argument ignores rule in California

2012(See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [ 161 L.Ed.2d 1 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 ] [8th Amend, prohibits execution of those who were under 18 years of age when they committed their crime], overruling Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 306 , 109 S.Ct. 2969 ]; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 304 [8th Amend. prohibits execution of the mentally retarded], overruling Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 256 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 ]; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 347 , 107 S.Ct. *466 1821] [Fla. jury instruction limiting jury to mitigating circ

2012(See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of those who were under 18 years of age when they committed their crime], overruling Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361 ; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 304 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of the mentally retarded], overruling Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302 ; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [Florida jury instruction limiting jury to mitigating circumstances specifically enumerated by statute is unconstitutional], reversing Cooper v. State (Fla. 1976) 336 So.2d 1133 .) This argument i

2012(See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [ 161 L.Ed.2d 1 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 ] [8th Amend, prohibits execution of those who were under 18 years of age when they committed their crime], overruling Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 306 , 109 S.Ct. 2969 ]; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 304 [8th Amend. prohibits execution of the mentally retarded], overruling Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 256 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 ]; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 347 , 107 S.Ct. *466 1821] [Fla. jury instruction limiting jury to mitigating circ

2012(See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of those who were under 18 years of age when they committed their crime], overruling Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361 ; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 304 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of the mentally retarded], overruling Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302 ; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [Florida jury instruction limiting jury to mitigating circumstances specifically enumerated by statute is unconstitutional], reversing Cooper v. State (Fla. 1976) 336 So.2d 1133 .) This argument i

2012(See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [ 161 L.Ed.2d 1 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 ] [8th Amend, prohibits execution of those who were under 18 years of age when they committed their crime], overruling Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 306 , 109 S.Ct. 2969 ]; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 304 [8th Amend. prohibits execution of the mentally retarded], overruling Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 256 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 ]; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 347 , 107 S.Ct. *466 1821] [Fla. jury instruction limiting jury to mitigating circ

2012(See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of those who were under 18 years of age when they committed their crime], overruling Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361 ; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 304 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of the mentally retarded], overruling Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302 ; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [Florida jury instruction limiting jury to mitigating circumstances specifically enumerated by statute is unconstitutional], reversing Cooper v. State (Fla. 1976) 336 So.2d 1133 .) This argument i

2012(See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of those who were under 18 years of age when they committed their crime], overruling Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361 ; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 304 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of the mentally retarded], overruling Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302 ; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [Florida jury instruction limiting jury to mitigating circumstances specifically enumerated by statute is unconstitutional], reversing Cooper v. State (Fla. 1976) 336 So.2d 1133 .) This argument i

2012(See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of those who were under 18 years of age when they committed their crime], overruling Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361 ; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 304 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of the mentally retarded], overruling Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302 ; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [Florida jury instruction limiting jury to mitigating circumstances specifically enumerated by statute is unconstitutional], reversing Cooper v. State (Fla. 1976) 336 So.2d 1133 .) This argument i

2012(See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [ 161 L.Ed.2d 1 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 ] [8th Amend, prohibits execution of those who were under 18 years of age when they committed their crime], overruling Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 306 , 109 S.Ct. 2969 ]; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 304 [8th Amend. prohibits execution of the mentally retarded], overruling Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 256 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 ]; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 347 , 107 S.Ct. *466 1821] [Fla. jury instruction limiting jury to mitigating circ

2012(See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of those who were under 18 years of age when they committed their crime], overruling Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361 ; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 304 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of the mentally retarded], overruling Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302 ; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [Florida jury instruction limiting jury to mitigating circumstances specifically enumerated by statute is unconstitutional], reversing Cooper v. State (Fla. 1976) 336 So.2d 1133 .) This argument i

2012(See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [ 161 L.Ed.2d 1 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 ] [8th Amend, prohibits execution of those who were under 18 years of age when they committed their crime], overruling Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 306 , 109 S.Ct. 2969 ]; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 304 [8th Amend. prohibits execution of the mentally retarded], overruling Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 256 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 ]; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 347 , 107 S.Ct. *466 1821] [Fla. jury instruction limiting jury to mitigating circ

2012(See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of those who were under 18 years of age when they committed their crime], overruling Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361 ; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 304 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of the mentally retarded], overruling Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302 ; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [Florida jury instruction limiting jury to mitigating circumstances specifically enumerated by statute is unconstitutional], reversing Cooper v. State (Fla. 1976) 336 So.2d 1133 .) This argument i

2012For example, we held in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , that a habeas corpus petitioner may raise ―an issue previously rejected on direct appeal when there has been a change in the law affecting the petitioner.‖ (Id. at p. 841, and cases cited.) A change in the law will also excuse a successive or repetitive habeas corpus petition.

2012For example, we held in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813 , that a habeas corpus petitioner may raise ―an issue previously rejected on direct appeal when there has been a change in the law affecting the petitioner.‖ (Id. at p. 841, and cases cited.) A change in the law will also excuse a successive or repetitive habeas corpus petition.

2026(Morton v. Thousand Oaks Surgical Hospital, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 935 .) Evaluating whether a plaintiff’s rebuttal evidence is sufficient to establish a triable issue of material fact is not the same as giving preference to one expert’s 10 declaration over another’s.

2025“Whether the victim possessed sufficient mental capacity to give legal consent despite [his] intoxication is a question of fact for the jury” (People v. Giardino (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 470 (Giardino)), and because their conclusion is supported by substantial evidence, “[i]t is of no consequence that the jury believing other evidence, or drawing different inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.” (People v. Brown, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 970 .) Haldeman’s reliance on Giardino, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 454 is unavailing.

2025All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent . . . .’” (Denhman v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 , italics omitted.) “Thus, in the absence of contrary findings, ‘we must presume in favor of the judgment every finding of fact necessary to support it [that is] warranted by the evidence.’” (Summers v. City of Cathedral City (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1047, 1070-1071, fn. 19 (Summers).) “Accordingly, were a trial court to expressly find that an action was frivolous, as this one did, and then impose sanctions on the plaintiff, we would

2023However, even if the record supported a finding defendant was homeless, it does not actually show the jury was presented with evidence that defendant had been shot or threatened in the recent past or that he was fearful or hypervigilant as a result of a prior assault The defense had made certain offers of proof relating to such information, and considered allowing defendant to testify to those facts as supporting his theory of self- defense or heat of passion (relying on People v. Sotelo-Urena (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 732 [regarding the effects of chronic homelessness on a person’s subjective fear

2021But this argument ignores the requirement that “the evidence, and not merely its materiality, be newly discovered.” (Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 212 .) Third, as stated ante, Crowley’s purported testimony, such as we know it, would be cumulative.

2021(See, e.g., Perez, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at pp. 866- 867.) This argument ignores that the immunity promised was conditioned on his truthfulness.

2017Instead[,] to trigger CEQA compliance, the discretion must be of a certain kind; it must provide the agency with the ability and authority to ‘“mitigate . . . environmental damage” to some degree.’ ” (San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coalition v. City of San Diego, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 934 , italics omitted.) For the reasons discussed above, the existence of discretion is irrelevant if it does not confer the ability to mitigate any potential environmental impacts in a meaningful way.

2015(See Valdez, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 112 .) We also note that Garcia did not challenge the proposed instruction (or request modification or clarification) on this basis below, and his argument is therefore forfeited.

2015(See Fashion 21 v. Coalition for Human Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1147 .) This argument ignores the standard of review.

2013(Noguera, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 629 .) At the time of the August 2009 interview, Vasquez had not yet been granted immunity for his testimony and did not yet face sanctions for violating his probation or failing to appear.

2007This argument ignores the requirement that “a rent control law [that] establishes a ‘base rent’ by reference to rents on a specified date .. . should permit adjustments of that base rent for those rental units that had artificially low rents at that time.” (Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 772 .) *1186 3 The Trial Court Properly Dismissed Stardust’s Claims that the Application of the Rent Control Ordinance Violated Its Constitutional Right To Be Compensated for the Taking of Its Property Stardust challenges the trial court’s dismissal of its taking and due process claims.

1982(City of Los Angeles v. Waller, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d 766, 779 .) 4 This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to discuss additional arguments presented by respondent in support of the trial court’s ruling.

1982This argument ignores the rule that Klopping liability is an issue for the trial court, not the jury (City of Los Angeles v. Lowensohn, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d 625, 636 ), so that the substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of appellate review.