensation legislation. | 1 | 2 |
County of Sutter v. Davisgreen2 sentences2001I, § 7(a)) does not require such a right.” (County of Sutter v. Davis, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 332 .) In Iraheta v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1500 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 ], the issue was whether there is a constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in actions, like the present one, to enjoin gang activity in a specified target area. 1997(See, e.g., People v. Smith [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [313,] 317 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 486 P.2d 1213 ] [due process requires jury trial in proceedings to extend commitment to California Youth Authority]; In re Gary W. [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [296,] 307 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 486 P.2d 1201 ] [same]; Conservatorship of Roulet [(1979)] 23 Cal.3d [219,] 235 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 590 P.2d 1 ] [due process requires unanimous jury verdict in ‘gravely disabled’ civil commitment conservatorship proceedings under Lanterman-Petris-Short Act]; see also People v. Burnick [(1975)] 14 Cal.3d [306,] 310, 319-322 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. | 1 | 2 |
Conservatorship of Rouletgreen2 sentences1997(See, e.g., People v. Smith [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [313,] 317 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 486 P.2d 1213 ] [due process requires jury trial in proceedings to extend commitment to California Youth Authority]; In re Gary W. [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [296,] 307 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 486 P.2d 1201 ] [same]; Conservatorship of Roulet [(1979)] 23 Cal.3d [219,] 235 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 590 P.2d 1 ] [due process requires unanimous jury verdict in ‘gravely disabled’ civil commitment conservatorship proceedings under Lanterman-Petris-Short Act]; see also People v. Burnick [(1975)] 14 Cal.3d [306,] 310, 319-322 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 1991(See e.g., People v. Smith, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 317 [due process requires jury trial in proceedings to extend commitment to California Youth Author- *328 ity]; In re Gary W., supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 307 [same]; Conservatorship of Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 235 [due process requires unanimous jury verdict in “gravely disabled” civil commitment conservatorship proceedings under Lanterman-Petris-Short Act]; see also People v. Burnick, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 310, 319-322 [due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in “mentally disordered sex offender” civil commitment proceedings]; | 1 | 2 |
People v. Feagleygreen2 sentences1997(See, e.g., People v. Smith [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [313,] 317 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 486 P.2d 1213 ] [due process requires jury trial in proceedings to extend commitment to California Youth Authority]; In re Gary W. [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [296,] 307 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 486 P.2d 1201 ] [same]; Conservatorship of Roulet [(1979)] 23 Cal.3d [219,] 235 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 590 P.2d 1 ] [due process requires unanimous jury verdict in ‘gravely disabled’ civil commitment conservatorship proceedings under Lanterman-Petris-Short Act]; see also People v. Burnick [(1975)] 14 Cal.3d [306,] 310, 319-322 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 1997(See, e.g., People v. Smith [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [313,] 317 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 486 P.2d 1213 ] [due process requires jury trial in proceedings to extend commitment to California Youth Authority]; In re Gary W. [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [296,] 307 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 486 P.2d 1201 ] [same]; Conservatorship of Roulet [(1979)] 23 Cal.3d [219,] 235 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 590 P.2d 1 ] [due process requires unanimous jury verdict in ‘gravely disabled’ civil commitment conservatorship proceedings under Lanterman-Petris-Short Act]; see also People v. Burnick [(1975)] 14 Cal.3d [306,] 310, 319-322 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences1997(See, e.g., People v. Smith [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [313,] 317 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 486 P.2d 1213 ] [due process requires jury trial in proceedings to extend commitment to California Youth Authority]; In re Gary W. [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [296,] 307 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 486 P.2d 1201 ] [same]; Conservatorship of Roulet [(1979)] 23 Cal.3d [219,] 235 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 590 P.2d 1 ] [due process requires unanimous jury verdict in ‘gravely disabled’ civil commitment conservatorship proceedings under Lanterman-Petris-Short Act]; see also People v. Burnick [(1975)] 14 Cal.3d [306,] 310, 319-322 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 1997(See, e.g., People v. Smith [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [313,] 317 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 486 P.2d 1213 ] [due process requires jury trial in proceedings to extend commitment to California Youth Authority]; In re Gary W. [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [296,] 307 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 486 P.2d 1201 ] [same]; Conservatorship of Roulet [(1979)] 23 Cal.3d [219,] 235 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 590 P.2d 1 ] [due process requires unanimous jury verdict in ‘gravely disabled’ civil commitment conservatorship proceedings under Lanterman-Petris-Short Act]; see also People v. Burnick [(1975)] 14 Cal.3d [306,] 310, 319-322 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Gary W.green2 sentences1997(See, e.g., People v. Smith [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [313,] 317 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 486 P.2d 1213 ] [due process requires jury trial in proceedings to extend commitment to California Youth Authority]; In re Gary W. [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [296,] 307 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 486 P.2d 1201 ] [same]; Conservatorship of Roulet [(1979)] 23 Cal.3d [219,] 235 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 590 P.2d 1 ] [due process requires unanimous jury verdict in ‘gravely disabled’ civil commitment conservatorship proceedings under Lanterman-Petris-Short Act]; see also People v. Burnick [(1975)] 14 Cal.3d [306,] 310, 319-322 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 1997(See, e.g., People v. Smith [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [313,] 317 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 486 P.2d 1213 ] [due process requires jury trial in proceedings to extend commitment to California Youth Authority]; In re Gary W. [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [296,] 307 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 486 P.2d 1201 ] [same]; Conservatorship of Roulet [(1979)] 23 Cal.3d [219,] 235 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 424 , 590 P.2d 1 ] [due process requires unanimous jury verdict in ‘gravely disabled’ civil commitment conservatorship proceedings under Lanterman-Petris-Short Act]; see also People v. Burnick [(1975)] 14 Cal.3d [306,] 310, 319-322 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Ramirezgreen2 sentences1991These factors must then be balanced against the state’s interests” keeping in mind that the “touchstone of due process is fundamental fairness.” ( 24 Cal.3d at p. 27 ; see also People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 268-269 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ].) All of the cases in which a right to a jury trial has been found by the California Supreme Court to be mandated by the state due process clause have involved the fundamental interests of a person’s dignity and liberty. 1991These factors must then be balanced against the state’s interests” keeping in mind that the “touchstone of due process is fundamental fairness.” ( 24 Cal.3d at p. 27 ; see also People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 268-269 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ].) All of the cases in which a right to a jury trial has been found by the California Supreme Court to be mandated by the state due process clause have involved the fundamental interests of a person’s dignity and liberty. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Ramosgreen1 sentence2024(See People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 153 [invalidating the so-called Briggs Instruction in capital cases as “seriously misleading” and inconsistent with the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the state due process clause; disagreeing with the contrary holding of the United States Supreme Court under the federal due process clause].) Here, however, “listing the witness’s level of certainty as one of [12] factors the jury should consider when evaluating an eyewitness identification” did not render Wilson’s trial “fundamentally unfair” under either the state or the federal Constitution. | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.green2 sentences2008(Griswold, at p. 486.) With California’s adoption in 1972 of a constitutional amendment explicitly adding “privacy” to the “inalienable rights” of all Californians protected by article I, section 1 of the California Constitution—an amendment whose history demonstrates that it was intended, among other purposes, to encompass the federal constitutional right of privacy, “particularly as it developed beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut[, supra,] 381 U.S. 479 . . .” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 28 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 ])—the state constitutional 2008(Griswold, at p. 486.) With California’s adoption in 1972 of a constitutional amendment explicitly adding “privacy” to the “inalienable rights” of all Californians protected by article I, section 1 of the California Constitution—an amendment whose history demonstrates that it was intended, among other purposes, to encompass the federal constitutional right of privacy, “particularly as it developed beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut[, supra,] 381 U.S. 479 . . .” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 28 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 ])—the state constitutional | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Scheffergreen2 sentences2004(See United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 309-311, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (lead opn. of Thomas, J.); id. at p. 318, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) [12] Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion. [1] Statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted. [2] If two groups are not similarly situated, then any "equal protection claim cannot succeed, and does not require further analysis." ( People v. Nguyen, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 714 , 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 173 .) Thus, by applying a rational basis test, the majority here imp 2004(See United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 309-311, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (lead opn. of Thomas, J.); id. at p. 318, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) [12] Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion. [1] Statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted. [2] If two groups are not similarly situated, then any "equal protection claim cannot succeed, and does not require further analysis." ( People v. Nguyen, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 714 , 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 173 .) Thus, by applying a rational basis test, the majority here imp | 1 | 1 |
People v. Yeomangreen2 sentences2004If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]" (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, ї 594, p. 627; see also People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 , 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 , 897 P.2d 481 ; Cal. Rules of Court rules 14(a)(1)(B), 29.1(b)(1).) Because defendant's "unelaborated citation[]" to the state due process clause "add[s] nothing to [her] argument" ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 118 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 , 72 P.3d 1166 ), we "`pass it without consideration'" ( Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at 2004If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]" (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, ї 594, p. 627; see also People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 , 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 , 897 P.2d 481 ; Cal. Rules of Court rules 14(a)(1)(B), 29.1(b)(1).) Because defendant's "unelaborated citation[]" to the state due process clause "add[s] nothing to [her] argument" ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 118 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 , 72 P.3d 1166 ), we "`pass it without consideration'" ( Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stanleygreen2 sentences2004If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]" (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, ї 594, p. 627; see also People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 , 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 , 897 P.2d 481 ; Cal. Rules of Court rules 14(a)(1)(B), 29.1(b)(1).) Because defendant's "unelaborated citation[]" to the state due process clause "add[s] nothing to [her] argument" ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 118 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 , 72 P.3d 1166 ), we "`pass it without consideration'" ( Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at 2004If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]" (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, ї 594, p. 627; see also People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 , 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 , 897 P.2d 481 ; Cal. Rules of Court rules 14(a)(1)(B), 29.1(b)(1).) Because defendant's "unelaborated citation[]" to the state due process clause "add[s] nothing to [her] argument" ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 118 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 , 72 P.3d 1166 ), we "`pass it without consideration'" ( Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Marilyn Hgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vance v. Villa Park Mobilehome Estatesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Burnickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Patterson v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Federal Deposit Insurance v. Meyergreen | 1 | 1 |
| J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Price v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cordova v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Friersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Saleeby v. State Bar
green
2 sentences2019(See Saleeby v. State Bar, supra , 39 Cal.3d at p. 565 , 216 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 702 P.2d 525 & Asimow et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Administrative Law, supra , ¶¶ 3.181, 3.544.) The only citations to the record which Barclay provides are to the December 24, 2014 letter and two January 2015 letters, which as we discuss in the text, above, were untimely assertions of its claim based on the regulation cited there. 2019(See Saleeby v. State Bar, supra , 39 Cal.3d at p. 565 , 216 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 702 P.2d 525 & Asimow et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Administrative Law, supra , ¶¶ 3.181, 3.544.) The only citations to the record which Barclay provides are to the December 24, 2014 letter and two January 2015 letters, which as we discuss in the text, above, were untimely assertions of its claim based on the regulation cited there. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Stevens v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
green
2 sentences2018To support this theory, the Government relies entirely on a single appellate decision from the First District, Division One, Stevens, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th 1074 , 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 469 . 2018To support this theory, the Government relies entirely on a single appellate decision from the First District, Division One, Stevens, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th 1074 , 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 469 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Bonner v. City of Santa Ana
green
2 sentences2003The Court [has] identified one claim (decedent’s father’s substantive due process right involving the constitutionally protected interest of companionship with one’s child).” Citing Bonner v. City of Santa Ana (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1465 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 671 ], the superior court stated “that it cannot be categorically stated that money damages are precluded for violation of the state due process clause.” *1080 City petitioned for a peremptory writ of mandate, which we now issue. 2003The Court [has] identified one claim (decedent’s father’s substantive due process right involving the constitutionally protected interest of companionship with one’s child).” Citing Bonner v. City of Santa Ana (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1465 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 671 ], the superior court stated “that it cannot be categorically stated that money damages are precluded for violation of the state due process clause.” *1080 City petitioned for a peremptory writ of mandate, which we now issue. | 2 | 2002–2003 |
People v. Rowland
green
1 sentence2026(Quinonez, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 464–465.) We affirm if there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s findings on great bodily injury, even if the “ ‘ “circumstances might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” ’ ” (People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 750 .) When we review the sufficiency of the evidence under the federal due process clause, we determine “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Rowlan | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Escobar
green
1 sentence2026(Quinonez, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 464–465.) We affirm if there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s findings on great bodily injury, even if the “ ‘ “circumstances might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” ’ ” (People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 750 .) When we review the sufficiency of the evidence under the federal due process clause, we determine “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Rowlan | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Beltran
green
1 sentence2024(Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 661 .) To the extent that Wilson also asserts that the instruction was a violation of state law that did not rise to the level of constitutional error, he has not established it was “reasonably probable that the jury here was misled to [his] detriment.” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 956 .) As indicated, the prosecutor acknowledged that the defense succeeded in significantly undermining Richards’s identification and urged the jury to convict Wilson on the basis of other evidence of his guilt that corroborated Richards’s identification. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Lemcke
green
1 sentence2024(Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 661 .) To the extent that Wilson also asserts that the instruction was a violation of state law that did not rise to the level of constitutional error, he has not established it was “reasonably probable that the jury here was misled to [his] detriment.” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 956 .) As indicated, the prosecutor acknowledged that the defense succeeded in significantly undermining Richards’s identification and urged the jury to convict Wilson on the basis of other evidence of his guilt that corroborated Richards’s identification. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Daugherty
green
1 sentence2023(People v. Daugherty (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 314, 321 .) Judicial approval is required, however, before any plea bargain goes into effect. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
United States v. Salerno
green
1 sentence2021The first three factors—the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government's interest—are the same. 5 As indicated, Salerno referred to the procedural safeguards in the Bail Reform Act as “extensive.” (Salerno, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 752 .) Given the lack of adequate briefing on this issue, we do not consider or decide whether and which of those federal safeguards may be necessary to defeat a due process challenge. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
1 sentence2021Accordingly, we cannot agree with petitioner’s suggestion that reliance on proffers of evidence categorically renders a bail decision invalid under federal due process principles. 5 Moreover, petitioner provides no legal authority or argument supporting the notion that a state due process analysis would yield a different result. 6 The language of the federal and state due process guarantees are “virtually identical,” and so California courts look “to the United States Supreme Court’s precedents for guidance in interpreting the contours of our own due process clause and have treated the state c | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education
green
1 sentence2021Accordingly, we cannot agree with petitioner’s suggestion that reliance on proffers of evidence categorically renders a bail decision invalid under federal due process principles. 5 Moreover, petitioner provides no legal authority or argument supporting the notion that a state due process analysis would yield a different result. 6 The language of the federal and state due process guarantees are “virtually identical,” and so California courts look “to the United States Supreme Court’s precedents for guidance in interpreting the contours of our own due process clause and have treated the state c | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Hillsboro Properties v. City of Rohnert Park
green
1 sentence2012(Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 771 .) When considering whether a rent control statute violates substantive due process, “a ‘court must determine whether the [statute] may reasonably be expected to maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly compensate investors for the risks they have assumed, and yet provide appropriate protection for the relevant public interests, both existing and foreseeable.’ ” (Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 772 .) The essential inquiry is “whether the regulatory scheme’s result is just and reasonable” and regulated rents must fall within “a | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board
green
2 sentences2012(Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 771 .) When considering whether a rent control statute violates substantive due process, “a ‘court must determine whether the [statute] may reasonably be expected to maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly compensate investors for the risks they have assumed, and yet provide appropriate protection for the relevant public interests, both existing and foreseeable.’ ” (Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 772 .) The essential inquiry is “whether the regulatory scheme’s result is just and reasonable” and regulated rents must fall within “a 2012(Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 771 .) When considering whether a rent control statute violates substantive due process, “a ‘court must determine whether the [statute] may reasonably be expected to maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly compensate investors for the risks they have assumed, and yet provide appropriate protection for the relevant public interests, both existing and foreseeable.’ ” (Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 772 .) The essential inquiry is “whether the regulatory scheme’s result is just and reasonable” and regulated rents must fall within “a | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Griswold v. Connecticut
green
1 sentence2008(Griswold, at p. 486.) With California’s adoption in 1972 of a constitutional amendment explicitly adding “privacy” to the “inalienable rights” of all Californians protected by article I, section 1 of the California Constitution—an amendment whose history demonstrates that it was intended, among other purposes, to encompass the federal constitutional right of privacy, “particularly as it developed beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut[, supra,] 381 U.S. 479 . . .” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 28 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 ])—the state constitutional | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Conservatorship of Valerie N.
green
1 sentence2008(See, e.g., Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 34 [the interest in personal autonomy protected by the state constitutional privacy clause includes “the freedom to pursue consensual familial relationships”]; Valerie N., supra, 40 Cal.3d 143, 161 .) 31 Although all parties in this proceeding agree that the right to marry constitutes a fundamental right protected by the state Constitution, there is considerable disagreement as to the scope and content of this fundamental state constitutional right. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Dat Tan Nguyen
green
2 sentences2004(See United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 309-311, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (lead opn. of Thomas, J.); id. at p. 318, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) [12] Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion. [1] Statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted. [2] If two groups are not similarly situated, then any "equal protection claim cannot succeed, and does not require further analysis." ( People v. Nguyen, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 714 , 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 173 .) Thus, by applying a rational basis test, the majority here imp 2004(See United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 309-311, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (lead opn. of Thomas, J.); id. at p. 318, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) [12] Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion. [1] Statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted. [2] If two groups are not similarly situated, then any "equal protection claim cannot succeed, and does not require further analysis." ( People v. Nguyen, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 714 , 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 173 .) Thus, by applying a rational basis test, the majority here imp | 1 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Batchelder
green
2 sentences2004(See United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 309-311, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (lead opn. of Thomas, J.); id. at p. 318, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) [12] Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion. [1] Statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted. [2] If two groups are not similarly situated, then any "equal protection claim cannot succeed, and does not require further analysis." ( People v. Nguyen, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 714 , 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 173 .) Thus, by applying a rational basis test, the majority here imp 2004(See United States v. Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 309-311, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (lead opn. of Thomas, J.); id. at p. 318, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) [12] Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion. [1] Statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted. [2] If two groups are not similarly situated, then any "equal protection claim cannot succeed, and does not require further analysis." ( People v. Nguyen, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 714 , 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 173 .) Thus, by applying a rational basis test, the majority here imp | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Bradley v. Medical Board
green
2 sentences2002The court in Bonner ultimately concluded that damages were not available, however, on the ground that the plaintiff had an effective alternative remedya common law action for conversion. ( Bonner, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1473-1476, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 671 .) Thereafter the plaintiff in Bradley v. Medical Board (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 445 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 (Bradley) asserted a due process violation under article I, section 7(a), relating to his surrender of a medical license while disciplinary charges were pending against him. 2002The court in Bonner ultimately concluded that damages were not available, however, on the ground that the plaintiff had an effective alternative remedya common law action for conversion. ( Bonner, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1473-1476, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 671 .) Thereafter the plaintiff in Bradley v. Medical Board (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 445 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 (Bradley) asserted a due process violation under article I, section 7(a), relating to his surrender of a medical license while disciplinary charges were pending against him. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Davis v. Passman green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Carlsbad Aquafarm, Inc. v. State Department of Health Services green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Iraheta v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| San Jose Police Officers Ass'n v. City of San Jose green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Thomas green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Salas v. Cortez green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| County of El Dorado v. Schneider green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.